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 ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation is a qualitative case study of organizing for sustainability, which 
is an ambiguous term that has been part of public discussion of environmental issues 
since at least 1987. A growing number of organizations employ sustainability officers 
responsible for communicating with internal and external audiences. Since this sort of 
work is becoming more common, scholarship investigating the intersections of 
sustainability, organizing, and communication is needed. 
 This study followed the development of an office of sustainability at a large U.S. 
public university from the fall of 2007 to the spring of 2010. The author engaged in long-
term participant observation, conducted 20 in-depth individual interviews, and two group 
interviews with employees and partners of the office of sustainability. This study’s 
research questions focus upon lay theories of communication, organizing, and persuasion. 
The author develops a uniquely interpretive approach to reconstructing and 
assessing lay theories of communication. Employing this analytic framework, the author 
addresses participants’ lay theorizing of intraorganizational advocacy, voice, and 
communication ethics. Findings show that study participants navigate at least three 
tensions when cultivating a collective environmental voice on campus, and theorize 
communication in ways that discourage or disparage overt influence and the direct 
engagement of communication ethics in discussions about sustainability. The study 
demonstrates the value of inquiry into sustainability advocates’ metacommunication in 
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In this preface, I offer a brief introduction to the study. I begin with a discussion 
the project’s origins. Following that, I provide a short description of the Office of 
Sustainability (OS) at the heart of this case study.1 I conclude the chapter with an 
explanation of some of the motivations that brought me to and have carried me through 
this project. 
 
Origins of This Study 
 In the summer of 2007, a colleague told me about “a really great research 
opportunity.” She said that a university had provisionally approved the formation of an 
Office of Sustainability. The Office would begin its work during the fall 2007 semester. 
My colleague was familiar with the man who was to serve as Director of this new 
organization, and she suggested that he would appreciate a researcher following the 
development of the Office. I emailed him, indicating that I was a doctoral student with a 
particular interest in environmental organizing. In early July, I met him for lunch on 
Intermountain West University’s (IWU) campus.2 He expressed enthusiasm about my 
participation as a researcher during the early stages of the Office’s development.
 Snyder would act as director quarter-time for at least the first semester. The 
Office had only one other staff member as of July 2007, Lillian Valmer, a recent 
graduate of IWU. As I describe in Chapter 2, she was a key player in the movement to 
establish an Office of Sustainability on campus. Valmer worked for 1 year with the OS 
thanks to a grant provided by a local philanthropic organization. Later in the summer, 
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Robin Carson was hired as the Office’s first full-time employee and given the title 
Sustainability Coordinator. 
One week after I met him, Snyder invited me to attend the meeting of the 
Office’s ad-hoc steering committee. In an email on July 10, 2007, he wrote to me: “I 
plan to introduce you as a graduate student from communication interested in observing 
the way that the OS network evolves.” At that meeting, participants congratulated one 
another on the launch of the OS and Snyder, Valmer, and a few others talked about their 
earlier briefing of IWU administrators on plans for the Office’s pilot year. Snyder was 
excited after that first meeting. “That’s a good group of people, huh?” he asked me. 
With a broad smile, he said, “We’re really going to change this thing.” 
My advisor, Dr. George Cheney, and I were excited about the prospect of a 
research project following the emergence of an organization devoted to sustainability. I 
began informally working with Snyder, Valmer, Carson, and other volunteers in July 
2007. During August and September of that year, I assessed the feasibility of an 
ethnographic research project. I submitted an application for Institutional Review Board 
coverage of a study using participant-observation research methods and an “action 
research” perspective (Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, 1985), and I received approval for 
formal research activity with the OS in October 2007. 
 
A Brief Introduction to the Case: An Office of Sustainability 
This project took shape as a long-term case study of an environmental 
organization working within and upon a larger institutional system. In this section, I 
provide a broad and brief sketch of the Office and IUW. I offer a more detailed 
description of the OS in Chapter 2. 
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The OS is part of a large university in the U.S. Intermountain West. Between July 
2007 and July 2008, the OS operated under probationary status within IUW. On Earth 
Day 2008, IWU administrators announced their intention to establish the OS as a 
“permanent feature of IUW” during a press conference. Since July 2007, the OS has had, 
at most, three full-time staff members. Between July 2007 and July 2009, the individuals 
acting as the Office’s Director worked part-time, according to pay and personnel records. 
That said, the Office’s first director, Russell Snyder, frequently worked hours well 
beyond those expected of a full-time employee. Snyder also worked as a researcher and 
teacher at IWU. The employees of the OS do sometimes work long and irregular hours, 
and in day-to-day talk they note how their commitment to sustainability bridges (and 
blurs) their work and personal lives.  
It is difficult to define who is a “member” of the Office of Sustainability, and 
perhaps it is misleading to use that term. The OS presently has three paid and full-time 
staff members—a Director, a Sustainability Coordinator, and an Outreach and Education 
Coordinator—plus one part-time Grant Coordinator. During each academic semester, the 
Office benefits from the contributions of a varying number of interns and student 
employees with “work-study” arrangements. From the beginning, a host of University 
faculty and staff have been intensively involved in the organization’s operations. 
Additionally, there have been a small number of graduate students, such as myself, who 
have conducted research projects with, on behalf of, or about the OS for coursework or 
thesis/dissertation projects. Finally, as the Office broadened and intensified its 
communication campaigns, Office staff consulted with and relied upon an increasing 
number and variety of IWU administrators, staff members, and student group 
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representatives. I will call individuals working with or alongside the OS volunteers and 
partners. Some campus organizations, such as IUW’s library system, have developed 
internal “green teams;” OS employees have worked from the beginning to foster and 
support these groups. Thus, while the Office employs a small number of people, it 
maintains a complex and changing network of relationships on campus. 
The Office of Sustainability is charged with, among other things, coordinating 
sustainability communication on campus. It has a public “strategic plan” that lists three 
specific functions of the OS: connect, collaborate, communicate. As such, the Office is an 
organization particularly attuned to and reflective about its communicative action. 
Additionally, Office staff members maintain a loosely coupled organic network within 
the encompassing university system (Morgan, 2006; Weick, 1976). This means that their 
work is in large part organizing and, by their own definition, communicating. Thus, the 
Office of Sustainability is an ideal case for the study of communication about 
communication, organizing, and environmental issues.3 
 
Motivations 
In many ways, this dissertation project emerged out of opportunity and 
happenstance. Nevertheless, I was motivated to work on this project by a set of 
longstanding ethical and professional commitments. There are several personal 
motivations that contributed to my decision to carry out this project: (1) my identification 
as an environmentalist, (2) my interest in people’s attempts to self-organize because of 
environmental and ethical issues, and (3) the immediacy of sustainability issues in the 
western United States and Great Basin.  
  xiii 
I am an environmentalist. It can mean many things to take on that identity 
(Corbett, 2006). For me, being an environmentalist means understanding one’s identity 
with specific and enduring reference to the extra-human world—to be in communication 
with it, if you will (see Peterson, Peterson, & Grant, 2004). One of the clearest 
articulations of such a perspective is Aldo Leopold’s (1949) development of a land ethic 
in A Sand County Almanac. Leopold explains that, “In short, a land ethic changes the role 
of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of 
it. It implies respect for his [or her] fellow-members, and also respect for the community 
as such” (p. 204).  
I believe that there is no ideal or pure form of environmentalism. Instead, I 
believe that in pursuing the meanings of nature human beings ought to “transgress the 
borders of one’s own self [… to reflect] on the situation that defines one’s subjectivity or 
the forces of domination that define one’s being” (Spoelstra, 2007, p. 301). Symbolic 
processes establish subjectivity and relations between people, as well as between people 
and the extra-human world. This case involves people who wrestle with environmentalist 
identities and who do “environmental work” but must negotiate what that means in a 
particular context. 
As well, I have had a long-standing interest in the ways in which people attempt 
to self-organize. I have studied citizen involvement in municipal sustainability groups, 
local currency networks, consumer activism, and such. The Office of Sustainability 
provided me an engaging and complex case of creative organizing for environmental, 
organizational, and social change. In the pages to come, I explore the ways in which these 
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environmental organizers conceptualized and talked about communication, and how that 
affected their work.  
The concept of sustainability is consequential for the places I called home while I 
conducted this study: Salt Lake City, Utah, the Great Basin, the Rocky Mountains, and 
the Colorado Plateau. Recent research suggests that climate changes in the American 
Southwest will be significant in the coming decades (U.S. Global Change Research 
Program, 2009). For instance, high alpine ecosystems like those of the Wasatch and Uinta 
mountain ranges are at great risk due to projected rises in average temperature. Down in 
the valleys along the Wasatch Front, dangerous levels of air pollution are a chronic 
problem, and unabated population growth may exacerbate toxic conditions in the area. 
What’s more, most of Utah’s human population is dependent upon “dirty” energy fuels 
and technologies (especially coal), while opportunities for “clean” energy development 
(e.g., solar, wind, geothermal) abound. Contention over the disposal of radioactive waste 
in the state is perennial and likely to continue, given the popularity of plans to mitigate 
climate change by augmenting nuclear energy production. It is the complexity and 
multiplicity of these sorts of issues that are, for me, inherent to life in Utah. Thus, I 
jumped at the opportunity to conduct research with an emerging Office of Sustainability 
at a prominent university in the Intermountain West. 
 Finally, I am writing this some time after Russell Snyder’s death in November 
2008. He died while on a hike in a national park that he loved very much. His death, my 
personal response, and the great uncertainty his passing brought for everyone involved 
with the Office reminded me of the remarkable and dynamic nature of research 
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relationships. I am indebted to Snyder and the many other participants in this study. I 
hope that this project honors their work. 
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Notes 
1
 I will frequently use “the Office” and “the OS” instead of the Office of Sustainability. 
 
2
 The name of the university and names of all research participants are pseudonyms. 
 
3
 In this study, I will frequently use the terms environment and environmental. Unless 
otherwise noted, I use these terms to describe the natural world—ecosystems, ecologies, 
and the like. For the most part, I do not use the term environment in the way many 
organization theorists do—that is, as a label for a population of organizations. As well, I 
want to acknowledge that calling anything “natural” is selective, political, and 
historically grounded (Sturgeon, 2009). Yes, making distinctions between the 
environment and society is reductionistic and problematic (Cronon, 1996). Still, I will 
use these terms, making sure to note the multiple meanings of language about the natural 






 This is a study of organizing for sustainability. Sustainability is a widely 
recognized, though ambiguous and contested, term. There are, of course, competing 
definitions of what it means for people, organizations, and societies to be(come) 
sustainable. In this study, I use that word to talk about the struggle over human 
organizations’ and societies’ relationships to the natural world over the long term. Some 
people question whether sustainability is a necessary goal, as well as whether its pursuit 
impedes the attainment of goals that are supposedly more worthwhile (e.g., economic 
growth; see e.g., Lomborg, 2001, 2007). If nothing else, the struggle over the term 
presents scholars and laypersons alike with interesting philosophical and practical 
problems. As my work on the project progressed, I refined my focus to address 
communication about communication in this case of organizing for sustainability.1 
 
Research Purposes 
I designed this study and report according to three guiding purposes. These 
purposes took shape over the course of a research process in which I identified and 
selected questions and problems in cooperation with research participants after a period 
of joint work and reflection (Heron, 1996). Taken together, these purposes explain why 
this study is a valuable investigation of a case of organizational change connected to 
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 My first aim is to present a detailed case study of organizational change related 
to environmental communication. There are now a number of books and reports on  
organizational (and individual) change vis-à-vis the goal of ecological sustainability. 
Many of these volumes rely heavily upon heroic narratives about triumphant and 
persistent individuals, as well as dynamic organizations (e.g., Hawken, Lovins, & 
Lovins, 1999; Nattrass & Altomare, 2002; Senge, Smith, Kruschwitz, Laur, & Schley, 
2008; SustainAbility, 2008). In a growing number of confessional tales, business leaders 
recount their personal and organizational encounter with the idea of sustainability, 
persuading others that such a conversion is necessary and a business advantage (e.g., 
Anderson, 1998, 2009; Chouinard, 2006). There are now a slew of well marketed 
frameworks and programs for organizations undertaking sustainability-related change, 
including the natural capitalism approach promoted by the Rocky Mountain Institute 
(see Hawken, Lovins, & Lovins, 1999), the organizational learning approach made 
famous by management guru Peter Senge and promoted by the Society for 
Organizational Learning (see Senge, Laur, Schley, & Smith, 2006), the natural step 
approach established by Karl-Henrik Robèrt (see Nattrass & Altomare, 2001; Robèrt, 
1997, 2008), the community-based social marketing approach developed by Doug 
McKenzie-Mohr (McKenzie-Mohr & Smith, 1999), and more. However, it is an open 
question as to whether this discursive trend is a mere fad or indicative of a more 
enduring, widespread, and thoroughgoing change in thinking about organizations 
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(Abrahamson, 1991; Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999; Barley & Kunda, 1992; Zorn & 
Collins, 2007). Indeed, scholars of communication have offered numerous examples of 
the ways in which sustainability and sustainable development discourse has been used to 
defend the status quo and limit the scope of change (Ganesh, 2007; Livesey, 2002; 
Livesey & Kearins, 2002; Peterson, 1997; Torgerson, 1995). 
 As an ambiguous master-concept for organizations, as well as for citizens and 
nations, sustainability deserves investigation and critique. More importantly, the 
frameworks, heroic narratives, and pop culture artifacts that make up the so-called 
sustainability “trend,” “revolution,” or “ideology” are not the final word on how to do 
sustainability. Instead, these are representative of a discourse through which particular 
kinds of knowledge about the world is created (Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1980; 
Livesey, 2002). As people participate in these discourses, they borrow from, manipulate, 
and add to the set of symbolic and material practices that make up “sustainable-ness.” 
There is a complex, nonlinear, reciprocal relationship between the work of people on the 
ground and the figure of sustainability as a social myth (De Geus, 2002). As such, a 
detailed communication-centered case study of sustainability organizing can speak to the 
intersections of organizational and social change in the interest of the natural world.  
 
Second Purpose 
This study is designed to examine and explain multiple lay theories of (1) 
communication and organization/organizing. In particular, I track and interpret research 
participants’ lay theorizing about persuasive communication in the interest of 
organizational change—and thus, by extension and orientation, social change. My 
advisor, Dr. George Cheney, first suggested that the dissertation’s theoretical focus 
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could be implicit theories of communication. He and I regularly discussed my fieldwork, 
and he observed that, based upon my early participant observation, communication was 
both a primary function of and significant concern for the Office of Sustainability. 
In this dissertation, I develop a uniquely interpretive approach to lay theory and 
theorizing. Past work on the subject has been overwhelmingly (but understandably) 
guided by the assumptions of cognitivism. The approach developed in this dissertation 
will enable scholars of organizational communication to move beyond the currently 
predominant techniques used to study lay theories of communication, including the 
analysis of cultural codes, metaphors, and message design logics (e.g., Baxter, 1993; 
Koch & Deetz, 1981; O’Keefe, 1981; Putnam & Boys, 2006).  
 It is not my intent to determine the most functional or authoritative lay theories 
in this case. Instead, I am more interested in interpreting how such logics are expressed 
and implicated interaction (Tompkins, 1984), tracing how they interact with the multiple 
forms of work that people do (Barley & Kunda, 2001; Vallacher & Wegener, 1987). 
Moreover, I consider how the notion of lay theorizing can speak to organization 
scholars’ current interest in organized tensions (Ashcraft, 2006; Ashcraft & Trethewey, 
2004; Harter & Krone, 2001; Trethewey & Aschcraft, 2004). In all, this study offers an 
interpretive analysis of “sustainability work” and the role of lay theorizing about 
communication in that work. 
 
Third Purpose 
 The third and last purpose that guides this study is to understand and critique 
values-relevant communication in a case of environmental advocacy. As I suggested 
earlier, sustainability is an ethically loaded concept; it inevitably suggests (at the very 
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least) “moral philosophy or philosophical thinking about morality, moral problems, and 
moral judgments” (Frankena, 1973, p. 4). It may be possible to limit sustainability-
related talk to technical discussion of efficient systems engineering. Still, people’s 
advocacy for sustainability usually involves ethical reasoning and arguments about 
which decision premises should guide our individual and organizational actions.  
 I am interested in both the participants’ ethical claims and their claims about 
ethics, itself. Organizational scholars have explained how people use ethical claims as a 
strategic resource (e.g., Kuhn, 2009) and how people frame ethics, itself, in their 
discourse (Cheney, Lair, Ritz, & Kendall, 2010). Ultimately, the third purpose of this 
study is to explore how the study’s participants come to understand and use their notions 
of communication ethics in their environmental advocacy. 
 
Summary 
 This dissertation is designed to do at least three things. First, I developed the 
project as a long-term, ethnographic case study of environmental communication “in” an 
organization. Second, following discussions with Office staff members between 2007 and 
2008, a theoretical focus emerged for the project: lay theories of communication and 
organizing. Third, I paid traced the significance of ethics in participants’ 
metacommunication, especially with reference to sustainability advocacy. 
 
Preview of the Dissertation 
I now provide a brief sketch of each of the subsequent chapters. I provide a plan 





Chapter 2: The Case 
In Chapter 2, I provide a description of the Office of Sustainability at the heart of 
this case study. In particular, I discuss how the Office came about and I introduce 
several people intimately involved with the Office’s work. Also, I describe the 
relationship of the Office to other groups at IWU. This chapter provides necessary 
background information to understand many of the descriptions and quotations of study 
participants throughout the rest of the manuscript. 
 
Chapter 3: Sustainability 
 Chapter 3 is a multifaceted review of sustainability. First, I put the idea of 
sustainability in a particular historical and social context. Specifically, I consider 
sustainability against the backdrop of successive waves of the North American 
environmental movement. I then trace the relatively recent effort to make sustainability a 
priority for higher education institutions, which participants in my study have called “the 
campus sustainability movement.” Third, I review sustainability’s lexical, 
organizational, and ecological meanings. Finally, I identify and critique three common 
themes in high-profile advocacy for sustainability. As a whole, Chapter 3 offers an 
introduction to and critique of sustainability that is historically grounded and 
communication-centered. 
 
Chapter 4: Theory and Literature Review 
Chapter 4 provides the theoretical groundwork for the analysis chapters of this 
dissertation. I provide definitions of communication, discourse, and rhetoric, as well as 
organization. With those definitions established, I construct an argument for 
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communication-centered thinking about lay theorizing. Blending ethnomethodological 
perspectives (Garfinkel, 1967) with Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) concept of 
interpretive repertoires, I craft a uniquely interpretive perspective on lay theory and 
theorizing. Finally, I review three well-known treatments of lay theory from different 
disciplines: Vallacher and Wegner’s (1985) action identification theory, O’Keefe’s 
(1988) theory of message design logics, and Argyris’ (Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, 1985; 
Argyris & Schön, 1974) approach to espoused theories and theories-in-use. In the course 
of that review, I demonstrate how each of these disparate perspectives acknowledges at 
least three dialectics in lay theorizing. This perspective, I think, may provide some base 
for future interdisciplinary research on lay theory. Analysis chapters will bring the 
approach developed in Chapter 4 to the topics of organizational advocacy, voice, and 
ethics. 
 
Chapter 5: Methodology 
 Chapter 5 describes this project’s methodology and lays out my research 
questions. I explain why I foreground interpretivist perspectives on organizing but also 
draw from the insights of critical approaches. I was very much a part of the 
organizational setting that I analyze in this study, so Chapter 5 provides greater detail on 
my relationship to the research scene and the means by which I maintained reflexivity. I 
also explain each of the research methods I used to gather data for this study—namely 
participant observation, qualitative interviewing, and focus group discussion. I close the 
chapter by explaining grounded theory methodology, the framework that guided my 






Chapter 6: Advocacy 
 Chapter 6 applies the approach developed in Chapter 4 to participants’ lay 
theories of advocacy. I begin the chapter by considering participants’ general preference 
for the term “advocacy” over “persuasion.” I then trace three interpretive repertoires 
connected to their conceptions of advocacy for sustainability-related change: (1) the 
directive repertoire, (2) the expressive repertoire, and (3) the representative repertoire. 
Ultimately, I attempt to demonstrate how these repertoires undercut or limit the 
effectiveness of an organization charged with communicating sustainability on campus. 
 
Chapter 7: Voice 
 Chapter 7 is centered on the concept of voice. The most significant contribution 
of the chapter is the Dialectical Model of Voice Organizing (DMVO). The DMVO 
explains three dialectical tensions that sustainability officers may confront when 
attempting to build an environmental voice in organizations: (1) the dialectic of 
facilitation, (2) the dialectic of leadership, and (3) the dialectic of motivation. I 
developed this model in response to both the case and extant environmental 
communication theory. On one hand, the DMVO is the result of my attempt to bring 
some order to the broad constellation of terms used to talk about organizing. As well, the 
model depicts the kinds of difficulty faced by participants as they worked to cultivate a 
voice for sustainability at IWU. On another hand, I developed the model in order to (1) 
extend Senecah’s (2004) theory of the trinity of voice and (2) put environmental 
communication and organizational communication scholars in conversation with one 




Chapter 8: Ethics 
 Chapter 8 deals with ethics, principally communication of or about ethics. I 
begin the chapter by analyzing interviewees’ responses to some variation on the 
question, “To what extent, if at all, should ethics feature in messages about sustainability 
from the Office of Sustainability?” I explain how their lay theories of advocacy—as 
detailed in Chapter 6—affect their willingness to associate sustainability with concepts 
and messages related to ethics. Following the approach delineated in Chapter 4, I 
identify three interpretive repertoires that result in this their hesitancy to highlight ethical 
issues in their talk about sustainability: (1) the individual repertoire, (2) the conflict 
repertoire, and (3) the context repertoire. In the second half of the chapter, I explain that 
the persistence of the participants’ tentativeness is due in part to three preferences 
implicit in their metacommunication: (1) unification, (2) being reasonable, and (3) 
unobtrusive control. At the close of this chapter, I argue that these patterns inhibit the 
ability of the study participants to reflect critically on the ethical implications of their lay 
theories of communication and organizational strategy. 
   
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 In the concluding chapter of this dissertation, I comment on the study’s 
contributions and limitations in the domains of theory, research methods, and practice. 
This study generates important insights from a unique case of the organizing of 





This study explores lay theories about communication. In particular, I have 
traced and analyzed the development of those theories among a group of people 
organizing for sustainability at a large university in the US. Toward that end, I 
developed a uniquely interpretive perspective on lay theorizing and applied it to 
participants’ communication about advocacy, voice, and ethics. As I will show in 
Chapter 3 and throughout this dissertation, sustainability is a human concept more than 
it is a natural phenomenon. For that reason, it is important to understand sustainability in 
terms of communication. By extension, it is also important to understand sustainability 
advocates’ communication about and theories of communication. This dissertation is 





1 I do not provide an absolute definition of sustainability in this project. Rather, my goal 
is to tell the story of people communicating sustainability in a specific organizational 
context. In Chapter 3, I provide an historical account of the contemporary idea of 
sustainability and critique common themes in sustainability rhetoric. Still, I will not 
provide a single, overriding definition of sustainability within this document. 
Nonetheless, I will occasionally use terms such as “sustainability communication” or 
“sustainability-related communication” to describe actions that include description, 







 This chapter reviews the history and prominent features of the Office of 
Sustainability examined in this study. I begin the chapter with a discussion of the 
university of which the Office is a part. Second, I tell the story of the Office’s creation. 
Third, I introduce the Office’s employees and discuss some of the groups involved in the 
Office’s campus network. Following that, I sketch the campus and community location 
of the OS. I conclude the chapter by pointing out that the people involved in this case 
have been unusually reflective about communication, making it a suitable case for the 
study of lay theorizing about communication, organizing, and sustainability. 
 
The Office of Sustainability 
The University: Intermountain West University 
The Office of Sustainability featured in this study is part of a university in the 
U.S. Intermountain West, a region bounded on the east by the Rocky Mountains and on 
the west by the Cascade and Sierra Nevada Mountains. I give the university featured in 
this study the pseudonym Intermountain West University (IWU). IWU incorporates more 
than 30,000 students, thousands of faculty, and almost tens of thousands of people on 
staff. It is the flagship research institution in its state. The state’s citizens predominantly 
hold some version of conservative/right-wing political views in the state, as is true for 
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many other states in the region. Like many other research-intensive universities, current 
economic conditions stress its research, service, and educational efforts. IWU is 
experiencing growth in student enrollment, and plans to add well more than 5 million 
square feet to its building infrastructure in the next 20 years. The size of IWU, the great 
number and variety of operations it supports, the current economic strife, its established 
and aggressive development plans, and state/local politics make sustainability advocacy 
in this case a complex, sometimes contentious endeavor. 
The Office of Sustainability, which was initiated as a pilot project in July 2007 
and announced as a “permanent feature” of IWU on Earth Day 2008, is administratively 
located in the Facilities Management arm of the university. This location for the Office 
was suggested early on by advocates for a formal sustainability-centered administrative 
unit. An associate vice president heads Facilities Management; that position involves the 
supervision of planning, construction, building maintenance, utilities services, and more. 
Importantly, OS staff members have asked others and myself, both directly and 
rhetorically, “What are we doing in Facilities Management?” They pose such a question 
with some regularity, and it marks their routine reflection on their location and function 
in IWU’s structure. This wondering has often been prompted by conversation about the 
thoroughly social activity of Office employees and volunteers. After all, the OS is 
located in a division devoted largely to infrastructure, buildings, and the material 
elements of campus. By contrast, consider what it might mean for the Office of 
Sustainability to serve the Vice President for Academic Affairs or to serve a 
(nonexistent) Vice President for Sustainability? 
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Obviously, OS staff members spend a considerable amount of time interacting 
with people employed by or directly implicated in the work of Facilities Management. 
Yet, I regularly heard OS staff members express uncertainty about the organization’s 
situation in Facilities Management. Their uncertainty is captured, in part, by this 
expression: “We don’t turn any of the dials or flip any of the switches, but we know the 
people who do.” Office staff members and volunteers made statements like this in 
situations where they were called upon to respond to questions such as, “How, exactly, 
does your work make the university more sustainable?” The common concern here is 
that “flipping switches,” “turning dials,” and such are fundamental to the pursuit of 
sustainability and central to the work of other Facilities Management departments. These 
are not, however, activities under the control of Office of Sustainability. The second 
statement I regularly heard from almost every Office staff person was, “We don’t really 
have any power.” This sort of statement informs the first, in that it suggests that power is 
located in the other operations incorporated by Facilities Management or different 
departments altogether. As well, the statement suggests a less powerful or important 
position for those who merely know the people who do flip switches. Nevertheless, the 
Office of Sustainability’s first strategic plan identifies the organization’s central 
activities as connecting, collaborating, and communicating. Such accounts are one way 
that IWU employees make sense of the purpose of the Office and express tensions 
pertaining to Office’s administrative location in Facilities Management. It also reflects a 
concern that OS staff members share with other sustainability officers at North 
American universities and colleges: placement in a facilities management division may 
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limit the scope and power of any unit responsible for sustainability organizing (Carlson, 
2008). 
Still, advocates suggested early on that the Office be located in the Plant 
Operations arm of Facilities Management. In a November 2006 email message to an 
IWU manager, one staff person wrote that the Office “should be situated in Plant 
Operations with tentacles that extend throughout the academic and research 
administrative units.” Today, the OS maintains working relationships with a wide 
variety of IWU’s organizations, departments, and stakeholders. 
 
Emergence 
 Usually, the story begins with a garden. A group of students, having started a 
group under the aegis of IWU’s community service center, hoped to create an on-
campus, student-maintained organic garden. Depending on who is telling the story, two 
to six students are usually mentioned as crucial to the garden plan and, later, the 
emergence of the Office of Sustainability. Most of the students had taken what is now a 
popular course in organic gardening from a particularly charismatic professor. 
According to others’ accounts as well as my impression of him, this professor is 
enthusiastic about his own work, deeply committed to teaching his students practical 
thinking and skills, and unusually adept at drawing together global phenomena and the 
consequence of individual action. His abiding concern for ecological and social change 
was, as I have been told, very salient in the organic gardening class. 
During 2005, members of the new student group conceived of and sought 
approval for a campus-based organic garden to be tended and overseen largely by 
students. The garden was to be a site for learning and a public demonstration of 
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commitment to environmental responsibility. However, the students met with 
disappointment when an administrator responsible for grounds maintenance rejected 
their plans in December of 2005. As told to me later, the students were let down that 
their plans were not perceived to be adequately developed, and that the supervisor 
doubted that students and student groups would be responsible stewards of university 
land over the long term. More significantly, students told me that they recognized right 
away that little or no consideration had been given to the environmental values 
embodied in the project. Put another way, the students were concerned that 
environmental premises and sustainability principles seemed to play an insignificant, if 
any, role in the administrator’s decision to not allow the development of a student-led 
organic garden project on campus. 
 It was this larger perspective that guided the students’ later actions. Documents 
and accounts from students and faculty involved in these early stages characterize the 
sustainability “movement” on the campus as “fragmented.” There had been other 
successes. Thanks to the support of the student government and a particularly active 
member of the faculty, a program to raise money for the development of regional wind-
powered energy infrastructure had garnered a fair deal of attention and funds. Several 
student groups with explicitly environmental missions existed. Earth Day celebrations 
had, by 2005, become routine. Student research spurred the administration to conduct a 
comprehensive waste audit. These developments and others reflected the sense that, as 
an early proposal for a formal Office of Sustainability stated, “The IWU community is 
highly motivated to pursue sustainability and is calling for leadership.” 
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 The students pursuing an organic garden laid the groundwork for such leadership 
when they hosted a series of open forums on campus sustainability in the fall season of 
2006 and winter of 2007. Members of the sponsoring student group perceived a deficit 
of environmental thinking or concern in campus planning, administration, and education. 
They sought to bolster the legitimacy of environmental regard in the management of the 
university and campus life. Additionally, they hoped that such an office would aid in the 
success of future efforts to establish installations and programs like their failed campus 
organic garden. (At this time, students maintain several campus-based organic gardens.) 
A number of people attended first of the public discussions in November of 2006. I did 
not attend the sessions, but have been told that those in attendance were passionate, that 
many were already involved with a range of environment-related initiatives at IWU, and 
that the group included staff, student, and faculty stakeholders. Following the sessions, 
attendees committed to a common purpose: A campus sustainability office should be 
established. 
A team dubbed The Sustainability Task Force formed after the discussions. 
Several of the student leaders contributed, as did a handful of university staff and 
faculty. This small team began drafting proposals outlining the need for the Office of 
Sustainability. Brief proposals were sent to administrators and other campus leaders. 
Eventually, the Sustainability Task Force recruited the support of select members of the 
President’s advisory board responsible for recommendations on campus and 
infrastructure development. In a memo submitted to the IWU’s President in late 2006, 
advocates for an Office of Sustainability offered these initial goals:  
(1) articulating a visible message that sustainability is a priority, (2) coordinating 
the fragmented current sustainability initiatives ongoing across campus, and (3) 
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highlighting advances in university sustainability programs such as the 
significant energy and water conservation successes of recent years. 
 
The advisory board happened to be reviewing the campus’ master plan for development 
at the same time that the Task Force submitted its proposal for an Office of 
Sustainability. The proposal stated, “The overarching goal of the OS would be to 
catalyze a transformation to a more environmentally sustainable campus and to 
institutionalize a commitment to campus sustainability.” The presidential advisory board 
met in February 2007 to consider the proposal. The advisory board endorsed the plan to 
create an office with probationary status for one calendar year, with full recognition to 
be granted upon a review of the unit’s performance during the probationary period. 
August 2007 marked the initiation of the Office of Sustainability as a pilot 
project. By September 2007, I was convinced that a long-term case study of the 
development of the Office of Sustainability and the experiences of those working on its 
behalf would provide rich matter for a dissertation project. Russell Snyder, acting part-
time director, Robin Carson, sustainability coordinator, and Lillian Valmer, Office staff 
member and fellow, were at work designing an Office website, securing a physical 
workspace, and making contact with people they had begun to label “sustainability 
champions.” Early in the autumn semester, the 15-person steering committee began 
meeting regularly. In the first week of October 2007, Office of Sustainability staff and a 
number of the students involved in its creation announced the launch of the Office at an 
environment-themed event sponsored by the student government. Later that month, the 
Institutional Review Board at my university approved my study, and I began formal 




Office of Sustainability Personnel  
 Since July 2007, the Office of Sustainability has employed no more than three 
people full time. Between that time and January 2010, the staff composition has changed 
frequently and unexpectedly. In addition to the three people currently employed full-
time by the IWU as OS staff, a cadre of students have contributed as interns earning 
academic credit and as work-study employees. In this section, I offer sketches of the 
Office staff members and key figures its emergence. 
Russell Snyder. Before his quarter-time appointment as Director of the Office of 
Sustainability, Russell Snyder’s professorial work was supported in large part by 
research grants. He taught regularly for a variety of programs and departments, 
sometimes on the topic of sustainability. Snyder was an outdoor enthusiast as a young 
man, and his enjoyment of outdoor recreation had not waned with time. His passion for 
sustainability grew from this connection to the natural world, as well as from his 
research experiences. Snyder’s expertise involved him with some frequency with the 
mitigation or remediation of industrial pollution. His work involved systems modeling, 
and systems thinking became a prominent trope in his discussion of sustainability, 
societies, and organizations. In a variety of situations I observed, he described his work 
as “doing/encouraging systems-level thinking and change.” 
Through 2008, Snyder was officially designated a part-time employee of the OS. 
Russell Snyder died from a fall while hiking with his wife and friends on a steep section 
of desert trail in November 2008. IWU was closed for the Thanksgiving holiday, but 
word traveled quickly to the Associate Vice President for Facilities Management, and 
through him to the Office’s Sustainability Coordinator, Robin Carson. I recall the weight 
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and grief of that evening. “Hi, Robin,” I said plainly when I received her call Saturday 
night. “Brenden, are you sitting down?” she asked. “Russell died yesterday.” 
 Lillian Valmer. The second time I met Russell Snyder, he introduced me to 
Lillian Valmer, who led the push for an organic garden with another student. That other 
student, Yasmin Meadows, would become one of a few key student leaders (including 
Valmer) in the campaign for a formal Office of Sustainability. Valmer applied for and 
received a fellowship to serve as the Office’s first full-time employee. Valmer was a 
senior during the 2006-2007 academic year, the period during which she and others 
hosted the public discussions and pursued approval of an Office of Sustainability. She 
earned degrees in several majors at IWU prior to beginning her work at the Office.  
As needed—during what she, Snyder, and Robin Carson called “the start-up 
phase”—Valmer worked on the Office’s website, established connections with 
sustainability leaders on other campuses in the state, planned public events, and more. 
Throughout her work as an employee of the Office, Valmer reminded staff, volunteers, 
and others that the Office came about because of the entrepreneurship of students. In a 
conversation with me soon before her employment ended and she moved away for 
graduate school, Valmer told me that she was excited that the OS  
just seemed to establish a base [during the pilot year]. For example, [take the 
student group that I helped start]. Our initial goal with that group was [to] work 
on gardens. We couldn’t get any of that done [on IWU’s campus]. So, now that 
this Office is in place, they’re back to their original plan because the support 
system’s there. It’s just nice to see how we’ve enabled greater and more rapid 
change. 
 
Robin Carson. Robin Carson was hired as Sustainability Coordinator in the 
summer of 2007. She was the first full-time staff person hired by IWU for the OS. In the 
original proposal submitted to the presidential advisory board, Carson’s position was 
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said to “[require] a creative, self-starting, independent person who communicates well, 
has experience in coordinating university student activities, and is knowledgeable about 
sustainability principles.” This description, the proposal argued, befit someone who 
would be responsible for developing and maintaining an emerging network of people 
working on or invested in sustainability advocacy at IWU, who would be a primary 
author of the Office’s strategic plans, who would participate in research work with 
student interns, and more. 
Carson’s previous employment had been with the campus center responsible for 
coordinating student service-learning projects and organizations. In fact, she had 
mentored and assisted Valmer, Meadows, and other students involved with the group 
that sought organic garden space on campus and, later, organized the forums on campus 
sustainability. Carson had previously worked with the U.S. Forest Service and a range of 
other organizations that dealt with the natural world in one way or another. Thus, she 
brought to the OS a breadth  ofexperience in working with stakeholders on 
environmental issues. It also bears mentioning that Carson continues to maintain an 
active civic life; she participates actively in a host of third-sector organizations 
addressing matters as varied as local food production and animal welfare. In December 
2007, at the end of the first semester of the Office’s pilot year, Carson told me that she 
was invigorated by her sense of the enthusiasm for sustainability on campus. Still, she 
told me, “We’ve got to make real change. I worry that we could just help in 
greenwashing IWU.”  
Karen Adams. Hired to replace Valmer in the summer of 2008, Karen Adams 
coordinates educational and outreach initiatives for the OS. Adams took the position 
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following her graduation from a private college in the region, where she was an active 
participant in student-led environmental initiatives. Her work keeps her in regular 
contact with students and members of the surrounding community with some interest in 
the matter of sustainability.  
One day in the early summer season of 2008, while Snyder, Valmer, and Carson 
considered the person they hoped to hire upon Valmer’s departure, Carson noted that 
each of them agreed that the person hired should “incorporate sustainability into their 
life.” The work had to be “more than a job,” she said. The others nodded along. I did not 
know who was in the pool of applicants, as I wanted to avoid influencing their hiring 
decisions. Still, I was interested in what they meant and asked that of the group. 
Providing one response, Valmer noted that the work of the Office was in large part 
“asking others to change,” so we should be “willing to change ourselves.” Later, Adams 
would tell Carson and me that this was not merely her first job in sustainability, it was a 
part of her life’s work. 
Paul Abbey. Following an extensive search, Facilities Management 
administrators, Carson and Adams, members of the various working groups interacting 
with the OS, and students conducted interviews with three candidates for the Director 
position that opened up following Snyder’s death. Paul Abbey was hired in the summer 
of 2009. Prior to his work at the OS, Abbey was a city planner and Director of 
Sustainable Design in a local architectural firm. Following his appointment, Abbey 
moved swiftly to focus a great deal of the Office’s effort on the development of a 
Climate Action Plan. Such a plan is required of signatories to the American College and 
University President’s Climate Commitment. Signatories are called upon to work 
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systematically for climate neutrality, a state in which the organization’s functioning has 
no net effect on anthropogenic climate change. The President signed the Commitment on 
Earth Day 2008. At the time of this writing, the OS is constructing the plan by 
facilitating six “task teams” dedicated to distinct but interrelated dimensions of the 
effort. More than 60 volunteers have contributed to the work of the various task teams. 
Abbey has told me that this effort laid the groundwork for the future of the OS, but also 
enacts the kind of participation and collaboration that he believes is necessary for 
achieving sustainability. 
Yasmin Meadows. Finally, Yasmin Meadows deserves mention here. Though 
she has not worked as an employee of the Office, Meadows was a founder, along with 
Valmer, of the student group that catalyzed the processes that led to the establishment of 
the OS. Meadows remained active in the development of community and campus 
gardens, and worked as a graduate student intern with the Office. Recently, she acted as 
one of several leaders of the new campus farmers market. Meadows frequently tells 
people that her aspiration is to one day be community-grounded urban farmer. 
 
Campus Network 
 Between the summer of 2007 and 2010 Office employees spent a great deal of 
effort finding and coming into contact with many IWU stakeholders. Here, I sketch 
several bona fide groups established, facilitated, or supported by the OS. In the course of 
my observational research, I was required to obtain the consent of people interacting 
with the group in settings that would not normally be construed as public. I obtained 
consent from nearly 100 individuals. Many more people interact routinely with the OS, 
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especially since the commencement of the climate action planning process, which began 
in the fall of 2009. 
Volunteers and partners. I will use the terms volunteers and partners to identify 
people who work in behalf of the OS. I use the terms to describe those who use work 
and personal time to invest in and shape the Office or its objectives. Rather than being 
rigid analytic categories I have constituted, these are labels that OS employees regularly 
use. Hundreds of individuals have worked with the Office as volunteers and partners; it 
is misleading to call these people a group. Instead, the image of a network is more 
appropriate. The OS employees couple and decouple these individuals in an ad hoc 
fashion, with levels of participation varying across time, tasks, and issue. Indeed, OS 
employees use the term “networking,” to account for and enable the dynamic and varied 
relationships maintained with many individuals and groups (see Eriksson, 2005). 
Students and student-led organizations. In many ways, the OS was born from the 
work of a student group. The OS continues to maintain connections with students and 
student lead groups. As Outreach Coordinator, Karen Adams convenes regular meetings 
with representatives from a variety of student groups. This gathering was initiated early 
on by Lillian Valmer, who wanted to ensure that students remained involved in 
sustainability work at IWU. Undergraduate and graduate students participate in the work 
of the OS as interns, work-study students, volunteers, and research partners. In addition, 
IWU’s student government has a Sustainability Board; it coordinates events and 
attempts to steer policy relevant to Sustainability. Today, teams of students, faculty, and 
staff compete for grants that fund sustainability-related research and programming on 
campus. Students conceived of and advocated for the fees and administrative program 
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that supports those grants. Student empowerment remains an important goal for the OS 
employees. 
Steering Committee. The Steering Committee (SC) developed out of what 
participants had called the Sustainability Task Force. That group worked to formulate 
the proposal for the OS, and later met as a Steering Committee charged with providing 
advice and perspectives to the OS staff. In the summer of 2007, when I first sat in on SC 
meetings to determine the feasibility of the study, 10 to 15 people attended regularly, not 
counting OS employees and myself. Today, the group is open to anyone wishing to 
participate. It meets approximately once per month to serve and guide OS initiatives, as 
well as to provide a forum for the members to share their stories, request help from 
others, and hear about recent or relevant research on matters related to sustainability. In 
late 2009, after I ceased my formal observations of the group, the OS employees began 
calling this group The Working Group. The name change reflected many participants’ 
desire to do or contribute something seemingly more tangible or consequential for the 
OS. 
  President’s Sustainability Advisory Board. The President’s Sustainability 
Advisory Board (PSAB) has 12 members. These members were recommended to and 
approved by the President of IWU. The group’s membership includes associate vice 
presidents, deans, directors, staff members, and students. Their charge is to provide 
advice to the office and make recommendations to university administrators regarding 
sustainability-related policy. This group, for example, encouraged the President to sign 
the PCC described above, and sought to, but failed to, include explicit sustainability 
language in the opening passages of IWU’s most recent campus master plan. The group 
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has convened as frequently as every 2 weeks, and as infrequently as once per semester, 
depending upon the activity of the OS. 
 Staff green teams. In several administrative units across campus, such as the 
library system and the Office of Information Technology, formal staff teams have 
formed to address the challenge of sustainability for their organization within the 
university. In some cases, informal groups have sought to gain influence in their 
workplace. Office employees—Robin Carson, in particular—coordinate with and 
support these groups. Carson once told me that this element of the Office’s mission is 
grounded in the metaphor of the grassroots. The aim is to find, encourage, and 
coordinate semi-autonomous and self-directed groups working on sustainability, which, 
she said, “may sprout up anywhere.” OS staff emphasized the development of green 
teams across campus during the 2010-2011 academic year. 
 
The Scene: Campus Office and Other Locations 
 The Office of Sustainability occupies three small rooms in a building housing an 
eclectic bunch of organizations, including a military training program, academic 
programs, the Purchasing Department, and more. The multiwinged structure is, notably, 
poorly insulated and contains few features that suggest ecological principles were 
considered during its design. The office is recognizable from the hallway because of the 
many film, event, and organizational flyers and posters taped to the door and walls 
nearby. One enters into the largest of the three rooms, which holds several chairs 
procured from IWU’s surplus supplies department, two tables pushed together to create 
a conference space, various office appliances, and three computer workstations lined up 
against one wall. OS interns and work-study students regularly work at these computers, 
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coming and going throughout the day. The next room to the left now contains two desks, 
at which the Sustainability Coordinator and Outreach Coordinator work, as well as a 
large bookshelf holding what has been dubbed the Office’s “lending library.” The back 
room is now the Director’s office, but both Snyder and Abbey frequently work at laptop 
computers on the front room’s conference tables. As well, the backroom intermittently 
serves as a kind of greenhouse. For several years, Robin Carson has slung up fluorescent 
lamps underneath a table in order to husband tomato starts and other garden plants. 
 However, much of the work of the Office is conducted in other locations around 
campus. The committees described above meet in conference and event rooms in 
academic departments’ facilities, the student union building, administrative services 
buildings, and elsewhere. Many times, Office employees would suggest that I meet them 
to discuss their recent work experiences and other matters at community coffee shops 
and campus restaurants. As well, the Office has sponsored a range of events in public 
locations. That the work of a small office was not confined to a specific office space is 
not unusual, of course. 
  
Movement and Community Connections 
At various times, OS employees reported to me that they perceived themselves, 
in their work roles, to be part of a broader environmental social movement. At the same 
time, they have expressed concern about the consequences of identifying themselves as 
activists. This sort of tension has been borne out in the staff’s concern—a concern that I 
share—for identifying the “broader connections” and responsibilities for the IWU 
suggested by a sustainability-inspired worldview. Simultaneously, they voice their worry 
that “we can’t do it all” or “be responsible to everybody.” In fact, most every Office 
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employee has spoken with me about their sense of dialectical pull between being “out on 
the campus making change happen” and “spending time inside to build up the Office.” 
From the beginning, Office staff and partners have worked on several levels and in 
different spaces simultaneously—developing the foundational texts and routines of the 
organization while seeking out connections with other campus stakeholder groups, in 
addition to fostering novel connections between those stakeholders. 
The Office of Sustainability has established connections with the surrounding 
community. By hosting events, participating in public decision-making processes, 
coordinating with representatives from other campuses in the region, responding to 
public pressure on the IWU, and taking other measures the Office staff members have 
attempted to shape and be responsive to people beyond IWU students, staff, and faculty. 
 Events. IWU plays host to a great many events that draw attendees from far away 
and from proximate communities. Since 2007, the OS has designed or co-sponsored a 
range of events, taking advantage of IWU’s prominence in the community. These 
include a campus-wide teach-in on the subject of climate change, community forums on 
public and alternative transportation, regular lectures, and more. Recently, with 
leadership from Yasmin Meadows and other students, the OS and a university office 
promoting “wellness” created a weekly farmers market on campus that is open to 
members of the surrounding neighborhoods. 
 Such events provide an important means by which Office staff members 
“identify/highlight successes.” In other words, OS employees and key volunteers often 
point to public events they have coordinated when publicly describing their successes. 
For example, a prominent scholar working on issues of sustainability, Doug McKenzie-
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Mohr, visited the IWU in 2007 at the request of the OS. McKenzie-Mohr, a social 
psychologist, held public talks, private workshops, and an executive brunch on the 
principles of community-based social marketing (see McKenzie-Mohr & Smith, 1999). 
Snyder, Carson, and others had been exposed to McKenzie-Mohr’s work at conferences 
on the topic of sustainability, and the event at IWU enabled them to establish the 
discourse of community-based social marketing as a common frame for the work of the 
OS and its campus partners, at least for some time. 
 Sustainability roundtable. In the spring of 2008, representatives from a number 
of colleges and universities in the region met at a demonstration house in the area to talk 
about campus sustainability. (The demonstration house provides an example of 
environmentally responsive home design and occasionally serves as a small conference 
center.) Lillian Valmer had worked for most of the spring term to secure the attendance 
of representatives from all campuses in the area. Most of the colleges and universities 
did not have mature sustainability efforts, let alone official offices of sustainability on 
campus. The gathering brought together staff members at the OS, sustainability officers 
at an area private college, professors from departments as diverse as English and 
Biology, Facilities Management directors, administrators, and more. In an invitation to 
the inaugural event, Valmer wrote, “We are hoping […] to create an ongoing dialogue 
within the higher education community about future-proofing our Universities and 
Colleges.” 
 Together, Valmer and I designed a series of exercises for the half-day event in 
the spring of 2008. She and I facilitated the session to promote open conversation, the 
sharing of best practices, and brainstorming about the future of the convened group. An 
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expanded group met to continue the conversation in early fall 2008, and again during the 
spring season of 2009. During the most recent roundtable, Carson told me that she 
believed the series of gatherings were primarily “about sharing and just getting people to 
show up.” In that way, the series of roundtables serve to establish an intercampus 
collectivity dedicated to issues related to sustainability. 
 
Communication, Organization, and the Office of Sustainability. 
 The Office’s work has largely been devoted to sustainability advocacy within 
IWU. Still the people and issues involved with the OS inevitably intersect with the 
broader community and complex social issues. Offices of sustainability are relatively 
new to universities and other organizations. Because it is a new sort of venture and is 
charged with coordinating sustainability-related communication on campus, the people 
contributing to the Office of Sustainability have been uniquely reflective about 
communication and organizational development. Their heightened attention to 
communication and organizing makes this a case a particularly good one for the 
investigation of how organizational change agents and environmental advocates think 
and talk about communication, itself.  
In the next chapter, I explore the history and various meanings of sustainability. 
In the chapter after that, Chapter 4, I construct a theoretic framework for a 
communication-centered approach to lay theory and lay theorizing. Together, those 








 I have two objectives for this chapter. One is to provide context for the concept 
of sustainability. Specifically, I look at the place of sustainability in contemporary 
environmentalism and institutions of higher education. The other objective for this 
chapter is to conduct a short but broad analysis of the current rhetoric of sustainability. 
Sustainability is variable and indeterminate term, yes. Despite that, a few themes are 
characteristic of high-profile activism for sustainability. I describe and critique a few of 
these themes because they constitute the public language that sustainability advocates at 
Intermountain West University (IWU) used and encountered in their work. Most of the 
analysis chapters deal with this study’s participants’ lay theorization of communication, 
especially persuasive communication. Nevertheless, the participants are engaged in 
sustainability-related advocacy and organizing, which is why it is important for me to 
provide a communication perspective on sustainability. Together, the brief history of 
sustainability in the North American environmental movement and analysis of 
contemporary sustainability rhetoric in this chapter provide the background for later 
chapters. 
 Chapter 3 has three main sections. First, I discuss the U.S. environmental 
movement and sustainability’s current place in it. In the second section, I narrow my 
focus to tracking the sustainability movement in North American higher education. That 
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section examines the intellectual, institutional, and textual roots of the push for 
sustainability on campus. Third, I conduct a broad analysis of contemporary 
sustainability rhetoric. For the most part, I base my analysis on public language and 
well-known texts by North American authors. Concluding the chapter, I explain why 
this background demonstrates the usefulness of this study of sustainability advocates, 
one dealing primarily with their lay theorization of communicating and organizing. 
 
Contemporary Environmentalism and the Concept of Sustainability 
The concept of sustainability has an interesting place in the context of the U.S. 
environmental movement. Sustainability is now one of the best known, widely 
discussed, most institutionally supported concepts related to environmentalism. In this 
country, the environmental social movement has undergone several significant 
transformations, which a number of historians used to identify the so-called waves of 
environmentalism. At least two things are clear: (1) Sustainability is a crucial 
(discursive) component of the environmental movement today, and (2) the U.S. 
environmental movement must contend with globalization and related issues when 
addressing sustainability. I make these points for two reasons. First, the participants in 
this study maintain an ambivalent relationship with “activist” (individual) and 
“movement” (collective) identities. Second, the participants in this study were not 
dedicated to globalization-related matters, for the most part. Yes, they were cognizant of 
the global implications of sustainability. Still, their work establishing the Office of 
Sustainability within IWU focused their attention on IWU as an organization, their local 
community, and regional issues and ecosystems. For that reason, I will not extensively 
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discuss globalization-related themes in sustainability rhetoric or the data gathered for 
this study. 
The relationship of this study’s participants to activist and movement identity is 
worth discussion at this point, however. A statement from Lillian Valmer, a student 
founder of the Office of Sustainability, is a good example. In an interview, she told me 
about her ambivalent and changing relationship to activist identity. She told me that she 
began to accept the label over the course of her time in college, 
recognizing that activism is not a bad thing, and that it is a form of civic 
engagement and community service in a lot of ways. It's sort of dispelling those 
myths that I was taught. [… I did not want] to associate myself with something 
negative. But now […] I'm not so afraid of it […] You know, before I became so 
involved in this work [with the Office of Sustainability], I saw [activism] as an 
angry crowd of protestors with posters outside of a plant, or PETA, or something 
that just seemed sort of—um, I don't know—almost rebellious or something. […] 
But once I became more involved with the [University’s service learning center] 
and different projects and things, I started to learn like student activists. What is 
that? Oh, this is a really cool thing. So okay, I'm an activist [she claps her hands 
together once], you know?   
 
Valmer ardently promoted social and environmental change, to be sure. Nevertheless, 
her comments above cast activism as “a form of civic engagement and community 
service,” “becoming involved with […] different projects,” and the like. Furthermore, 
the activism Valmer identified with is positioned against an image of “something 
negative.” This is consistent with Killingsworth and Palmer’s (1992) observations: 
Grass-roots support for environmentalism in America has shifted in recent years 
away from an exclusive commitment to resistance—the not-in-my-back-yard 
mentality—to an open commitment to small-scale positive actions like recycling 
and community education projects that focus on such issues as environmentally 
conscious shopping, energy conservation in the home, and organic gardening and 
lawn care. (p. 241) 
 
Of course, the Office email lists were used by faculty and students to discuss the merits 
of direct action protests on campus, and in the community. Off work hours, many of the 
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participants in this study volunteered with grassroots and nonprofit organizations 
working on environmental problems. In December 2008, while I was conducting 
research for this project, a young man in the Intermountain West region named Tim 
DeChristopher disrupted a U.S. Bureau of Land Management public lands auction by 
entering false bids (see Henetz, 2008). His civil disobedience, for which he now faces 
felony charges, was the subject of intense discussion amongst Office employees and 
partners. My main points are that the people involved with the OS (1) do sometimes 
identify their efforts as a contribution to the U.S. environmental movement, though (2) 
they are ambivalent about labeling their work “activist” or part of a “movement.” 
That said, the purpose of the OS is literally the institutionalization of 
environmentalism. Let us use Bryant’s (1953) definition of rhetoric, “adjusting ideas to 
people and people to ideas,” for the time being (p. 413). The OS attempts to adjust the 
concept of sustainability to IWU’s unique organizational characteristics and vice versa. 
Sustainability is an idea with connections to the U.S. environmental movement, and the 
OS is clearly engaged in environmental rhetoric. For those reasons, it is worth tracking 
the history of sustainability rhetoric in the environmental movement although the Office 
I studied is not a social movement organization, per se. Before tracking the history of 
sustainability in U.S. environmentalism, I should first define social movement(s). 
 
Defining Social Movement(s) 
Tilly (2004) notes that the term “social movement [… sponges] up so many 
different meanings” (p. ix). The scholarly study of social movements began with 
political-economic theory that “featured protestors as straightforwardly rational and 
instrumental” (Goodwin & Jasper, 2003, p. 6). Now, social movement studies is a 
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vibrant interdisciplinary area, and most theoreticians treat movement members as users 
of “symbols, convincing people that they have grievances, and establishing a feeling of 
solidarity of among participants”—all through “framing” and the production of 
“collective identity” (Goodwin & Jasper, p. 6). Historians have followed these turns, 
concerning themselves with “how, when, where, and why ordinary people make 
collective claims on public authorities, other holders of power, competitors, enemies, 
and objects of popular disapproval” (Tilly, 2004, p. ix). In cognitive sociology, scholars 
have treated social movements as “producers of knowledge” through interaction 
collective identity (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, p. 3). Other sociologists have focused on 
the ideologies comprising movements, where “Ideology refers to the discourses of the 
movement, to what people think and say [… especially] the set of ideas expressed by the 
most active participants” (Garner, 1996, p. 15).  
The first scholars of social movement communication and rhetoric made similar 
arguments. They called for historically-grounded (Griffin, 1952), social-psychological 
(Gregg, 1971), politically-grounded (Smith & Windes, 1975), and functionalist (Stewart, 
1980) theory and research. More recently, however, scholars from many disciplines have 
given communication (including varieties of symbolic interaction) a central place in the 
study of social movements. Movement studies pioneer Sydney Tarrow (2001) proposed 
that silence and voice are key terms for understanding contentious politics. Jasper (1997) 
critiques structuralist, functionalist, and other “objective” approaches to social 
movement scholarship for ignoring the moral, emotional, narrative/biographic, and 
creative elements of this form of collective action. McGee (1980b) famously staked out 
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the radical position: “Social movement is a set of meanings and not a phenomenon” (p. 
233). McGee further claimed:  
We can demonstrate by a survey of public discourse that descriptors of the 
environment have changed in common usage in such a way as to make 
“movement” an arguably acceptable term useful in formulating the chain of facts 
we believe to have constituted a real change. The primary objective of a theorist 
working under such constraint is to prove rather than presume the existence of 
“movement(s).” (p. 243, emphasis in original) 
 
Thus, communication is what constitutes a sense of movement in the first place. Social 
movements are claimed to be such by their members or adherents. Alternatively, 
scholars may use communication-centered analysis to argue that something qualifies as 
a social movement. Let us now look at the history of the U.S. environmental movement 
charted by scholars. 
 
A Brief History of the U.S. Environmental Movement 
The antecedents of modern U.S. environmentalism can be found in “active 
concern for the natural world and alarm at its various perils […] back through the 
twentieth century and into the nineteenth” (Sale, 1993, p. 5).1 Many scholars have said 
that the foundations for U.S. environmentalism are the works of Henry David Thoreau 
(e.g., Cotgrove & Duff, 2003) and John Muir (e.g., Oravec, 1981), especially when it 
comes to the preservationist stream of the movement (Oelschlager, 1993). Others point 
to conservationists like Gifford Pinchot and Aldo Leopold, especially their “rejoining 
[of] eloquence and wisdom in ways that are persuasive and critical” (Bruner & 
Oelschlager, 1994, p. 392). However, communication scholars have argued we often 
overemphasize the writings of such 19th-century men-in-the-wilderness, excluding from 
view the influence of capitalists (DeLuca, 2001) and an array of institutions (Schwarze, 
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2004) in shaping U.S. environmentalism. I simply want to point out that most narratives 
about the U.S. environmental movement’s history begin with these men’s various 
writings, campaigns, and professional/civic work. In any case, we should avoid 
unreflectively “[reading] our contemporary concerns [about social movements] into the 
historical past” (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, p. 81). 
Sale (1993) observes, “It is fair to say that there was really no such thing as an 
environmental movement—concerted, populous, vocal, influential, active—before the 
publication of Silent Spring” by Rachel Carson in 1962 (p. 6, emphasis in original). By 
that time, environmentalism in the United States took hold because the population could 
“concern themselves with […] amenities beyond the necessities” thanks to increasing 
levels of education and rising living standards (p. 7). The period between the publication 
of Carson's Silent Spring and Earth Day 1990 has been called the second wave of U.S. 
environmentalism. That period was marked by an increase in environmental organizing–
that is, expanded direct action by a larger number of environmentalist organizations 
(Cotgrove & Duff, 2003). As well, the second wave period involved the passage of 
major national laws, including the Clean Air Act (1963), Wilderness Act (1964), 
National Environmental Policy Act (1970), Endangered Species Act, (1973), and Clean 
Water Act (1977).  
The third wave grew and diverged from the trends established up through the 
1980s. Shabecoff (1993) explains the transition from second- to third-wave 
environmentalism in the United States: 
The new group was in many ways more pragmatic and professional, more 
inclined to cooperate with existing political and economic forces to achieve its 
goals. The newcomers also recognized that more complex problems such as 
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global warming and well-organized opposition by powerful industry groups who 
no longer dismissed them […] must be met with improved goals. (p. 257) 
 
Through the 1990s, the membership numbers for large environmental organizations 
swelled. Moreover, environmentalist messages gained greater presence in popular 
culture. Environmentalists and environmental researchers sought more sophisticated 
media strategies and persuasive techniques for the next “environmental decade” (see, 
e.g., Krendl, Olson, & Burke, 1992). Thiele (1999) notes that “the assimilation of 
environmentalism into the mainstream widened the movement’s appeal and increased its 
power, but also posed a serious threat to its integrity. That is the danger and merit of co-
optation” (p. 21). The great success of the third wave was to make “environmental 
values, though shallow, […] pervasive. Anti-environmental values, on the other hand, 
[remained] marginalized. No anti-environmental alternative [had] gained a coherent and 
consistent voice” (Thiele, p. 209). That said, corporate and other anti-environmental 
voices have made strides on two fronts: (1) perverting or marginalizing environmental 
values in order to limit change; and (2) creating elaborate campaigns, sometimes 
involving “front groups,” to systematically distort public environmental debate (for a 
comprehensive history and analysis, see Beder, 1997). Environmentalism did seem to 
sweep the U.S. prior to the 2000s. For instance, people in political power expressed 
genuine environmentalist sentiment (e.g., Gore, 1992). Also, Earth Day celebrations in 
1990 and 1995 were large, corporate-sponsored, media-friendly affairs. This “green 
party,” as commentator Thomas Friedman (2008) calls it, waned some during the years 
of the George W. Bush administration. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. (2005), a prominent 
environmentalist, called Bush “the worst environmental president we’ve have in 
American history” (para. 7). Still, the establishment and expansion of the environmental 
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justice movement was a major achievement of the third wave period. Bullard, as cited in 
Pezzullo (2001), writes that this new strain of environmentalism highlights 
interdependent social-environmental degradation and aims to “make environmental 
protection more democratic. More important, it brings to the surface the ethical and 
political questions of ‘who gets what, why, and in what amount.’ Who pays for, and who 
benefits from, technological expansion?” (p. 2). In any case, the legacy of the third wave 
of U.S. environmentalism is still a matter of active debate. 
 It is interesting that the concept of sustainability first earned its widespread 
acclaim during the transition between waves two and three. Later in this chapter, I will 
discuss three themes of contemporary sustainability rhetoric: ecological foundations, 
crisis, and (temperate) revolution. Consider these three elements in turn. Ernst Haeckel 
is credited with inventing the term ecology in 1866, just after the death of Henry David 
Thoreau and during the life of John Muir, two standout voices of U.S. 
environmentalism’s first wave. The call to action implicit in the crisis theme is 
reminiscent of the militancy and direct action campaigns characteristic of the second 
wave. Finally, the postmodern revolutionary zeal characterizing sustainability rhetoric 
today bears the hallmark of the popularization and commercialization of 
environmentalism during the third wave. I am not claiming that sustainability rhetoric 
encapsulates the whole history of U.S. environmentalism. Rather, I believe that 
sustainability’s many contradictions and ambiguities stem from the kinds of claims 
people make with the concept and in its interest. Contained within those claims are 
traces of the broad trends in U.S. environmentalism for the last 150 years or so. Having 
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established that historical context, I now say more about sustainability’s current 
relationship to the environmental movement. 
 
Sustainability and Sustainable Development 
Peterson (1997) notes that sustainability is an ancient idea, one with roots in the 
early systemization of agricultural practices. While those who worked (with) the land in 
agriculture, animal husbandry, and forestry have long been concerned with “sustainable 
yield” and “living within the bounds” of natural systems, the notion of ecological 
sustainability was not given intersocietal meaning until the United Nations World 
Commission on Environment and Development’s (UNWCED) report in 1987. The 1992 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development’s (UNCED) “Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development” further established sustainability. The 
UNWCED report, informally called the Bruntland Commission Report, addressed—and, 
in many ways, invented—the problem of global sustainable development. The definition 
of sustainable development put forward in Our Common Future (the title given to the 
UNWCED report) stressed transgenerational justice at a global scale. Sustainable 
development was said to be “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (United Nations, 
1987, p. 43). Today, the term sustainability is more popular than sustainable 
development, in part because of its applicability to matters beyond intergovernmental 
politics and economics. Additionally, many public intellectuals have worked to 
deemphasize or strip development from the notion of sustainability because of its 
postcolonial implications (see, e.g., Shiva, 2010). In any case, sustainability is now 
promoted as a framework for everything from corporate change (e.g., Anderson, 2009) to 
  
41
everyday life (e.g., Beavan, 2010) and, as I will show in the upcoming section, North 
American institutions of higher education. 
According to Peterson (1997), the broad cultural appeal of sustainability in the 
global West is indicative of  
a transformed environmentalism, which dialectically embraces a number of 
values from the developmentalist program, including an ideological commitment 
to achieving universal prosperity by addressing poverty in third world countries 
and a worldwide market economy (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992). Support of 
sustainability implies a criticism of past practices whereby science and 
technology were employed to increase the production of consumable goods, with 
little regard for the long-term or easily externalized costs, yet it maintains 
support for the general goals toward which science and technology are directed. 
(p. 7) 
 
She is highlighting the fact that sustainable development discourse serves an interesting 
function. Antagonism and resistance were key features of second wave 
environmentalism’s relationship to the larger culture. By contrast, sustainable 
development talk achieves legitimation by incorporating cornerstone values of North 
American cultures and economies. Critics have noticed, for instance, that sustainability 
and sustainable development discourse can accommodate the languages of capitalism 
(Kendall, 2007; Singer, 2010), colonialism (Shiva, 1992, 2005, 2010), consumerism 
(Cohen, 2010; Sanne, 2002), and growth (Hamilton, 2004). 
While it may be easy to dismiss sustainability because of its ambiguous 
connection to hegemonic social and economic ideologies, I believe that those points of 
slippage and interconnection are important. They are points at which environmentalists 
may gain rhetorical traction, build unique coalitions, and take creative action (Kendall, 
2007; c.f., Bruner & Oelschlager, 1994; Schellenberger & Nordhaus, 2004; Schwarze, 
2002). For instance, the promotion of “green collar jobs” in the face of the late 2000s 
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economic collapse presents an opportunity to align the politics of the labor, 
environmental, and social justice movements (Jones, 2009). Furthermore, the concept of 
sustainability has some roots and considerable appeal in academic disciplines as varied as 
economics (see Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992), engineering (see Beder, 1996), and 
philosophy (see Norton, 2003). 
Consider also the historical moment at which sustainability and sustainable 
development earned widespread recognition. Globalization was entering what Robertson 
(2003) has called its third wave. In recent years, a genuine global consciousness been 
facilitated by the diffusion of telecommunications and computing technologies, the 
development of the Internet, the intensification of transnational human and capital flows, 
and globally accessible media (Appadurai, 1996). While the institutions and ethical 
systems necessary for a robust global social order may not yet exist (see Appiah, 2006; 
Singer, 2002), the discourses of sustainability and sustainable development can help 
people to think of themselves in terms of global systems, both social and ecological. In 
fact, Office of Sustainability staff and I regularly groused, as Karen Adams once put it to 
me, that it “pisses me off sometimes” when people reduce sustainability to “just 
recycling.” This synecdoche, a reduction of one thing to a “smaller” constituent part, 
was irritating to us because it limited the broad horizons of sustainability. We often 
treated sustainability as an ethic or mode of environment-related “systems thinking” 
applicable to all kinds of behaviors and organizational forms. Sustainability and 
sustainable development emerged at a time of important global transformation, so the 
concept itself is uniquely globalized. 
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The concept of sustainability both came from and changed the third wave of U.S. 
environmentalism. The second wave of environmentalism has been characterized as “a 
specialization of the all-encompassing new left, a part of the niche-seeking strategy that 
has continued to characterize the new social movements” (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, p. 
91). By contrast, sustainability’s inherent ambiguity and broad scope facilitate its 
appropriation by and incorporation into a great variety of movements in locations around 
the world (Hawken, 2007). Peterson (1997) proposes that, 
As postmodern women and men, we abandon the notion of progress, but, as 
humans, we need something to take its place. Sustainability may provide an 
appropriate substitute because it is less boastful and confident, but it remains 
equally ephemeral and contested. (p. 32) 
 
 
Sustainability On Campus 
 Sustainability is frequently talked about as “the future” of institutions of higher 
education (Carlson, 2006). Such an expression promotes and naturalizes the 
institutionalization of sustainability in higher education. If nothing else, sustainability 
has a rather short history as an enthusiasm of university and college students, staff, and 
administrators. For example, the Association for the Advancement of Sustainability in 
Higher Education (AASHE) surveyed 70 sustainability officers at institutions of higher 
education in North America; three-quarters of the respondents said their positions were 
created between 2003 and 2007 (Association for the Advancement, 2008, p. 2). 
Communication of sustainability on campus has developed rapidly but received little 
critical scholarly attention.  
In this section, I do three things. First, I discuss one of the main intellectual roots 
of what has come to be called the campus sustainability movement. Second, I identify 
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key features of sustainability’s institutionalization in higher education. Third, I offer a 
short and critical review of representative practice-oriented publications on campus 
sustainability. Over the next three subsections, I will provide some background for my 
own study and point out the need for communication-focused inquiry on sustainability 
advocacy in complex organizational environments. 
 
Intellectual Roots: David Orr 
 David Orr, a distinguished professor of environmental studies at Oberlin College, 
is frequently cited as the intellectual progenitor of the campus sustainability movement. 
Movement supporters and detractors alike identify Orr’s work as a wellspring (c.f., 
Henson, Missimer, & Muzzy, 2007; Wood, 2010). Orr is best known for his arguments 
in favor of bringing environmental/ecological science, philosophy, and topics into the 
heart of educational institutions.  
Orr’s (1992) Ecological Literacy: Education and the Transition to a 
Postmodern World is a widely cited text. One of the book’s primary arguments is that 
the material world has limits, though human beings have constructed ideologies and 
societies that do not recognize that fact. This is primarily an educational deficiency, Orr 
argues, and it is one that imperils people and the planet. The notion of “global limits” 
has long history and prominent place in environmental rhetoric (see Cox, 1982). Thomas 
Malthus’ writings from the 18th century established this concern within the social 
sciences (see Heilbroner, 1972). Donella Meadows’ (1972) The Limits to Growth and 
Paul Ehrlich’s (1970) The Population Bomb employ the limits trope—though, it should 
be said, in different ways and with reference to different predictions and prescriptions. 
Those influential writings and others like them established the obsession with limits in 
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contemporary environmental rhetoric. Orr’s Ecological Literacy reinvigorated the limits 
trope and set the terms for interweaving sustainability and higher education. 
Orr’s (1994) next book, Earth in Mind, centered on the organizations and 
institutions of higher education, while Ecological Literacy emphasized curricular issues. 
Earth in Mind identified disciplinary separation, values-neutral education, and 
ecologically irresponsible design of the built environment on campus as central 
challenges facing the movement for environmental responsibility. By 2004, a so-called 
campus sustainability movement was up and running, and the second edition of Earth in 
Mind (Orr, 2004a) more thoroughly incorporated the concept of sustainability. Orr was 
by then a leader of the push for campus’ transformation, and his book The Nature of 
Design (2004b) focused attention on teaching students architecture, design, and 
community planning according to sustainability principles. Much of the book details 
university cases. The confluence of these streams of Orr’s work is most apparent in The 
Campus and Environmental Responsibility (Egan & Orr, 1992).  
By the mid-2000s, significant subdisciplinary and transdisciplinary fields had 
grown up around the notion of ecological literacy (see, e.g., Stone & Barlow, 2005). 
Other scholars expanded the reach of Orr’s work by using his writing in new contexts 
and in the popular press. For instance, Richard Louv (2008) popularized the concept of 
“nature-deficit disorder” and promoted the “No Child Left Inside” campaign, based in 
part on Orr’s arguments. Orr’s (2009) most recent book deals with social responses to 
climate change and is intended for a broad, nontechnical audience. Indeed, Orr has 
become a touchstone of sorts. His published work is one intellectual source of the 
campus sustainability movement, and he has coupled that record with consistent 
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advocacy in behalf of the various institutional structures that have emerged from the 
campus sustainability movement. 
 
Institutionalization: Compacts, Professional Associations, and Measures 
 In 1990, the president of Tufts University convened a group of university 
presidents and chancellors in Talloires, France. The participants composed and signed 
the Talloires Declaration, a “ten-point action plan” for sustainability. Signatories 
claimed that they were “deeply concerned about the unprecedented scale and speed of 
environmental pollution and degradation, and the depletion of natural resources” 
(University Leaders, 1990, para. 1). Furthermore, “university leaders must initiate and 
support mobilization of internal and external resources so that their institutions respond 
to this urgent challenge” (para. 3). The ultimate goal was “creating an equitable and 
sustainable future for all humankind in harmony with nature” (para. 4). The Association 
of University Leaders for a Sustainable Future (ULSF) was established according to the 
Declaration’s plan.  
 Since 1990, an array of institutional structures has emerged around this issue. 
Table 3.1 is a timeline of major episodes in the institutionalization of sustainability in 
North American higher education. A handful of organizations stewarded the movement 
for campus sustainability to date. ULSF promoted the Talloires Declaration through and 
beyond the 1990s. Senator John Kerry and Teresa Heinz Kerry were prominent 
participants in the founding of Second Nature, a nongovernmental organization formed 
to promote the institutionalization described here. Second Nature encouraged and aided 
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Ultimately, these efforts came under the aegis of the Association for the Advancement of 
Sustainability in Higher Education (AASHE), founded in 2006. AASHE now functions 
as the de facto professional association for sustainability officers at colleges and 
universities, in addition to serving students, administrators, and vendors in various ways. 
Most often, organizations publicly demonstrate commitment to sustainability 
through executive-level pledges. The two most prominent higher education-related 
compacts on sustainability are the Talloires Declaration and the American College and 
University Presidents Climate Commitment (PCC). Three groups—the original 
signatories, AASHE, and Second Nature employees—crafted the PCC. It commits 
signing institutions to the pursuit of “climate neutrality,” a state of operations in which 
(1) greenhouse gas emissions are minimized to the greatest extent possible and (2) 
remaining emissions are “offset” by (support for) activities that sequester atmospheric 
greenhouse gasses elsewhere. The Talloires Declaration and PCC helped legitimize and 
advertize the broad “steps” they required of signatories. Additionally, these pledges 
involved crude reporting mechanisms to promote accountability. 
Until very recently, there has been little agreement on sustainability auditing and 
accounting methods at universities and colleges. For some time, various publications 
have circulated self-report surveys to administrators in order to gauge and compare 
campuses. For instance, The Princeton Review has for 3 years running provided a “green 
rating” of schools based upon self-reports and publicly available information. The 
company has partnered with the U. S. Green Building Council to produce “The 
Princeton Review’s Guide to 286 Green Colleges,” available online (The Princeton 
Review, 2010). The Sierra Club publishes a list of “Cool Campuses,” a bit of wordplay 
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connoting hipness and mitigation of anthropogenic climate change. Participants in my 
study complained regularly about the “hodgepodge” of grades, ranks, and lists of 
schools according to various standards: sustainable, green, responsible, cool, and so 
forth. Moreover, they were concerned that much of their time was spent responding to 
surveys that affected the public image of the university, though the information provided 
by respondents was not verified. Moreover, the measures, themselves, were sometimes 
not particularly valid assessments. AASHE attempted to fill this vacuum in 2010 by 
launching the Sustainability Tracking, Assessment, and Rating System (STARS). 
STARS is intended to be a comprehensive, third-party-verified sustainability audit 
tailored to institutions of higher education. My participants noted its connection with 
AASHE. They said that AASHE’s involvement and STARS’ public reporting 
framework communicate professional credibility, transparency, data trustworthiness and 
consistency, and network-based support (see Cheney & Ashcraft, 2007; Lawrence, 
2007). By the end of 2010, the program’s first year, 238 schools had enrolled with 
STARS, including the university addressed in this study. 
Institutional structures are emerging for sustainability in North American higher 
education. Universities are creating and changing executive positions, departments, and 
offices in the interest of sustainability. Professional and third-sector organizations exist 
and are growing in size. Collective commitment and formal communications have 
developed around specific pledges and accounting instruments (see McPhee, 1985). 
These institutional/structural activities signal important symbolic and material changes 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977), as well as unique possibilities for organizational 
communication praxis (Lammers & Barbour, 2006). While sustainability may be a 
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passing fad (Zorn & Collins, 2007) or the latest example of ideological groupthink on 
campus (Wood, 2010), it is clear that the institutionalization of sustainability in higher 
education is more robust than ever. Nevertheless, the sustainability↔campus 
conjunction is relatively young, so to speak. For that reason, we should more carefully 
examine the basic texts promoting sustainability on campus. In the next section, I briefly 
survey publications representative of the institutional trends that I have already 
described. 
 
Representative Publications on Campus Sustainability 
 To date, much of the writing on sustainability and institutions of higher 
education has been practice-oriented. The intellectual history described above guides 
most of the book-length manuscripts. Still, many of these titles devote little attention to 
philosophical or theoretical issues. Indeed, most of the books on the subject are manuals 
of some sort. In other words, they deal with the mechanics of assessing, marketing, and 
bureaucratizing sustainability on campus.  
Among the first of its kind was Smith’s (1993) Campus Ecology: A Guide to 
Assessing Environmental Quality and Creating Strategies for Change. The bulk of the 
book is contained in three sections: “Wastes and Hazards,” “Resources and 
Infrastructure,” and “The Business of Education.” In these sections, chapters deal with 
water, energy, institutional investment portfolios, air quality, environmental education, 
curriculum planning, etc. The closing section, number four, contains two chapters. One 
chapter provides rather broad advice to “build coalitions,” seek alliances with persons in 
power, and such. The other discusses campus ecology in terms of environmental justice. 
These chapters hint at issues of meaning, discourse use, and organizing, but only in the 
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broadest sense, which is true of many of the campus sustainability books that would 
follow Smith’s. Her book is most useful as an analytic take on university and college 
campuses in light of environmental issues. David Orr (1993) wrote the forward to 
Campus Ecology. The language he uses in framing the book closely resembles patterns 
in my study participant’s talk. Pay specific attention to the realist tone of the following 
quotation, the importance of the laboratory metaphor, as well as the characterization of 
those working in behalf of the environment: 
Campus Ecology uses the campus as a laboratory for the study of resource flows 
and for the implementation of environmentally sound alternatives. […] It seeks 
to solve real problems that are embedded in organizations whose decisions shape 
our lives and environment. Most importantly, this is a book about educating 
people to think broadly, observe carefully, and act responsibly. [… It] is a vision 
of renewed educational institutions that lead by example, that catalyze change, 
and that help communities move toward sustainability. I encourage you to 
become an active part of this urgent process of renewal and transformation. (Orr, 
1993, p. 12) 
 
This passage reads quite a lot like the foundational texts for the Office of Sustainability 
that I studied. Some of those documents were discussed in Chapter 2 and will be 
addressed in subsequent chapters. For now, it is enough to point out that certain 
communicative styles have emerged as common to communication about sustainability 
on campus. However, those communication patterns are rarely given critical scrutiny. 
 Smith’s (1993) early work was followed by similar publications. Creighton’s 
(1998) Greening the Ivory Tower is on the bookshelves in the OS where I did my 
research. Creighton’s approach to the subject of campus sustainability is similar to 
Smith’s. For example, Creighton gives considerable weight to quantitative assessment 
and less to matters associated with qualitative data. She writes, “Qualitative data are lists 
of actions that have been undertaken to reduce waste or improve conservation without 
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specific quantitative measurements of their results” (p. 34). It is reductionist to regard 
qualitative data as mere lists of actions. However, environmental communicators 
commonly reduce complex realities into action steps, lists, and bullet points in the 
interest of being practical—or sounding practical, at the least (Luke, 1997). 
Nevertheless, publications like these very often merely list actions and dwell upon 
quantitative measurement of those actions (for a more recent example, see Corcoran & 
Wals, 2004).  
Book collections of case studies are increasingly common (e.g., Barlett & Chase, 
2004; Filho, 2000), and case studies are among the most frequently published sort of 
article in the International Journal of Sustainability in Higher Education. Recent 
handbooks and case studies retain the bias toward “behaviors” and best practices, but 
demonstrate greater sensitivity toward the role of culture, aesthetics, and symbols (see 
e.g., Aber, Kelly, & Mallory, 2009; Simpson, 2008). Sustainability is a multifaceted 
concept and its meaning is dependent upon the contexts in which it is used (Peterson, 
1997). Subtle and thorough investigations of the qualitative dimensions of sustainability 
are important because the term’s negotiated meanings will affect outcomes on campus. 
Furthermore, many campus advocates have struggled to maintain the integrity of 
“sustainability” while avoiding its marginalization (Newport, Chesnes, & Lindner, 
2003).  
  Most of the titles discussed in this section are compendia of best practices and 
confessional narratives of sustainability at specific institutions. They provide broad 
stories about attempts to legitimate sustainability discourses on university and college 
campuses, but they do not provide much analytic attention to organizational 
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communication. Where communication is addressed directly, it is usually talked about as 
a conduit for information and a medium for coalition building (see Axley, 1984; Putnam 
& Boys, 2006). These publications certainly do not address the ways in which 
knowledge is constructed through the confrontation of system-level contradictions. Of 
course, Peter Senge and colleagues’ various applications of organizational learning 
theories to the problem of sustainability—which, importantly, emphasize contradictions 
and systems thinking—seem to be popular amongst university-based sustainability 
officers (Senge, 1990; Senge, Laur, Schley, & Smith, 2006; Senge, Scharmer, Jaworski, 
& Flowers, 2004; Senge et al., 2008). However, the work reviewed in this section 
certainly does not treat communication as constitutive of knowledge.  
This study offers perspectives on campus sustainability officers and advocates’ 
lay theories of communication and related concepts. I intend to go beyond mere 
description of the meanings of sustainability in this case. My goal is to elucidate (1) 
participants’ communication practices and (2) the claims that they make about 
communication. It is my hope that this study provides scholars, environmental 
communication officers, and other people with some insight into the place of 
communication in organizations’ sustainability efforts. To date, communication has been 
given limited attention in writings about sustainability on campus. So, I use the 
“problem of sustainability” as a starting point for crafting a unique approach to lay 
theorization of communication. 
 
Why Communication Critique of Sustainability Is Important 
This dissertation treats “sustainability” as an environmental communication 
neologism. The term clearly has multiple meanings. In Orion Magazine, one author 
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listed 18 unique “theses” on human-natural world relationships that are suggested by 
people’s use of the word (Zencey, 2010). Such ambiguity is inherent in the concept, and 
people strategically exploit that ambiguity (Peterson, 1997). The variability of 
sustainability’s meaning is even more evident when you consider its applications in 
organizational, economic, and policy contexts—not to mention personal, activist, or 
natural science contexts.2  
 In this section, I track some of the variety of meanings given to sustainability in 
everyday talk and popular writing. I do not yet delve into the data from my case study of 
the Office of Sustainability at Intermountain West University. Instead, I draw from 
writing, colloquialisms, and expressions that are readily familiar to many or most people 
who would call themselves “sustainability advocates/supporters.” Everyday language 
embodies certain cultural assumptions for those people working in established 
organizations, as well as those people organizing for particular goals; such expressions 
help to shape people’s perception and action (see, e.g., Cheney, Lair, Ritz, & Kendall, 
2010, on professional ethics and communication; Clair, 1996, on the phrase “get a real 
job”). For that reason, this section traces the meaning of sustainability as in several 
contexts. 
 Peterson (1997) explains in her thorough rhetorical analysis of the twin terms 
sustainability/sustainable development that, as with any “totalizing construct” (p. 2), 
sustainable development’s rhetorical strength lies in its philosophical ambiguity 
and range. As an oxymoron, the term both draws attention to the obstacles 
intrinsic to resisting exploitation (which brings temporary profits but future 
losses) and encourages the invention of alternative forms of resistance. […] If 
sustainable development is to become more than another meaningless bit of 




The practical uses to which the concept is being put should be considered. Here is why: 
The concept of sustainability entwines human interests with extra-human interests, 
science with ethics and politics, social sciences with natural sciences, and so on. To 
begin to understand what it is people may be talking about when they talk about 
“sustainability,” we should first ask, “Sustainability with regard to what?” In the 
subsections that follow, I explore sustainability’s lexical meanings and their application 
to organizations and ecology. 
 
Lexical Meanings of Sustainability 
The root word for sustainability is sustain, of course. Let us start, however, with 
ability. Ability can be defined as the quality of being able to do something, as a skill or 
talent, or as a capacity. Among those definitions, the first and last are the ones most 
commonly suggested by everyday discussions of sustainability and “sustainable 
practices.” The second sense of ability—that is, ability as a skill or talent that is innate or 
learned—is addressed by Peterson (1997), but primarily in the negative. She borrows 
Burke’s notion of trained incapacity, “a condition in which our abilities ‘function as a 
blindness’” (p. 43). The implication is that certain learned skills blind people, 
individually and collectively, to the unsustainability of the status quo. Trained 
incapacities also complicate attempts to cultivate alternative, “sustainable” skills.3 
Lightheartedly, we might call this a “sustaininability.” In any case, it is interesting to 
consider that organizations may need to develop some kind of ability to be sustainable. 
A survey of several dictionaries also yields a commonsense list of definitions for 
the word sustain. Some definitions are less frequently associated with the 
environmentalist uses of the term sustainability. In each of the next four paragraphs, I 
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discuss what several lexical meanings for sustain might mean for sustainability as an 
ideograph.4 
 The definition of sustain most commonly associated with environmentalist 
discourse involves terms like continuance, endurance, and maintained. Things—be they 
practices, organizations, or ecological systems—are sustainable if they can be continued 
or maintained. The so-called sustainable entity or activity is durable over some 
(presumably extended) period of time. The expression “think sustainably” therefore 
means to think of the long-term effects of an activity or of the long-term wellbeing of 
some group or thing. (What counts as “long-term” is, of course, open to debate.) The 
sense that present conditions cannot be continued into perpetuity contributes a great deal 
to the theme of crisis in sustainability rhetoric, which I discuss later in this chapter.  
 A second lexical meaning for sustain relates to with the provision of sustenance. 
In this case, the word sustain derives its meaning from a kind of service. One thing 
serves to sustain another, as, for instance, food sustains human life. This meaning can be 
found in arguments that treat the natural world as the fundamental source of humanity’s 
sustenance. It is the source of conceptions of the extra-human world as the ground and 
society as the figure—or, similarly, thinking of the natural world as base and humanity’s 
creations as superstructure. Such an image is reflected in the theme of ecological 
foundations, which I discuss later. This sense of the term sustain does not universally 
connote disaster, however. For example, Van Jones (2009), an environmental justice 
activist and former advisor to President Obama, represents an emerging perspective on 
sustainability and economics. His talk of “green collar jobs” presents sustainability-
related economic change as the wellspring of greater economic prosperity and equity. 
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Sustainable economies are said to offer whole communities sustenance through the 
preservation of several types of capital (see also Hawken, Lovins, & Lovins, 1999; 
McKibben, 2007). In other words, reorganizing societies according to sustainability 
principles affords richer sustenance to a greater number of people. Thus, sustainability 
rhetoric suggests that the present form of human society undermines its own 
prerequisites, but may be saved/enriched by a turn to broad environmentalist values. 
 A third definition presents an interesting possibility: Sustain means to bear or 
endure, as in the phrase “sustain an injury.” This definition resembles Burke’s (1969a) 
account of the tragic frame. In tragedy, the agonist suffers the consequence of his, her, 
or others’ passions. Peterson (1997) argues that the idea of sustainability is more 
commonly associated with comedy, and that the idea should be critiqued from that 
perspective: 
The comic frame offers the more humane corrective to troubling situations. It 
encourages acceptance of material conditions by acknowledging that all aspects 
of reality are somehow related to all others, whereas the tragic frame emphasizes 
separation and division, which encourages oppositional interpretations of 
situations. (p. 39) 
  
Yet scholars have recently challenged the comic framing of environmental problems and 
conflicts. Schwarze (2006) challenges Burke’s (and, by extension, Peterson’s) 
valorization of the comic frame. Schwarze demonstrates the value of environmental 
melodrama for communicators who are systematically marginalized and harmed by the 
very social institutions meant to deal with environmental matters. Žižek (2009) and 
Sturgeon (2009) argue that the unity and harmony implicit in popular images of ecology 
minimize the politics that must be addressed in order to achieve substantial social 
movement. Humans have not borne the environmental degradations of modernity 
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equally, and they will not equally share in the benefit of environmental “progress” as it 
is currently conceived (Kendall, 2008). These points are related to the theme of 
revolution in a good deal of sustainability-related discourse. 
 The fourth and last definition of the word sustain gets its meaning from law and 
science. To sustain can mean to corroborate, prove, or affirm. Like the third definition I 
discussed, this one is not frequently associated with the environmentalist discourses of 
sustainability. Still, it should be apparent that the language of sustainability could be 
used to legitimate worldviews and ideologies.5 This meaning of “sustain” reveals the 
self-affirming nature of sustainability discourse. When a particular program or 
perspective is aligned with the concept of sustainability, it may enjoy increased appeal 
or acceptance. After all, who would be against ongoing and enriched human life? Zoller 
(2003) demonstrates a similar consequence in the promotion of “health” at a workplace 
recreational facility. Managerialist values were positively associated with “health,” an 
abstract concept that is difficult to contest, and workers lost some autonomy as a result. 
The same is possible with talk about sustainability. For that reason and the others 
described above, any application of sustainability deserves critical attention.   
 
Organizational Meanings of Sustainability 
For a moment, let us strip the term sustainability of any connotations of the 
natural world. Assume that sustainability is a concept that has nothing whatsoever to do 
with ecology or the environment. Now consider what the term might mean for 
organizations and their members. Against this backdrop, the preoccupation with being 
“sustainable” is certainly not new. Indeed, research on organizational autopoesis, or self-
organizing, has demonstrated that organizations exist largely to perpetuate themselves 
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(Luhmann, 1990; Taylor, 2006). In the 1930s, Barnard (1938/1968) made the case that 
organizations are essentially transient. Even the mightiest organizations fail or 
fundamentally change with remarkable frequency. Sustainable organizations are 
exceptional, not normal. For this reason, the contemporary sense of sustainability 
(grounded in the language of ecology) is a present-day manifestation of an old goal: 
durability over time. Granted, the concept of ecological sustainability suggests meanings 
related to social justice and the wellbeing of the commons. Nevertheless, organizational 
talk about ecological sustainability is often grounded in anxiety over the permanence of 
the collective. After all, very few organizations ever willfully end their own existence 
(Cheney, 2002). As one participant in this study put it to me: “The bottom line is this: 
We can’t keep doing this forever.” His statement and others like it are based upon the 
belief that the status quo cannot be maintained. Moreover, the belief goes, if it is 
maintained, the organization will be placed in jeopardy. Thus, sustainability is and has 
been a fundamental organizational concern—a concern that predates (but is not the same 
as) public anxiety about the global environment. 
The lexical and organizational meanings of sustainability sketched above largely 
connote stability and durability. By contrast, Papa, Singhal, and Papa (2006) describe 
the ways in which organizing for social change is inherently dynamic. Four dialectics 
characterize those change processes: control-emancipation, oppression-empowerment, 
dissemination-dialogue, and fragmentation-unity. Remaking organizations in the interest 
of sustainability should involve some measure of these social change processes (see 
Pepper, 1984). People negotiate the dialectics through praxis, but can never fully resolve 
the oppositions. This insight draws attention to the second meaning of ability described 
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above. The “sustainable organization”—as a fixed, stable, perfected entity—is a fiction. 
Or, at the least, it is an idealization. I believe that it is more reasonable to speak of 
sustainability organizing. Crafting and maintaining organizations that are less 
ecologically disruptive and destructive, more humane, and more economically sound is 
an ongoing and complex process. Importantly, that process requires people to grapple 
endlessly with the dialectics of social change. In the context of the environmental 
transformation of organizations, we might call this sustainment. Such a process-centered 
term is more appropriate for our purposes than the simple adjective “sustainable.”  
 
Ecological Meanings of Sustainability 
The science of ecology provides the central images and root metaphors for 
contemporary environmentalism (Pepper, 1984). Ecological rhetoric offers much to 
environmental advocates. It explains complex interactions and interdependencies 
between species and places. Similarly, the science of ecology offers a useful shorthand 
conceptualization of locales as open systems. And yet, ecosystemic perspectives may 
also excuse the increased mechanization of the world. The thinking (and speaking) goes 
like this: Some objective kind of “ecosystem” is threatened. Technology is required to 
moderate the relationship between humans and the planet. The implicit logic: “The 
active subject humanity threatens the object earth” (DeLuca, 2005, p. 72). That easy 
assumption deserves critique. 
Capra’s (2002) The Hidden Connections fused social theory and ecosystem 
theory to articulate “a science of sustainability.” He treats the material sciences as the 
study of matter (material structure) and form (pattern of organization) in process (the 
interaction of the previous two over time). Capra points out that different branches of the 
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physical sciences tend to focus on different elements of this trinity. His perspective 
unifies the three. To understand human life and sociality, he adds a fourth component: 
meaning. Meaningfulness and meaning-oriented practices “play no role in most of the 
nonhuman world but are essential to human social life,” writes Capra (p.73). He does, 
however, argue that the human and extrahuman worlds both organize around the 
fundamental principle of self-reference. Above, I discussed the role of autopoeisis in 
organization theory. Capra insists that self-creation and self-reference are characteristic 
of human and nonhuman worlds. Much writing about sustainability involves or implies 
this claim. For instance, Benyus’ (1998) concept of biomimicry seeks to redesign human 
systems according to the apparently natural elements of ecosystems. Leopold’s (1949) 
conception of biotic community positions humans as members of a network or energetic 
exchanges rather than as conquerors of the community. These approaches and others 
accord ethical significance to the ecosystemic perspective, itself. That is, these positions 
assume that a clearer, systemic perspective is possible, preferable, and necessary. 
The notion of sustainability assumes that human beings can threaten or are 
threatening ecosystems locally and globally. The discourse of sustainability assumes that 
humans can order their activities in a manner that sustains ecologies. The notions of 
ecology that lie at the core of sustainability discourse position humans as members of 
ecosystems, but exceptional ones. Our exceptional quality lies in the extent to which we 
are self-reflective and the degree to which our technologies enable us to affect the rest of 
existence. Bullis (1996) points out that ideologies like ecofeminism may serve human 
and nonhuman interests by drawing the two closer together. At the same time, she notes, 
conflating human and extrahuman interests may in fact deepen the domination of nature. 
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McKibben (1989) labeled this the “second death of nature.” This second death is 
essentially the mechanization of the world described above. The problem is: If human 
beings are making ecosystems less sustainable or unsustainable, how are we to respond? 
The ecosystemic themes in sustainability discourse may, on one hand, encourage people 
to relinquish (the idea of) control of natural systems. On the other hand, this discourse 
may encourage deeper human involvement in and/or control of natural systems in order 
to “save” and sustain them. Consider the example of geoengineering. Some 
geoengineers support large-scale alteration of environments in order to remake those 
environments in the image of “healthy” ecosystems, and their arguments are 
increasingly popular. The irony, of course, is that the image of ecosystem health is 
usually a more “natural” and less human-dominated one. 
 
Summary 
Sustainability discourse certainly encourages thinking in terms of a crude binary 
(i.e., sustainable-unsustainable). Yet it is rarely the case that perspectives on 
environmental issues are so easily dichotomized (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992). 
Indeed, the meaning of sustainability in any given situation is part of the social 
construction of that very situation. Moreover, participants’ theories of communication 
will influence the social construction of the situation, and thus the meaning ascribed to 
sustainability—a tautology, if ever there was one (Waddell, 1995). What is to be 
sustained, how it is to be sustained, and why it is to be sustained is often ambiguous or 
implicit in sustainability discourse. This problem draws our attention to the importance 
of interest and motive in the practical use of sustainability discourse (cf. Schwarze, 
2007). Rather than fret over specific definitions of sustainability, it is more fruitful to 
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track the interests of those who employ sustainability discourse. As well, it is important 
to look at the ways in which the features of sustainability discourse, itself, can motivate 
people. Burke (1936) makes the point eloquently:  
Our interests may tend to confine our thinking with in certain channels, being 
prejudicial to the extent that they give us cues as to what we shall stress or 
disregard. But interests need not deceive us in the sense that “the wish is father to 
the thought.” (p. 330) 
 
Sustainability rhetoric usually draws from some of the lexical meanings of sustain more 
than others, and its application in the realm of organizations and ecologies bear similar 
meanings. In the next section, I describe several major themes in sustainability rhetoric. 
I argue that these themes stem from and are reinforced by the appropriation of some 
definitions of sustainability more frequently than others. 
 
Major Themes in Sustainability Rhetoric 
At least three themes run through most popular, high profile takes on 
sustainability: (1) ecological foundations, (2) crisis, and (3) revolution. I believe that 
these thematic elements are due in part to the selective use of some meanings relevant to 
sustainability. First, the predominant if implicit definition of ability as capacity, rather 
than skill, contributes to the prevalence of these themes in sustainability rhetoric. 
Second, defining sustain as continuation or life-giving, rather than suffering or 
affirmation, also contributes to the overwhelming prevalence of these themes. 
Additionally, organizations’ preoccupation with maintaining a stable existence 
reinforces these themes, as does reliance on the language of ecology.  
I intentionally use the term rhetoric in this section on three major themes of 
sustainability rhetoric. In Chapter 4, I address the difference between rhetoric and 
  
65
discourse; please see that chapter for a more extensive discussion. While I acknowledge 
that there are many definitions, let me simply define rhetoric as language and other 
symbols used in the service of some sort of influence. There are three reasons that the 
term rhetoric applies to the texts, messages, and colloquialisms interpreted below. First, 
the communication(s) I address is (or are) active attempts to construct, influence, and 
represent “social knowledge” about sustainability (Farrell, 1976). Second, most all of the 
examples demonstrate “the art of the persuasive dimension in discourse” (Leff, 1999, p. 
62). In other words, these examples are all attempts to persuade, to use language in order 
to influence others in some way. Moreover and third, I am reconstructing “textual 
fragments” in order to make an argument about the “discursive fragments of context” in 
which sustainability advocates make claims (McGee, 1990, p. 287). According to this 
third treatment of rhetoric, we can think about my writing in two ways. On one hand, I 
am trying to show you the symbolic situation in which people usually make claims about 
sustainability. On another, I am gathering together the symbolic resources with which 
people usually make such claims. So, those are three different rationales for adopting the 
label rhetoric, and each helps explain why I am critiquing sustainability rhetoric in this 
section. That is, according to a variety of definitions, it is appropriate for me to say, for 
the purposes of this chapter, that I am critiquing sustainability rhetoric. 
 
Ecological Foundations 
The first theme appearing consistently in sustainability rhetoric is the belief or 
claim that ecosystems are the fundament of human existence. The gist of this theme is 
that open, dynamic, living systems are the foundation of all life on Earth. Pepper (1984, 
p. 68) calls this a “neoplatonic cosmology.” Put another way, ecology is inextricably 
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part of being human; humans cannot rise above or conquer the biotic webs that make up 
Nature with a capital N.  
To put this theme in perspective, take Corbett’s (2006) spectrum of 
environmental ideologies. Her spectrum is bounded by two polar worldviews, 
anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. Insistence on ecological foundations is not limited to 
the most strident ecocentric ideologies. Rather, the theme is simply a repudiation of the 
central tenets of anthropocentric ideology, an ideology which coheres around the 
premise that “humans are superior to and dominate the rest of creation, and the natural 
world is ranked hierarchically with humans at the top [… and] humans consider 
themselves separate from nature, if not alienated from and fearful of it” (Corbett, p. 27).  
A good and widely cited example of this first theme comes from Gaylord 
Nelson, the former U.S. senator who established Earth Day. The quotation is particularly 
apropos because Nelson uses the anthropocentric language of the economy to argue in 
favor of the perspective I have described. Nelson (2002) says that “explaining things in 
economic terms helps” people understand environmentalist perspectives: 
The economy is a wholly owned subsidiary of the environment. All economic 
activity is dependent upon that environment and its underlying resource base of 
forests, water, air, soil, and minerals. When the environment is finally forced to 
file for bankruptcy because its resource base has been polluted, degraded, 
dissipated, and irretrievably compromised, the economy goes into bankruptcy 
with it. The economy is, after all, just a subset within the ecological system. (p. 
18) 
 
Nelson’s metaphor uses the language of economics in order to secure a more 
fundamental place for ecology. “The environment” is the foundation of a thriving 
economy and thus of a thriving human population. The necessity of ecology is apparent 
in the clichés of environmentalism, as well. Take, for instance, the image of “Mother 
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Earth,” in which humans are born collectively from our Mother, who nurtures, protects, 
and sustains us. Without her, we do not exist. Bumper stickers with pictures of the globe 
implore people to “Love Your Mother.” As you can see, this thematic treatment of 
ecology runs through metaphors, aphorisms, and images associated with sustainability. 
 This theme is common in university-related sustainability rhetoric, too. As a 
trope, “ecological foundations” is often used as a marker of change. That is, the problem 
of sustainability is said to necessitate systemic, total, or transformative changes in 
behavior, culture, and/or technological infrastructure. The director of the Harvard Green 
Campus Initiative (now Harvard Office for Sustainability) wrote this way about “the 
environmental imperative”: 
In short, every natural life support system is in long term systemic decline and 
every human contributes directly or indirectly to the escalation of this decline. If 
universities are going to survive into the next century, they must not only 
respond to this new force which, for the duration of this essay, will be termed the 
environmental imperative, but they must also provide leadership for broader 
society. (Sharp, n.d., p. 3) 
 
The director goes on to cite the work of Peter Senge, arguing, “Universities must 
become learning organizations, as well as teaching and research institutions” (Sharp, 
n.d., p. 3). The director’s vision of learning organizations involves confrontation of the 
“absurd consensus” that produces “the [current] degree of inaction around this 
profoundly life threatening situation”—that is, “the demise of the planetary systems that 
support human life” (p. 8). Unsurprisingly, Harvard University is frequently cited as a 
“leader” in the campus sustainability organizing movement. Rhetoric like that of the 
Harvard Green Campus Initiative is representative of patterns in sustainability rhetoric at 
institutions of higher education. Insistence on ecological foundations is pervasive in 





The theme of global crisis also pervades sustainability rhetoric. It should be 
obvious that the prospect of an unsustainable society and/or natural world is a crisis for 
humanity. In fact, there are twin crises implied in the popular rhetoric of sustainability. 
The first crisis is said to exist because of humanity’s disruption or destruction of natural 
things and processes. The natural world is presumably in peril. And, given the theme of 
ecological foundations, humanity is thus in peril, too. The most widely known proponent 
of such a view is Al Gore. His 2006 book and associated multimedia campaign, An 
Inconvenient Truth: The Planetary Emergency of Global Warming and What We Can 
Do About It, is principally designed to instill a sense of crisis in audience members. The 
title for Gore’s (1992) other much-heralded book, Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the 
Human Spirit, hints at both of the first two themes, ecology and crisis. Other prominent 
though less well-known environmentalists rely explicitly on the crisis frame in their 
writings for broad audiences. Environmental philosopher David Orr (2009), whom I 
discussed at length above, titled his recent book on the science and social implications of 
anthropogenic climate change Down to the Wire: Confronting the Climate Collapse. 
These titles owe much of their perspective on global crisis to Rachel Carson (1962), who 
wrote in the classic Silent Spring, “We stand now where two roads diverge. But […] 
they are not equally fair. The road we have long been traveling is deceptively easy, a 
smooth superhighway on which we progress with great speed, but at its end lies disaster” 
(p. 277). The first sense of crisis in sustainability rhetoric locates this disaster first and 
foremost within the natural world. 
  
69
The second sort of crisis prevalent in sustainability rhetoric is human-centered. 
For those who are not ecological fundamentalists, “sustainability” labels the crisis facing 
human social systems. Their reasoning is that, while natural systems may be severely 
disrupted by human activity, social systems are more immediately threatened. Comedian 
George Carlin (1992) humorously (and crudely) captured this position when he quipped, 
“The planet is fine. The people are fucked.” An example is Kuntsler’s (2005) bleak book 
on the intersection of a number of challenges, titled The Long Emergency: Surviving the 
End of Oil, Climate Change, and Other Converging Catastrophes of the Twenty-first 
Century. More sober engagements with this second sense of crisis usually talk about the 
economic consequences of remaining unsustainable. The collection Changing Climate, 
Changing Economy (Touffut, 2009) represents this position well. These essays assume 
that economics as currently practiced simply cannot be sustained—or can be sustained, 
but at too great a cost. The authors of Natural Capitalism (Hawken, Lovins, & Lovins, 
1999) draw upon the second crisis frame when they write: “We believe that the world 
stands on the threshold of basic changes in the conditions of business. Companies that 
ignore the message of natural capitalism do so at their peril. […] What we are saying is 
more pressing than a request.” (p. xiii). Rhetoric of this ilk brackets the question of 
whether or not the natural world is fundamentally in jeopardy. The focus is instead upon 
substantial threats to present-day lifestyles or social systems. Whether or not 
sustainability advocates dwell on the foundational relationship between human life and 
ecosystems, most all of them raise the specter of global crisis for society, nature, or both. 
Scholars have picked up on this theme. After all, throughout its history, 
environmentalism has been colored by apocalyptic and jeremiadic language (Daniels, 
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1999; Killingsworth & Palmer, 1995; Opie & Elliot, 1996). In the inaugural essay of the 
journal Environmental Communication, Cox (2007) proposed that the environmental 
communication be treated as a “crisis discipline.” Cox compared our discipline to 
conservation biology, arguing that scholars have a moral responsibility to address our 
“moment of conjunctural crisis, defined in not insignificant ways by human-caused 
threats to both biological systems and human communities, and also by the continuing 
failure of societal institutions to sufficiently engage these pressures” (p. 6). In response, 
Schwarze (2007) argued that the frame “discipline of crisis” better suits the intellectual 
and moral commitments of communication scholars. He meant that “a truly reflexive, 
crisis-oriented environmental communication discipline should make environmental 
crisis itself a central theoretical concept and object of inquiry” (p. 94, emphasis in 
original). Either way, leading scholars locate the crisis trope at the heart of 
environmental communication studies, though it is just one element of the discipline. 
 
Revolution 
The third theme prevalent in sustainability rhetoric is revolution. In some 
instances, the move to more sustainable humanity is nothing short of a sweeping 
overthrow of the status quo. Such a radical shift is taken as necessary, given the kinds of 
crises evident in the second theme of sustainability rhetoric. In our darker moments, the 
OS staff and I would sit and talk about the overwhelming scale of change we thought 
was necessary; we would sometimes confess to one another that we felt as though 
“radical change” wasn’t likely across the globe, in our region, or even for IWU. We 
hardly felt as though we were participating in what the social critic David Korten (2007) 
calls “the great turning.” 
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  The idea that social change toward sustainability involves a revolution pervades 
sustainability rhetoric. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman is perhaps the best 
known advocate of social sustainably writing today. In his bestselling Hot, Flat, and 
Crowded, Friedman (2008) claims that the social change required is nothing short of 
systemic: “And in politics and economics, there is a simple term that describes the 
process of replacing one system with another: revolution. Some people say that is what 
we’re having right now—a green revolution. I beg to differ” (p. 246, emphasis in 
original). Friedman characterizes the current approach to sustainability as one in which 
“everybody gets to play, everybody’s a winner, nobody gets hurt, and nobody has to do 
anything hard. As I said, that’s not the definition of a revolution. That’s the definition of 
a party” (p. 252). Another bestselling book, insists that the move to sustainability is or 
must be revolutionary; the titular tagline for Natural Capitalism is “the next industrial 
revolution” (Hawken, Lovins, & Lovins, 1999). 
In other instances, the theme of revolution is exploited in an offhanded or banal 
way. The sentiment that ecological-mindedness is at root a revolution can be seen in the 
following comment by noted scholar of ecological education David Orr (2005); it is, 
however, one casual statement in a litany of observations about contemporary changes: 
“The possibilities for transforming manufacturing and technology to mimic natural 
systems are revolutionary” (p. x). Organizational learning guru Peter Senge wrote The 
Necessary Revolution with a team of management and sustainability experts (Senge, 
Smith, Kruschwitz, Laur, & Schley, 2008). While the authors describe the sustainability 
revolution as “perhaps the greatest learning challenge humans have ever faced,” they 
insist that their book—grounded in the metaphor of a revolution, mind you—“is not pie-
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in-the-sky rhetoric or intellectual idealism, but in fact […reflects] ways organizations 
and individuals are already working together” (p. 12). This is the domestication of 
revolution. As an added example, take Lester Brown’s (2009) very popular Plan B series 
of books. (Brown was among the first intellectuals to define and disseminate knowledge 
about sustainable development [see Peterson, 1997].) The most recent edition, Plan B 
4.0, is billed in the subtitle as a plan for “mobilizing to save civilization.” Revolution 
plays an interesting role in this plan for civilization’s salvation. In two chapters, Brown 
details the possibility of a “lighting revolution” and an “efficiency revolution.” These are 
technical and technological feats, for the most part. When it comes to society, however, 
Brown calls for “social change” rather than social revolution.  
Such a move points up “a possible problem with trying to create an appeal that 
communicates both a sense of urgency and a plan for action,” as Killingsworth and 
Palmer (1992, p. 263) observed of Brown’s writing in the 1980s. When such rhetoric is 
considered as a whole, the impression is this: The so-called sustainability revolution 
ought to be a revolution, but not that kind of revolution. 
 
Critical Perspectives from Communication and Organization Studies 
These themes are not inconsequential. McGee (1980b) points out that the 
movement of social movements is primarily an effect of rhetoric. That is, social 
movements cohere around sets of meanings, and their “success” is determined according 
to social negotiations rather than objective measures. As such, the variability within and 
across the three themes discussed here is problematic. Ecosystems are supposedly the 
foundation of humanity, but exclusively human crises should be sufficient to motivate 
action. The crises facing humanity are supposedly total and sweeping, but the 
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sustainability revolution is strangely modest and progressive. In short, the rhetoric of 
sustainability suggests that advocates of sustainability hedge their bets, so to speak. The 
argument might go like this: ecocentrism is a necessary part of social change, though it 
is necessary to say so only when persuasive. Also, the social change advocated is a 
radical response to unprecedented crisis, but it won’t upset the status quo too greatly or 
violently. Some critics examine these fault lines and assert:  
Environmentalism is tired. It is a movement both institutionalized and insipid. 
The vast majority of Americans claim to be environmentalists while buying ever 
more SUVs, leaf-blowers, and uncountable plastic consumer goods. Indeed, 
environmentalism itself has become just another practice of consumerism, a 
matter of buying Audubon memberships, Ansel Adams calendars, and 
“biodegradable” plastic bags with one’s Sierra Club credit card. As a practice of 
everyday life, environmentalism has devolved into another lifestyle choice. 
(DeLuca, 2005, p. 67) 
 
Sustainability rhetoric has too frequently been used to quell controversy and make 
environmentalism marketable or politically palatable. This sentiment was evident in a 
turn of phrase from one professor of biology in my study: “The point is not for us to 
figure out how to be less unsustainable.” 
It is important to ask whether or not the rhetoric of sustainability is suitable for 
the task of transforming organizations. Scholars of organizational communication have 
begun to respond to those questions. The critiques they provide largely respond to the 
insight that modern language obscures humanity’s multifarious relationships to nature: 
These remnants of symbolic signifiers of nature express a relationship to nature 
that strives to efface everything which cannot be measured by the yardstick of 
utility. Modern society has made great strides in the attempt to erase these 
broader symbolic meanings from its collective consciousness. (Eder, 1996, p. 
viii) 
 
 Ecofeminists (e.g., Bullis, 1996), poststructuralists (e.g., Livesey & Graham, 2007; 
Livesey & Kearins, 2002), Marxists (e.g., Luke, 2001), and others (e.g., Campbell, 
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Follender, & Shane, 1998) have examined the processes by which organizations’ 
environmental rhetoric position organizational interests above social justice and 
environmental wellbeing. In other words, it seems as though the bulk of organizational 
rhetoric dealing with sustainability serves organizational image above all else and may, 
in fact, deepen rather than resolve environmental problems. After all, the language of 
organizational proactivity and dialogue, especially corporate versions of those practices, 
can be used to systematically distort communication (Zoller, 2004; Zoller & Tener, 
2010). While sustainability is usually framed as a grand prospect for organizations, 
economies, and societies—sometimes even all life on Earth—organizational 
sustainability rhetoric has been shown to limit rather than promote change (Ganesh, 
2007). Organizational sustainability rhetoric can exemplify organizational narcissism, 
meaning that it has more to do with image making than anything else (Ganesh, 2003). It 
is important to locate these problems within the larger prospects suggested by 
sustainability as an iteration of the U.S. environmental movement. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has addressed the language of sustainability, with specific attention 
to the idea of sustainability in higher education. Sustainability on campus may manifest 
itself with reference to the term’s lexical, organizational, or ecological meanings. 
Broader rhetorics of sustainability entail the themes of ecological foundations, crisis, and 
revolution, but texts focused on higher education have concentrated on developing 
practical metrics and sharing stories about success and disappointment in particular 
cases. This is an instance of fusion more than confusion. For, sustainability discourse is 
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an example par excellence of what Burke (1969a) terms the principle of merger: “the 
comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea” (p. 403). 
 If sustainability is scattered particulars in one idea, communication of or about it 
will be complex. I want to understand how people make knowledge claims about 
sustainability and also what they (claim to) know about communicating that knowledge. 
The way we frame the environment matters (Lakoff, 2010), and I contend that the ways 
in which we treat communication for organization’s environmental change matters, as 
well. In the next chapter, I develop a unique theoretical perspective on lay theory and 
theorizing. That perspective is based upon a review of literature on lay theory from 
several disciplines, including communication studies. The framework I create in Chapter 
4 should provide a useful way to look at people’s lay theorization about sustainability, 





1 A brief reminder to the reader: I acknowledge the fact that speaking of “nature and 
society” or “the human and the extrahuman” tends to reify dichotomous thinking about 
environmental matters. For the sake of clear expression, I will occasionally use these 
sorts of labels and comparisons. Please bear in mind the limitations of such expressions. 
 
2




 This treatment of ability is akin to Tsoukas’ (2005) definition of organizational 
knowledge as a “capability [that] members of an organization have developed to draw 
distinctions in the process of carrying out their work, in particular concrete contexts, by 
enacting sets of generalizations” (p. 128). The application of those generalizations 
“depends upon historically evolved collective understandings and experiences” (p. 128). 
 
4
 See Chapter 4 for a definition and discussion of ideographs. 
 
5
 Rhetorically-oriented scholars have begun to critique the way in which potentially 
contentious plans are made palatable by virtue of their association with concept of 






THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
This chapter provides theoretical perspectives on the issues that I deal with 
throughout this dissertation. Chapter 4 is divided into four major sections. First, I 
explain how I will use the terms communication, discourse, and rhetoric. Second, I offer 
a perspective on organization that is rooted in the interpretive turn organization studies. 
Third, I build an argument for a communication-centered approach to lay theory and 
theorizing. Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) conception of “interpretive repertoires” plays a 
special role in that approach. The theoretical framework I develop is similar to 
perspectives on narrative, metaphor, framing, and sensemaking in organization studies, 
so I offer comparisons to each. Fourth and finally, I use the perspective I have 
established to critically review select literature on lay theory from three different 
disciplines. Ultimately, this chapter presents a perspective on lay theory and theorizing 
that is centered on discourse and discursive practice, appropriate for organizational 
research, and responsive to scholarship from multiple disciplines and epistemological 
traditions. 
 
Perspective on Communication 
This section defines communication, discourse, and rhetoric. I position discourse 
as a form of communication, and rhetoric as a form of discourse. At the end of the section, 
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I explain that a discursive-rhetorical view of communication is appropriate for this study 
because sustainability is an ideograph, which is a term that links rhetoric to ideology and 
broader discursive practice. 
 
Communication 
I will use Cheney, Christensen, Zorn, and Ganesh’s (2004) definition of 
organizational communication: “It is a complex system of symbols, messages, efforts, 
and activities—a network of contributions from its members and from people and groups 
outside of its boundaries” (p. 8). This definition has several useful features. First, the 
definition encompasses a range of practices, which is important to organizational 
communication’s status as a practical discipline (Cheney, 2007; Craig, 1989). Second, 
this definition emphasizes that organizations are really ongoing processes of organizing, 
and that person’s contributions are always situated and incomplete (see Weick, 1979). 
Thus, communication is a primary means by which people organize.  
I treat communication as a master category encompassing a variety of types of 
meaning making and information sharing. As I explain below, discourse is the language-
centered dimension of communication and rhetoric is a particular kind of discursive 
practice. Thus, early on I framed this dissertation project as case study of rhetorical 




Fairhurst and Putnam (2004) also position communication as a broad, 
encompassing domain of meaning making. They write: 
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We contend that “communication” and “discourse” are not synonymous. […] A 
concern for discursive formations encapsulates but goes beyond the linguistic. 
Communication, as distinct from discourse, is a related but broader construct that 
encompasses research residing outside discourse studies, for example network 
analysis, information processing, and message flow. Thus a language emphasis 
distinguishes the discursive from the more general communicative approach. (p. 
7) 
 
As language-centric investigation, organizational discourse analyses borrow from a 
variety of disciplines (Fairclough, 1993; Grant, Hardy, Ostwick, & Putnam, 2004; Grant, 
Keenoy, & Ostwick, 1998). The theme drawing together discursive organization studies 
is that “social reality, seen as shared mental schemes or […] social representations, is 
thus mainly based upon discursive interaction” (Heracleous, 2004, p. 178). The sharing, 
dissemination, and imposition of those mental schemes and representation takes place on 
a number of levels. We may speak of discourse in the singular, as “language use 
conceived as social practice,” or in the plural form, discourses, as the variety of “[ways] 
of signifying experience from a particular perspective” (Fairclough, 1993, p. 138). In 
this study, I am studying the language-related social practices of a specific group of 
people. The Office of Sustainability exhibits creative use of discourse in the service of 
sustainability. Put another way, they participate in sustainability discourses.  
Fairclough (1992, 1995) has posited that discourses operate simultaneously in at 
least three different dimensions. All discourse is constructed through human activity in 
these dimensions. The first is the dimension of the text, where texts are “any product 
whether written or spoken” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 4). OS staff and volunteers produce an 
array of texts, from websites, to strategic plans, to policies, and more. One purpose of 
this study is to create a public text of the processes that contribute to the creation of 
these texts—their back-story, if you will.  
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The second dimension of discourse is discursive practice. Seen as a practice, 
discourse is an improvisation carried out by people as they produce and interpret texts. 
For instance, I sat in on a meeting with the dean of a college, a consultant to 
Intermountain West University (IWU), and Russell Snyder. The three met to consider 
how the college might take advantage of the completion of a new building to conserve 
energy. In this conversation, the participants shared ideas, concerns, and arguments for a 
variety of proposals. In this interaction, the participants practiced discourse by citing 
established texts, interpreting some, seeking to establish new ones according to the 
objective of making the college’s stakeholders work within the buildings “more 
sustainable.”  
The third dimension of the three-dimensional approach to discourse is social 
practice. Social practice, in this framework, is distinguished from discursive practice 
according to “issues of concern in social analysis such as the institutional and 
organizational circumstances of the discursive event and how that shapes the nature of 
the discursive practice” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 4). In other words, people’s discursive 
practices must always draw from and contribute to contexts in which they act. For 
example, talking about sustainability in any organizational context usually brings one 
into a discussion of economics. A standard argument made by sustainability advocates at 
IWU was that the pricing of environmentally friendly projects was usually not 
appropriate. The advocates called for “lifecycle costing,” in which consumers take into 
account the up-front price of a purchased item, its efficiency over the long term, the 
price of its disposal, and any externalities (which are costs borne by third parties). For 
instance, using talk about lifecycle costs, sustainability advocates sought to reframe solar 
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power as “cheaper and better” than electricity that the utility company generated by 
burning coal. Lifecycle costs and costing are social concepts already well established in 
certain communities; the employees of the OS were not inventing the term and its 
implications. In this way, their discourse involved social practice, meaning the 
appropriation and alteration of institutionalized languages and resources.  
Thus, the domain of discourse, which I treat as a subsidiary of communication, is 
three-dimensional. Discourse involves human texts, discursive practices, and social 
practices. Fairhurst and Putnam (2004) treat the three dimensions in this way: 
For many organizational analysts, discourse embodies cultural meanings that 
enable the social and communicative; discourse is a medium for social 
interaction (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Hence, the 
study of language in use and interaction process is the focus of discourse 
analysts. For others, discourse refers to forms of talk and social texts that are 
loosely coupled from meaning and relatively autonomous from communicative 
processes. (p. 7) 
 
In the course of my research, I examined texts, discursive practices, and social practices 
implicated in sustainability organizing by the members of the Office of Sustainability. 
 
Rhetoric 
According to Bryant (1953), “The rhetorical function [of language] is a function 
of adjusting ideas to people and people to ideas” (p. 413). By this, Bryant meant both 
that rhetoric involves “the management of discourse in specific situations for practical 
purposes” and that “it touches the art of informing ideas, and the functioning of 
language” (p. 424). Scholars have argued that “a rhetorical view of organizational 
discourse […] focuses on the strategic possibilities of discourse in action” (Cheney, 
Christensen, Conrad, & Lair, 2004, p. 85, emphasis in original). The focus on strategy is 
important and central to the way I will define the term in the remainder of this 
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document. Rhetoric is language and other symbols used purposively in the service of 
influence. I will define rhetoric as “the art of using symbols to persuade others to change 
their attitudes, beliefs, values or actions” (Cheney, et al., p. 79).1 
This study is a study of rhetoric inasmuch as I am interested in the study 
participants’ communication about rhetoric. Rhetorically-oriented researchers have 
investigated topics as diverse as organizations’ public talk about ethics (e.g., Cheney & 
Frenette, 1993), corporate representatives’ representation of a crisis (e.g., Conrad, 2004; 
Crable & Vibbert, 1983; Heath, 1990), the personification of corporations (e.g., Cheney, 
1992; Livesey & Kearins, 2002), and more (for reviews of the literature, see Cheney, 
2005; Cheney, Christensen, Conrad, & Lair, 2006). Most of these perspectives on 
organizational rhetoric focus on public communication or seemingly finished texts 
intended for broad consumption (cf. McGee, 1990). “However,” Cheney and McMillan 
(1990) point out, “public, representative pronouncements do not necessarily reflect the 
range of rhetorical activities by, for, and within organizations” (p. 102). My emphasis is 
not upon the completed texts produced by OS stakeholders. While I do consider some 
published and recorded works authored by Office stakeholders—a few of which I helped 
to author or revise—I am more interested in the way the production of these texts plays 
in to the everyday discursive practices of people who call themselves “sustainability 
advocates.” 
I think such a perspective on rhetoric “has much to offer those interested in how 
groups of individuals come to see strategic alternatives in ways compatible enough to 
allow collective action” (Huff, 1983, p. 168). That is the case because, as Cheney (2005) 
argues, “The more traditional rhetorical concepts informing what I’d call a ‘rhetorical 
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sensibility’ are valuable above all for their recognition of how discourse links individual 
persuasive choices with organizational resources” (p. 68, emphasis in original). This is a 
significant contribution because few studies of (organizational) rhetoric utilize 
ethnographic and interviewing techniques to (1) represent voices silenced in or absent 
from official texts, and (2) assess the processes that serve to construct rhetorical artifacts 
and situations (see Clair, 1993, 1998; Endres, 2009b, Pezzullo, 2003; Senda-Cook, 
2010). 
 
Sustainability: An Ideograph  
 My study simultaneously deals with discursive and rhetorical practice. One 
communication concept that suits this duality is the ideograph. McGee (1980a) offered 
the most classic definition: 
An ideograph is an ordinary-language term found in political discourse. It is a 
high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but 
equivocal and ill-defined normative goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses 
behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, 
and guides behavior and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as 
acceptable and laudable. (p. 15) 
 
For the OS and IWU, as for other organizations, sustainability is such a term. Thus, my 
study concerns the ideograph “sustainability” and rhetorical attempts to legitimate 
discourse about it at IWU. The social function of ideographs change over time, and 
ideographs’ meanings are struggled over by groups in order gain power (Condit & 
Lucaities, 1993). In this case, I follow the ways in which communication of and for 
sustainability is negotiated, muted, and put into play for the purpose of changing an 




Perspective on Organizations and Organizing 
Since what has been labeled the interpretive turn in the field, organizational 
communication has taken on “the organization,” itself, as a central problematic (Mumby 
& Stohl, 1996). This means that organizational communication research is distinguished 
in part by the investigation of what it means to organize or be organized in the first 
place. This dissertation takes up an interpretive position on organizational 
communication. As such, I treat communication as an organizing activity.2 
I will use Cheney’s (1991) definition of organization. He writes, “Organization, 
generally speaking, is the coordination of individual interests; it is the mobilization of 
energies (symbolic and material) toward selective goals and values, including the value 
of organization in itself and the goal of its maintenance” (p. 19, emphasis in original). I 
adopt his definition for three reasons. First, I think it is sufficiently ambiguous. The 
Office of Sustainability has three employees, but a great many volunteers, partners, and 
other stakeholders working in its behalf on particular initiatives and over the long term. 
The OS organizes the energies of these many people. Still, it may not appear as 
expansive and complex to someone simply looking for the formal boundaries and 
location of the Office within the structure of IWU. Second, Cheney’s definition 
recognizes that an organization is more active than static. Weick (1979) famously 
proposes that organization theorists study organizing instead of organizations, which is 
the perspective I adopt for this study. Third, Cheney’s definition is appropriate because 






 This is a study of a specific case of sustainability-related discourse. Contributors 
to the Office of Sustainability participate in that discourse, by which I mean they (1) 
produce and interpret texts, (2) engage in discursive practices, and (3) use language that 
connects with broader patterns of social change. I train my attention on a specific 
discursive practice: lay theorizing. In terms of content, I focus my investigation on lay 
theorizing about three different dimensions of communication—advocacy, voice, and 
ethics—as they relate to the topics of sustainability and organizational change. 
 
A New Perspective on Lay Theory and Theorizing 
 In this section, I synthesize treatments of lay theory in social psychology, 
organization studies, and communication studies. Ultimately, I forge a new perspective 
on this area of interest. As Garfinkel (1967) puts it: 
The recognizedly rational properties of [members’] common sense inquiries—
their recognizedly consistent, or methodic, or uniform, or planful, etc. 
character—are somehow attainments of members concerted activities. For 
Suicide Prevention Center staff, for coders, for jurors the rational properties of 
their practical inquiries somehow consist in the concerted work of making 
evident from fragments, from proverbs, from passing remarks, from rumors, 
from a partial descriptions, from “codified” but essentially vague categories of 
experience and the like […] Somehow is the problematic crux of the matter. (p. 
10, emphasis in original) 
 
In this study, I focus on the “somehow” of participants’ lay theorizing about 
sustainability, persuasion, and organizing. 
 In the subsections that follow, I first define theories and lay theorizing in 
communication-related terms. Second, I compare communication-centered perspectives 
on lay theory to those from sociology and psychology. Third, I discuss important issues 
suggested by my definition of lay theory. Finally, I explain how the approach to lay 
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theory I develop here is similar to but distinct from other frameworks in communication 
and organization studies. 
 
Communication and Lay Theory 
Theories are knowledge claims. Lay theories are no exception; they too are 
knowledge claims. Because they are claims, lay theories are connected to discourse. In 
other words, theories are made up of and realized in communication. Thus, lay theories 
are not simply phenomena in individuals’ minds, but are properties of social collectives, 
of people in conversation with one another. I focus on the communicative dimensions of 
lay theories and lay theorizing, rather than their psychological and sociological 
dimensions. Lay theories are most commonly treated as psychological phenomena 
(Furnham, 1988; Kruglanski, 1989). However, lay theories are social in nature and they 
are made practical in communication. In Weick’s (1983) terms, lay theorizing is people 
“acting thinkingly” with discourse. 
 Thagard (1984) distinguishes theories from other types of claims: “A theory is a 
definition of a kind of system, claimed to apply to real systems” (p. 82). To define a 
system is to make a claim about its meaning or nature. Deetz (1992) points out that 
although theories provide definitions, they are best recognized as conceptions that 
“[specify] a point of view, a way of seeing and talking” (p. 74). Because they are 
knowledge claims, theories (lay and nonlay alike) usually show up in communication as 
definitional, descriptive, or evaluative statements, but they are always already 
conceptions (cf. Mills, 1940). I want to stress that this definition of lay theory should be 
treated differently than definitions applied to so-called formal or scientific theories. As 
Redding (1992) cautioned, “The word ‘theory,’ a notoriously elastic term, should not be 
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interpreted so rigidly as to include only the ‘classical’ (hypothetical-deductive or 
variable-analytic) model” (p. 92). 
 As claim making, lay theorizing may involve argument. Brockriede (1974) 
defines argument as “the process whereby a person reasons his [or her] way from one 
idea to the choice of another” (p. 166). Theorizers and others may experience lay 
theorizing as argumentation. However, there are at least two characteristics of lay 
theorizing, qua discursive practice, that minimize the likelihood that people will 
experience lay theorizing as an essentially argumentative activity.  
First, lay theorizing is usually enthymematic (Furnham, 1988; Thompson, 
Kruglanski, & Spiegel, 2000). Put succinctly, “Enthymemes are rhetorical structures of 
argumentation” (Heracleous, 2004, p. 183). While syllogisms are logical arguments in 
which premises are expressed, enthymemes’ premises (or at least some of them) are left 
unexpressed. Strong enthymematic rhetoric involves premises that are shared or taken for 
granted by the audience. Importantly, sharing premises and communicating based upon 
premises facilitates claim making (see Cheney, et al. [2004, p. 42] for a discussion of 
enthymeme as a “shorthand definition” that relies upon context and generates a sense of 
organizational rationality). A good example from my research comes in the common 
expression of an ideal sustainable university as one where members are “interconnected” 
and “collaborative,” and in which people work less in “their silos” (e.g., academic 
departments, operational units with narrowly-defined missions).3 The subsumed premises 
in this enthymematic theory of an ecologically sustainable university may take a number 
of forms. One premise is that collaborative decision making will lead to prioritization of 
environmental goals. Another assumption built into expressions of this kind: A greater 
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number of connections between people makes for a more effective organizational 
system.4 In any case, the kind of interconnection is specified only sometimes and the term 
collaboration is very rarely defined when it is used. This example demonstrates how lay 
theories function as definitions of a system expressed in shorthand language.5 
 The second reason people may fail to think of lay theorizing as conceptual and 
argumentative is that an individual doing lay theorizing may fail to recognize the 
premises subsumed in their enthymematic argument at all. This is an important point for 
understanding lay theorizing as a discursive practice. For, enthymemes “are not 
necessarily consciously evoked, [because they are] located in actors’ practical 
consciousness rather than discursive consciousness (Giddens, 1984, pp. 44-45)” 
(Heracleous, 2004, p. 183). As definitional claim making, lay theorizing may naturalize 
the system or system conditions being defined. That is, lay theorists may “[treat] the 
socially produced as given in nature [and] one view of the subject matter […] as the way 
the thing is” (Deetz, 1992, p. 190).6 As such, it is important for the analyst as well as the 
practitioner to assess lay theorizing with reference to the contextual factors that shape 
how actors understand what is being “done” with lay theories. The point here is that lay 
theories are arguments about reality, though they may not ostensibly take that form in 
actors’ perceptions and language. 
 
Comparing and Contrasting Various Perspectives on Lay Theory 
 I have defined lay theories as knowledge claims and will examine lay theorizing 
as a discursive practice. Below, I present a communication-centric perspective on lay 
theorizing that is built around this definition. First, however, I briefly characterize and 
comment upon sociological and psychological perspectives on lay theory. 
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 Sociological perspectives on lay theory. Sociological approaches center on the 
collective sharing of lay theories regarding some phenomenon or set of phenomena. 
Potter and Wetherell (1987) explain that this perspective coheres around the assumption 
that “social groups are constituted by their shared social representations” (p. 142). There 
is a puzzle here. Are social collectives naturally occurring groups that “have” shared 
social representations, or does the social group emerge though consistent representation? 
Potter and Wetherell point out that, either way, this perspective unduly foregrounds the 
roles of consensus and consistency, and backgrounds the place of dissensus and 
inconsistency within and between social groups.  
Most writers define lay theories by what they are not. Specifically, scholars 
regularly claim that lay theories are not developed by professionals working in their area 
of expertise according to scientific methods of inquiry and knowledge development 
(Furnham, 1988).7 Scholars usually define lay theories according to their supposed 
counterpart, scientific or professional theories. This bifurcation of theory types rests 
upon the distinction of the theorizer’s social group membership—scientific and/or 
professional versus lay.8 This is important because, “the shared interests and tight 
language structure of technical discussion” makes the comparison and adjudication of 
formal knowledge claims more easy in scientific and professional communities 
(Railsback, 1983, p. 363). Despite that fact, lay and scientific/professional theory 
intersect in both social and technical arenas (Giddens, 1979; Goodnight, 1982), 
especially on issues connected to the natural world (Endres, 2009a; Kinsella, 2004). A 
communication-based definition would not focus on the class or social category of the 
theorizer, but rather on the symbolic effort necessary to legitimate a theory as a so-
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called lay theory. From this point of view, as opposed to what I am very broadly calling 
the sociological perspective, it should be clear that the term lay theory is a “claim-
bearing label” (see Hilhorst, 2003). 
The argument I am making is analogous to some organizational culture scholars’ 
argument that culture is not so much something organizations “have” as it is something 
organizations “are.” An associated thesis is that organizations are not characterized by a 
singular culture, but by the struggle over cultural representation in the first place, despite 
widespread acceptance of phrases like “an organization’s culture” (Smircich, 1983). 
While it may be the case that organization members propound similar theories of one 
thing or another, it can be misleading to say either that the commonality constitutes the 
group, or that group membership is determined by the sharing of a theory. Baxter (1993), 
for example, studied “cultural codes” in the debate over governance at an academic 
institution, defining “a code of communication in its general sense [as] a coherent system 
of symbols, meanings, and beliefs and normative rules about communication (Philipsen, 
1992)” (p. 314). While she couches the study as an interpretive ethnography of multiple 
voices within an organization, she seems at times to reify membership in communication 
codes. She speaks of “code members” (see, e.g., p. 317) and code “subcultures” (see p. 
325), but also “code users” (see pp. 318-319). I believe that the last characterization, code 
users, is more appropriate for a communication-based take on such activity. Still, Baxter 
neatly divides the two codes identified in her research, which provides for cogent analysis 
but scant attention to diversity within the codes, overlap between the codes, and 
complexity in the uses of codes. Instead, she speaks simultaneously of the code as the 
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group and as the communication system. From a communication perspective, it is less 
than ideal to assume a one-to-one correspondence between the two. 
 Psychological perspectives on lay theory. Lay theory is a concept that has its roots 
in psychology, particularly in the study of attitudes (Furnham, 1988). Kruglanski’s (1989) 
theory of lay epistemics deals specifically with the nature of people’s attitudes, “a special 
type of knowledge, notably knowledge of which content is evaluative or affective” (p. 
139). Note his focus on content of knowledge, rather than the language in which the 
knowledge is formed. There are untold numbers of definitions for attitudes in 
organization studies (see Brief, 1998, for a review), and Potter and Wetherell (1987) 
suggest that this is at least in part the case because social psychologists describe attitudes 
as structures of the mind, though they study them through actors’ language use and other 
behaviors. In place of the mental construct attitudes, Deetz (1992) notes that theories do 
three things: direct attention, organize experience, and enable useful responses (pp. 71-
77). These are communicational dimensions of theories, and they are suitable substitutes 
for the attitude concept, which is too grounded for my purposes in theories of individual 
cognition and mind. 
Cheney (2002), for instance, examined the struggle over “democracy” at the 
Mondragón worker cooperatives in the Basque Country in Spain. His study provides a 
good example of a communication-based alternative to psychological claims about lay 
theory. Organizational democracy may be read, Cheney suggests, as a hindrance to 
competitiveness in the “new global economy,” as a crucial part of the tradition and 
“soul” of the cooperative system, as a “Trojan horse” for increased management 
pressure and control, and more. Indeed, Mondragón employees interviewed by Cheney 
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talked of democracy as it was practiced in their organization through multiple frames. 
Their theories of what democracy is and ought to be for the cooperatives could be 
thought of as involving personal and collective attitudes. Importantly, Cheney chooses to 
focus on discourse, and upon rhetoric in particular. The key is that Mondragón workers’ 
talk about democracy organized their experiences; it motivated attention toward the 
matter of democracy and involved certain dispositions toward the meaning of 
democracy. It is reasonable to call these attitudes toward democracy, but I prefer to 
conceive of the claims about democracy that Cheney documents as rhetoric (as Cheney 
does) and thus as meaning making that advocates for particular perspectives on the 
matter at hand. 
 
A Communication-Centered Perspective on Lay Theory 
The communication-oriented perspective that I advocate draws upon some of the 
premises of ethnomethodology. Garfinkel (1967), who offered the first systematic 
explication of ethnomethodology, presented scholars with this guiding maxim: “The 
activities whereby members [of social groups] produce and manage settings of organized 
everyday affairs are identical with members’ procedures for making those settings 
‘account-able’” (p. 1). In other words, activities are the social processes of making sense 
of collaborative action. From this perspective, an activity is organized in that people 
produce mutually sensible procedures for interacting. Thus, activity and knowledge are 
accomplished, rather than being an unproblematic fact of life. As such, 
ethnomethodologists study “the rational accountability of practical actions as an ongoing, 
practical accomplishment” (Garfinkel, p. 4). Lay theories of communication are one way 
in which these practical accomplishments are realized. I will draw upon Craig’s (1999) 
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definition of lay theories of communication, in particular: “commonplaces of practical 
metadiscourse—such as the commonplace belief that people ordinarily understand each 
other’s utterances” (p. 128, emphasis in original). 
 Organization scholars use ethnomethodology to conceptualize the “detailed and 
specifiable processes of producing orders based on shared methods, trust, competence, 
and attention” in work settings (Rawls, 2008, p. 702). Recently, scholars have used this 
approach to detail how dimensions of organizational life such as gender (Acker, 1990; 
Ashcraft & Mumby, 2004; West & Zimmerman, 1987) and knowledge (Kuhn & Jackson, 
2008; Rawls) are constituted within organizational environments through 
communication. In turn, these accomplished constructs shape people’s understanding of 
(the) organization, itself. 
Accordingly, lay theories are one means by which people cooperate in creating 
realities and negotiating what we might call the established realities of organizational 
life. Lay theorizing involves more than simply an individual “trying to understand what is 
out there.” Instead, this perspective presumes that “mutual understanding […] requires 
constant mutual orientation to situated constitutive expectancies—taken-for-granted 
methods of producing order that constitute sense” (Rawls, 2008, p. 701). 
The ethnomethodological perspective outlined above helps to explain this 
example. It is not the case that the OS merely helps IWU “reach” sustainability. Instead, 
it struggles to fold “sustainability” into the everyday “sensibility” of work at IWU. It was 
taken-for-granted that “rational” action on sustainability required explicit methods for 
gathering quantitative data. Still, many, many times during my fieldwork and in 
ethnographic interviews, I heard people say things like “we need to follow the data” or 
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“we need to decide based on the data.” And so, the OS goes about creating data sets such 
as the annual GHG inventories. Yet, because other organizations within IWU system do 
not create knowledge of the university with reference to sustainability, the data required 
to make the inventory do not exist. Thus, the OS’s advocacy for “rational action” on 
climate change-relevant issues is made problematic. First, the existing system did not 
value or assess sustainability at IWU, so it did not gather all data required for measuring 
or meeting sustainability goals (for discursive and institutional explanations, see e.g., 
Fairclough & Thomas, 2004; Orssatto & Clegg, 1999). Second, the procedures for 
gathering certain data and making certain knowledge claims are well established. Thus, 
Office supporters have a hard time challenging the notion that administrators are not 
seeing the whole picture, so to speak.9 And so, third, OS actors struggle simultaneously to 
(1) appropriately guess about the required data, and (2) create new procedures and 
symbolic contexts for collecting heretofore nonexistent data—procedures that 
nonetheless must approximate or simulate the old means of making and using data. 
However, ethnomethodology is concerned almost entirely with “accomplishment” 
as the realization of cooperation and coordination. This perspective pays somewhat less 
attention to tension, contradiction, multiplicity, and the like. The recognition of the 
disorganization of organizational life has a long history organizational communication 
scholarship but has garnered significant attention recently (e.g., Ashcraft 2006, Ashcraft 
& Trethewey, 2004; Harter, 2004; Harter & Krone, 2001; Jian, 2007; Putnam, 1986; 
Stohl & Cheney, 2001; Tracy, 2004; Trethewey & Aschcraft, 2004). This approach 
challenges the presumption in ethnomethodology that organization is a characteristic of 
everyday interaction. That is, the ethnomethodological perspectives outlined above 
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dispose researchers to see “the organization” in the organizing properties of everyday talk 
more than its inconsistent or polyvalent features.  
Scholars dealing with organizational and social change have suggested that 
dialectics are a useful concept for understanding the ways in which organizations embody 
regularity and irregularity, the common and the uncommon (e.g., Harter & Krone, 2001; 
Papa, Auwal, & Singhal, 1995; Papa, Singhal, & Papa, 2006). Baxter and Montgomery 
(1996) argue that dialectical thinking about communication should not be treated as a 
unified theory of communication, but rather as “a small set of conceptual assumptions” 
about symbolic interaction (p. 6). Dialectical thinking attunes the researcher to 
contradictions, which are the “dynamic interplay between unified oppositions” (p. 8).  
For instance, the notion of a sustainable organizational ideal requires one to 
assume that the present form is somehow unsustainable. There is no sustainability 
without its opposite. This, I’ve found in my fieldwork, is a particular challenge for the 
OS. They strive to label particular initiatives, objects, and aspirations as sustainable, and 
the result is somewhat piecemeal. The solar panels on that building are sustainable; using 
a universal power strip to shut down all of your office’s electronics at the end of the day 
is a sustainable behavior; the plans for a “net-zero water campus” are sustainable. There 
are two points of contradiction. First, these efforts exist in a system that the OS treats as 
unsustainable. I am willing to conjecture that none of the active participants in my project 
would claim that IWU is, at present, a sustainable organization according to any 
definition. Second, and moreover, sustainability advocates at IWU usually claim that 
achieving sustainable organization requires systems thinking and they simultaneously 
claim that sustainability needs to be made personal, immediate, or concrete. These 
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assertions are related to the labeling practices I mentioned at the beginning of this 
example, where singular things, rather than systems, are assigned the label “sustainable” 
in order to make sense of sustainability in the present. These tensions are required, I 
believe, for people to successfully navigate and induce environment-related 
organizational changes.  
 I have argued that a communication-centered perspective on lay theorizing must 
attend to the communicative production of consonance, commonality, and routine 
practices on one hand, and of dissonance, fragmentation, and uncustomary practices on 
another. To build that perspective, I turn to Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) concept of 
“interpretive repertoires” (IRs). The IR concept has received limited attention in 
organization studies. These two authors developed the concept to describe the sociality of 
discursive activity without assuming “a one-to-one concordance with group boundaries, 
and [… without deploying] the type of speculative cognitive psychology which underlies 
social representation theory” (p. 146). 
 Interpretive repertoires. The study of IRs is grounded in a “discourse approach,” 
which “shifts the focus from a search for underlying entities—attitudes—which generate 
talk and behavior to a detailed examination of how evaluative expressions are produced 
in discourse” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 55). Primary attention is given to “the situated 
flow of discourse [… and] is concerned with [people’s] methods and the logic of 
accountability while describing also the collective and social patterning of background 
normative conceptions” (Wetherell, 1998, p. 405). At the center of research in this 
tradition are questions about how and with what social connections/consequences people 
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take up positions and make claims with language. Potter and Wetherell (1987) provide 
the following definition: 
Interpretative repertoires are recurrently used systems of terms used for 
characterizing and evaluating actions, events and other phenomena. A repertoire 
[…] is constituted through a limited range of terms used in particular stylistic and 
grammatical constructions. Often a repertoire will be organized around specific 
metaphors and figures of speech (tropes). (p. 149) 
 
Elsewhere, they substitute the words “lexicon or register” for “system” (p. 138). 
IRs are resources for understanding (Wetherell & Potter, 1988). Scholars have 
explored the means by which rhetoric shapes understanding (Scott, 1967) and orients 
people toward knowledge of reality (Railsback, 1983). IRs are rhetorical because people 
utilize them in support of tenuous claims (Milne, 2009). Compelling claims draw upon 
IRs in ways that are “practically adequate” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 31), meaning 
that they are suitable for the situation at hand, which typifies rhetorical language 
(Heracleous, 2004; Cheney, et al., 2004). Of course, people do not simply use IRs as a 
tool, since the availability or legitimacy of language used to make explanatory accounts is 
subject to historical and institutional constraint (Milne). Put simply, history and culture 
matter (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Nonetheless, it should be clear by now that IR 
analysis is antideterministic and treats people as creative, if constrained, agents 
(Wetherell, 1998). 
IR analysis can account for both similarity and variation in people’s discourse 
use, where studies of lay theory, attitudes, codes, and such often look for patterns 
primarily in terms of consistency or commonality (McKenzie, 2005). In other words, 
variation within and across accounts is not seen as out of the ordinary for IRs, but 
characteristic of their use as language forms. This is true for the study of IRs because the 
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concept’s “concern is firmly with language use” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 157). 
“Contingency, precariousness and openness arise in part because utterances are designed 
to do interactional tasks and do not thereby entail descriptive closure and cognitive 
consistency” (Wetherell, 1998, p. 401). On one hand, individuals may present 
inconsistent or contradictory explanative accounts at any given moment, and always draw 
from an “‘ensemble’ of subject positions” (Wetherell, p. 404). The point is not to pursue 
how this affects or is affected by group memberships, or to point to some trouble with the 
individual’s thinking, per se. Instead, the consistency and contradiction may be 
investigated in terms of how they play out in the use of language. On another hand, 
individuals may draw upon different IRs to make different claims, to make claims to 
different audiences, or to make arguments under different conditions. IR analysis treats 
this as a normal aspect of communication, since IRs are “used to perform different sorts 
of accounting tasks” (Potter & Wetherell, p. 156). To sum, the study of IRs should not be 
driven by a reductionist search for constant, regularized language use, although patterned 
talk is an element of IRs. Some collectives—successful “high reliability organizations” 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), for example—may exhibit consistent use of a very limited 
number of IRs. Nevertheless, IR analysts following Potter and Wetherell’s vision 
recognize that people draw from a variety of IRs, in a variety of contexts, with varying 
degrees of reflexive awareness. 
Connecting lay theories and interpretive repertoires. Lay theories are, at base, 
statements of some sort that do definitional-conceptual work. They are reliant upon 
context for their meaning in every case (Draper, 1988). IRs are “recurrently used systems 
of terms used for characterizing” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 149). Thus, lay theories 
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are definitions of systems, while IRs are systems. I argue that lay theories contribute to 
and are drawn from IRs. Using the language of structuration theory, I characterize the 
relationship as recursive (Banks & Riley, 1993; Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Giddens, 
1984; Poole & McPhee, 1983). Drawing from its meaning in ethnomethodology, I 
characterize people’s actions within and upon these systems as reflexive. In other words, 
IRs provide a productive structure for making theoretical claims and agents theorize in 
practical ways that also affect the structural possibilities of IRs. IRs are “modalities” that 
mediate social structures the relationship between social structures and communicative 
actions (Hardy, Palmer, & Phillips, 2000; Heracleous & Barrett; Mueller, Sillince, 
Harvey, & Howorth, 2004). It is important to point out that some interpretive 
possibilities/resources are relatively prefigured for organization members while others are 
continually changing  (Koch & Deetz, 1981, p. 3).10 
An excellent example of this comes from what is often called the contemporary 
climate change debate. Scientific theory now overwhelmingly acknowledges that human 
activity has the capacity to alter global climatic patterns, dubbed “anthropogenic climate 
change,” and that such change is currently underway. In nontechnical spheres, there 
remains serious contention as to whether anthropogenic climate change is real, let alone 
whether or not it is a crisis (i.e., an “imperfection marked by urgency” [see Bitzer, 
1968]). These contests are marked by innumerable lay theories about climate change and 
possible human responses. People engage in lay theorizing with resources available in 
IRs. As such, it is reasonable to suppose that people stridently working to mitigate 
anthropogenic climate change might draw on repertoires that cohere around particular 
jeremiadic or apocalyptic themes and images (Opie & Elliot, 1996; Wolfe, 2008), balance 
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and harmony metaphors (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992; Zizek, 2009), and certain socio-
economic ideologies (Kendall, 2008). Collections of these themes, metaphors, and 
ideological pronouncements constitute the system (i.e., the IR) that grounds knowledge 
claims such as, “The Earth’s climate is warming at an alarming rate; humans are 
responsible for this; we must come into balance with nature and find sources other than 
fossil fuels for fueling global economic development or face catastrophe.”  
From a communication-based perspective, lay theories are the language-based 
artifacts of lay theorizing, which is a discursive practice. Importantly, theories and 
theorizing involve “global” discourses; they employ the language of systems and wholes, 
and they are tightly coupled to meaning. By that, I mean people use lay theories to make 
the reasoning process, itself, meaningful (see Sillince, 2007). Individuals and collectives 
may draw from a number of IRs at once in order to craft their espoused lay theories. 
Ultimately, the “quality” of lay theorizing, for the theorizer and their audience, is judged 
in terms of its practical adequacy. Thus, communication-centered analysis of lay 
theorization and IRs should:  
• subtly trace lay theories and IRs at play in a given case,  
• foreground (or at least pay attention to) the actors’ perspectives,  
• show how people make lay theories and IRs practically adequate,  
• assess the social consequences of lay theories and IRs in use,  
• and, perhaps, suggest new repertoires and practices in order to address 







Brief Notes on Knowing, Power, and Metalanguage 
 The discussion above invites brief commentary on three broad topics related to 
my approach to lay theories and IRs. First, I say more about contemporary approaches to 
organizational knowing that draw from ethnomethodological premises. Second, I discuss 
the place of power in any discussion of lay theory. Third, I explain why lay or nonlay 
theories of communication must involve some sort of metalanguage. Together, these 
three short discussions round out my approach to lay theorizing as a definitional-
conceptual practice that is accomplished through the complex utilization of IRs. 
On organizational knowing. As outlined above lay theorizing contributes to the 
accomplishment of knowledge by drawing from, establishing, and/or participating in 
routines for sharing, verifying, and using information in organizational systems (Kuhn & 
Jackson, 2008). In order to be recognized as organized, a human system must also be 
explained in some way (Pye, 1993). This perspective 
assumes that knowing precedes knowledge, both logically and chronologically, 
for the latter is always an institutionalized version of the former […] such [that] 
knowledge is thus acquired through some form of participation, and it is 
continually reproduced and negotiated; that is, it is always dynamic and 
provisional. (Nicolini, Gherardi, & Yanow, 2003, p. 3) 
 
Garfinkel points out that nonacademics usually talk about knowledge as “coming to 
terms with a situation” as it really is (p. 96). Actually, people must always “[assemble] 
and make available for use” arguments that warrant particular interpretations and actions 
(p. 96). As such, the form of participation (i.e., organizational knowing) creates the 
sense of established reality in/of the context (i.e, organizational knowledge). How 
communication is practiced in an organization and the beliefs about communication that 
inform those practices will, ultimately, shape how people (may) participate in 
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knowledge-constituting practices (Deetz, 1995). To see knowledge as an 
accomplishment grounded in processes of knowing requires an understanding that 
communication is “always incomplete and partial, and the reason [any person talks] to 
others is to better understand what I and they mean, hoping to find new and more 
satisfying ways of being together” (Deetz, pp. 97-98).  
A dialectical tension exists in this perspective on knowledge. To engender 
“expert” knowing, collectives must develop common and relatively stable processes by 
which knowledge is established. Yet, the collective must also empower members 
understanding of the knowing process, itself—at least, that is, to the extent that the 
collective can be flexible (Christensen, Morsing, & Cheney, 2008) and viable during 
conditions of change (Harter & Krone, 2001).11 This back-and-forth process is how 
people use communication to come to know. While it is tempting to think about lay 
theorizing as representations of static knowledge, it is better to conceptualize theorizing 
as a process of knowing, meaning that it is subject to change and negotiation.12 
On power. Deetz (1992) writes, “There is a politics within the production of 
knowledge” (p. 77, emphasis in original). For Foucault (1980), power “produces effects 
at the level of desire—and also at the level of knowledge. Far from preventing 
knowledge, power produces it” (p. 59). As it is productive, power shapes (but does not 
necessarily determine) how people constitute organization through discourse, as well as 
how people act and who people may be in organizational environments (Mumby & 
Putnam, 1992). The effects of power may be seen in people’s resistance to it, reticence 
to voice opposition, or failure to perceive or understand alternatives to the status quo 
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(Lukes, 1974). We should treat lay theorizing as a constructive activity rather than a 
representative one. For that reason, power is always a relevant issue. 
On metalanguage. Lay theorizing, as a discursive phenomenon, involves the 
development of shared language and other modes of representation. As I demonstrated 
above, power defines what may and may not be legitimate knowledge, perpetuates tacit 
knowledge, and influences interpretation. Scholars have analyzed the effects of power 
on people’s interpretation and use of narratives (e.g., Brown & McMillan, 1991; 
Mumby, 1987), root metaphors (e.g., Smith & Eisenberg, 1987), meetings and other 
rituals (e.g., Schwartzman, 1989; Trujillo, 1992). In studies like these, discourse is 
assumed to, in part, constitute organization. However, I examine a case of the struggle to 
create metalanguages, or talk about discursive practices (not just of discursive practices, 
if you will).  
It is on this final point that I want to stress the significance of lay theorizing about 
communication. Communicative activity is a medium in which people (re)formulate, 
express, and share their everyday knowledge. Simultaneously, it is subject to 
theorization. In particular, people both think about and think with discourse (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). As such, lay theories of communication take form in metalanguage, or 
talk about talk. Radford (2005) argues, “To understand communication, we must 
understand the language of communication and the genuine conversations in which such 
language is created and used” (p. 176, emphasis in original).13 
Of course, the language of lay theorizing need not be consistent, formal, or 
contradiction free. In fact, it is usually the case that people’s knowledge claims are 
audience-specific and self-contradicting both in the moment and across time (Furnham, 
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1988), especially in organizational settings (Whittle, Mueller, & Mangan, 2008). It is 
less interesting to investigate whether  
[…] communication is valid, testable, reliable, misleading, has effects, or can 
change behaviors. […] In a sense, it is already known that communication exists 
because it exists in and through the discourse that sustains it. The question 




In many ways, the approach to lay theorizing that I have outlined here parallels 
scholarship on related and better-established concepts in organizational communication 
scholarship. In the following pages, I briefly comment upon research and theory dealing 
with (1) accounts and narratives, (2) metaphors, (3) discursive frames/framing, and (4) 
sensemaking in order to highlight the ways in which that work is related to this study. 
Accounts and narratives. The study of accounts has its roots largely, but not 
entirely, in language-focused social science (Burke, 1969a, 1969b; Haaré & Secord, 
1973, Mills, 1940), and that work has been appropriated in organization studies (e.g., 
Staw, 1980; Tompkins & Cheney, 1983). Accounts are “the actor’s statement about why 
he or she performed certain acts and what social meaning he or she gave to the actions of 
himself or herself and others” (Tompkins & Cheney, p. 129). Such statements are 
justifications that are occasioned. In other words, accounts offered when called forth or 
believed to be expected by others. Importantly, accounts often supply accounts in 
“local” context (Sillince, 2007), which means that they inform of who someone thinks 
they are or whom they desire to be seen as. We might say that accounts offer responses 
to questions like, “Just whom do you think you are to do such a thing?” The study of IRs 
is the study of explanative talk (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). However, IR analysis is not 
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bound to explaining a central theme or set of themes in given accounts. Potter and 
Wetherell’s research described the fragmentation and diversity involved when people 
explain things, and their concept applied to explanation beyond justifications and 
excuses for unusual behavior (see Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Potter, 1988). 
Fisher (1984) argued that narration and narrative is the ontology of human 
existence: people exist qua people through stories (cf. Geertz’s [1973] “webs of 
significance”). Some have adopted this foundation for understanding organizing and 
organizations (e.g., Boje, 1991; Brown, 1990; Browning, 1992; Mumby, 1987; Weick & 
Browning, 1986). People are said to go beyond simply portraying the organization in 
stories. Instead, stories give life to organizations by providing narrative arc, and 
positioning people as characters within the narrative. Moreover, some narratives acquire 
mythic status. That is, a particular storyline can achieve widespread acceptance as a 
cultural master-frame for phenomena and experiences. By way of example, myths frame 
the role of organizations, as well as the value of people, in the “new economy” (Cheney, 
Lair, Ritz, & Kendall, 2010; Cloud, 2001; Nadesan, 2001). Lay theories of 
communication may guide the performance of stories, and analysts may infer lay 
theories from the stories told by organization members. However, as definitional work, 
lay theorizing is not storytelling. Lay theory coheres around global definition-
conceptions rather than the narrative form, which construes life according to characters 
and plotline. 
 Metaphors and clichés. To speak of an organizational plotline is to use a 
metaphor, of course. Since Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) foundational work on 
generative metaphors, organizational communication scholars have appreciated how 
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metaphors “[serve] as a background from which all choice and persuasion emerge” 
(Koch & Deetz, 1981). Several works have demonstrated that metaphor operates through 
visual, imagistic symbolizing, as well as through language (Harrison, 2004; Morgan, 
2006). Armenakis and Bedeian (1992) demonstrated the basic epistemological role of 
metaphor with reference to organizational change, and Smith and Eisenberg (1987) did 
so with reference to organizational conflict, for example.  
Some metaphors, images, and sayings may operate as clichés. Clichéd language 
and images are expected, stereotypical representations of organizational life, which 
people can put to use in defense of particular perspectives or interests. Clichés draw 
upon and reinforce cultural premises, usually in ways that are ironic. For example, 
Anderson-Gogh, Grey, and Robson (1998) show how the maxim “work hard, play hard” 
enabled managers to co-opt employees at accountancy firms in increasing productivity 
by framing (hard) work as play; Mueller, et al. (2004) explain how managerial insistence 
on “a rounded picture” of organizational performance may, in fact, reinforce decision 
making practices that are adversarial, partial, and not dialogical. 
Putnam and colleagues (Putnam & Boys, 2006; Putnam, Phillips, & Chapman, 
1996) used metaphor as the foundation for reviews of the discipline of organization 
studies. Their work provides a thorough look at the role of metaphor in organization 
studies, which is of course beyond the scope of this chapter. It is enough, I think, to say 
that many organizational communication scholars treat metaphor as the essence of lay 
epistemology. My emphasis is on lay theorizing and I treat metaphors and metaphoric 
communication as discursive devices that may be present in participants’ IR use. Indeed, 
certain root metaphors may predominate particular repertoires. The primary lesson of 
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metaphor analyses in organizational communication for this study is that lay theorizing 
may frequently be made enthymematic through people’s use of figurative discourse. In 
some cases—or, perhaps, most cases—metaphors will serve as a kind of shorthand that 
provides a truncated metalanguage for lay theorizing.  
 Discursive frames. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) introduced the notion of 
framing to psychology, defining “decision frames [as ...] the decision-maker’s 
conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice” 
(p. 453). They described how the language about a choice influenced individual’s 
perception of and action based upon the scenario. As psychologists, they treated frames 
as mental constructs. Language-centered scholars have treated frames as features of 
language, itself. Discursive frames are language constructs that direct people’s attention 
to particular meanings in a given context—and, perhaps, even on a given topic across 
contexts (Lakoff, 2004).  
Fairhurst and Sarr (1996) position frames and framing as encompassing 
concepts; they describe metaphors, narratives, slogans and jargon, and related concepts 
as framing techniques. For them, framing is a discursive practice—and an inevitable 
one, at that—in which language is consciously used to shape collective thought and 
forethought. As the first major component of framing processes, language enables 
collective memory, learning, and meaning making. Thought, the second component of 
framing, is grounded in attention. Thus, language shapes what people attend to based on 
particular conceptions of what is salient and important. People utilize discourse to 
accomplish knowledge. Put another way, people “do thought” with language. 
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Forethought is the last component of Farhurst and Sarr’s concept of framing, and that 
concept echoes the discussion of psychological attitudes above.  
It may be useful to think about lay theorization as the framing of thought, itself. 
Of course, people may be more or less aware of the frames they employ. In fact, those 
more cognizant of language’s power to shape people’s perception and experience are 
likely more adept at framing situations for others (Fairhurst, 2005; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991; O’Keefe, 1988). Lay theorizing, as the making of knowledge claims, provides 
frames for “how I/we know” as well as “what I/we know.” The relationship is 
reciprocal: People use frames to think, but they (may) also think about frames. Still, as I 
discussed above, theories may rely entirely on shifting, enthymematic arguments. That 
is, frames may speak for themselves as claims where the premises are entirely implicit 
and unexplained. It is for this reason that tracking people’s utilization of multiple IRs, 
which may be cohere around different frames, is useful for studying lay theorizing as a 
flexible, complex, but patterned definitional-conceptual process. 
Sensemaking. Thus far, I have made a number of references to the work of Karl 
Weick without addressing sensemaking directly (see especially Weick, 1969, 1979). The 
sensemaking concept (and other concepts) offers researchers a unique aesthetic 
sensibility, insisting that organizations are best thought of as contingent processes of 
organizing (Eisenberg, 2006; Van Maanen, 1995; Weick, 2004). In any case, the concept 
of sensemaking is particularly relevant to lay theory and theorizing. 
O’Connell (1988) claims that seven features of Weick’s theorization of 
sensemaking make it a unique approach to “words in action” (p. 205): its grounding in 
identity construction, its retrospective orientation, its enactment of environments, its 
  
109
social nature, its continuousness, its basis in extracted cues from the present which are 
related to the past, and its basis in plausibility rather than accuracy. Weick (1995a) 
argues, “The key distinction is that sensemaking is about the ways people generate what 
they interpret” (p. 13). Sensemaking takes “the flow of organizational circumstances 
[and turn them] into words and salient categories” (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). 
Others have used the concept to examine organizational phenomena as diverse as 
work/life interrelationships (Golden, 2009), strategic change (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; 
Gioia & Thomas, 1998), and crisis/disaster (Boudes & Laroche, 2009; Mills & 
Weatherbee, 2006). 
 Two frames for action provided by Weick are germane to my discussion of lay 
theorizing. First, Weick (2004) suggests that, from a communication perspective, action 
is best conceived of as people “acting discursively.” He points out a duality: People are 
always already “conversing within flux and conversing about flux” (p. 411). In my 
discussion of metalanguage above, I made the point that, for lay theorizing about 
communication, discourse is both the medium and subject. Sensemaking proceeds 
through discourse and interaction, and, on occasion, sensemaking is about discourse. 
Second, Weick (1983) has described everyday managerial action as “acting thinkingly.” 
This characterization draws upon the principles of ethnomethodology that I outlined 
above. In this way, theory is an artifact or outcome of sensemaking in Weick’s view. It 
is a reification—a solidification that often conceals actual processes of theorizing, which 
emerges from the collective need to put things into meaningful order (Weick, 1995b). 
Resultantly, because sensemaking is ongoing, relying too heavily on established theory 
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in lay and nonlay groups can impede rather than facilitate creative, competent, and 
effective action. 
 Weick’s development of the concept of sensemaking is closely related to the 
perspective I offer on lay theorizing. However, Weick (2001) locates lay theorizing—
and a related term, cognitive mapping—as one element of enactment and as just one of 
many aspects of the whole sensemaking process. As a facet of enactment sequences, lay 
theories are modified by available meanings/information in the environment. An actor’s 
lay theories then direct perception and action. This direction may be inferred in a 
person’s extra-linguistic action or from their accounts (Weick, 1979, pp. 153-157). As a 
substantial component whole sensemaking process, Weick (1995a, pp. 121-124) 
describes theories of action as “vocabularies of coping.” By this, he means that people 
use theories to punctuate organizational sensemaking. Rather than see theories exhibited 
in practice as somehow entirely distinct from those manifested in language, Weick 
(1995a) instructs, 
The question then becomes, how seriously do speakers and their close associates 
take those statements? These are important questions because those statements 
are potential recipes by which the environment may be shaped, and they are 
potential filters for what is noticed. (p. 214) 
 
This study responds directly to those questions. As a study of lay theorizing, I am 
interested both in the discursive construction of theories and in how “speakers and their 
close associates” make—or, perhaps, fail to make—those statements compelling to one 
another. 
Summary. IRs are systems of discourse in use. Wetherell and Potter (1988) say: 
Any particular repertoire is constituted out of a restricted range of terms used in a 
specific stylistic and grammatical fashion. Commonly these terms are derived 
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from one or more key metaphors and the presence of a repertoire will often be 
signaled by certain tropes or figures of speech. (p. 172) 
 
Thus, metaphors may anchor an IR, performing the epistemic function above. Narratives 
and accounts may be stylized in repetitive ways that reinforce the use of an IR. Frames 
and framing are concepts that emphasize the ways in which interpretation is always 
already shaped for actors, at least somewhat. Finally, lay theorizing may be thought of 
the way in which actors draw upon IRs to cope with the persistent equivocality of 
sensemaking in organizations. These are concepts that might alternately be seen as 
discursive devices within, overriding, or complementary to the approach I developed 
above. I prefer the ambiguity of these possible relationships because it allows for 
adaptation and creativity. I have emphasized interpretive repertoires over alternative 
concepts because of the IR concept’s foundation in discourse analysis, and because it 
allows me to interpret both the content and social uses of lay theories/theorizing. 
 
Transition to Critical Review of Literature 
 In the first half of this chapter, I sketched a synthetic, interpretive, and 
communication-centered approach to lay theory and theorizing. I now use that 
perspective to conduct a review of prominent scholarship on lay theorizing. I have 
selected academic treatments of lay theory from psychology, organization studies, and 
communication. I conduct this review in order to demonstrate how, employing this new 
approach, we might critique and contribute to these works. I observe three dialectics 
implicit in well-established treatments of people’s everyday theories; it is my hope that 
the framework I provide in this critical review will provide a foundation for 
interdisciplinary discussion of lay theorizing. 
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 I should mention that the material before this transition will be more prominently 
featured in later chapters than will the discussion that follows. I believe that this review 
demonstrates one way to align the perspective I crafted above with extant scholarship on 
lay theory. In that way, the section that follows applies my unique treatment of lay 
theory to scholarly literature rather than the case study. For that reason and for the sake 
of clarity in Chapters 6 through 8, what follows will not later receive the same level of 
emphasis as the perspective developed above. Nonetheless, I have opted to keep the 
following section in this chapter in order to demonstrate the way in which this 
dissertation can contribute to scholarly conversations on the topic of lay theory and 
theorizing. 
 
Dialectics in Discussions of Lay Theory and Theorizing 
 This section describes several themes in academic discussions of lay theory. I do 
not review all formal considerations of lay theory in the humanities and social sciences. 
Instead, I have selected several theories/theorists that feature lay theory prominently in 
their explanations of communicating and/or organizing.14 I work with three exemplar 
discussions of lay theory: Vallacher and Wegner’s (1985, 1987) theory of action 
identification, O’Keefe’s (O’Keefe, 1988; O’Keefe & McCornack, 1987) theory of 
message design logics, and Argyris and colleagues’ (Argyris, 1976, 1977, 2003; Argyris, 
Putnam, & Smith, 1985; Argyris & Schön, 1974) treatment of organizational theories-in-
use and espoused theories of organization. I frame my discussion around three dialectics 
in the discussion of lay theorizing—the simplicity-complexity dialectic, the knowledge-
knowing dialectic, and the implicitness-explicitness dialectic. This approach recognizes 
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several consistencies in academic treatments of lay theory while preserving the view of 
lay theorizing, itself, as a complex and contingent undertaking. 
 I selected these three treatments of lay theory based upon four shared features. 
First, the work of these authors draws from and contributes to different but overlapping 
disciplinary traditions. O’Keefe is a scholar of communication studies. Vallacher and 
Wegner’s disciplinary tradition is social psychology. Argyris’ work with a variety of 
collaborators contributes to the interdiscipline of organization studies (see Cheney, 2007). 
Second, each of these scholars and their theories has achieved prominent status in their 
respective fields of inquiry. While I will not claim that the selected scholars are in any 
way “representative” of the fields in which they operate, their published works have 
become touchstones for others’ research. Third, all of these discussions treat lay theory as 
social phenomena and/or lay theorization as a social process mediated by symbols. Put 
another way, communication is featured in all of these discussions but it is conceptualized 
(and emphasized) differently in each. Fourth and finally, I considered the relevance of 
organizations to these scholars’ approaches to lay theory. That is, they each implicate—
again, to greater and lesser degrees—organizing and the creation of “a system of 
consciously coordinated personal activities or forces” (Barnard, 1938/1968, p. 72).  
At this point, I provide very brief introductions to each of the selected approaches 
to lay theory. Afterward, I conduct a critical review of the three selected approaches. 
 
Introduction to Vallacher and Wegner’s Action Identification Theory 
Vallacher and Wegner’s (1984) theory of action identification defines the 
relationship between social representation and action:  
People do seem to develop representations of their action after the fact, but they 
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also seem capable of planning and directing their action in accord with their 
cognitive representations. [… Our theory] holds that the relationship between 
cognitive representations and overt behavior is not unidirectional, but cyclical. 
Through the intent connection, cognitive representations generate action, and 
though the reflective connection, new representations of what one is doing can 
emerge to set the stage for a revised intent connection. (p. 4) 
 
In other words, discourse (i.e., cognitive representations embodied by language and other 
symbols) allows us to articulate what we wish to do, ought to do, or how we engage in 
strategic action. Action can also be made sensible after the fact—recall the discussion of 
Weick’s approach to sensemaking, above. 
 What is generated and revised is an “act identity,” the cognitive-linguistic 
representation of behavior. Essentially, an act identity is what we think we are doing (or 
have done, or will do). Positing an act identity is “action identification,” hence the name 
of these authors’ theory. Vallacher and Wegner (1987) suggest that “with increasing 
action experience there is a corresponding increase in action automaticity” (p. 7), by 
which they mean that, over time, actions’ identities become familiar and more tacit or 
taken-for-granted.  
 Vallacher and Wegner do account for change in act identities. The concept of 
“identification level” is the central means by which they explain change. Action 
identification and act identities can exist on a low or high level. Low-level identities are 
basic, often bodily in nature. A person might be describes as depositing an aluminum can 
in a bin. At an intermediate level, a person might account for their behavior as sorting 
trash from recyclable material. The very same behavior may be given a high-level 
identity, as with the statement, “I’m doing my part to help the environment.” Note the 
abstraction of the third possible act identity: it makes no reference to the physical act of 
putting an aluminum can into a specific container. This is significant because “variation 
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in [persons’] level of identification […] has implications for the form that action control 
is likely to take” (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, p. 8).  
Vallacher and Wegner’s arguments about change in act identification level are too 
complex to rehash in detail, so I will focus only on the concepts of prepotence, 
emergence, and maintenance. A prepotent identity is an antecedent identity. The term is a 
label for an action’s meaning that is familiar and affords the actor a subjectively plausible 
representation of behavior. For example, if called upon to account for what I am doing at 
the moment, I would likely say, “I am working on my dissertation.” This is a relatively 
abstract, and therefore high-level, act identity. I might have also said that I am typing on 
a keyboard, writing, or providing exposition on a particular theory. Situations present 
“stimuli” that prompt individuals to maintain the act identity level, to lower it, or to raise 
it (see Vallacher & Wegner, 1985, pp. 122-138). Difficult situations or situations that 
challenge an act identity are hypothesized to result in lowering the prepotent identity. 
Consider how people colloquially speak of going back to basics, which often means 
taking stock of what it is I am (or we are) actually doing at a very rudimentary level. Of 
course, people also gain understanding and self-awareness of their actions, as well as 
develop mastery of relevant skills. As this occurs people employ high-level act identities. 
Doing so allows them to vest behavior with greater meaning. It also allows for greater 
variation in actual behavior. A person raising awareness about sustainability issues 
might be pamphleteering, hosting public events, talking with close personal 
acquaintances about environment-related concerns, lobbying elected officials, or 
undertaking any number of other activities. Resultantly, the person can maintain the 




Action identification is social, and people are socialized to particular forms of 
action identification. People are “increasingly held responsible for our actions and so 
learn to offer public accounts of them. [… We] clarify our intentions, excuse or justify 
our misdeeds, point to causes beyond our control, communicate values, and offer 
evaluations, all through depictions of action.” (Vallacher & Wegner, 1985, pp. 18-19). 
Action identification is pragmatic in that “behavior is dependent on, or at least associated 
with, some form of conscious representation” (p. 19). Vallacher and Wegner, as social 
psychologists, are more interested in the psychological processes involved than the 
communication processes. Still, it is clear that communication, as “conscious 
representation” through symbols, is the means by which action identification is made 
practicable in social situations. 
 
Introduction to O’Keefe’s Message Design Logics 
The basic argument made by proponents of message design logic theory is this: 
In general, messages originate in speakers’ representations of situations; that is, 
messages begin not as abstract message types, but as thoughts that are available 
for expression. What we call a design logic is a way of thinking about 
communication situations, selecting thoughts for expression, and modifying 
expression to meet goals. A design logic is a description of the way thought, 
transformed as messages, related to desired message outcomes. Hence, we should 
model differences in message production processes as differences in patterns of 
thoughts about communication situations and differences in the mapping of 
thoughts to messages. (O’Keefe, 1997, p. 112) 
 
Put simply, message design logics are lay theories of communication. They are “different 
fundamental premises in reasoning about communication (O’Keefe, 1988, p. 84). The 
theory of communication from which people operate will influence their goal setting and 
message adaptation” (see O’Keefe, 1997, p. 95). It is obvious, she notes, that messages 
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will differ within and across situations, for both similar and dissimilar people. What is 
more important is to describe how people’s conceptions of communication affect their 
message choice. Lay theories of communication are evident in “different ways of 
reasoning from goals to messages [… which challenges the presumption that] alterative 
message forms [are] derived from the same way of reasoning about communication” 
(O’Keefe, 1988, p. 83). 
 O’Keefe (1988) developed a three-tiered classification of message design logics 
to account for the ways in which individual’s theories of communication shape their goal 
setting and message selection. The three message design logics are expressive, 
conventional, and rhetorical. “An expressive message design logic reflects a view of 
communication as a process of expressing and receiving encoded thoughts and feelings” 
(O’Keefe & McCornack, 1987, p. 71). A conventional logic differs from an expressive 
logic in that “the conventional view subsumes the expressive premise; language is viewed 
as a means of expressing propositions, but the propositions one expresses are specified by 
the social effect one wants to achieve rather than the thoughts one happens to have” 
(O’Keefe, p. 86). The conventional design logic rests upon the assumption that 
communication “is constituted by cooperation” (O’Keefe, p. 86). The third design logic, 
rhetorical message design, moves beyond simple means-ends reasoning about 
communication. People working from this premise understand that “communication is 
the creation and negotiation of social selves and situations” (O’Keefe, p. 87). From this 
perspective, communication is constitutive, and not merely representative, of meaningful 
things in the world.  
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The theory of message design logics maintains that “there is a logically necessary 
order to the acquisition of expressive, conventional, and rhetorical premises about 
communication” (O’Keefe & McCornack, 1987, p. 72). Resultantly, those capable of 
working from rhetorical design logics have the option—or, at least, the ability—to 
employ conventional or expressive logics, whereas people with communication 
competence developed to the level of expressive message design logic are unable to 
maintain communication based upon the premises rooted in the conventional or rhetorical 
approach to language. McClish (1994) usefully notes, “It is important to realize, though, 
that that the rhetorical design logic is not the only approach that is inherently ‘rhetorical’ 
in the humanist’s terms” (p. 33). 
 O’Keefe and colleagues’ work has largely focused upon the explication of 
message design logics’ causal relationship to message production (see O’Keefe, 1997, p. 
98). In other words, message design logics are said to limit or enable people’s ability to 
produce certain kinds or varieties of messages (see e.g., O’Keefe & McCornack, 1987, on 
the pursuit of multiple goals in regulative communication situations). I should note that 
O’Keefe’s work stresses that message design logics are features of cognition; the role of 
cognitive ability and mental representation are in the foreground, and the productive role 
of discourse in the background, in much of the writing on message design logics (see, 
e.g., O’Keefe & Delia, 1982). The theory of message design logics has been applied in 
organization studies to topics such as individual responses to sexual harassment in the 
workplace (Bingham, 1991; Bingham & Burleson, 1989) and beliefs about to superior-
subordinate evaluation (Peterson & Albrecht, 1996). 
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O’Keefe and Lambert (1995) advise scholars to analyze the content and empirical 
consequences of design logics over description of their uses and functions in naturalistic 
settings. They do so because interpretive meaning is multiplex and indeterminate. My 
study, of course, embraces the nuances and indeterminacy of interpretive research. As 
such, I treat message design logics as vocabularies of communication, which we might 
compare to humanistic work on the grammar/rhetoric of motives (Burke, 1969a, 1969b; 
Mills, 1940). In contrast with the traditions O’Keefe draws from, my traditions’ 
“analytical approaches and truth claims tend to be ad hoc and situational, rather than 
universal [… seeking] specific knowledge about specific texts and contexts” (McClish, 
1994, p. 28). Tracy and Coupland (1990) point out that cognitively-oriented and 
discourse-oriented studies share at least two similar commitments about communication: 
“(1) a recognition of the intertwined nature of ‘goal’ and ‘discourse’; and (2) a 
recognition that people typically have more than one goal when they talk with others” (p. 
2). Accordingly, I incorporate O’Keefe’s (1988) conception of message design logics in 
this review of literature on lay theory. 
 
Introduction to Argyris and Colleagues’ Theories-in-Use  
and Espoused Theories 
 Chris Argyris developed these concepts with several colleagues as part of a larger 
methodological project, “action science.” Action science theorists and researchers “are 
concerned with how knowledge of the commonsense understanding of social actors is 
possible. In this sense the human sciences may be said to be built on an epistemology of 
practical knowledge” (Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, 1985, p. 11). Action scientists 
investigate the interplay of people’s lay understandings and their behavior in the world, 
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especially in organizational and community settings. For, “human behavior […] is 
directly influenced by our actions and therefore by our theories of action. The behavior 
world is an artifact of our theories-in-use” (Argyris & Schön, 1974, p. 17). The goal for 
action science theorists and practitioners is the production of  “actionable knowledge,” 
which describes the world and prescribes paths for change in language that is familiar—
or, at least, comprehensible—to the people consulted or studied. This methodology has 
been popularized in writing about “organizational learning” by Senge (1990) and Whyte 
(1991), among others. I should note that Senge and colleagues recently applied theories 
of organizational learning to the problem of sustainability in several publications for lay 
audiences (Senge, Laur, Schley, & Smith, 2006; Senge, Smith, Kruschwitz, Laur, & 
Schley, 2008). The book Presence (Senge, Scharmer, Jaworski, & Flowers, 2004), a 
nontechnical adaptation of the theory of “double loop learning,” has received much 
attention from Office staff members, especially Robin Carson. 
The aim of this research is enhanced effectiveness paired with greater self-
awareness and self-possession—double loop learning (see Argyris, 1977). Obviously, a 
single person or group of people may learn and adapt without conscious reflection upon 
the premises that guide their action. Argyris and colleagues identify these processes as 
“single loop learning.” Double loop learning enables actors to “learn to change our 
governing variables,” rather than simply satisfy them in our action (Argyris & Schön, 
1974, p. 18). An individual or collective engaged in double loop learning maintains the 
capacity to reflect openly and honestly about two types of “theories of action” employed 
by actors.  
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Theories of action are essentially people’s everyday understanding of (1) 
situations and (2) the action or actions required to bring about (3) some desired outcome 
or state of affairs (Argyris & Schön, 1974, pp. 3-6). These theories necessarily rest upon 
assumptions, since people are at best capable of “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1976). 
The dynamic relationship between two types of theories of action, espoused theories and 
theories-in-use, is crucial to the realization of (in)effectiveness; for action scientists, this 
is true at both individual and organizational levels (Argyris, 1976). Espoused theories are 
“the theory of action [a person] gives allegiance, and which, upon request, [she or] he 
communicates to others” (Argyris & Schön, p. 7). Theories-in-use, by contrast, must be 
reconstructed “from observations of his [or her] behavior [… which involves] 
assumptions about self, others, the situation, and the connections among action, 
consequence, and situation” (Argyris & Schön, p. 7). Theories-in-use are treated by 
action researchers as “tacit cognitive maps by which human beings design action [… and 
which] can be made explicit by reflecting on action [… though] we should note that the 
act of reflection itself is governed by theories-in-use” (Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, 1985, 
p. 82). Their point goes beyond the common observation that people fail to walk their 
talk, as the saying goes. In other words, it is not the case that people fail to hold to their 
“actual theory” of action: “There is a theory that is consistent with what they do; and this 
we call their theory-in-use. [… What] people do is not accidental. They do not ‘just 
happen’ to act in a particular way” (Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, p. 82).15 
 In the review below, I explore Argyris and colleagues’ development of two 
models of action based upon espoused theories and those in-use in greater detail. Model I 
and Model II practices correspond, respectively, with single and double loop learning. 
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For now, I will point out that communication lies at the heart of transitions from Model I 
to Model II behavior and thus from single to double loop learning. While Argyris and 
colleagues’ conception of human action is decidedly behaviorist, communication plays an 
important role in their approach to lay theory and theorizing. 
 
Introduction to Three Dialectical Themes in the  
Treatments of Lay Theory  
A number of themes cut across these different explanations of lay theorizing in 
social life. Above, I discussed the role of dialectical thinking in conceptualizing lay 
theory, itself. Here, I will demonstrate how thinking in terms of dialectics is a useful way 
to apprehend academic discussions of lay theory. I will address three dialectics—namely, 
simplicity-complexity, knowledge-knowing, implicitness-explicitness. In doing so, I offer 
a perspective on lay theory scholarship that takes the constitutive power of 
communication seriously; is appropriate to organizational analysis; and foregrounds the 
fluid, ongoing character of theorizing and organizing. In each subsection, I present 
unique quotations and examples that substantiate a dialectical view of lay theorizing. I am 
intentionally suturing together the work of theorists not commonly in conversation with 
one another. I do so because I believe that an eclectic, inclusive take on lay theorizing 
can enrich the discipline of organizational communication in particular, and the field of 
organization studies more broadly. 
 
The Simplicity-Complexity Dialectic 
 In this chapter, I have discussed lay theories as knowledge claims applied to 
supposedly real systems (i.e., complex wholes). The simplicity-complexity dialectic 
captures the difficulty of making knowledge claims about complex wholes. Each of the 
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three discussions of lay theory I selected acknowledges that lay theorization involves 
both simplifications of experience and complex forms or patterns of explanation.  
Vallacher and Wegner’s action identification. Vallacher and Wegner’s theory of 
action identification hinges to the notion of simplification. Recall that their theory 
attempts an explanation how people know and say what they do, so to speak. Their notion 
of identification level crystallizes the role of simplification in their model of lay 
theorizing. People may identify an act at either a low or high level. Low-level act 
identities are characterized by descriptions that hew close to simple action, the lowest 
level being characterized by descriptions of bodily action. High-level act identities are 
more broad, abstract, and encompassing. So one may say that they are “raising an arm 
and extending a hand to engage a switch” or that they are “turning off a light when 
leaving work for the day.” The latter example, turning off a light at the end of the 
workday, is a higher level act identity because it assumes the first, flipping a switch. 
Indeed, leaving for the day usually requires other low-level act identities, such as “saying 
goodbye to others” and “getting my coat.” Introducing sustainability into the mix would 
engage a very high-level act identity. So, turning off the lights might be “conserving 
energy,” “being responsible,” “leading others by example,” or even “helping the planet.” 
The point is not to assume that one of these accounts is best, but that the act of turning off 
lights may have a particularly abstract meaning for the person involved. 
Vallacher and Wegner (1985, p. 229) note that high-level act identities are usually 
more meaning-rich for the people providing them. Interestingly enough, high-level act 
identification involves simplification as much as low-level act identification. A 
supervisor who says that they are “firing someone or letting someone go” is describing a 
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scenario that involves lots of lower level act identities. Vallacher and Wegner call this 
integration act identity structures. To “let someone go” may involve “letting Security 
know in advance,” “sitting the person down,” “giving bad news,” and so on. It should be 
obvious that giving someone bad news may be a complex action also involving lower-
level act identities—being honest and direct, speaking calmly, etc.—rather than just 
informing someone of something another they feel badly about. Changes in context may 
require different low-level identifications.16 Since, according to these authors, people 
adjust their cognitive and linguistic representations of everyday action in order to 
maintain, change, and navigate actions in relationships with other people, a variety of 
factors press upon people’s statements about action. Vallacher and Wegner (1985) 
summarize: 
The [act identity] emergence process occurs rapidly and repeatedly in daily life. 
Many actions must change their meanings through […] downward and upward 
movements in identity structures, because it is only by virtue of these movements 
that the person links together the actions of the day. (p. 124) 
 
By “downward and upward movements” they mean that people engage in action with 
reference to language that is less and more abstract, or less and more encompassing. But, 
it is uncommon for people to be called upon to account for all this when they provide act 
identifications in everyday situations, if they are called upon to verbalize what they think 
they are doing at all. Thus, people use high-level act identities (i.e., they use explanative 
language that is abstract) when the context makes it possible to have “a clear sense of the 
larger meaning of what one is doing,” when the action is not too difficult, and when the 
person is experienced with the action (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, p. 6). In these ways, 
action identification theory treats lay theorizing as a dialectical process of people creating 
simple and complex accounts of their experience. In the language of this treatment of lay 
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theorizing, everyday action identification “[tends] to spawn identity structures that lack 
the symmetry and closure normally associated with hierarchies” (p. 12). 
O’Keefe’s message design logics. O’Keefe’s theory also engages the simplicity-
complexity dialectic. The message design logic model, write O’Keefe and McCornack 
(1987), “offers an analysis of message-to-task fit, positing that the apparent style of an 
individual’s messages will vary with situation and task” (pp. 70-71). This argument is 
fundamental to O’Keefe’s approach, and it structures the simplicity-complexity 
dialectic’s play in the approach.  
There are two ways we can read the dialectic in her theory. First, as I discussed 
earlier, O’Keefe conceives of the message design logics as progressively complex. A 
rhetorical logic is more complex than a conventional logic, which demonstrates more 
sophistication than an expressive logic. O’Keefe (1988) points out that 
Individuals sometimes do fail to adopt and pursue goals that are intrinsically 
relevant to a situation. For example, a person can show a lack of consideration by 
failing to appreciate the relevance of face goals [i.e., “face-saving”] to his or her 
actions, and not by performing any action intentionally designed to give offense. 
[… Furthermore,] even when different individuals recognize the objectives to be 
met in a situation, their personal representations of a general or common 
situational objective may vary. (p. 82) 
 
People who operate with expressive design logics are less likely to recognize the 
diversity of goals that bear upon a communication situation, since their fundamental 
premise is that communication is used to bring out inner cognitions, emotions, and such. 
Second, the face goals example highlights the fact that relatively simple message design 
logics, when not suitable to the communication task, may introduce complexity into the 
situation (e.g., by adding the goal of conflict resolution to the preexisting task). Besides, 
complex situations are subject to a variety of interpretations, which themselves may be 
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simplifications to a greater or lesser extent. O’Keefe and McCornack (1987) explain, 
In contrast to […] relatively simple communication situations, a situation in 
which goal achievement requires drawing a clear separation between subjective 
and intersubjective relevance, or in which goal achievement is facilitated by 
reorganizing the communication context, will promote message diversity by 
leading different design logics to generate different messages. This is because, in 
such situations, those employing conventional and rhetorical design logics 
distinguish between issues that are objectively relevant and those that are only 
subjectively relevant, whereas those relying on an expressive logic do not; and 
because those employing conventional design logic operate within established 
situation parameters whereas those employing rhetorical logic make overt efforts 
to change the situation. (p. 74) 
 
To sum: message design logics are conceived us as progressively complex cognitive 
representations of communication. As well, situations that involve multiple goal 
possibilities may be made more or less complex if participants all operate from the more 
complex rhetorical design logic, while people employing differing or inappropriately 
simple design logics may generate situational complexity. 
 Let us return to the example of a person turning off lights around the workplace at 
the end of a work shift. A person working from an expressive message design logic may 
simply tell people, “I’m an environmentalist, and so I make sure to reduce my energy 
consumption when I can.” According to O’Keefe, such statements will not be oriented 
toward any pragmatic purpose. Instead, the expressive communicator will simply 
announce their impressions of what they are doing, should they have reason to do so. (In 
fact, it is likely that many people, when asked why they turn off lights at the end of the 
day, would simply respond, “I don’t know; I just do.”) Someone working from a 
conventional design logic, however, will say that they are “following the rules,” “doing 
what others do,” or “helping the organization meet its goals.” Participants in an energy 
use reduction campaign are likely to use conventional reasoning to justify their choice to 
  
127
turn off lights. Thus, the message about the action positions the actor with reference to a 
particular audience or group, which is not the case for messages generated from an 
expressive logic. A person working from a rhetorical perspective would likely utilize 
multiple justifications for and accounts of their action when speaking to different people. 
Their language use would depend upon the impression they wish to make upon the 
message’s hearers, as well as how they would like to be seen as a speaker.  
The act of turning off the lights may be accounted for with relatively simple to 
relatively sophisticated communication techniques. Nevertheless, “meaning does not so 
much reside in the form of a message [i.e., design logic], but on the function and 
evaluation of the message in situ; hence, sophisticated may not always mean effective” 
(Peterson & Albrecht, 1996, p. 305). So, the self-defined environmentalist employing an 
expressive design logic can add complexity to a situation. It is not hard to imagine that 
coworkers could find someone speaking openly and with little strategic purpose about 
their environmentally friendly behavior to be preachy, holier-than-thou, or pushy. In that 
way, the expressive communicator could undermine their stated environmental goals by 
annoying or offending colleagues who might otherwise consider taking up the behavior. 
Of course, a nuanced message produced by someone acting rhetorically may well bring 
about the very same response. Message design logics are not determinative of specific 
messages, nor are they determinative of success. Message design logics range from 
simple to complex, and communicators maintain complex relationships to speech 
situations with their use (O’Keefe, 1997).  
Argyris’ theories-in-use and espoused theories. There are at least three ideas 
within Argyris and colleagues’ approach to lay theorizing that highlight the simplicity-
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complexity dialectic: constancy, consistency, and congruence. These three terms may be 
grouped together as loci of contradiction or corroboration—this label is mine, not 
theirs—within and between theories-in-use and espoused theories. As with the other two 
perspectives on lay theory, action science treats lay theories as simplified or shorthand 
representations of the world by nature and necessity (see Argyris & Schön, 1974, pp. 5-
6). It is because lay theories are heuristic schemes that Argyris and colleagues discuss 
constancy, consistency, and congruence as indicators of the complexity of lay theorizing.  
 Argyris and Schön  (1974) believe the following: 
Theories-in-use maintain a person’s field of constancy. They specify the 
governing variables and their critical relationships to one another—for example, 
which variables have priority. They specify the acceptable ranges for these 
variables and the objective functions for new governing variables. […] Theories-
in-use are the means of maintaining specific constancies, but they also come to be 
valued in their won right for the constancy of the world-picture they provide. The 
inherent variability of the behavior world gives us more information than we can 
handle, so we value a stable world-picture, being predictable, and being able to 
predict. (pp. 16-17) 
 
Constancy is a kind of simplification that enables people to deal with change and 
uncertainty, and it is an inherent feature of theories-in-use. Of course, the presumption is 
that the behavioral world—and, I would add, the realm of meaning and interpretation—is 
immeasurably complex.  
As people grapple with the flux of the world, their theories also demonstrate 
greater or less consistency. Consistency is the degree to which a lay theory remains 
coherent insofar as the assumptions it carries remain applicable to the situation being 
theorized in addition to remaining relatively consistent with one another. When a theory 
is inconsistent, its variables are not in agreement or it is not in agreement with other 
theories used by the same person. Take, for example, the sentiment expressed to me that 
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“We can’t scare people into sustainability.” This statement is obviously inconsistent with 
another popular theory that was often repeated in the case I am studying: “Human beings 
will only do something about sustainability when they’re faced with an immediate crisis 
or catastrophe.” The two theories are incompatible and markedly reductionist. Still, I 
have heard them both stated many times, sometimes by one person during a single 
conversation. This, of course, makes for a particularly exasperated sustainability advocate 
and a complex, if utterly conflicted and inconsistent, view of human agency. 
Congruence is the final dimension of the simplicity-complexity dialectic I will 
explore here: 
Congruence means that one’s espoused theory matches his [or her] theory-in-
use—that is, that one’s behavior fits his [or her] espoused theory. A second (and 
much-used) meaning of congruence is allowing inner feelings to be expressed in 
actions: when one feels happy, [she or] he acts happy. Double loop learning 
enables actors to “learn to change our governing variables,” rather than simply 
satisfy them in our action. (Argyris & Schön, 1974, p. 23) 
 
Colloquially, a person demonstrating congruence is said to walk their talk. Interestingly 
enough, double loop learning is a process by which people learn to talk their walk. Put 
another way, double loop learning is about developing people’s capacity to reflect on and 
speak about their theories-in-use in order to mutually align them with espoused theories. 
As people and organizations learn, they grapple with the complexity of resolving 
contradiction of three sorts—constancy, consistency, and congruence.  
These ideas can be readily applied to the example of a person turning off lights at 
the end of a workday. Imagine that this person thinks and talks about herself or himself as 
a “passionate environmentalist.” They might espouse the belief, “Sustainability is my job 
and affects every part of my life.” Such an assertion might encounter challenges rooted in 
constancy. While this person may be particularly vigilant, they may not turn off lights 
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when they exit every room or at the end of every workday. Indeed, their employer may 
install occupancy sensors that the person rightly or wrongly believes will do the job for 
her/him. The person may learn more about sustainability related matters, and discover 
that their action, in isolation, saves relatively little or no energy, given the design of most 
US electricity grids. Their “passionate environmentalist” self-image may come to be 
recognized as inconsistent. Lastly, our “passionate environmentalist” may find their 
espoused theory of self to be incongruent with many other dimensions of their 
consumption (e.g., in their household, in transportation, in material waste disposal), 
which an obsession about workplace lights covers up, if you will. Indeed, this person may 
be someone who leaves office lights on, computers running, and such. In all of these 
ways, the simplifying function of theories-in-use and espoused theories generate 
complexity. That complexity may be revealed when the mindful analyst considers the 
theories’ internal consistency, their relationship with one another, and their relationship 
to the greater world.  
Summary. Theories derive much of their practical and persuasive power from 
reduction. Any understanding achieved through theorization is always couched in a 
particular perspective and is contingent upon any number of premises or circumstances. 
Anderson (1996) argues, “We cannot understand a paradigm, discipline, or particular 
theory without investigating what it opposes, excludes, denies, or suppresses” (p. 10). 
Lay theories are also irreducibly complex. They are complex and sometimes inconsistent 
in their logic and structure. Moreover, the practice of lay theorizing is complex, since 
people work both within and upon systems when using the language of lay theory. Each 
of the three approaches to lay theory discussed here grapple with the simplicity-
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complexity dialectic in some manner. 
 
The Knowledge-Knowing Dialectic 
 Earlier, I explained how organization researchers have used ethnomethodology to 
explain organizational knowledge as an accomplishment rooted in processes of 
organizational knowing. The knowledge-knowing dialectic in discussions of lay theory 
deals with just this problem. As the making of knowledge claims, lay theorizing involves 
processes that constitute knowledge. However, the theorist must deal with (e.g., use as a 
warrant, challenge as an assumption) the established facts of the situation. I explained 
this claim by comparing lay theorization to structurational perspectives (Banks & Riley, 
1993; Giddens, 1984) and to ethnomethodological perspectives (Kuhn & Jackson, 2008; 
Nicolini, Gherardi, & Yanow, 2003) on organizing. Our three approaches to lay theory 
treat knowledge simultaneously as a social object and a flow of individual and collective 
experience. While these three approaches deal with the cognitive and linguistic 
dimensions of lay theory, it is important to see that knowledge also has extra-linguistic, 
embodied, and aesthetic dimensions (Ewenstein & Whyte, 2007). Below, I provide 
evidence of dialectical thinking about knowledge in the three selected approaches to lay 
theorizing. 
Vallacher and Wegner’s action identification. Vallacher and Wegner (1987) begin 
their arguments with this mundane but important observation: “People always seem to be 
doing something. They also seem to be quite adept at identifying what they are doing. 
What is less clear is how these two observations relate to one another” (p. 3). The social 
psychologists’ work pertains to mental and discursive representations’ connection to the 
maintenance or alteration of behavior. Reasoning from research data, Vallacher and 
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Wegner (1985) conjecture that  
The emergence of self-defining identities does not imply a deliberate process of 
self-scrutiny. […] During […] periods of existential crisis, the person attempts to 
discern patterns in courses of action he or she has chosen, so that these actions 
might be identified in a broader context of goals and purposes But it probably is 
more often the case that the sort of self-understanding implied in our account 
emerges over time without explicit recognition of the transition from doing to 
being. Just as “hitting the right keys” gradually becomes “playing the piano” 
without a dramatic shift in understanding, so too do self-thematic identities 
become part of us without our awareness of what has occurred. It could be argued, 
in fact, that conscious attempts to forge this sort of understanding often promote 
disappointment rather than enlightenment. An identity may emerge, of course, but 
if it would not have emerged naturally anyway, it may prove difficult to maintain 
effectively over time. (p. 190) 
 
The overarching lesson is that people do several things with discourse. People account for 
past and current behavior to demonstrate their knowledge to others. They also use 
discourse to drive purposive action—that is, to provide a frame of reference that suggests 
certain patterns of behavior. As well, people who have undertaken certain practices may 
change their discourse use over time, often without reflection, as their knowledge is 
shaped in/by the experience of knowing what one is doing. Vallacher and Wegner (1987) 
give the example of action maintenance on the part of a person using a high-level act 
identity: 
In essence, a person with a relatively high-level understanding already knows 
what he or she is doing and thus is less primed to accept other understandings at 
the same level provided by the context surrounding the action. Such 
understanding allows people to maintain a course of action in the face of changing 
conditions with the passage of time. (p. 8) 
 
Yet, as demonstrated in the example of piano playing, conditions change and people 
regularly alter their self-understanding without deliberation and reflection. In that way, 
Vallacher and Wegner’s theory of action identification accounts for the dialectical 
essence of knowledge as a thing symbolized by people, and as a complex and never-
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ending process of coming to know (i.e., knowing). 
For example, Office of Sustainability staff members, routinely and repetitively 
laud people who are doing something sustainable or are being sustainable. Additionally, 
practices, artifacts, or systems are regularly labeled unsustainable by OS staff and 
volunteers. Using the ideograph sustainability, they provide people with a high-level 
justification for behavior, or attempt to present a challenge to what another person is 
doing. Importantly, many people do not carry on their work and studies at IWU with 
reference to discourses of sustainability. As such, providing new language structures 
presents people with the discursive means by which they may maintain desired actions, 
and complicates people’s attempts to justify undesired actions. At the same time, the OS 
has struggled to “show people what IWU is doing already” that is sustainable. Facilities 
Management began projects to retrofit light fixtures across campus and monitor campus 
sprinkler systems with real-time computer models, for example, well before the OS was 
well established on campus. Faced with the charge from campus stakeholders that “you 
don’t get it” or “you’re not doing enough,” Office employees and other representatives of 
Facilities Management routinely label extant projects as sustainable, even if the premises 
that led to their implementation had little or nothing to do with environmental concern at 
the earlier time. These interactions demonstrate the struggle over sustainability 
“knowledge” on campus, and they will, I believe, change the way in which Facilities 
Management and other departments make sense of efficiency-related projects in the 
future. 
O’Keefe’s message design logics. In O’Keefe’s development of a theory of 
message design logics, we can see the knowledge-knowing dialectic in her 
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developmental/progressive understanding of logics. O’Keefe (1987) argues that messages 
characteristic of the expressive logic are organized in “reaction to prior [events],” but 
usually contain “pragmatically pointless content” (p. 85). People working from an 
expressive logic presume that messages are merely linguistic manifestations of what the 
individual knows/thinks/feels. Communication makes public knowledge as a stable facet 
or possession of the speaking person, such that “The messages generated by an 
expressive logic are straightforward expression (or “dumping”) of salient mental 
contents” (p. 85). By contrast, a person employing a rhetorical message design logic 
understands the constitutive power of communication. Framed according to the 
knowledge-knowing dialectic, rhetorical logics involve the premise that communication 
facilitates knowing. Indeed, O’Keefe and McCornack (1987) believe that people 
employing rhetorical design logics know differently, if you will. For those using the 
rhetorical design logic, 
the potential of language to evoke roles and to structure context is exploited 
through the manipulation of stylistic variation in language and explicit 
contextualizing elaborations of messages. The assume attention to the details of 
message construction is devoted to message interpretation, leading to more 
careful listening and deeper interpretation of intentions, motives, and character. 
(p. 72) 
 
The implication is that people designing messages rhetorically are more attuned to 
situational change and engage in ongoing and (more) thoroughgoing interpretation. 
Moreover, people employing a rhetorical design logic may intentionally use 
communication to construct knowledge and interpretation, while that intention is not a 
feature of the other design systems. The process of understanding is more salient for 
these people than for speakers operating simply from an expressive logic, who treat 
knowledge as a relatively invariant property of individual speakers. 
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Let us return to the example of labeling specific projects, artifacts, and 
technologies as (un)sustainable. In the language of message design logics, it is sensible to 
say that some people will use this labeling scheme to express some kind of knowledge or 
opinion. A straightforward, although awkward, exemplar might be, “I think the 
transportation plan will get us to carbon neutrality rapidly enough, so I believe it is 
worthy of the label ‘sustainable.’” Such an expression is a statement of individual 
knowledge. Alternatively, someone reasoning from a rhetorical logic would use the label 
sustainable to appeal to audiences strategically. For instance, participants in the Office’s 
Steering Committee meetings would regularly tell one another something to this effect: 
“We have to help people see what this is all about.” The optic metaphor was used, in my 
interpretation, as a shorthand way for participants to say that labeling existing things and 
practices sustainable made the concept more tangible, and thus relevant and compelling, 
for target audiences. Participants regularly fretted that sustainability seemed too far off or 
was not concrete enough for other University stakeholders. Resultantly, they actively 
sought to identify objects and processes in the here-and-now as “sustainable.” This was 
true despite the fact that participants in my study seemed to share the belief that these 
things, in isolation or embedded in present systems, will never make for a wholly 
sustainable campus. Thus, it is apparent that some participants in the study used the 
labeling technique as a means to shape how people come to be aware of and 
knowledgeable about sustainability on campus. In other words, they sought to generate 
new forms of organizational knowing. 
Argyris’ theories-in-use and espoused theories. One way to read the knowledge-
knowing dialectic into Argyris’ approach to lay theory is to examine his models of 
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organizational learning. Argyris and Schön (1974) introduced the concepts of “Model I 
and Model II” thinking and learning. Argyris (2003) suggests, “There is diversity in 
espoused theories, but not in theories-in-use” (p. 438)—a contestable claim, to be sure. 
The most prevalent theories-in-use are supposedly modeled according to  
four governing values. They are: (1) achieve your intended purpose, (2) maximize 
winning and minimize losing, (3) suppress negative feelings, and (4) behave 
according to what you consider rational. The most prevalent action strategies that 
arise from Model I are the following: (1) advocate your position, (2) evaluate the 
thoughts and actions of others (and your own thoughts and actions), and (3) 
attribute causes for whatever you are trying to understand. (Argyris, 2003, p. 438) 
 
By contrast, Model II theories-in-use are what action scientists are supposed to introduce 
into organizational systems. Model II theories do not stand in direct opposition to Model 
I theories, but are alternatives to them. 
The aims of Model II are to help people to produce valid information, make 
informed choices, and develop an internal commitment to those choices. 
Embedded in these values is the assumption that power (for double loop learning) 
comes from having reliable information, from being competent, from talking on 
personnel responsibilities, and from monitoring continually the effectiveness of 
one’s decisions. (Argyris, 1977, p. 122). 
 
One way to frame the tension between the models is to say that Model I thinking 
encourages people to establish the legitimacy and power of knowledge they possess or 
with which they are familiar, while Model II thinking encourages people to create and 
reflect upon systems for creating and sharing new knowledge (i.e., organizational 
knowing).  
Depending upon the circumstances, an analyst may interpret Model I or Model II 
behavior in the Office of Sustainability’s practice of calling some extant projects and 
technologies as sustainable. On one hand, it is reasonable to see the labeling of one thing 
as a “sustainability success” and another thing as a “real problem” or “step backward” as 
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simply Model I behavior. The label is used to afford legitimacy to select projects (e.g., 
those projects with a 1- to 10-year payback window). The labels serve as a simple 
judgment, and causes such as “the hard work and leadership of the Dean” or the “short 
sightedness of not accounting for our long-term interests in the budgeting process” are 
attributed in order to parcel out acclaim and blame. On another hand, the introduction of 
sustainability-related descriptors could be seen as a chance to make information about 
organizational artifacts and processes more valid, in that they would then take into 
account environmental costs/harm. The labels are an attempt to introduce a new 
perspective on the status quo. For this to be a feature of Model II behavior, however, 
people would need to be competent in sustainability theory and participate in the 
practices of evaluation freely. The OS staff members approximate some of these 
standards in their design of the process to create a Climate Action Plan. Stakeholders 
from across IWU—from Student Services to Auxiliary Services, from associate vice 
presidents to students—are currently participating in open membership “task teams.” 
Each task team is undertaking a review of one dimension of IWU subject to the Climate 
Action Plan: energy, curriculum, transportation, grounds and waste, and communication. 
More than 80 people have been involved. As such, the exercise offers the possibility for 
participants to rethink their guiding values and strategies for maintaining an enduring 
campus, since they construct inventories of present and future activity, discriminate 
amongst them, and collaborate on crafting a vision of one dimension of sustainability. 
Ultimately, deciding whether this sort of practice is Model I or Model II behavior would 
require a more extensive investigation of group communication processes, which I 
provide later in this study. For now, our example demonstrates how a Model I frame 
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disposes people to defend the knowledge they (think that they) have, and a Model II 
frame disposes people to openly negotiate and change how they know. The relationship 
involves dialectic interplay between knowledge and knowing. 
Summary. The knowledge-knowing dialectic represents the twin nature of 
understanding. It may be thought of as an artifact or object used in communication or as 
a facet of the communication process. The significance of people’s level of self-
awareness about how knowledge is constituted in organizations is captured in Maslow’s 
(1966) now widely known maxim: “When the only tool you have is a hammer, it is 
tempting to treat everything as if it were a nail” (p. 15). Above, I demonstrated the way in 
these discussions explain the kinds of knowledge people generate with lay theory (e.g., 
“knowledge tools”) and reflect upon the processes people use to construct that knowledge 
socially (e.g., “finding nails”). 
 
The Implicitness-Explicitness Dialectic 
Lay theorizing involves both assumption and reasoning from premises as well as 
outright statement of beliefs and hypotheses. The dynamic relationship between 
implicitness and explicitness is fundamental to lay theorizing. As Weick and colleagues 
(2005) put it, “How can I know what I think until I see what I say?” (p. 416). Each of the 
three selected approaches handles the implicitness-explicitness dialectic in a unique 
fashion. 
Vallacher and Wegner’s action identification. Action identification theory’s 
implicitness-explicitness dialectic is evident in passages that discuss how people come to 
perform actions expertly or automatically. Vallacher and Wegner (1987) suggest that 
“with increasing action experience there is a corresponding increase in action 
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automaticity” (p. 7), by which they mean that actions become familiar and more tacit or 
taken-for-granted over time. As well, new act identities replace old conceptions of what 
is being done as an action becomes more familiar. They point out, “variation in [persons’] 
level of identification […] has implications for the form that action control is likely to 
take” (p. 8). In other words, the degree to which the people are able to expertly engage in 
an action is correlated with higher levels of abstraction. People who know what they’re 
doing are likely to have less explicit conceptions of the act they undertake, ironically 
enough. However, they begin with the assumption that people are socialized and 
“increasingly held responsible for our actions and so learn to offer public accounts of 
them. [… We] clarify our intentions, excuse or justify our misdeeds, point to causes 
beyond our control, communicate values, and offer evaluations, all through depictions of 
action.” (Vallacher & Wegner, 1985, pp. 18-19). Vallacher and Wegner, as social 
psychologists, are more interested in the psychological processes involved than the 
communication processes. Still, it is clear that communication, as conscious 
representation through symbols, is the means by which action identification is made 
explicit and practicable in social situations. 
For example, in the fall of 2007, during the first half of the Office’s pilot year, I 
frequently heard Snyder and Valmer, as well as some of the OS interns, use viral 
metaphors to describe their sustainability-related communication. They would go about 
infecting people on campus, who themselves would be contagious or would make for a 
contagion. The contagion would, according to the metaphor, spread widely. More than a 
few times, Snyder and Valmer told me directly that the use of the metaphor helped 
represent that IWU leaders “wouldn’t know what hit them.” Effective sustainability-
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related communication would act much like the transmission of many viruses, infections, 
and the like: Everyday interaction spreads it, but the means of transmission goes largely 
unnoticed in day-to-day life. However, the use of this metaphor rapidly declined during 
and after the spring of 2008. After that time, I infrequently heard it used. I do not claim 
that a specific event or sequence of changes caused a change, but after the winter and 
spring of 2008 the metaphors of sharing and showing were predominant. Around this 
time, I began hearing specific justifications for framing effective sustainability-related 
communication as sharing or showing. I was told, “We can’t scare people into 
sustainability.” Also, I was told that people have to engage sustainability “on their own 
terms.” This change occurred at a particularly important moment for the Office. First, the 
OS was formally reviewed and announced as an official unit of IWU at the end of the 
spring 2008 semester. Previously, the OS had operated as a pilot program, the fate of 
which was uncertain. During the period of review, Snyder met with high-rank 
administrators, one of whom announced his skepticism about the urgency and centrality 
of environmental problems to IWU’s mission. As well, interns and OS staff persons 
gathering data for the greenhouse gas inventory were confronted by other employee’s 
apathy and, in few cases, hostility. The Office representatives were asked why anyone 
should be bothered with the exercise, and were told that asking for complex or 
nonexistent data created a mighty and unwelcome hassle. Against this backdrop, Office 
employees and partners began using sharing and showing metaphors more frequently. 
Naturally, OS employees continued their practice of seeking out people in diverse 
administrative units. Targeted people continued to be told that they would be “leaders” 
and “change champions” in the “sustainability movement” on campus. Yet, the root 
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metaphors for explaining how these interactions served the goal of sustainability 
changed. This change was ostensible inasmuch as the patterns of explicit language use I 
recorded underwent change. At the same time, I believe that the change served an 
implicit function. That is, the change in metaphors enabled an implicit reframing of how 
the Office engages in persuasion and influence. This shift was necessary because the 
Office’s work and influence rapidly increased in scope during the pilot year, and its 
employees were called upon to justify their actions to IWU administration and other 
audiences more frequently as time passed. 
O’Keefe’s message design logics. O’Keefe (1988) assumes that each of the 
message design logics hinge on some premise—an implicit reasoning. To demonstrate 
the implicitness-explicitness dialectic in the theory of message design logics, it is 
appropriate to again turn to the hierarchical arrangement of the three types of logic. 
O’Keefe and McCornack (1987) explain,  
Each move up the hierarchy of message design systems opens up additional 
possibilities for the use of language. Attaining a conventional level of functioning 
makes expression an option, a goal one might choose rather than the guiding 
principle behind the message production system; attaining a rhetorical level of 
functioning makes affirmation of preexisting roles and routines a choice, rather 
than a necessary foundation from which all meaning derives. (p. 73). 
 
O’Keefe’s research has demonstrated that the ability to use increasingly sophisticated 
message design logics also enables people to, first, explain their pursuit of multiple goals 
and, second, better articulate their reasons for evaluating other’s messages in a particular 
way. The key here is that each logic is grounded in implicit beliefs about and attitudes 
toward communication, and that these are best studied in situations that require multiple 
communication goals. The assumptions of higher order logics enable people to speak 
competently and explicitly about other communication logics. The rhetorical design logic 
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is distinguished in that people using it demonstrate reflexivity about their own 
impressions of what communication is and can do (McLish, 1994). 
Through the lens of message design logics theory, the example of changing 
metaphors can be explained. An analyst might find that Lillian Valmer, Robin Carson, 
Russell Snyder, and others changed metaphors as a result of or in order to convey shifting 
conceptions of the communicative work they do. Statements similar to, “I’ve had a 
change of heart about how the OS should communicate,” might evince the expressive 
design logic. Given that I was present in the scene as a researcher of communication, OS 
staff members frequently told me about feelings regarding communication. Of course, it 
is also the case that Office employees would return to the full group to report on their 
findings about “how IWU (really) works.” Especially early on, Office advocates sought 
to develop some relatively stable conceptions of “what’s going on” at IWU. It is 
plausible, then, to assume that the shift from viral to sharing/showing metaphors was the 
consequence of a conventional design logic; many times, I heard OS employees and 
volunteers talk about their interactions with senior administrators and the consequent 
lessons about “how we (ought to) do things around here,” so to speak. Yet, it is also 
sensible to interpret the change in predominant root metaphors as evidence of rhetorical 
message design. In one sense, the change may be seen the creative use of language in 
order to lay the symbolic ground for creating the organization the OS would like to see 
realized in the future. The viral metaphor may have made sense, but the participants in 
the study may have used sharing and showing-related talk to live the vision, if you will, of 
more open and dialogical communication in their ideal sustainable organization (see 
Deetz, 1995). In another sense, the change in metaphors can be read as a deft strategic 
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change. As the Office gained public recognition and legitimacy in the eyes of a range of 
University stakeholders, they needed to account for their position differently. Both 
metaphor types feature interaction and the spread of ideas and information, but viral 
metaphors also suggest incompatible or dissimilar goals, alien bodies, and threat to or 
radical change for the host. Such a representation makes less sense for an organization 
with improving stature and which has achieved recognition as a valued participant in 
several decision making processes. Thus, I might also argue that the Office staff acted 
from a rhetorical design logic in 2008, using strategic communication to change the 
symbolic elements of the situation in/on which they worked.  
In each interpretation, different elements of the message function are left implicit 
or made explicit by the study participants. In fact, I heard accounts like those described 
above across the time I spent in the field for this study. Given my interpretive, 
noncognitive approach, I do not think that any one of these possibilities precludes the 
others. As Wetherell and Potter (1988) explain, function is not an inherent feature of 
messages but rather the “discovery” of analysis and reflection, be it lay or expert in 
nature. 
Argyris’ theories-in-use and espoused theories. The implicit-explicit dialectic in 
action science theories is obvious. Theories-in-use “are those that can be inferred from 
action” (Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, 1985, p. 82). They are implicit by definition. Still, 
theories-in-use can be made explicit through reflection and dialogue. Espoused theories, 
on the other hand, “are those that an individual claims to follow” (Argyris, Putnam, & 
Smith, pp. 81-82). They are theories made explicit, although not always clear, in 
discourse. When I explored the simplicity-complexity dialectic above, I noted the ways in 
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which these implicit and explicit theories play off another.  
Using the language of action science, it is clear that, through the use of metaphor, 
the predominant espoused theory of sustainability-related communication changed at the 
Office of Sustainability during the spring season of 2008. As I described above, Office of 
Sustainability employees began in 2008 making a greater number of statements in staff 
meetings and in public that communication is or ought to be conducted as “showing” 
(unidirectional) or “sharing” (multidirectional). The viral metaphor featured less in their 
speaking and writing after that time, and it may thus be said that the logic of that 
metaphor received diminished emphasis in their espoused/explicit theories.  
Reviewing my fieldnotes from the spring season of 2008 onward, I see indications 
that the premises about communication involved in the viral metaphor still informed 
Office members’ theories-in-use, though they were less outstanding in employees’ and 
volunteers’ espoused theories. Since I must be brief here, I will explain the persistence of 
a viral-like theory-in-use through several phrases that persisted after 2008. When OS 
employees thought together about strategy for gaining an audience with members of 
another administrative unit, they regularly spoke of “getting in.” To get in, OS supporters 
seek out “sustainability champions.” These are people who are believed to already be 
interested in sustainability, have some sense of efficacy or power in their home 
organization, and are likely to be well received by the organization’s executive official(s). 
Persons in executive positions are said to be demonstrating “leadership in sustainability” 
more frequently than they are called “change champions.” The latter term seems to be 
informally reserved for staff persons and midlevel managers. The metaphor of the virus 
should be clear: the OS’s mission/rhetoric is the virus, the change champion represents 
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the vulnerability/penetrability of the host, the change champion is used to replicate and 
adapt the OS’ rhetoric within the organization, and the organization plays the role of a 
host that is fundamentally transformed by the incursion of the virus. 
More recently, the term facilitation has taken center stage in espoused theories of 
effective OS action. It is likely that this most recent change in metaphors/espoused theory 
obscures the endurance of viral thinking and the associated images of penetration, 
widespread and spontaneous replication, and partner individuals as “carriers” of some 
sort. This example demonstrates the utility of Argyris and colleagues’ recognition of the 
loose coupling of explicit and implicit theories of action. 
Summary. Lay theories are almost always enthymematic. They involve unstated 
premises and taken-for-granted, substantive knowledge. Yet, as knowledge claims with 
social functions and consequences, lay theories also involve explicit discursive 
performance. Across the three approaches to lay theory I have reviewed, it is 
demonstrated that assumptions guide people’s explicit communication, and that changes 
in explicit communication behavior and communication settings has the potential to alter 
assumptions. The play between implicitness and explicitness is fundamental to lay 
theorizing. 
 
Summary: Three Dialectics of Academic Treatments of Lay Theory 
The practical nature of lay theorizing is what engenders the simplicity-
complexity, knowledge-knowing, and implicitness-explicitness dialectics. Lay theories 
are practical in that they are socially used and useful, that people create meaning and do 
meaningful things with them. Kurt Lewin (1951) famously wrote, “There is nothing so 
practical as a good theory” (p. 169). Lay theories bring together people’s philosophical-
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ideational understandings and specific communication techniques to address problems 
(Craig & Tracy, 1995). In this chapter, I argued that lay theorizing may be seen as the 
eclectic, sometimes strategic use of interpretive repertoires to make definitional-
conceptual claims. Potter and Wetherell (1987) draw attention to the fact that 
“interpretive repertoires are used to solve problems, but they also generate difficulties of 
their own” (p. 155). 
 As a result, lay theorizing is contingent and ever changing. Writes Garfinkel 
(1967), “Members’ accounts are reflexively and essentially tied for their rational features 
to the socially organized occasions of their use, for they are features of the socially 
organized occasions of their use” (p. 4). Similarly, Wetherell (1998) emphasizes “the 
highly occasioned and situated nature of subject positions and the importance of 
accountability rather than ‘discourse’ per se in fueling the take up of positions in talk” (p. 
394). As people communicate conceptions of the world, they negotiate their 
accountability to those conceptions. That activity is dynamic and complex, but may 
involve reductionism and simplification to be effective in a variety of contexts—the 
simplicity-complexity dialectic. Additionally, people must be able to communicate what 
they or a collective thinks they know, and this is intimately bound up with processes of 
knowing established by collectives—the knowledge-knowing dialectic. Finally, 
knowledge is always incomplete, and it is usually shared most readily when members of 
a collective also share premises or tolerate ambiguity (Eisenberg, 1984). Accordingly, lay 
theories must balance what is stated and unstated—the implicitness-explicitness dialectic. 
We can see a pattern of dialectical thinking in academic work on lay theory from a 
variety of disciplines although discussions of lay theory to date have not framed the 
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literature in dialectical terms. Dialectical thinking is, I think, a suitable frame for a 
discourse-centered approach to lay theory and theorizing. 
 
Conclusion 
Chapter 4 provided a detailed review of the theory that serves as the foundation 
for my perspective on communication, organization, and lay theory. I highlighted why 
this is a study of discursive practice, and I gave particular attention to the fact that this is, 
in part, a study of how people make sense of organizational rhetoric with discourse. My 
review of the concept of organization further situated this as a study of discourse, though 
I explained the relevance of material concerns to the topic of organizational 
sustainability. I outlined a communication-oriented approach to lay theorizing, relying 
principally on Potter and Wetherell’s notion of interpretive repertoires. I then used that 
perspective to rethink three classical and cognition-oriented treatments of lay theorizing. I 
demonstrated three dialectical tensions characteristic to that literature: simplicity-
complexity, knowledge-knowing, and implicitness-explicitness. 
The next chapter details my methodological approach to this study. It grounds my 
discourse- and rhetoric-sensitive approach to communication in interpretive 
epistemology, with some consideration of the critical tradition in communication studies. 
I explain how I utilized an interpretive perspective and participant observation, 
interviewing, and textual research methods. The research data generated from those 
methods will be analyzed with the techniques developed by grounded theory 
methodologists (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser, 1978; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). I believe 
that, when paired with the theoretical perspective developed in this chapter, those  
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methodological considerations provide for a robust, nuanced analysis of lay theories at 





1 These kinds of changes include processes of identification, whereby people 
consubstantiate—or, colloquially, link or make common—their individual interests with 
that of the organized collective (Cheney, 1983a, 1983b, 1985; Tompkins & Cheney, 
1983). As is now common in organizational communication scholarship dealing with 
rhetoric, I assume that the term rhetoric encapsulates both persuasion and identification. 
I recognize that this definition may favor rhetoric’s intentional dimensions and minimize 
attention to its broader and unintended social dimensions and consequences. 
 
2
 I explain my epistemological choices and the tradition of interpretivism in greater 
detail in Chapter 5. 
 
3
 In some cases, people have made the claim simply and tersely: A sustainable university 
is one where people work together and get out of their silos. In other cases, the theory 
expressed with greater attention to detail. 
 
4
 The notion that a greater number of interconnections connections improves the 
functioning of a communication network is a common belief that simplifies a more 
complex reality (see Corman & Scott, 1994; Eisenberg, Monge, & Miller, 1984; Ray, 
1993; Reagans & McEvily, 2003). 
 
5
 Koch and Deetz (1981) call this the “non-ostensive reference” of organizational 
communication in constituting social reality (pp. 3-4). 
 
6




 Of course, calling something nonscientific or nonprofessional/unprofessional is an 
evaluative act (see e.g., Cheney & Ashcraft, 2007; Cheney, Lair, Ritz, & Kendall, 2010). 
The discourses of science and profession are cultural resources, and struggle over the 
labels “scientific” and “professional(ism)” is a communicative activity that connects 
people with cultural capital, status, and power (Douglas, 1986). It matters, then, that 
professional academics have often defined lay theory by what is not—a professional 
endeavor hewed to the scientific method. 
 
8
 A scientific or professional group producing theory is defined by its membership. 
Members should be afforded “expert” status or some comparable standing in the eyes of 
most people, I would presume. It should nevertheless be obvious that experts may 
produce lay theories when those individuals are members of other collectives dealing 
with other problems. In my case, many experts in a variety of subjects were involved. 
(The study was conducted at a university, after all.) Still, the contributors to the Office 
of Sustainability were not collectively or individually communication experts, 
communication scholars, or professional theorists of communication. As such, they 
developed lay theories of communication. Regardless, the lay status of this (or any) 
group’s theorizing does not mean that they cannot act with skill and wisdom. Also, it is 
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not the case that scientific theories are inherently better than lay theories; they are 
simply constructed, confirmed, and put to use in different ways. 
 
9
 My ethnographic observations demonstrate that these arguments have come to the 
minds of OS employees and volunteers. However, when they come up, those arguments 
are usually positioned as gripes about a reified reality they have to “deal with.” Someone 
without “common sense” would argue that IWU ought to rethink its elevation of select 
forms and uses of data. Indeed, it is common to hear OS staff and volunteers say—and, I 
should mention, I am paraphrasing here—that people who argue against sustainability-
related change “either don’t know or don’t understand the data.” 
 
10
 I should add nuance to this line of reasoning. I am saying that people accomplish 
reasonableness (Garfinkel, 1967). Lay theories are not objectively better or worse. It is 
not the case that a complex or contradictory lay theory is somehow more “subtle” than 
another. Additionally, the specific discursive devices used on some occasion should not 
be confused with the system of discursive devices comprising an interpretive repertoire. 
(To use a naturalizing metaphor, we should not confuse the trees with the forest.) 
Whittle, Mueller, and Mangan (2008) do, I think, confuse a collection of discursive 
devices with an IR, when they define “discursive devices” as “a lexicon or register” (p. 
102). The authors observed and recorded a “training session” connected to “the rollout 
phase of a new quality framework information system” (p. 107).  Working from a 60-
second statement by one trainer, the authors identify at least 12 discursive devices in 
use, pointing out multiple contradictions. The authors’ confusion leads them to insinuate 
that the trainer acts as a “rhetorically competent, creative, and reflexive agent” without 
devoting attention to the rhetorical effects/audience’s response (p. 115). While Whittle, 
Mueller, and Mangan do note the difference between speech acts and effects (p. 111), 
they seem to jump to the conclusion that situated, complex, paradoxical speech 
evidences rhetorical competence. It may well be the case that the members of the 
audience at the training session thought of the trainer’s talk as babble. While I agree 
with Whittle, Mueller, and Mangan that attention to the subtleties of peoples’ talk is 
important, I believe they confuse the elements of an IR with the system as a whole. This 
confusion leads them to neglect the interpretations of other people in the context as to 
whether the trainer’s speech made sense and did, in fact, evince “rhetorical competence” 
(see the discussion of audiences in Potter & Wetherell, 1987, pp. 170-181). 
 
11
 This is a particular challenge in environmental matters; the rhetoric of environmental 
activist organizations is often characterized by polarizing, sometimes anti-dialogical 
rhetoric (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1995). Such an approach to communication process 
can entrench positions within organizations, especially organizations with missions that 
are not expressly activism-oriented, and suppress managers’ openness to change (Deetz, 
2005b; Seiling, 2001). 
 
12
 Gherardi and Nicolini (2003), for example, demonstrate how knowledge may be 
“accomplished” and “made organizational” (i.e., organized) in their examination of 
safety as a “collective capacity or competence” (p. 209). Quoting Engeström and 
Middleton (1996), they explain that expertise or expert knowledge in such an area is 
  
151
fundamentally communicative, since “expertise [is an] ongoing collaborative and 
discursive construction of tasks, solutions, visions, breakdowns, and innovations” (p. 
204). An example is the inspection (Gherardi & Niclolini, pp. 217-220). Inspections 
involve inspectors who utilize bureaucratic discourses and apply/accommodate those 
discourses to specific cases. The inspections reinforce standards, codes, and the like, 
which serve to reify certain artifacts and practices as “safe,” and the nature of those 
artifacts (e.g., cement mixers, cranes, torches) provide some boundary conditions about 
how people can make sense of safety. Reports provide authoritative accounts of “what is 
going on.” And, of course, those subject to inspection, “such as the construction 
companies and professionals, influence the premises and activity of the control agency 
[…] by participating in the ‘conversation’ among organizations that determines local 
safety practices—and distinguishes them from those of other communities of practice” 
(p. 219). Involved in all of the interactions are interpretations and evaluations what is 
“known” or “unknown” about the site vis-à-vis discourses of safety. People’s theories 
about organizational performance in the area of safety become particularly important 
under conditions of equivocality (Weick, 1995a) and crisis (Weick & Suttcliffe, 2007). 
This example demonstrates how people co-create organizational knowledge through 
mutual equivalence structures: 
 
Mutual equivalence structure comes into existence when my ability to perform 
my consummatory act depends on someone else performing an instrumental act. 
Furthermore, my performance of my instrumental act has the function of eliciting 
the other’s instrumental act. (Weick, 1979, p. 98) 
 
A crucial point here is that “the sharing of beliefs is not essential to the perpetuation of 
interlocked behaviors” that constitute organizational knowing (Weick, 1979, p. 98). 
 
13
 In a footnote, Watzlawick, Weakland, and Fisch (1974), point out that a theoretic 
understanding of communication and action that effects change are only weakly 
associated: 
 
To express or explain something requires a shift to one logical level above what 
is to be expressed or explained. No explaining can be accomplished on the same 
level; a metalanguage has to be used, but this metalanguage is not necessarily 
available. To effect change is one thing; to communicate about this change is 
something else: above all, a problem of correct logical typing and of creating and 
of creating an adequate metalanguage. (p. 79) 
 
What they are saying is that the accomplishment or alteration of action/knowledge may 
take place without a coherent explanation. But, when people seek to explain action, a 
metalanguage is required. To theorize, people must develop reflexive language: 
language that accounts for the discourses they use. Along these lines, Craig (199) treats 
theorizing, lay and nonlay alike, as “practical metadiscourse.” 
 
14
 I will call these discussions, treatments, or explanations of lay theory rather than 
“theories of lay theory.” I use such labels because I wish to avoid the awkwardness and 
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repetitiveness of phrases such as “academic theories of lay theories.” Also, I wish to 
avoid confusion. Scholarly inquiry into lay theorization—be it scientific, humanistic, or 
a blend of those perspectives—is actually theorization of a different sort, produced in 
different kinds of communities (Furnham, 1988). That is, what we might call academic 
or scientific theories are not simply lay theories “turned up a notch” or lay theories that 
are enhanced, refined, and improved. 
 
15
 It bears mentioning that feminists have critiqued Argyris’ work and related 




 The recent film Up in the Air (Reitman, 2009) provides a good example. The main 
character—Ryan Bingham, played by George Clooney—is a consultant who primarily 
fires people at client firms. Bingham ends up teaching a young colleague—Natalie 
Keener, played by Anna Kendrick—how he goes about expertly terminating people’s 
employment. The audience is party to several virtuosic performances by Bingham. At 
first, he has a difficult time describing to Keener what he does. Called upon to do so, he 
uses high-level act identities, but Keener must first provide act identities at a lower level, 
since she is new to the profession. However, Keener has also designed computer-
mediated processes by which employees at her company may go about doing the same 
work. To understand what is basically the same act identity structure—acting as a 
consultant who lays employees at client firms off—Bingham must be given a host of 
new low-level act identities specific to Keener’s computer-mediated process. Thus, the 
context change requires a renegotiation of the identity of the act (i.e., how the two speak 







 This chapter presents my methodological choices and their implications. First, I 
describe my study as an interpretive investigation that employs modest critique. Second, 
I provide detailed accounts of my approaches to data gathering, as well as my treatment 
of the types of data produced. Third, I explain how my data analysis techniques were 
informed by grounded theory methodology (GTM) (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser 
1978; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Ultimately, I designed this interpretive and in-depth case 
study to provide a rich, nuanced account of communication at an emerging organization 
dedicated to sustainability.  
 
Epistemological Perspective: Interpretivism 
 For this study, I utilized an interpretivist perspective on research methodology. In 
this section, I describe my attitude toward knowledge production and use, position this 
study according to neo-Weberian traditions, present my response to the contingencies 
and risks of interpretivism, and outline my treatment of research data. 
 
Organizational Research and Theory in the Interpretive Tradition 
 Putnam’s 1983 essay in the book Communication and Organizations: An 
Interpretive Approach was an early delineation of the meaning of “interpretive research” 
in the field of organizational communication. Her definition of interpretive research 
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borrowed from the distinction between interpretivism and functionalism in Burrell and 
Morgan’s (1979) now classic categorization of research paradigms in organizational 
analysis. She explains, 
The interpretive approach as a paradigm for social science research is actually a 
compilation of diverse philosophical and sociological traditions. […] In addition 
to [a] meaning-centered focus, interpretive schools share general assumptions 
about the nature of reality and social order, the role of knowledge in social, 
action and the relationship between human beings and their environment. 
(Putnam, 1983, p. 32) 
 
 In contrast to functionalism’s generally positivistic approach to society and social 
research, Putnam writes, “interpretivists believe that reality is socially constructed 
through words, symbols, and behaviors of its members,” and “collectivities are symbolic 
processes that evolve through streams of ongoing behavior instead of through static 
social facts” (p. 35). Geertz (1973) puts the matter succinctly and poetically: “[Human 
beings are] an animal suspended in webs of significance [they themselves have] spun” 
(p. 5). Organizations are a particular kind of “web.” Thus, an interpretive perspective 
treats organizations as lively social collectivities rather than preexisting structures that 
contain symbolic activity (see Axley, 1984; Hawes, 1974).  
As social collectivities, organizations are in large part human constructions, 
composed of “complex, semiautonomous relationships that originate from human 
interactions” (Putnam, 1983, p. 35). In Weber’s (1962) terms, “An ‘organization’ is a 
system of continuous activity pursuing a goal of a specified kind” (p. 115). That is, 
human interaction is organizational when it takes the form of “collective structure” that 
delimits and enables activity as an ensemble (Weick, 1979; see also Barnard, 1938/1968; 
Tompkins, 1984). Organizations are grounded in meaning because meanings “evolve 
from interaction processes and the ways that individuals make sense of their talk. 
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Process […] refers to the ongoing, everchanging sets of interlocked behaviors that create 
as well as change organizational events” (Putnam, p. 40). Put another way, “[the] 
language trappings of organizations […] are important components in the creating of 
order. […] The conditions for order in organizations exist as much in the mind as they 
do in the rationalized procedures” (Weick, 1987, p. 98).  
 The Office of Sustainability (OS) I studied provides a fitting example. Certainly, 
the addition of the OS to the formal organizational structure of Intermountain West 
University (IWU) was a meaningful symbolic exercise on the part of the administration. 
Indeed, manipulation of organizational structure is as much a symbolic move as it is a 
functional one (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The Office possesses no formal authority over 
most university operations. Its employees do not run or design buildings, its employees 
do not review the purchase of materials in other operational units; its employees do not 
monitor and adjudicate staff and faculty travel except for the purpose of “carbon 
accounting.” In other words, the OS is loosely coupled with other operational units 
(Weick, 1976). Still, Office staff members develop formal policy statements for 
administrative adoptions, maintain formal groups and informal networks of faculty and 
staff devoted to sustainability issues, educate and consult others regarding developments 
in the science and economics of sustainability, and more. These kinds of activities are 
essentially symbolic. Especially during the first years, OS employees devoted significant 
energy to establishing “sustainability” as an important watchword and premise for 
decision making. Accordingly, those working in behalf of the OS attempted to represent 
sustainability as a legitimate and actionable goal for IWU. They did so through the 
appropriation and creation of formal communication channels and media (McPhee, 
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1985), and they did so through communication networks designed to secure commitment 
to sustainability-related goals (Eisenberg, Monge, & Miller, 1984). As such, it makes 
sense to think of the Office of Sustainability as an organizing collective—that is, a group 
of people working to coordinate activity around a particular discourse—as much as an 
organization—that is, a thing with particular structural qualities. I will take an 
interpretive perspective on the OS and IWU, meaning that I will devote my attention to 
the negotiation of significant symbols “clustered” with sustainability, communication, 
and organizing in this case. 
 
Locating Interpretivism vis-à-vis Other Epistemological Approaches 
  The distinction between functionalism and interpretivism can be drawn too 
easily, with either epistemic camp represented simplistically in order to augment 
distinctions rather than define a particular research endeavor (Cheney, 2000; Miller, 
2000). Indeed, diverse traditions inform interpretivist accounts of organizational 
communication (Taylor, Flannigan, Cheney, & Seibold, 2001). Deetz (1996/2006) offers 
an alternative to Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) sociological paradigms and overly general 
distinctions between interpretivism and other research epistemologies. Instead of 
paradigms, Deetz suggests that organizational research may be sorted according to the 
various discourses appropriated by researchers. He proposes two axes for distinguishing 
the claims about and representations of research that characterize different discourses: 
(1) local/emergent-elite/a priori and (2) consensus-dissensus (see, Deetz, 1996, p. 198).  
The first axis suggests the spectrum of orientations toward problem definition 
and theoretical deployment. The in the extremes of the spectrum,   
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either concepts are developed in relation with organizational members and 
transformed in the research process or they are brought to the research 
“interaction” by the researcher and held static through the research process—
concepts can be developed with or applied to the organizational members being 
studied. (Deetz, 1996, p. 195, emphasis in original)  
 
As I described in Chapter 1 and will detail below, my approach to defining research 
problems favored the local/emergent pole of the spectrum. Addressing the research 
problems in the manner suggested by GTM (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), I consulted 
academic literature with potential relevance to the problems after some time in the field. 
My research questions reflect a kind of “meeting in the middle” of emergent research 
problems and extant research. I attempted to “[appreciate] how the very phenomenon [I 
was] studying […] changed for the participants themselves during the course of the 
investigation and as a result of both planned and unforeseen interactions” (Cheney, 
2000, p. 33). I envisioned my research as a process of theorizing rather than applying or 
developing theory (see Weick, 1995b).   
 The second axis of Deetz’s (1996) comparative research discourses is consensus-
dissensus. This “dimension draws our attention to the relation of research to existing 
social orders. Consensus or dissensus should not be understood as agreement and 
disagreement but rather as presentation of unity or of difference, the continuation or 
disruption of any prevailing discourse. The aim of consensus-oriented researchers is “to 
display a discovered order with a high degree of fidelity or verisimilitude” (Deetz, p. 
197). This metatheoretical position may be marked by an interest in understanding 
others’ meanings and actions (according to the spirit of fidelity) or a commitment to 
accurately representing others (according to the spirit of verisimilitude) (Mumby, 
1997).1 By contrast, scholars who orient toward dissensus in the interpretation of 
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organizing “concern [themselves] with understanding, explicating, and critiquing the 
various ways in which political and ideological limits are placed on social actors’ 
abilities to fully realize their identities as active participants in meaningful dialogue 
communities (including organizations)” (Mumby, 2000, p. 72). I am primarily 
consensus-oriented in this study, meaning that I favor understanding and representation 
over critique and challenge. However, in accordance with Deetz’s (1996/2006) image of 
these positions as located across a spectrum, I preserve some sense of critique and 
dissensus orientation. After all, “power relations affect members’ embodied identities 
(Allen, 2005, p. 46, emphasis added). And, while I am invested in understanding a 
plurality of meanings at play in a particular case, “by taking multiplicity and polysemy 
seriously, and by placing variant meanings on equal footing, [I could] become blind to 
the workings of power in the situation that have helped to create the very parameters for 
those meanings” (Cheney, 2000, p. 34). Thus, I frame my epistemological choices as 
tentatively consensus-oriented, reserving some space for critique and reflection on 
power dynamics and discrepancies in this case. 
 I am taking on a qualified form of interpretive epistemology. I aim to show how 
“particular realities are socially produced and maintained through norms, rites, rituals, 
and daily activities” (Deetz, 1996, p. 248). I do not, however, assume that my own study 
and representations are impartial or that the participants in my research are maintaining a 
harmoniously communitarian work life (Clifford & Marcus, 1986). First, I am interested 
in the particularities of this case, the local and emergent meanings created amongst 
participants and in relation to me, as well as in relation to the historical moment and 
social context. Members of the organization I studied appropriate a variety of discourses 
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in order to organize for social and institutional change, and it is the unique, negotiated 
production of common meaning that most interests me in this case. Second, while my 
focus is on the development of coordinated behavior and meanings, I strive to remain 
attuned to, on one hand, the variety of meanings at play in the case and, on another hand, 
the contestation, fragmentation, and negotiation of power in the processes I studied. The 
report that I present to the reader draws from interpretive epistemology and should be 
read as an inquiry into a socio-historically situated case of people organizing for change, 
with attention to the creation and co-orientation of meanings relevant to action in the 
service of that change. 
 
Framing this Study as Interpretive Research 
I call this study “interpretive” because I “aim to explicate and, in some 
[instances], to critique the subjective and consensual meanings that constitute social 
reality” in this case (Putnam, 1983, p. 32). I approach the case according to neo-
Weberian conception of Verstehen, which we might simply call “understanding” or 
“gaining empathic insight into others’ attitudes” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 31). The 
term Verstehen has been deployed disparately and widely in social research (Martin, 
2000), but I define it as a methodological “choice of means which is consciously and 
systematically oriented to the experience and reflection of the actor[s]” (Weber, 1997, p. 
161). In other words, I want to understand how the people I study craft “organization” 
through communication in ways that make sense from their standpoints. As a participant 
observer, I was both party to and part of their sensemaking processes and “languages.” 
Still, my engagement was what we might call “partial inclusion” (Weick, 1979), since 
my relationships were mediated by research goals (Waddington, 1994).  
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A pragmatic take on Verstehen recognizes the productive role of the researcher 
as a “professional stranger” (Agar, 1996) who is invested in “making strange” that 
which is or seems natural to research participants in order to provide a useful account to 
others and the participants, themselves. My approach to generating understanding was 
not simply to gather up contextual and subjective data, but to occupy a position of 
partnership defined by liminality—being suspended between member and non member, 
insider and outsider (Jackson, 1995).  
An example. In the spring of 2008, I had two separate conversations with Office 
staff about the meaning of work. The first discussion took place with Russell Snyder, the 
Director at the time, after a regular staff meeting. The meeting was shorter than usual 
because, as Snyder had put it, everyone was busy. After others had left the room, Snyder 
and I discussed his concern that Office staff spent, perhaps, too much time “just talking 
and socializing” with others after meetings. When I asked why this seemed to be a 
“problem,” he said that there was a lot of work for the Office now that it was 
transitioning out of what staff had come to call its “start-up phase.” He was suggesting, 
it seemed to me, that lots of “talk and socializing” was justified in the “start-up phase,” 
but questionable during the present “busy time.” He’d discussed this with reference to 
other employees, and I pointed out that he, too, had long informal meetings and 
regularly spent more than an allotted time in meetings with people in positions of 
authority over the Office. Part of the busyness had to do with the fact that the Office 
staff had just begun to compose an annual report and strategic plan.  
Later in the same week, Robin Carson mentioned those documents in particular 
when she and I spoke alone after a steering committee meeting. She and I agreed that a 
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lot was “going on” on campus. She expressed to me that she felt that “internal” work on 
Office documents such as the annual report got in the way of her “real work.” When I 
pressed her on what she meant by “real work,” she said “making change” in connection 
with people from various parts of IWU.  
During a meeting of the staff the next week, Robin brought up Chester Barnard’s 
approach to “effectiveness” and “efficiency,” which I had mentioned as I tried to make 
sense of her feeling of tension about the recent emphasis on “internal” OS work and her 
sense of her “real work.” Snyder was curious, and said, “Tell me more.” Robin said that 
I was the “expert” and should probably explain. I said that I didn’t want to be thought of 
as the “expert,” but that I’d talk about Barnard’s concepts and then what I saw as an 
interesting tension in the framing of work at the Office. I offered a loose sketch of 
Barnard’s thoughts about communication and coordination, and then talked about my 
impression of the definitions of “work” that were at play in my discussions with Russell 
and Robin. Did my summary of their reflections on work resonate, I asked? They 
provided elaborations and challenges to my interpretation, and the four of us (Lillian 
Valmer was involved) talked about their feeling of time-pressure, work stress, and the 
relative importance of certain tasks. Near the end, I realized that there seemed to be a 
kind of dichotomizing playing out—internal/external, real work/routine tasks, etc. Our 
conversation had by that time, ironically, gone on longer than we’d planned. My notes 
on the episode remind me that one staff person said that the discussion had “given us 
some things to think about,” though little sense of finality. 
This example has several important features related to my methodological 
choices. I participated in work activities with Office staff, including attending meetings, 
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the informal talks afterward, mulling over drafts of documents, and planning future 
gatherings. As I did this, I actively marked and reflected upon episodes in which the 
experiences and meanings of significant features of the case came to the fore for both the 
participants and me. However, I did not simply “gather data about their experience” for 
use in academic writing. Instead, I shared my reflections with participants, compared 
their sensemaking, and sometimes tested or challenged their claims. As can be seen in 
the example above, I was sometimes called into what I thought was a difficult position—
“expert” and the like—given my attempts to use my active partnership as a researcher to 
participate in and stimulate understanding from a unique perspective. Importantly, my 
reflection was a part of the organizing processes I studied. The participants knew I was 
actively seeking multiple perspectives and voices, and that I would synthesize, compare, 
and critique those perspectives.  
Summary. For me, then, Verstehen is not merely “understanding” as an accurate 
representation of a social collectivity—the Office and its advocates, in this case. Instead, 
I shaped my methodology to generate knowledge in/through the relationships between 
participants in the study and me (Eastland, 1993). They were cooperating with one 
another and myself in the interest of organizational, social, and environmental change; I 
was involved as a pragmatic, empathic, yet challenging inquirer. Nonetheless, my 
attention was on understanding and interpreting the situation largely through a 
reconstruction of their points of view. 
 
The Role of Critique in this Study 
Later in this chapter, I characterize my fieldwork role as “active membership” 
(Adler & Adler, 1998). That is, I worked as a partner facilitating organizational activities 
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and I retained the independence necessary to make claims about and on other members. 
The kind of relationship I am talking about is defined by critique. Brinkmann (2007) 
compared this sort of relationship to Socratic dialogue: 
The “researcher” (Socrates) is a participant, who takes seriously what his fellow 
citizen says (“What does he say?”)—seriously enough to disagree with it in 
fact—he is not a spectator who objectifies the conversation partner and his 
arguments by ignoring the normative claims of the statements or looking at them 
in terms of the causes (psychological or sociological) that may have brought the 
person to entertain such beliefs (“Why does he say that?”). (p. 1126) 
 
My treatment of lay theory moves beyond interpretation as mere description in that I 
also examine the normative grounds/contexts involved, bringing it to bear upon my 
interpretation and presentation in this research report. So, for example, when participants 
claim that the OS must enlist and empower “reasonable people” to “get anything done,” 
my interpretation involves more than description of the presumed constituents of the 
category “reasonable people.” Instead, I compare the interpreted statements with other, 
even competing, examples and principles. I represent their perspective and consider it 
alongside my own, and I attempt to write in a manner that reflects this commitment. In 
most cases, I interpret with reference to conceptual, theoretical, and ethical constructs 
not immediately relevant to the situation involving these participants.  
This is a kind of value-relevant critique, an informed challenge. My posture on 
this matter assumes that participants are 
not necessarily right (nor wrong, for that matter), for opinions and beliefs are 
debated, tried, tested, and challenged in an open conversation, where the validity 
of [any given participant’s communication] does not depend on how he or she 
“really feels” but rather on public and intersubjective criteria—perhaps even 
ethical ones. (Brinkmann, 2007, p. 1134) 
 
But the function of critique in the kind of interpretation I conduct also offers a kind of 
clarity from the analysis of discourse from a unique research position. Fairclough (1993) 
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writes, “I am suggesting that such linkages between this course, ideology and power 
may well be unclear to those involved, and more generally that our social practice is 
bound up with causes and effects which may not be at all apparent” (p. 135). From this 
perspective, the purpose of interpretation is novel, enlightening, systematic connection 
of perspectives, rather than faithful representation of the perspectives of the persons 
under study. 
Schwandt (1997) proposes three possible kinds of interpretation-criticism 
hybrids, including a “value-critical” interpretivism. He summarizes value-critical 
research approaches in the following way:  
Judging the merit or worth of a particular practice […] requires cultivating 
perceptual awareness of concrete particulars. Yet one cannot ignore standing 
commitments and general principles that form the traditions of various practices. 
Nor, because of the mutability and indeterminacy of practices, can we engage in 
some (relatively simple) processes of weighing alternative goals, values, criteria, 
and the like that reduces judgment of what constitutes good practice to 
calculation. Rather, we must engage in strong evaluation, judging the qualitative 
worth of different ends or aims of our practices by bringing into simultaneous 
critical examination the perceptual knowledge of concrete details of a practice 
and the conceptual knowledge of principles that have traditionally shaped the 
goods of that practice. (Schwandt, 1997, pp. 19-20) 
 
This is an important distinction, as I am working to make sense of the means by which a 
group of people create understanding and transform their social situation. Rational 
analysis and critique is a contribution to such an endeavor (see Fay, 1987, pp. 23-26). 
Thus, I take up a value-critical perspective, being sure to account for my performance as 








Qualitative Validity and Reflexivity 
 Qualitative research establishes coherence and credibility through the 
demonstration of researcher practice and active persuasion regarding the novelty, 
resonance, or practicality of the research (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 1993). As such, the 
writing-up of the research is a feature of the interpretive validity of qualitative research 
(Van Maanen, 1988). Here, I discuss the definitions of validity and reflexivity that 
should be used to assess the value of my study. As well, I briefly mention the specific 
means by which I worked to ensure valid interpretations and reflexive accounts of the 
research process.   
Validity. In quantitative social science, internal and external validity are “critical 
evaluative constructs” for judging the merits of a study and its results (Miller & Salkind, 
2002, p. 50). Miller and Salkind (2002) advise those conducting empirical research with 
quantitative data to “strike a balance” between internal validity, which “is the quality of 
an experimental design such that any outcomes or effects can be attributed to the 
manipulation of the independent variable,” and external validity, which is “the quality of 
an experimental design such that the results are generalizable to different settings” (p. 
50). This construal of validity is problematic for a qualitative case study analysis 
involving participant observation. As such, different standards are necessary. 
Golden-Biddle and Locke (1993) discuss three challenges to the validity of 
claims made by organization researchers in the interpretive tradition. First, interpretive 
research is “developed from a field-dependent situation incorporating a particular social-
historical context and the personal realities of the researchers as well as those actors they 
study” (p. 598). That interpretive research is specific and particular means that lessons 
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cannot be universalized in accordance with the classic virtue of scientific findings, 
generalization (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). Second, interpretive research offers accounts, 
readings, or arguments about the situation studied—interpretations, in other words—
rather than objective assessments and the absolute or universal truth. And third, 
interpretive research is conceptually mediated and focused upon experience, rather than 
upon direct or unmediated observation of some kind of external reality. Together, these 
challenges address the question of whether interpretive research can provide a “valid” 
account of whatever is the focus of research (Van Maanen, 1988). 
Interpretive researchers working with qualitative data respond by embracing 
these challenges. Accordingly, many scholars conceptualize research methodologies as 
an integral part of the social processes at the heart of the inquiry (Giddens, 1979). Such 
a turn has at least two consequences. First, as a researcher, I am required to document 
my methods and theoretical presupposition not simply as proof that I am working within 
the boundaries of an established “normal science” (Kuhn, 1970). Instead, my 
undertaking and account of interpretive research methodology is an enactment of or 
contribution to the situations or phenomena being studied. As such, “I ought to be aware 
of the very processes by which I interpret social data, making every effort to shed light 
on those as well as on my ‘objects’ or ‘subjects’ of analysis” (Cheney, 2000, p. 20). As a 
qualitative researcher, I must do so because the research “can only be understood in the 
context of its use” (Rohatynskyj & Jaarsma, 2000, p.7). Interpretive research, thus, does 
not so much document the world as it is, but emerges from the relationship between 
researcher and others, both in the setting of the research (Putnam, 1983) and in the 
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textual mediations of research reports (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 1993; Van Maanen, 
1988). 
I am claiming that the epistemological research traditions from which I draw 
eschew a “scientific” notion of validity. This does not mean, however, that rendering 
judgment about some quality of the research is impossible. Schwandt (1996, 1997) 
suggests that it is misguided to seek established, generalizable, enduring criteria for 
determining the validity of qualitative social research. He proposes a skeptical 
perspective on evaluation in and of social research—a perspective grounded in ethics. 
“We must learn to live with uncertainty,” he asserts, “with the absence of final 
vindications, without the hope of solutions in the form of epistemological guarantees” 
(Schwandt, 1996, p. 59). The standard of research quality and usefulness I invite the 
reader to apply is interpretive validity (see Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, pp. 238-242). 
I hold my research to the following conditions of validity. Most writers in the 
qualitative tradition anchor a modified sense of validity to the notion of plausibility 
(Glaser, 1978). Most contemporary qualitative researchers posit that multiple meaning-
based realities exist in any given situation. As such, a plausible account is descriptively 
accurate of gathered data and the researchers’ field experiences, and compared with or 
tested according to other possible interpretations (see Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 242). 
Thus, “the meanings emerging from the data have to be tested for their plausibility, their 
sturdiness, their ‘confirmability’—that is, their validity” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 
11). 
 I took three measures to ensure such interpretive validity. One measure was 
grounding my interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations in the data. Following 
  
168
GTM, my research practice involved, first, structured data gathering and, simultaneously 
but secondarily, ongoing and progressive data analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
Interpretations were made early on but held as tentative hypotheses about how I might 
plausibly make sense of aspects of the data. Returning to the data and research 
participants provided the basis for rejecting, revising, or elaborating initial 
interpretations. The second measure I took to ensure interpretive validity of my research 
findings was checking the plausibility of my findings with participants in the study 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). That is, I engaged in member validation during my time in the 
field and during writing. Member validation involved “sitting down with one or more 
participants [to ask them what they thought] of a description, and interpretation, or an 
explanation” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 243). I built such checks into the routine of my 
interaction with participants during my fieldwork. Office employees, students, and key 
volunteers had the opportunity to comment upon my informal summaries of my research, 
data displays drawn from representative theoretical memos, and preliminary formulations 
of this research report. The third and last formal measure I took to ensure interpretive 
validity was to maintain a set of reflexive memos. This journal, for lack of a better term, 
tracked my evolving relationships with participants and my sense of myself in the scenes 
portrayed in my field notes and other data. I discuss my treatment of the concept of 
reflexivity in the next subsection, and I provide a more detailed account of the reflexive 
memos I wrote in a later section that deals with the types of research data involved in this 
study. 
 Reflexivity. Reflexivity “in the strong sense [means] that we aspire to [… take] 
into account all the complex and particular variations in the relationships between the 
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researcher, the community studied, the audience, and the mediating role of the 
ethnographic artifact” (Rohatynskyj & Jaarsma, 2000, p. 15). This definition of 
reflexivity has a few important features with implications for my study. First, reflexivity 
is an aspiration rather than an objective standard. Reflexivity, then, is an ongoing 
research practice rather than a standardized measurement for the value any given study. 
Second, reflexivity is an accounting of the complexity and particularity of the given 
research endeavor. Resultantly, interpretive researchers must embrace the polysemy of 
the people and contexts studied, while working to provide useful and appropriate 
representations and explanations. Third, the definition draws our attention to the fact that 
fieldwork and writing mediates and shapes research relationships.  
I attempt to provide a reflexive account of the participants’ experiences, 
understandings, and actions in this study, including the contexts of their action. As such, I 
undertook specific measures to incorporate reflexivity in my research and writing work. 
First, I shared my research work with Office staff throughout the period of my participant 
observation. I did not “reveal” my findings at the conclusion of the study but scheduled 
consultation with Office employees and key volunteers about particular themes emerging 
from my investigation at specified intervals, approximately once per academic semester. I 
produced data summaries and fieldnote extracts, which I shared with Office staff. As a 
rule, participants in the research project were made aware that I would discuss my 
developing findings with Office employees, and any data summaries/extracts were made 
available to all Office employees in order to guard against coercive use of knowledge 
about my research practices. These member checks provided me the opportunity to 
discuss my research work explicitly with the most heavily involved participants. 
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Additionally, these practices provided the space for participants to comment on and shape 
my research focus and practices. I encouraged their commentary, suggestions, and 
criticisms in order to ensure interpretive validity, as described above, and to provide 
perspectives that informed my personal reflexivity work. Accordingly, I regularly 
composed memos that reflected my consideration of changing research relationships, 
developments in my understanding of the scene, and the like. I describe these memos in 
more detail in the section of this chapter describing types of data. For now, it is enough 
for me to say that these documents aided me in considering my influence in the scene, in 
accounting for situations that did not at first make sense to me, and enabling me to 
engage relationships mindfully. 
 As an example, I wrestled with being called an “expert” and similar labels early in 
the study. The Office employees and I routinely consulted one another before meetings of 
various groups about how I should be introduced. The loose script I preferred included a 
statement similar to: “I am a doctoral student conducting a communication research 
project with the Office of Sustainability. I’ll be taking notes. If you’re uncomfortable 
with me being here, please let me know; I can take no notes or can leave.” I was never 
asked to leave or not take notes during a meeting. In some instances, Russell Snyder 
would introduce me or add to my self-introduction that I was an “organizational network 
specialist” or a “communication expert” working with “us.” My memos on those early 
encounter express unease with this pattern. However, I provided less mention of—and 
positive response, when I do comment on—Robin Carson’s occasional characterization 
of me as a researcher “partnering with us.” Looking back at those memos, I note that she 
would usually add something to the effect of: “Brenden has been really helpful to have 
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around.” I used my memo writing to engage my “presence” in the scene directly. 
Speaking with these two directly, I was able to navigate the manifold and shifting 
identities I negotiated as I pursued empathetic understanding. I found out that Snyder 
wanted other participants to take me seriously, to treat me as an authoritative participant. 
(I was, after all, a student.) Carson, on the other hand wanted to demonstrate that I wasn’t 
a threat to others, and that I was sympathetic to the cause, if you will. These two 
perspectives are problematic, of course. But, the idea that I would be involved in a way 
that had me working in behalf of the Office without complication, contradiction, and 
liminality is more problematic. Thus, I openly discussed my evolving relationships with 
participants with those very participants. I did so for two reasons. First, I hoped to 
develop a more robust and reflexive sense of my research identities and practices. 
Second, I wished to ensure open and ethical relations over the course of my participation. 
This was particularly crucial because my approach to value-critical interpretation engages 
me simultaneously in the reconstruction, analysis, and critique of others’ meanings. 
 
Summary 
 This study is an interpretive account of a case of organizing for sustainability-
related change. My interpretive work enables a “reading” of research data from a 
perspective that attends dialectically to local emergent meanings and abstract 
theoretical/normative constructs. Similarly, I look for the convergence of meaning 
between participants (including myself as a participant in the field), but take up a modest 
position of critique in order to examine moments of dissensus, disjuncture, and 
resistance. I invite the reader to assess my interpretations according to the quality of my 
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description, the plausibility of my conclusions, and the documentation I provide of my 
research work and epistemological choices. 
 
Research Questions 
The epistemological and practical choices I described above shaped my creation 
of and responses to the following research questions. 
1. What lay theories of (a) communication and (b) organization do 
participants employ in this case, especially with reference to the goal of 
“sustainability”? What are the processes by which these lay theories were 
enacted in communication, and with what consequences? 
2. How do the participants in this study (a) talk about and (b) practice 
persuasion in this case? Specifically, how do they make sense of and 
construct knowledge about the connection (or disconnection) between 
their rhetorical actions and organizational/social change? 
3. Regarding communication and sustainability in this case, how are ethics 
talked about or practiced, explicitly or implicitly, if at all? 
 
 
Methods: Data Generation and Gathering 
 I employed research methods appropriate to interpretive research and qualitative 
data. I begin by defining qualitative research, and then describe my use of ethnographic 
participant observation and interview-based research methods. This section describes the 
methodological assumptions that guided my field practices, as well as the specific 
practices I used for the duration of the study. 
 “Qualitative research is […] an approach that subsumes most of what goes by the 
names of interpretive, ethnographic, and naturalistic inquiry” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 
19). The researcher working with qualitative data documents her/his observation of and 
interaction with a particular scene/situation in social life, using theoretic concepts to 
inform the encounter(s) as well as interpretation of data (Carbaugh, 1989/1990; Van 
Maanen, 1988). Indeed, Denzin and Lincoln (1994) suggest that in contemporary inquiry 
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the relationship between “researcher” and “researched” is the principle determinant of 
what counts as qualitative data. “Our writing,” argue Taylor and Trujillo (2001), “does 
not ‘capture’ the essential truth of the organizations we study. Rather, it reveals how we 
as writing actors are materially and symbolically involved with those organizations 
through a process of reflecting on and describing our relationships with them” (p. 177). 
And so, research using qualitative data offers, among other things, a meaning-focused 
“thick description” of social interaction that accounts for subtlety and complexity, 
including the researcher’s place in the field (Geertz, 1973). 
 
Fieldwork: Ethnographic Participant Observation 
Between July 2007 and October 2007, I conducted informal interviews and pilot 
observations to determine whether a long-term project involving the Office of 
Sustainability was feasible and met my research objectives. During that period, I 
proposed a working relationship with OS staff based upon the premises of “action 
research” (Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, 1985).3 I would participate in the work of the 
Office; Office staff would serve as co-investigators, commenting on research data as I 
produced it and helping shape my orientation to it. The roles of “participant” and 
“researcher” were somewhat blended in cooperative inquiry (Heron, 1996). I would 
remain responsiveness to participant’s interests but maintain independence in terms of the 
research findings and my assessment of accumulated research data. Similarly, I would 
have no formal authority in collectively made OS decisions—no voting rights, if you 
will—and would not be involved in staffing decisions, evaluations, and the like.  
I participated as an active member of the Office of Sustainability. “The active 
membership role describes researchers who become more involved in the setting’s central 
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activities, assuming responsibilities that advance the group, but without fully committing 
themselves to members’ values and goals” (Adler & Adler, 1998, p. 85). Burgess (1984) 
calls this role “participant-as-observer.” The researcher cooperates in everyday life in a 
more than superficial way, but is explicit that s/he is conducting research without 
intending to “pass” as a complete member. That frame guided my formal period of 
participant observation between October 2007 and November 2009. 
 I should note that my work as a research partner was not necessarily unique. 
Undergraduate students working as interns or on work-study programs performed both 
routine functions and conducted more extensive projects under the auspices of the Office 
from semester to semester. Graduate students maintained long-term projects that served 
the Office’s interest, including the ongoing collection and analysis of greenhouse gas 
emissions at IWU, developing a campus farmers market, and conducting research 
relevant to a proposed high-performance building policy. What distinguished my 
partnership was the duration of my engagement, and the interpretive nature of my 
investigation and qualitative nature of the data with which I worked. 
 I routinely observed the meetings of three bona fide groups (Putnam & Stohl, 
1990): (1) Office staff, including employees, interns, and affiliated students; (2) the OS 
Steering Committee (SC), also called at different times the “campus sustainability 
network” and “working group;” and (3) the President’s Sustainability Advisory Board 
(PSAB), a select group of University staff, students, and faculty convened, initially, by 
the OS’s Director to advise IWU’s President. During the school year, the groups met with 
the following approximate frequencies. Office staff met formally each week; the SC met 
every 1 to 2 months; the PSAB met two or three times per semester.    
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 Office staff meetings. I regularly participated as an active member in OS staff 
meetings. During those meetings, I would share the progress of my research, would ask 
for participants’ feedback, and developed activities during the 2007 and 2008 autumn 
semesters that engaged Office staff in assessing research data, both of which usurped a 
full meeting schedule. During these sessions, I would take notes on the interactions 
constituting the meeting, the subjects discussed, and my developing perspective on the 
process of organizing the Office. Some sessions engaged me more actively, and so my 
notes in the moment were less comprehensive and required more “filling in” when I 
wrote ethnographic field notes after the fact.  
For example, a large portion of a staff meeting in the fall of 2007 dealt with a 
response to a student’s email to the OS regarding the grounds watering system. 
Sprinklers, the student had observed, malfunctioned with some regularity during the hot 
parts of the year, and on some occasions quite a lot of water was wasted due to a broken 
sprinkler head. A response had been sent thanking the student for their notice, explaining 
that parts of the water system were being retrofitted with computer monitoring software 
to detect and fix such problems more rapidly, acknowledging the water-intensiveness of 
grounds maintenance, and identifying IWU staff in charge of turf management. Was this 
the appropriate response, the convened members of the OS staff were asked? A 
discussion ensued regarding whether or not the student was simply being “brushed off,” 
had been “given good information,” and such. At one point, I asked if this was a good 
chance to “bring somebody in” to the work of the OS, to “get them involved.” I 
participated in and tracked the flow of the episode, much of my own sensemaking 
occurring after the fact while I wrote up the session as a scene in my field notes (see 
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Emmerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995). This kind of active participation and reflective 
documentation is representative of my involvement in an array of staff meetings and 
events. 
I also participated in the work of Office staff outside of regularly scheduled 
meetings. As I was able or invited by OS employees, I sat in on meetings with various 
campus and community stakeholders. For example, I was present for meetings with an 
employee in IWU’s Purchasing Department, the director in charge of campus athletic 
facilities, members of the library staff “green team,” and a partner in a local architectural 
firm. Such meetings were common, if irregular, between 2007 and 2009, while the OS 
staff negotiated their role in campus and community networks. The OS staff scheduled 
these meetings opportunistically, and my involvement was equally driven by opportunity 
and availability. I played a largely observational role in such meetings, and I told 
participants that I was there to “watch what was going on” for the most part, though I 
may ask a few questions along the way. 
Finally, I participated actively in strategic planning sessions during 2008. During 
the summer and fall seasons of 2008 in particular, Office staff gathered a number of times 
to assess the development of the OS to that point, their evolving sense of its purposes and 
strengths, and opportunities in the future. Outside this window of time, actively 
participated in several days of fairly unstructured talk in January 2009. My meetings with 
Robin Carson and Karen Adams that month took place in response to the death of Russell 
Snyder in late November 2008. Adams and Carson both expressed uncertainty about the 
purpose and future of their work in the wake of Snyder’s passing. They engaged me in 
sessions that dealt with the mission of the OS, the role of advocacy in their work, and 
  
177
how they might carry on until someone could be hired to replace Snyder. These periods, 
in the summer of 2008 and winter of 2008-2009, involved the meetings most clearly 
devoted to organizational introspection and retrospection during the period of my formal 
observation. 
While reflection was perhaps the principal activity of Office staff after the winter 
of 2007-2008, the summer and fall sessions were explicitly labeled as “time outs” to 
think collectively and comprehensively. In these sessions, I participated actively, sharing 
relevant examples from my fieldwork and providing recommendations based upon my 
judgments. I declined to facilitate a series of these sessions, as I felt that my personal 
involvement, to that point, afforded me a functionally or ethically “neutral” stance for 
guiding the conversation.  
Let me offer a description of the sessions and my active participation in them. 
Three consecutive workdays in the summer of 2008 were labeled a “retreat” by Office 
staff. I was invited to participate in the retreat, and audio recorded work sessions with the 
consent of all participants. We met in a spacious and historic building reserved for such 
campus business, away from the Office’s headquarters. The meetings involved 
negotiating how to label, cluster, and prioritize activities: Did it make sense to group 
together student initiatives, staff initiatives, and university-wide policy initiatives—or 
would that kind of categorization prevent important “cross fertilization?” How did the 
collection of greenhouse gas emissions data relate to behavior change programs 
undertaken as a kind of community-based social marketing? What were the Offices’ 
responsibilities and capabilities in terms of communications with stakeholders within and 
beyond IWU? What, exactly, was the nature of change being sought by the Office? 
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I offered my interpretation of the others’ activities, even supplied my own 
opinions and challenges. One day I suggested that we, as a group, might be too easily 
conflating behavioral and cultural change. Lillian Valmer replied that she saw them as 
distinct, since cultural change dealt with norms, which were perceptions and judgments 
of others’ behavior. In her view, working for behavioral change need not involve 
normative considerations to affect material changes. (Energy could be saved, for 
example, by affecting the behavior of building managers, unobtrusively controlling the 
experiences and behaviors of building occupants.) Normative considerations bridged 
behavioral and cultural changes; a “culture shift” for her involved the adjustment of 
perception of behavior—and not behavior, itself, per se. Previously, my notes reflected 
my confusion with the staff’s apparent collapse of “behavior change” and “cultural 
change” into the overarching category of “norming.” This kind of contribution, testing, 
and dialogic change in interaction characterized my participation at events. 
Steering Committee. During our first meeting in July 2007, Russell Snyder 
invited me to a session of what he was then calling the “campus sustainability network.” 
The group was composed of people who had participated in the process that established 
the Office of Sustainability, as well as others who demonstrated strong environmental 
interests along the way. By the time I began my formal fieldwork, the group had been 
named the Steering Committee (SC). Members of the SC were recruited from diverse 
University departments and stakeholder groups, including Biochemistry, Campus Design, 
Dining Services, Computing Services, and more. Office staff conceived of the group as a 
set of informal advisors and, as appropriate, volunteers for specific projects and 
campaigns. Additionally, Office staff told me that they hoped that the SC would provide 
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a venue for participants to share their successes and failures, and to draw on the support 
and expertise of others as they pursued initiatives in their home departments or programs. 
Membership was not limited, and between 8 and 12 people, not counting OS employees 
regularly attended the meetings. The meetings usually involved briefings from OS staff, 
notices from participants, and an informational presentation or working session on a 
problem or project of significance to the OS staff. 
My participation ranged during these sessions. For many sessions, I assumed a 
“complete observer” role, simply taking notes on the unfolding events and conversations 
while attempting to remain unobtrusive (Adler & Adler, 1998). As I was called upon, I 
would comment or ask clarifying questions, but I remained passive in most sessions. That 
said, all members of the SC were aware that I was present “as a researcher working with 
the OS,” and they had completed forms documenting their consent to participation in my 
study, so I assume that my very presence affected the flow of events in some.  
One session deserves highlighting. In the fall of 2007, I facilitated an entire 
meeting of the Steering Committee. That meeting focused on the development of the 
OS’s mission statement. Russell Snyder had suggested that, as a “communication 
specialist,” I might provide a global perspective useful in facilitating an activity that 
helped define a memorable, direct mission statement for the Office. I told participants in 
the session that I was interested in working with them to develop and discuss a range of 
ideas. Some elements of the statements developed in that session are preserved in the 
mission, vision, and goal statements provided in public OS communications.  
President’s Sustainability Advisory Board. The President’s Sustainability 
Advisory Board (PSAB) convened for the first time in January 2008. The PSAB works 
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alongside a number of other presidential-level advisory boards, reviewing materials on 
behalf of and offering specific advice to IWU’s President on matters pertaining to 
sustainability. For example, the PSAB recommended that IWU become a signatory to the 
American University and College Presidents’ Climate Commitment, which commits 
institutions to the goal of climate neutrality— a still vague concept referring, broadly, to 
an organization’s capacity to regularly operate without any net effect global climate 
change. The PSAB has met between one and two times per semester. Its membership is 
composed of 13 people recommended by the OS Director and approved by the president. 
The PSAB was formed and, until Russell Snyder’s death, facilitated by the OS Director. 
Now, the PSAB is a functionally independent group, though Office staff persons are 
intimately involved in supporting and coordinating the board’s work. I was recognized, 
among others, as an ex officio member of the PSAB, and all participants in PSAB 
proceedings consented to my presence as a researcher. My role was almost entirely 
observational throughout, and I very rarely made comments or asked questions during 
sessions.  
I was, however, surprised with the number of times PSAB members, some of 
whom also participate in the SC, approached me after meetings to discuss my reaction to 
what I’d observed. The president was not usually in attendance, but he did attend the first 
session following the August 2009 hire of Paul Abbey as Office Director. Pressed by one 
member about the kind and scale of changes they, as a board, could consider, the 
President responded that he “wanted change.” “But,” he said, “you’ve got to make me.” 
He reasoned, “It’s really the other way around”: the campus has to lead, even though the 
President is often invoked as the leader. Following the session, the Chairman of the 
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PSAB turned to me and asked, a wry smile on his face, “Well, what do you make of 
that?” My sense was that he was pleased by the President’s openness to aggressive goal 
setting on the part of the PSAB, even it’s advocacy work beyond giving advice. I joked 
sarcastically, “I don’t know which of us is the cart and which of us is the horse.” I 
explained my unease about the President underplaying his authority, but also my 
appreciation of his emphasis on responsiveness. I was ambivalent. The chairman said to 
me, “Yes, yes. But, he [the president] seemed open. And he didn’t say no. He could, of 
course.” With that, he patted the arm of his chair, exchanged goodbyes with me, and got 
up to leave the room. A number of times, PSAB members, OS employees, and I would 
chat following these meetings, and these moments both informed my observations and 
constituted what might be framed as my “participation” with the PSAB. 
 Other settings. I should mention three other routines/settings in which I was a 
participant observer. First, during the fall term of 2007 and spring term of 2008, I 
regularly attended the meetings of a student group that had been crucial to the 
development of the Office. Lillian Valmer and Yasmine Meadows were founding 
members of the group named The Student’s Sustainability—University Network (or 
SSUN). Members of that group were central to the series of campus dialogues that 
resulted in the recommendation for a formal Office of Sustainability. Moreover, Valmer, 
Meadows, and others led the group of students, staff, and faculty that drafted the proposal 
eventually approved by University advisory boards and administrators. Valmer was an 
Office employee, and Meadows and other students worked directly with Office 
employees on a range of projects. Office staff members called SSUN a “partner group,” 
and I was told several times that the two entities were working “in concert.” So, I sat in 
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on the group’s meetings at least once per month in order to get a sense of the way SSUN 
members made sense of their connection to the OS. 
Second, I was regularly involved in informal social activities related to the Office 
of Sustainability. Workplace interactions extend beyond the physical confines of 
workspace, of course. What’s more, work of any kind involves significant emotional and 
relational elements in the everyday as well as the extraordinary (see, e.g., Cheney, Zorn, 
Planalp, & Lair, 2008). The work of Office staff is particularly social in the sense that it 
caught up in knowing and relating to one another, as well as people throughout IWU and 
surrounding community. Additionally, Office employees and volunteers spent a good 
deal of time and effort celebrating successes, maintaining relationships outside the 
workplace, and gathering together in situations that did not pertain directly to Office 
business (though environmental matters, social change, and, yes, work at IWU were 
commonly topics of conversation). Moments of this sort included pizza and beer at a 
hangout nearby IWU after the conclusion of the first large-scale event sponsored by the 
OS, occasional potluck dinners with a large number of students and volunteers at 
Snyder’s home outside of town, and a session with more than 10 people facilitated by a 
University grief counselor on the 1-year anniversary of Snyder’s death. At these sessions, 
I did not actively take notes, but did track the events and my experiences in subsequent 
memos.  
Third, I was involved occasionally in the planning and execution of specific 
events. Two such examples are illustrative. One is the first meeting of a statewide campus 
roundtable, where sustainability coordinators, advocates, and university officials met to 
talk about matters of mutual interest. Lillian Valmer conceived of the roundtable series, 
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and did the early work planning it. The Office I studied played host for the first session, 
which took the better part of a workday, and Valmer and I facilitated the meeting. We 
intended to guide those taking part in, first, meeting one another and, second, determining 
what they would most like the consortium to do. I also played a central role in designing 
a public session about “Communicating Climate Science.” The public event was part of a 
series supported by a University office oriented toward community education. I worked 
with OS staff to develop the rationale for, schedule, and host the event at the 
community’s public library. In these cases and others, I acted as an adjunct to the Office 
employees for the development of specific events. Here, I attempted to work as a 
“complete member […] in order to immerse [myself] and grasp […] the subjectively 
lived experience,” as well as to contribute immediate, practical assistance (Adler & 
Adler, 1998, p. 85). 
My occasional involvement in social activities and event-based work was rounded 
out by my informal drop-ins and unscheduled work time at the Office. Without plans, I 
would sometimes remain after a staff meeting or event at the OS, writing field notes or 
doing other work while the others went about their day. As well, I would sometimes stop 
by the Office when I was on campus in order to see what was going on and chat with 
whoever might have been available at the time. These experiences were not planned and 
did not often become significant parts of my observational work, but they offered 
opportunities to get a sense of the flow of experiences at the Office when I might not 
otherwise plan to be around. I believe they suitably complemented my more regular and 
active participation in other areas of Office work life. 
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 Summary. My fieldwork engaged me as a participant observer in a variety of 
situations. Whether I emphasized participant or observer depended upon the setting. I 
tracked the day-to-day work of Office employees, and the regular meetings of several 
bona fide groups created and coordinated, for the most part, by the OS. These activities 
afforded me the opportunity to assume the qualified perspective of a participant, while 
surveying a great variety of forms of Office work. 
 
Interviews: Individual and Group Approaches 
 I conducted in-depth, moderately scheduled interviews between February 2010 
and May 2010.4 The in-depth interviews I describe in this section were carried out after 
the conclusion of my participant observation, and were designed to investigate the 
research problems and questions of this study, which were specified between 2007 and 
2009. These interviews complemented the other means by which I gathered data, as they 
created a unique situation for gathering interactional data (Rapley, 2001). Interviewing 
techniques are particularly useful for eliciting accounts rich with actors’ communicative 
use of labels and categories (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). In total, I conducted 20 
individual interviews (i.e., one-on-one) and two group interviews (i.e., focus groups).  
 Individual interviews. Individual interviews took place in private meeting spaces 
or seminar rooms on the campus of IWU, or in locations selected by the participants. I 
completed 20 interviews, which averaged about 90 minutes in length. The shortest 
interview lasted 40 minutes and the longest interview lasted 3 hours. I began audio 
recording each interview after our discussion and completion of a document of informed 
consent (see Appendix A). 
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Individual interview participants were recruited in several ways. First, I recruited 
participants in person when I saw them in person or if I was in routine contact with them. 
Second, participants were recruited through the email listserv utilized by each of two 
groups of Office partners and volunteers: the SC and the PSAB. Third, announcements 
were made at routine gatherings of those and other groups involved in the OS’s mission. 
Fourth, I contacted participants directly if they had previously expressed interest in 
participating in research interviews for this study. A template for recruitment statements 
can be found in Appendix B. 
 Individual interviews were guided by a schedule of questions addressing several 
topic areas, all of which were related to the concept of sustainability: the participant’s 
University roles, their involvement with the Office, communication broadly construed, 
persuasion in particular, and ethics. The interview guide (available in Appendix C) 
provided a rough sequential arrangement for questions, which were developed with 
reference to my initial analysis of fieldwork data. Moderately scheduling interviews has 
several benefits for the researcher (Schensul, Schensul, & LeCompte, 1999). One benefit 
is a level of precision within interviews. That is, moderately scheduling interviews allows 
for the researcher to phrase important questions clearly, and order questions in a way 
sensible to the overarching goals for the interview. As well, moderately scheduling 
interviews allows for a degree of similarity between different interviews, providing points 
for comparison during the analysis of interview data. Finally, moderately scheduled 
interviews afford the researcher “flexibility to delete questions or create new one as the 
need or opportunities arise [… making them] ideal for probing interviews” (Stewart & 
Cash, 2006, p. 98). Whole interviews and individual sections of interviews were planned 
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according to a “funnel” scheme, where initial questions tended to be more broad and 
open-ended, and later questions more conceptually specific (Gottlieb, 1986). I sequenced 
the interview questions in this way to allow participants to identify significant matters 
and direct my attention as a conversational partner (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, pp. 152-
153).  
I conceptualized these interviews as “a conversation that has a structure and 
purpose” (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 3), but with the expectation that the interaction is 
an “inter-change of views between two persons conversing about a theme of mutual 
interest” (Kvale & Brinkmann, p. 2). The interviews were designed, on one hand, to 
provide rich accounts and stories related to the change processes observed in an earlier 
part of the study. On the other hand, I approached these interviews according to what 
Brinkmann (2007) calls an epistemic model of interviewing. The chief metaphor for 
interviews concerned with episteme, or “knowledge,” is the Socratic conversation, “a 
mode of understanding rather than a method in any mechanical sense” (Brinkmann, 2007, 
p. 1127). The use of an epistemic frame for interviews is intended as an “alternative to 
the standard doxastic interviews that probe for private meaning and opinions” 
(Brinkmann, p. 1129). The epistemic interview steers “not [to] the narrative of the 
individual’s life or his or her experiences, but rather people’s epistemic practices of 
justification” (Brinkmann, p. 1128). In other words, the interview is an interaction that 
demonstrates and reflects upon how people make knowledge claims. These claims are 
considered in light of particular normative dimensions of people’s experience and 
context. The aim is phronesis, as Flyvbjerg (2006) puts it; the interview involves not 
simply the “content” of interviewee’s experiences and perceptions, but also the 
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motivations, guiding values, that shape their knowledge about the organization(s) of 
which they are a member. In terms of specific practices, this meant that I acted as a 
“visible questioner” during the interviews, listening and asking scheduled questions, but 
also challenging claims, comparing answers, and suggesting alternatives (Brinkmann, p. 
1136). 
The distinction between this approach to interviewer conduct and simply asking 
good, probing questions in “standard or traditional” qualitative interviews is the degree to 
which I was an active participant. I believe an “epistemic interview” frame was 
appropriate to this study for three reasons. First, my research questions regard lay 
theorization of communicative events. I am interested in participants’ knowledge claims 
in the first place, and wanted to tease out the logics, conditionalities, and processes 
involved in such everyday explanation. Because my interests steered toward persuasion, I 
adopted a skeptical but invested perspective in order to create conditions for interview 
participants to convince me of things as well as demonstrate things to me. Second, my 
participant observation already involved me in events and topics being discussed in the 
interviews. In many cases, I had spent time with these participants explicitly mulling over 
and testing ideas, thinking about the effectiveness of this or that strategy. Participants 
were made aware that I would present alternative interpretations, including my own 
perspective, in order to make the interview a conversation. In this way, my use of the 
epistemic model both mirrored and extended my engagement in other fieldwork. Third, 
the interviews were designed after consultations with research participants. OS staff and 
select volunteers saw early, small-scale summaries and analysis. As such, I adopted an 
active role and framed the interview sessions along the lines of Brinkmann’s (2007) 
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formulation in order to involve participants in creating knowledge about the case, rather 
than simply recording their responses for the benefit of readers. 
 Group interviews. In May of 2010, I conducted two group interviews/focus 
groups.5 The group interview sessions were conducted in private meeting spaces on 
IWU’s campus. The first group interview, which involved 6 OS staff members and long-
term student partners, resulted in approximately 2 hours of recorded discussion. The 
second group interview—which involved six supporters of the Office, including students, 
consulting faculty, and members of the SC and PSAB—resulted in approximately 1¾ 
hours of recorded discussion. Each participant was made aware in advance of the other 
people to be involved in the session. All participants completed forms documenting their 
informed consent prior to the commencement of the session. When all forms were 
collected and signed by the researcher, the session and audio recording began. 
Group interviews are a research method uniquely able to generate “data and 
insights that would be less accessible without the interaction found in a group” (Morgan, 
1988, p. 12). In particular, the group interview session facilitates discussion about 
perceptions, ideas, and judgments without the need “to reach consensus, provide 
recommendations, or make decisions among alternatives” (Krueger, 1988, p. 29). 
Information shared in focus groups—as well as the session, itself—may be of practical or 
instrumental value. Regardless, group interview data are rich and detailed accounts of 
interaction that compliment other observational and interview research methods (Frey & 
Fontana, 1991). 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) note that, 
As his [or her] theory develops, the analyst will notice that the concepts abstracted 
from the substantive situation will tend to be current labels in use for the actual 
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processes and behaviors that are to be explained, while the concepts constructed 
by the analyst will tend to be the explanations. (p. 107) 
 
Participants in the group interviews were prompted to discuss my tentative explanations 
of field note and individual interview data.  I used their conversation to help me to 
“conceptualize how […] substantive codes may relate to each other as hypotheses to be 
integrated into a theory” (Glaser, 1978, p. 72). Additionally, I facilitated the discussions 
with attention to the possibility that the sessions could facilitate the emergence of new 
understandings for the participants, as well as be a venue for problem-solving interaction. 
I did not shy away from this possibility, but, when appropriate, sought to encourage 
dialogue, experimentation, and practical discussion amongst participants (Freeman, 2006; 
Krueger & Casey, 2000). 
Summary. Interviews afforded me specific, rich data in the form of transcribed 
audio recordings. During the interviews, I assumed the role of active interlocutor— I did 
not simply ask for opinions and probe for greater detail, but conversed with participants 
in a dialogue guided by the research questions. I intended that dialogue to invoke, reflect 
on, and demonstrate the communication phenomena under study. Group sessions were 
designed to engage groups of people who had previously worked/volunteered in behalf of 
the OS in discussion. That discussion was problem-oriented. I structured prompts and 
facilitated discussion to stimulate interaction about labels/phrases that I thought 
highlighted communication problematics for OS employees and partners. I believe that 
these methods were appropriate to my study, an example of applied research that “[set] 
out to contribute to knowledge by answering a real, pragmatic, social question” (Cissna, 




Types of Data 
My research methods and techniques generated specific types of data. I will 
briefly discuss my creation and treatment of four different kinds: ethnographic field notes 
and records, interview transcripts, theoretical and reflexive memos, and texts produced by 
or for the Office of Sustainability. 
 
Ethnographic Field Notes 
 As I conducted participant observations, I took notes on my experiences and 
perceptions. Golden-Biddle and Locke (1993) explain that interpretivist social scientists 
doing observational research ground their claims in the production of texts, principally 
field notes. “Ethnographers develop texts,” they write, “by entering the field setting and 
converting the stream of field experiences into their written form, initially through field 
notes” (p. 596). Field notes are inscriptions of social experience, and 
as inscriptions, fieldnotes are products of and reflect conventions for transforming 
witnessed events, persons, and places into words on paper. In part, this 
transformation involves inevitable processes of selection [… Fieldnotes] also 
inevitably present or frame objects in particular ways. (Emmerson, Fretz, & 
Shaw, 1995, p. 9) 
  
My field notes reflect my ongoing sensemaking and reconceptualization of 
participants’ experiences, my field relationships, and tentative interpretations of the flow 
of events. Grounded theory methodologists distinguish field notes from theoretical 
memos. Field notes “are data that may contain some conceptualization and analytic 
remarks. Memos, on the other hand, are lengthier and more in-depth thoughts about an 
event, usually written in conceptual form after leaving the field” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, 
pp. 123-124). I constructed field notes from my interactions in the field. In most cases, I 
took “scratch notes” in the moment on bound notebooks or my laptop computer (Sanjek, 
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1990). Meeting situations facilitated the use of a computer, as people often consulted 
meeting materials on their own computers, or attempted to do “other” work while 
participating in the meeting. Depending on the situation— specifically, whether it 
required more active participation or allowed for more detached observation—I took 
notes of varying specificity. Some situations discouraged note taking. An example is my 
meeting with Robin and Karen at a coffee shop to talk about our work and experiences in 
the wake of Russell’s death. I transformed my in situ scratch notes and after-the-fact 
reflections into longer narratives (i.e., formal field notes) as soon as was possible. As my 
participant observation progressed, my field notes became more refined, and my writing 
work turned more to the development of conceptual memos. I describe memos in more 
detail in the next subsection. I distinguish field notes from theoretical memos in the 
following way. Field notes utilize narrative conventions, emphasize descriptive content, 
and contain less in the way of analytical reflection (Manning & Cullum-Swan, 1998). My 
memos, however, feature purposeful exploration of the dimensions of the content, 
ordering according to conceptual categories and issues, explicit connections to theory, 
and—more frequently, at least, an analytic tone (Charmaz, 2006).  
For this report, I drew descriptive details from my field notes. In some cases, I 
excerpt whole sections of my field notes. In other cases, I present revised fieldnote entries 
in this document. When I indicate that some statement is a quotation, it is the language 
used by the speaking person as I took note of it at that time. However, in a few cases, I 
will place statements in quotation marks that are reconstructed from memory and 
inscribed in complete field notes. When I use what might be labeled a pseudo-quotation, I 
will identify it as such. In those instances, I will preface a quotation with a statement 
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similar to: “Snyder then said something to the effect of…” This fact highlights that my 
field notes are particularly useful in documenting my dynamic relationship with the field, 
and will not be treated in this study as neutral and sterile descriptions of the research 
scene (Jackson, 1995). In my writing, I did bracket my active reflection on events with 
these marks: “[ ].” Those marks indicated to me, upon reading for analysis, that the 
content separated was an explicit interpretation or perspective that I imposed after the 
fact, or which I engaged but did not make explicit to others in the situation described. 
This does not mean that the narrative reconstructions of my field notes are somehow 
more “pure,” of course. Instead, this demarcation scheme highlights the fact that I 
attempted to be reflexive about my role in shaping and interpreting the ethnographic 
scene, especially in the writing of field notes (VanMaanen, 1988). 
 
Theoretical and Reflexive Memos 
Glaser (1978) defines a memo as “the theorizing write-up of ideas about codes 
and their relationships as they strike the analyst while coding. [… It] exhausts the 
analyst’s momentary ideation based on data with perhaps a little conceptual elaboration” 
(pp. 83-84). I produced these write-ups from the beginning of fieldwork, according to the 
tenets of GTM (Glaser & Strauss, 1968). Miles and Huberman (1994) write that memos 
are distinct types of qualitative texts produced by the researcher in that they “make 
deeper and more conceptually coherent sense of what is happening. [… They are] a step 
away from the immediate toward the more general” (p. 72). As I accumulated time in the 
field and research data, my memos became more detailed and lengthy, representing 
conceptual focus and explanations that synthesized a greater range of data. 
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I produced two types of memos over the course of the study. One type I call 
“theoretical memos.” These memos dealt with conceptual and analytic issues in other 
data. For example, in the late winter of 2009, I wrote a brief memo in which I wondered 
about the OS staff persons’ dialectical concern for “not stepping on anyone’s toes” and 
“empowering others.” I made a note to return to that matter and find evidence of the 
tension in my field notes. Later, I constructed more detailed memos that sketched out 
various advocacy performances that might constitute “toe stepping,” “empowering,” and 
other frames for intervention. In that later memo, I referenced moments in past field notes 
where participants provided premises, justifications, or explanations—as when one OS 
employee said at a staff meeting, “We’ve got to get them [persuasion targets] to think 
they did it [desired action or change of mind] themselves.” These memos dealt less with 
describing the talk and its context than with noticing interesting problems in practice and 
proposing theoretically informed explanations. Elements of some theoretical memos are 
used in this dissertation, while many have been discarded or used to guide my own 
sensemaking about the organizing of the Office of Sustainability. 
I also kept reflexive memos. Earlier in this chapter, I described the role of 
reflexivity in my conceptualization of fieldwork in this project. Reflexive memos were 
important components of my reflexivity work throughout the study. Along with field 
notes, I kept a kind of analytic journal. These entries tracked my field experiences, noting 
interesting or exceptional elements of my research practices and relationships. These 
memos usually referred to discreet events, tracking my inevitable influence in/of the 
scene, but I also kept track of long-term dynamics.  
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A brief example is representative of the role of reflexive memos in the course of 
my study. When Russell Snyder died, my reflexive memos reflect on my relationship 
with the man and how his passing shaped my relationship with the others involved in the 
study. I was surprised by my personal feeling of shock and loss, and spent a good deal of 
time reflecting on the evening Robin Carson called me. She told me Snyder had died 
while on a hiking vacation, and asked if I wanted to visit her to drink a beer and talk 
about it. I did. The memos that deal with that night document that I did not think first of 
the study and “prudence” in my research relationship. I did recall, however, my sense of 
unease when Robin asked me asked me that night some version of the question: “What 
does this mean for your study?” I felt awkward, out of place. “My study?” I thought, 
“This isn’t about my study.” Upon further reflection, I considered the way in which I’d 
developed personal affections for the people I’d worked with for more than a year. Then I 
reviewed a number of my field notes to see how I’d represented the ways in which their 
relationships transcended social roles, as did my own. I came to the conclusion that I’d 
given too little attention to the personal dynamics in my field notes, and worked to 
incorporate that perspective more saliently in my field notes to come. Doing so was 
worthwhile. Karen Adams once called the period following Snyder’s death a span of time 
when everything seemed “on hold.” More than once, Carson and she have reflected that 
they felt like everything was “up in the air.” I was implicated in this feeling. One day in 
the OS offices, after I finished asking Adams about her thoughts on advocacy—my 
interest in the problematics surrounding Office stakeholders’ frames for persuasion was 
beginning to take shape, you see—I said something like, “Thanks for letting me take 
notes on this. It’s really helpful.” She said, “You’re welcome.” Then, “I trust you. You’re 
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not going to make us look bad.” My notes on this episode display my surprise and our 
conversation afterward about the comment. I explained my professional responsibilities 
in terms of representation, as well as my commitment to participating actively and 
usefully. Still, I said, I was uncomfortable about the notion that I wouldn’t “make the 
Office look bad.” I said I wouldn’t make her and the others “look good,” in the sense that 
I would not change my representation in order to ingratiate myself with them, or them 
with persons in positions of authority. My reflexive memos thus helped to shape my field 
notes and my practices in the field. I used them to consider my “presence” in the data, 
which was considerable, and to negotiate the politics and ethics of fieldwork as best as I 
could (see, Fine, 1993; Sanjek, 1990). 
Both types of memos contributed to my data analysis. They guided my 
interpretations during that stage, and even provided hints as to how I might sort the data 
available in other forms (e.g., field notes, transcripts, other documents). The memos 
provided a fusion of field documentation and analysis in that they involved me early on 
in suggesting plausible explanations and frames for messages, behaviors, and episodes—
which is in keeping with the principles of GTM (Glaser & Strauss, 1968). 
 
Interview Transcripts 
I conducted all recorded interviews face-to-face. I made digital audio recordings 
of every interview. I utilized an online file-sharing program to collaborate with a 
transcriptionist to create transcripts of the recordings made during the 20 individual 
interviews. To ensure participants’ confidentiality, the transcriptionist I hired resided in 
the U.S. Eastern Time Zone and had no connection to the Office of Sustainability. The 
transcriptionist completed a confidentiality agreement, presented as Appendix D. 
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Upon receipt, I reviewed the transcripts while listening to the audio recordings. I 
did so in order to guarantee the transcription quality and to ensure the proper use of 
interview texts (Poland, 1995). I corrected the transcription and added relevant detail 
when necessary (e.g., noting emphases, indicating pauses or sighs, etc.). I asked the 
transcriptionist to use verbatim transcription techniques, which preserve everyday speech 
terms and patterns (e.g., gonna, umm, should’ve, you know, etc.). This way, the data I 
coded were appropriately detailed and representative of the speech of those involved. The 
transcriptionist informed me that her technique involves minimal use of punctuation. 
When I was able to preserve the speaker’s meaning but improve readability, I edited 
statements for inclusion in the final report. For example, this is an unedited excerpt from 
an individual interview transcript: 
I try to you know my hope is that actually once the President signs off on the 
Climate Action Plan that we can work together to increase you know maybe the 
college participation in the Behavioral Program and you know that they sort of 
oversee a lot, I mean not that they oversee but they you know help coordinate 
information for like recycling and a lot of these events that go on on campus 
which I deal mostly with energy that you now we can sort of go out together and 
meet with every dean of every college on campus and sort of voice what the 
Climate Action Plan says and getting commitment from each dean to hopefully 
like give us a representative within their college to have this like Green Leader. 
But I think working together to do that will be a lot more effective and will you 
know have a greater scope that we can sort of address going out to meet them. 
 
The paragraph below is an example of how the excerpt might be edited for inclusion in 
this document: 
My hope is that, once the President signs off on the Climate Action Plan, we can 
work together to increase the college participation in the Behavioral Program and 
that they sort of oversee—I mean, not that they oversee—but they help coordinate 
information [… We] can go out together and meet with every dean of every 
college on campus and sort of voice what the Climate Action Plan says, getting 
commitment from each dean to, hopefully, give us a representative within their 
college as a Green Leader. I think working together to do that will be a lot more 
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effective and will have a greater scope that we can address [when] going out to 
meet them. 
 
The edits made improve readability and preserve the basic meaning I begin the quotation 
midsentence, remove a number of verbal filler words, add punctuation to highlight 
pauses, omit conjunctive terms used as “verbal punctuation marks, remove sentences 
between passages of interest, and add terms needed to understand the statement in written 
form. On occasion, I leave verbal hesitations, tics, and other nuances in the quotation. 
When that is the case, I have judged that the qualification or uncertainty left in the quoted 
text is of great significance to the meaning intended by the speaker (or my interpretation 
of their speech). Unless otherwise stated, the reader should assume that all transcript 
quotations are edited in this manner. 
I also kept field notes about the interview situations in order to document 
contextual factors not evident in the interview transcripts. I began recording interviews 
after obtaining consent from the participants. If participants indicated that something was 
“really important” before I began or after I stopped the recording, for instance, I made 
sure to keep track of the statement. Research interviews always take place in some 
context, and it is important to account for the situation of the interviews when analyzing 
the content in interview transcripts (Mischler, 1986). This is especially the case for my 
study, since my interviews were conducted following my extensive fieldwork as a 
participant observer.  
I subjected individual interview data to close readings, which I call “micro-level 
analysis” in the tables at the end of this chapter. I describe my coding procedures later in 
this chapter. However, I should say here that I listened to audio recordings of the 
interviews at least twice—once while reviewing and editing the transcription, and once 
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while listening with a blank notepad and no transcript. Individual and group interview 
data provide the bulk of quotation-based evidence in this dissertation. 
 
Office Texts 
 The last kind of data I gathered was documents and messages produced by Office 
staff and their partners during the period of my participant observation. These documents 
include promotional flyers, OS annual reports, strategic plans for various initiatives, and 
the like. In some cases, I was involved in writing or editing materials. I clearly identify 
the fact that I was a contributor to particular documents when they are used as evidence 
in this report. Other office text I gathered included email and written personal messages. 
Office staff regularly sent me copies of their email to others, when they felt it was 
appropriate to do so. For instance, Snyder once sent me his reply to a library staff person 
working on that organization’s staff Green Team. The library employee asked whether 
Snyder thought it wise to strive for “conceptual precision” when defining sustainability. 
Snyder replied to the library employee, “From a campus perspective, environmental 
sustainability decisions cannot be divorced from the financial realities and the social 
responsibilities that comprise the mission of the university.” Later, he wrote,  
My conversations with others around the country and observations of practice 
elsewhere suggest that we would be anomalous if we took the narrower view in 
fostering a more sustainable campus. Furthermore, using the narrower definition 
in [our U.S. state] complicates our efforts because ‘sustainability’ becomes 
equated only with ‘environmental’ and loses other aspects that may have greater 
appeal while downplaying environmental aspect. 
 
This message is representative of the significant role of electronic communications in 
Office employees’ and partners’ sensemaking about sustainability communication on 
campus and beyond. 
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 I treat these documents and messages as textual artifacts. When using this term 
this, I rely upon the following definition: “Texts are a manifestation of discourse in the 
discursive unit upon which the organizational discourse researcher focuses” (Grant, 
Hardy, Oswick, & Putnam, 2004, p. 4). I draw upon OS documents and messages less 
than other forms of data for the purposes of analysis.  
 
Summary 
My approach to data gathering yielded four types of data. Field notes, transcripts, 
memos, and documents relevant to the work of the Office were subjected to analysis. Of 
course, I did not every bit of every type of data. According to the grounded theory 
approach to research (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, pp. 197-198), as well as common sense 
(Kvale, 1996), I refined my review of accumulated data by writing memos and focusing 
on data relevant to emergent themes as time went by. I subjected these types of data to 
different levels of analysis. For each research question, the different types of data 
received varying levels of attention: microlevel, mesolevel, and macrolevel readings. I 
describe my data selection and analysis procedures in the next section. 
 
Data Selection and Analysis 
 I took specific but appropriately flexible measures in selecting and analyzing 
available data. My approach to data creation, management, and analysis followed the 
principles of grounded theory methodology (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). “The goal of 
grounded theory,” writes Glaser (1978), “is to generate a theory that accounts for a 
pattern of behavior which is relevant and problematic for those involved.” (p. 93). In 
order to identify such a relevant and problematic “core category” (see Glaser, 1978, pp. 
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94-96), I addressed the data produced in a combined inductive-deductive fashion. This 
approach “[roots theory] in data [and] not in an existing body of theory” (Glaser, p. 38). 
Accordingly, I undertook fieldwork to immerse myself in the work and social processes 
involving Office staff and volunteers, generating the data types described above along the 
way. Following an initial period of gaining access and establishing relationships with 
participants (Shafir, 1991), I began writing both field notes and memos, refining my 
attention and reflection deductively “in the service of further induction [such that] the 
source of derivations are the codes generated from comparing data” (Glaser, p. 38). 
Grounded theoreticians call this process the “constant comparative method” (see 
Charmaz, 1994, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1988, 
1995). I did not simply review all available data in conducting my analysis, but rather 
engaged in analytic thinking early on and throughout to refine my selection and 
conceptualization of available data (Kvale, 1996). 
 Below, I sketch the decision criteria and concepts that guided my analytic process. 
I discuss how I chose to unitize and select data after I developed initial, tentative insights 
during the period of participant observation. Following that, I discuss how the selection 
of data was bound up with fieldwork and analysis, according to GTM. I provide an 
extended illustrative example. I conclude the section by providing an overview of the 
distinctive features of GTM, including the use of particular coding schemes and 
theoretical memos. 
 
Unitizing and Selecting Data 
 I used GTM principles as a guide for unitizing and selecting data. During formal 
data analysis, I consulted and adapted a list of six data units (see Appendix E). One unit 
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of data that I tracked, coded, and analyzed was words or phrases commonly used by 
research participants. Examples include, “sustaining the sustainers,” “getting it” (as in, 
“s/he just doesn’t get it) “taking a systems perspective,” and such. A second way in 
which I distinguished “chunks” of data from one another was according to explanative or 
evaluative statements made by participants. For instance, in one discussion, Karen 
Adams, Robin Carson, and I talked about Karen’s question: “What do they [people who 
deny that anthropogenic climate change is taking place and requires remediation] have to 
lose?” The resulting discussion is rife with such statements. Robin observed that, 
figuratively and literally, “your whole world would change if you believed it [was true 
that human-caused climate change was an immediate problem deserving corrective 
human action].” I hypothesized that the (dis)belief one invests in climate change is caught 
up with other identity markers, such as membership in a political party. The conversation 
from that point provided a number of such judgments, hypotheses, and the like. Third, I 
reconstructed what we might call action routines or performances. With these labels, I 
single out notable social processes by which participants regularized interpretations (see 
Weick, 1995a) and/or negotiated preferred, embodied identities or identifications (see 
Holmer-Nadesen & Trethewey, 2000). Fourth, I also looked for stories frequently told by 
participants that captured some element of organizational values and ideology (see 
Mumby, 1987). Fifth, largely through the composition of memos, I traced relational 
dynamics overtime. As Office employees identified “key players” or “converts,” for 
instance, I examined the relational-communicative work and dialectics (Baxter & 
Montgomery, 1996) involved over time. Sixth and finally, I took note of exceptional 
circumstances, acts, and such. I used these events to identify key “turning points” 
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contrary examples, and patterns of variation (see Bullis & Bach, 1989; Corbin & Strauss, 
2008, pp.113-115). As I reviewed transcripts, field notes, and other data, I looked for 
these six types of data unit. From the specific (e.g., common words and phrases) to the 
broad (e.g., performances), these frames for the accumulated data afforded me distinct 
“lenses” for reading and sorting. 
 Obviously, I did not use all of the available data in producing this dissertation. I 
consciously applied seven selection criteria to unitized and coded data, as I sought to 
gather evidence for my claims. These criteria were not rigidly applied in every case, but 
rather served as guides for selecting useful and discarding less useful or compelling data. 
The criterion I most heavily relied upon was participant identification; when participants 
intentionally drew my attention to a particular communication phenomenon—as if they 
literally or figuratively said, “Here, look at this!”—I noted the significance of the data. 
Second, I selected data that were recurrent in interviews and/or observations, especially 
when these data were representative of some routine or process relevant to the research. 
Third, I marked data that were unique. Unique data were those that seemed to contradict 
or exist dialectically with data selected for its frequency and representativeness. Fourth, I 
selected data that represented shifts, changes, and flows in experience and 
communication patterns. Fifth, I selected data that were representative of significant 
events and moments/utterances marked by urgency or unusual import, according to the 
perceptions of others or myself. Sixth, I selected data that represented emotionally 
charged communication or the active suppression/manipulation of emotion, regardless of 
the context. Seventh and lastly, I selected data that were related to particular events or 
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periods that figured in my retelling of the OS story. These seven selection criteria guided 
my inclusion of data after I conducted initial coding and analysis according to GTM. 
 
Analysis: Grounded Theory Methodology 
 I utilized the principles of GTM (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) to organize and 
coordinate my analysis of accumulated research data. As mentioned above, I employed 
GTM practices in each stage of the research process. As a result, I conducted certain 
kinds of analytic work throughout; I did not wait to conduct analysis until after all 
research data had been collected. GTM engages analysis as a dynamic process of 
examining and explaining data’s various properties and dimensions (see Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008, p. 46). Glaser and Strauss (1967) called this constant comparison: “In 
contrast to analytic induction, the constant comparative method is concerned with 
generating and plausibly suggesting (but not provisionally testing) many categories, 
properties, and hypotheses about general problems” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 104). It 
“requires only saturation of data—not consideration of all available data, nor are the data 
restricted to one kind of clearly defined case” (p. 104). Theoretical saturation is a moment 
in analysis when the researcher feels as though the concepts and explanations developed 
from the data are plausible and demonstrable. 
An example. Before I talk about specific techniques, I should provide an extended 
example of constant comparison and theoretical saturation from my study. In the winter 
season of 2008-2009, I wanted to explore more deeply the issue of “information sharing” 
activities the OS staff undertook. Information sharing, from the perspective of the 
employees, was closely, but not exclusively, tied to the image of the organization as a 
“clearinghouse.” In doing so, I began developing categories that characterized various 
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relationships involved information sharing. Among other codes I found and developed, I 
explored these: creating data, referring, and materializing/showing.  
I built these categories from specific activities or processes I observed. Under the 
heading of “creating data” I noted the many times that participants told me or others 
present that the office in charge of travel accounting “had no idea” how many miles staff 
and faculty flew on University-related business. The OS, you see, attempted to create a 
greenhouse gas emissions inventory for the entire University. This inventory would 
approximate how many tons of greenhouse gases were released into the atmosphere as a 
result of University operations. Staff and faculty airline travel financed by IWU was one 
component of the whole inventory. Office employees and interns equally excited and 
concerned that they had to “figure out” or “make up a way” to reasonably approximate 
the contribution of University air travel to the accumulation of heat-trapping gasses in the 
atmosphere. “Nobody even knew or cared” until now, one person told me. I was 
confident that Office staff and volunteers routinely connected the production of the 
greenhouse gas inventory with the image of the OS as a clearinghouse.  
The sorting and refining I described above allowed me to differentiate between 
“data generating” and “referral” functions of the OS-as-clearinghouse. That is, I also 
worked through the proposition that the participants conceived of the clearinghouse role 
in terms of their personal knowledge of IWU’s networks of authority—knowing “who to 
go to,” in other words. This dimension of the OS-as-clearinghouse is summed up in a 
slogan that was repeated to me many times by several OS employees: “We don’t flip any 
of the switches, but we know the people who do.” Don’t know how you might have 
plastic recycling bins placed in your building? OS staff members do. Want to see more 
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done with organic gardens on campus? OS staff members know the people and groups 
maintaining and expanding the current projects. Robin Carson once told me her job was, 
in part, to serve as a “sustainability Rolodex.”  
I compared and contrasted the data creating and reference giving dimensions of 
the broader information sharing category to a third dimension: materializing/showing. I 
noticed that Office staff frequently talked with others about strategies that would “show” 
stakeholders the environmental and economic costs of University operations. One idea 
was to place interactive “dashboards” in heavily used areas of buildings. These data 
displays would show the real-time and historical energy and resource use of the building. 
If you happened upon one of the building dashboards, you would, ideally, be able to tell 
how much, say, electricity was being consumed at that moment in the day, over the 
course of the past month, and in comparison to other seasons and years. The participants 
in my study frequently referred to this sort of strategy as “showing” information to 
people; I use the word “materializing” because it is descriptive of the meanings 
participants ascribed to these kinds of technologies. Their sense was that these sorts of 
technologies and data sets would take something seemingly intangible, distant, or 
ephemeral, and reveal its immediacy, significance, and utility—to “make it real,” as I 
heard a number of people say at various times. 
To sum, I identified an interesting and problematic aspect of communication in 
the everyday work of the Office of Sustainability at an early point in my fieldwork. I say 
that the information sharing or clearinghouse role of the OS was “problematic” because 
the image was functional for the group but also generated tensions and complexity. I 
wanted to provide a conceptual representation of clearinghouse-oriented communication, 
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and so began to order my inductive observations. From that order, I worked deductively 
to see whether some of the categories of action I developed under the heading of 
information sharing—e.g., knowledge creating, referring, and materializing/showing—
were plausible reconstructions from participants’ and my own points of view. The point 
at which I was tentatively satisfied with the plausibility of this ordering of concepts may 
be called theoretical saturation. I had not referenced all data, but had brought a number 
of examples to bear on the categories posited. And so, through a mix of induction and 
deduction, I proceeded tentatively from this one insight through other matters important 
to the study. 
Coding for conceptual order. Ultimately, the analytic work of a grounded theory 
methodologist is aimed at “conceptual ordering,” which “entails not only condensing raw 
data into concepts but also arranging the concepts into a logical, systematic explanatory 
scheme […] considered from many different angles or perspectives” (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008, p. 56). Conceptual ordering thus involves the development of categories of data 
that are posited and labeled by the researcher with types of “codes.” Information sharing, 
knowledge creating, referring, and materializing/showing, discussed above, are examples 
of such codes. Using GTM meant that I developed codes iteratively, so that 
characterizations and hypotheses from research data were grounded in research data. The 
process of conceptual ordering and theoretic explanation involves abstraction and 
simplification, of course. Nevertheless, I strove to remain responsive to the complexity of 
the data and the context in which it was produced (Clarke, 2005). Similarly, I did not 
seek mere order in my research data; I remained attentive to alternative explanations, 
contradictions, and tensions, as well (Charmaz, 1994). The point of this is to provide 
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plausible explanations of research data that are not unnecessarily reductionist or 
simplistic. 
Two phases of analysis may be identified in the research process I undertook. The 
first phase began at the commencement of my fieldwork and ended with the design of the 
formal research interviews. That phase allowed me to refine my research questions and 
generate initial, tentative codes and hypotheses, which I then brought to the design and 
enactment of analytic methods in the second phase. The second phase began with the 
start of individual research interviews in February 2010 and continued until the 
completion of the dissertation. The processes of coding and sorting data that I describe 
below apply to both phases, though greater refinement and theoretical investment, as well 
as closer reading of the accumulated data, characterized the second phase. 
During and after both forms of my fieldwork (i.e., participant observation and 
interviewing), I coded and compared research data. There have been a great many 
explanations of codes and coding processes associated with GTM, but my explanation 
will involve those discussed in Lindlof and Taylor’s (2002) summary (see pp. 218-223). 
The analytic process of coding, itself, as composed of several stages: initial or tentative 
analysis, integration, and dimensionalization. The first stage, the initial analysis, is 
characterized less by explanation than it is exploration—more by reading and listening 
than writing, if you will (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 163). It is of particular importance to 
remain responsive to the data, and to change codes as needed. Impressions guide the 
overall reading of gathered data (Glaser, 1978, p. 15). The second stage, integration, 
involves the researcher collapsing and comparing codes according to emergent 
“principle[s] of integration” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2008, p. 221). Integration involves 
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frequent revision and may occur in several “waves” (Lindlof & Taylor). The third stage, 
dimensionalization, involves the researcher in fleshing out the various “attributes and 
characteristics” unique and common to the categories generated during integration 
(Lindlof & Taylor, p. 222).  Selective sampling of research data enables the testing of 
conceptual frameworks “by collecting data which proves or disproves the framework 
hypothesis. Concepts which cannot be supported by the data are dropped [or 
reconceived]” (Stern, 1994, p. 122). Theoretical saturation should, ideally, mark the end 
of dimensionalization. 
Types of coding loosely correspond with these three stages in data analysis. Open 
coding involves “breaking data apart and delineating concepts to stand for blocks of raw 
data” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 195). It is common for researchers to produce a great 
many open codes as they initially wade through research data. Lindlof and Taylor (2002) 
note that open codes can either be  (1) established by the researcher to distinguish the 
substantive elements of data or (2) developed according to “terms used by the social 
actors themselves” (p. 220). The second type is in vivo codes. Recall my discussion of the 
group interview schedule, above. In that case, I utilized in vivo codes to establish prompts 
and guide discussion. The second stage of my analysis involved axial coding of the data, 
“crosscutting or relating concepts to each other” (Corbin & Strauss, p. 195). Axial codes 
may demonstrate causes, conditions, strategies, and consequences associated with certain 
actions or processes identified in the open codes. Put another way, axial codes posit 
relationships between and amongst open codes in order to accord the data greater 
coherence. Finally, theoretical coding works to provide dimension and completion to the 
previously developed coding schemes. In the final stage, codes are intended to “provide a 
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way of thinking about data in theoretical rather than descriptive terms” (Stern, 1994, p. 
124). These codes were pursued and developed with greater purpose, according the 
intuitions I had when comparing the ongoing coding process with my research questions 
and objectives (see Strauss, 1988). 
Summary. As I collected data and plausible codes proliferated, I heeded Lindlof 
and Taylor (2002): “Sometimes a simpler set of codes, designed only to navigate the data 
more easily, is the better way to proceed. […] The code […] is not the interpretation” (p. 
222). Thus, my interviews were designed and enacted according to comparisons and 
hypotheses I made during and as a result the observational phase of my fieldwork. The 
interview data are more conceptually focused by design, and I analyzed interview data on 
a microlevel, as described above. I scrutinized participant observation data at a mesolevel 
or macrolevel, sampling data for representative themes, stories, episodes, and uses of 
figures of speech. I emphasized elements of the initial stages of analysis more during the 
observational phase of the study; I emphasized integrative and theoretical analysis during 
the interview and composition phases of the study. As a result, my analysis chapters 
feature interview data more prominently than other data. In total, my approach to data 
analysis involved an adaptable yet disciplined analysis of multiple types of data, guided 
by an interpretive approach to answering this study’s primary research questions. 
 
Conclusion 
 Case study research is particularly useful for placing theory and practice in 
conversation (Hammersley, Gomm, & Foster, 2000). My aim for this case study is to 
“develop theoretical frameworks [… that] inform and enrich the data and provide not 
only a sense of the uniqueness of the case but also what is of more general relevance and 
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interest” (Hartley, 1994, p. 210). Yin (2009) explains, “You would use the case study 
method because you wanted to understand a real-life phenomenon in depth, but such 
understanding encompassed important contextual conditions—because they were highly 
pertinent to your phenomenon of study” (p. 18). This is particularly relevant to the broad 
and embracing discourses of sustainability. Still, understanding the communicative work 
that goes into negotiating organizational sustainability can be widely useful so long as 
claims are made with reference to the context from which data were gathered. The 
design of this project allowed for the collection of data that offer several perspectives on 
the case (see Burgoyne, 1994, pp. 195-196). The result is this interpretive study of the 
Office of Sustainability and participants’ engagement of sustainability discourses, 





1 I am, of course, oversimplifying this dichotomy for the sake of clarity. Both reasoned 




 Given that I cite several scholars in this section who are associated with the traditions 
of Critical Theory, I should clarify my use of the terms critical and critique. I am not 
using the work of theorists aligned with the critical projects of Marxism, varieties of 
feminism, postmodernism, and such as the basis for my methodology or theory building. 
I am not primarily interested in the critique of power and power’s effects in 
organizations and societies. Here, I am using the terms critique and value-critical to 
describe my reflection upon data. I do not seek a “neutral” interpretation of participants’ 
meaning making. Instead, I compare and contrast what I interpret in the research data 
with normative ideals relevant to the case and do, on occasion, offer my own judgments. 
These activities, which are complementary to what is more commonly associated with 
interpretation, are what I call critique and criticism. 
 
3
 In the end, I did not carry out this study as an action research project. While I proposed 
that possibility to the employees of the OS, it was the alternative we found to be most 
feasible and descriptive of the relationship we eventually developed. 
 
4
 During the period of my participant observation, I conducted “ethnographic 
interviews,” which are open-ended but purpose-driven interviews conducted in situ 
(Spradley, 1979). The ethnographic interviews were unstructured and conducted 
informally in response to recent events in the field. For the most part, they served to 
orient my observations in the field, enrich my field notes, and aid my exploration of 
tentative interpretations of research data. 
 
5







 In this chapter, I discuss lay theories of advocacy. Specifically, I analyze and 
discuss Office of Sustainability (OS) staff members’, volunteers’, and partners’ 
theorizing about persuasion. To do this, I draw most heavily on transcripts of in-depth 
interviews with 20 participants. In Chapter 4, I conceptualized lay theorization in terms 
of interpretive repertoires (IRs) used in metacommunication—or, as Craig (1999) puts 
it, “the practical metadiscourse of everyday life” (p. 121). I now use that perspective on 
lay theorizing in order to trace the IRs that participants use when making claims about 
advocacy-related communication. 
 I identified three IRs involved in participants’ lay theorization of advocacy: (1) 
the directive repertoire, (2) the expressive repertoire, and (3) the representative 
repertoire. In reconstructing these IRs, I find that participants regularly underplay, 
diminish, or even denigrate the role of explicitly persuasive communication in 
sustainability organizing at Intermountain West University (IWU). This is particularly 
important for an office that has labeled itself a pan-campus advocate for sustainability. 
The discussion in this chapter is significant for organization studies scholars because 
previous research on intraorganizational advocacy has focused more on lay persons’ 
rhetorical strategies and techniques (e.g., Dutton, Asford, O’Neill, & Lawrence, 2001; 
Gossett & Kilker, 2006; Kassing, 2009; Sonenshein, 2006) than on persons’ theories or 
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metadiscourses of persuasion. This is a slight but important shift in perspective on 
organizational communication. 
 This chapter has four remaining major sections. I begin the chapter with a brief 
discussion of the connotations of persuasion and advocacy at the research site. I then 
carefully explain how the theory and methodology described in Chapters 4 and 5 ground 
the analysis in this chapter and the remaining chapters. Following that, I provide 
substantial evidence of the three advocacy-related IRs relevant to this case. I close the 
chapter by considering the problems of participants’ lay theorization of advocacy. 
 
Persuasion and/or Advocacy 
 During participant observation, I realized that others did not share my conception 
of persuasion. My work as a doctoral student attuned me to many perspectives on 
persuasion. For me, the term served an analytic function—specifically, labeling a 
particular genre of or approach to communicative activity. Many participants in this 
study spoke of persuasion pejoratively or, at the least, expressed reluctance at using the 
term to talk about their communication. This pattern was similar to the treatment of 
rhetoric in colloquial language; lay uses of the term frequently define rhetoric, explicitly 
or implicitly, as inaction, Machiavellian deception, impotent fantasizing, or the making 
of insincere promises. Among those I observed during the study, persuasion was a term 
similarly associated with untoward or undesirable communicative action.  
 Participants more frequently adopted the term advocacy. In the proposals 
formulated soon after the 2006-2007 campus forums, the OS was proposed to be a “pan-
campus advocate for sustainability.” Between 2007 and 2010, I would hear this 
description provided frequently when OS employees explained their roles at IWU. When 
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I spoke with Lilian Valmer, one of the first OS employees, she described the broad range 
of “roles” the OS ended up playing in its first year. Among those she was “really pleased 
with” were: “the mentorship role that we have for student groups, even campus groups 
like green teams;” “research and leadership roles” in initiatives to reduce the campus’ 
environmental impact; and “this sort of advocacy role, and maybe even a ‘watchdog’ 
kind of position.” The ambiguity in her statement about advocacy is not accidental. After 
all, she describes advocacy as a “sort of” role played by the OS, in her words. Her 
caution on this reflects broader concerns amongst sustainability officers and their 
supporters at IWU regarding the role of communication that seeks influence or change. 
Moreover, participants in this study struggled to distinguish persuasion from advocacy. 
This is what Valmer, who lauded the OS’s developing “advocacy role,” told me about 
persuasion: 
I think maybe the connotation of ‘persuasion’ that I’m a little bit leery of still is 
manipulation. And when people talk about ‘truth.’ It’s that sort of idea of 
someone holding that ultimate knowledge about how something should be and 
imposing that on someone else. I’m very much an avid supporter of freedom of 
thought. So, people can very well choose to go do something that will damage 
their own health, and we do. All the time. But at a certain point, when you look 
at how it’s going to impact the greater good, there are certain areas where you 
draw the line, and that’s where laws and regulations come into play. It’s like, 
“Listen, you can go smoke outside on your own time, but you can’t smoke in my 
office space because that’s impacting all of our health.” So, I feel like that kind 
of, um, maybe—let me think of a word for it. [Pause.] That’s not really an 
instance of persuasion, like telling someone that they’re a bad person because 
they’re smoking or something. I guess [that example] would be a different way 
to look at it [i.e., persuading], and not the way that I think is useful. But saying, 
“This is the situation and we’re going to set up some safeguards here so that the 
greater good isn’t damaged.” So, a tragedy of the commons kind of frame, for 
me. […] Um, maybe that’s the difference between manipulating something and 
facilitating change. So, recognizing that there’s certain goals and things that we 
want to get toward and changing behavior in a constructive, positive way which 




Advocacy emerged in OS employees’ and volunteers’ discourse as the principal label for 
the “good form of persuasion” described by Valmer. 
 
The Variability of Advocacy in Context 
 Participants in this study used the term advocacy in various ways. I want to 
acknowledge that variability and I want to point out that advocacy was the most 
prominent alternative to the term persuasion, though participants developed a host of 
synonyms. For clarity’s sake, I use advocacy as an overarching term. Still, my 
discussion is focused on its emic meanings—that is, its meaning in the context of the 
research site. I acknowledge the variability of advocacy in participants’ talk.1 
While participants’ implicit definitions of advocacy frequently conformed to 
Aristotle’s (2004) definition of rhetoric as “the faculty of observing in any given case 
the available means of persuasion” (p. 6), they distinguished advocacy in a variety of 
ways. For instance, I asked Karen Adams, an employee of the OS, about the “balance” 
between information giving and advocating in her work on campus. She responded: “Is 
it really different? I don’t know. […] I mean, I guess the hope for advocacy is to create 
action, but I think part of advocacy is informing people—so it’s intertwining that way.” 
Other interviewees concentrated on audience-centeredness more than action-orientation 
when defining advocacy. They spoke of “finding out what’s important” to people and 
crafting messages that have “emotional resonance” for the intended audiences. A 
member of the Office’s Steering Committee (SC) went so far as to tell me that advocacy 
was principally about “listening,” 
[… that is, about] figuring out where a particular person is at or where an 
organization's at in terms of what their goals are and what they're going to move 
towards. And if a student comes into see me, I want to really say, “What's 
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happening with you? Tell me, why are you here?” Get some information about 
what their needs are and listen to them and try to think—okay, from my vantage 
point, what would be the next place they could move or what would be 
helpful?—and then collaborate and discuss together, “Is this what you need?” 
 
During my ethnographic participant observation, OS employees and partners would 
frequently advise one another to “know where others are coming from,” “understand 
their perspective,” and “start from where they’re at.” A different employee, a very 
involved member of the President’s Sustainability Advisory Board (PSAB), said to me: 
“I would say that the sacred cow’s money.” He was concerned by this and mentioned his 
support for a “triple bottom line” approach to university management several times 
during our interview.2 Nevertheless, he insisted that appeals to fiscal savings were 
essential to sustainability advocacy at IWU. During my fieldwork, people often spoke in 
clichés and commonplaces that supported this position, too. They insisted that 
investments in technologies and social programs have a short “payback” or that “it all 
comes down to money” when talking about sustainability to people in power. While 
people did not always speak of advocacy directly when making such statements, it was 
usually clear that the statement was meant to discipline how others ought to conduct 
advocacy. 
Thus, when participants spoke of advocacy during my fieldwork and interviews, 
they defined it both directly and indirectly. Moreover, they defined it in different ways; 
some individuals concentrated on communicative relationships while others 
concentrated on the messages’ content. This variety—from person to person, from 
situation to situation—is to be expected. As I explained in Chapter 4, that is one reason 





Explanation of Method and the Reconstruction of  
Interpretive Repertoires 
  In the next major section of this chapter, I will provide evidence of 3 IRs at work 
in this case. As described in Chapter 5, I generated data through ethnographic participant 
observation, 20 in-depth interviews, and 2 approximately 2-hour focus group sessions. I 
draw mostly from interview transcripts for this section’s representative examples and 
other evidence. In-depth interviews’ transcripts provided me the best data for capturing 
long-form, nuanced metacommunication. During my ethnographic participation, I was 
frequently able to ask others to comment on their assumptions and claims about 
communication. However, it was also regularly the case that such discussions were 
sidelined because my questions were (potentially) off topic or distracting for the 
convened group’s task. One-on-one interviews enabled focused discussion of 
metacommunication and, importantly, recording and transcription of the interaction. 
Nevertheless, my analysis proceeded according to grounded theory methodology. Based 
upon preliminary analysis of my ethnographic field notes, I read interview transcripts 
with an eye toward participants’ characterization of communication, especially varieties 
of persuasive communication. I analyzed interview transcripts carefully and closely. 
During open coding, I treated specific terms and phrases as the primary units as analysis. 
As I proceeded through to the later stages of coding, I concentrated primarily on the 
most relevant complete statements or (in terms of the transcripts) paragraphs. Below, 
you will notice that I rely on fairly lengthy excerpts from the interviews. These larger 
units of analysis are more appropriate to documenting interpretive repertoires in the 
participants’ lay theorization of advocacy.  
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Explanation of theoretical perspective. Recall that I described the relationship 
between individuals’ claims and IRs as “structurational” in Chapter 4 (Banks & Riley, 
1993; Giddens, 1984; Poole & McPhee, 1983). This means two things at once. First, IRs 
are constituted or established by people’s claim making. Remember, I defined theory as 
definitions of a system, claimed to apply to real systems. So, interpretive repertoires are 
patterns in what people claim defines a particular system. In this case, the system I am 
interested in is sustainability advocacy. Second, IRs are structurational in that they 
provide discursive resources and rules for making knowledge claims. To make sense of 
this, focus on the word repertoire. Most lexical definitions associate “repertoire” with 
sets or stores (i.e., things in held in reserve) of skills, actions, or strategies. IRs provide 
patterned ways for people to talk about something. The patterns emerge from social 
interaction, common sense, and other processes of normalization. In that way, IRs are 
simultaneously ready-made for people’s claims about situations and flexible or 
interchangeable enough for people to make different claims (in the same or differing 
situations). This is the dual, or structurational, nature of IRs: they are “built up” from 
people’s recurring knowledge claims, but they also affect when and how people employ 
certain claims in various situations (or in response to different demands/objectives). 
An example. So, lay theories are knowledge claims, but they are best interpreted 
according to their relationship with certain repertoires of claim making. The analyst’s 
job is to reconstruct IRs in order to explain patterns in people’s lay theorization. To 
make this conceptualization clear, let me provide a very brief example before proceeding 
further. So that I do not confuse my discussion of advocacy, I will focus here on 
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ethnographic data about employees’ lay theories of the OS’s organizational relationship 
with the President’s Office.  
On occasion, OS employees would make claims akin to these: (1) “The President 
has the ultimate say,” and, (2) “We’ve got to make sure this sounds good to the 
President.”3 There are many claims related to the first statement. Among those I heard 
on IWU’s campus are: “I think we can get away with this as long as none of the higher-
ups think it goes against their interests,” and, “If we get the President’s endorsement, it 
will give other people license to say sustainability is part of their job.” What these 
claims have in common is their implication (or declaration) that the President’s Office 
maintains a fundamentally hierarchical, authoritative relationship with the Office of 
Sustainability. As an analyst, I noticed this pattern and began to collect examples. 
Participants have used claims like these in order to encourage sustainability advocates to 
act as subordinates, to forestall or catalyze action, to explain failures or changes in 
strategy, and such. My role as an analyst is to make sense of these claims and their uses 
in situ. Per the approach I developed in Chapter 4, I could argue that this collection of 
claims constitutes a hierarchy repertoire.  
Let us turn now to the second primary claim above. Related to the imperative to 
“make it sound good to the President,” participants would often encourage “putting it in 
his terms,” and they would orient themselves according to “what the President has said.” 
The logic guiding this set of claims is captured in the cliché: “speaking his language.” 
(IWU’s President at the time was a man.) We might label this the mimicry repertoire. It 
focuses our attention more on the power of linguistic patterns, frames, and discursive 
devices than does the hierarchy repertoire, which draws our attention to bureaucracy, 
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top-down authority, and commands. The use of one set of claims or the other is 
consequential. People making claims consistent with one will usually employ 
assumptions, frames, action orientations, and information also associated with that 
repertoire. A range of IRs could make for a variety of ways of constructing knowledge 
about the organization’s situation vis-à-vis the President’s Office.  
It is important for me to point out that the same person might employ either of 
these repertoires in different circumstances. In other words, I might make claims 
consistent with the hierarchy repertoire in one situation, but make claims consistent with 
the president’s language repertoire in another. It is also possible that I use both 
repertoires in just one situation. Recall that lay theorization is complex and occasioned. 
Furthermore, everyone experiences a tension between their interactional guidelines or 
scripts and the way in which they actually deal with situations, especially new or 
multidimensional situations. Moreover, lay theories are usually voiced as stylized 
expressions rather than thoroughly reasoned arguments (Hewitt & Hall, 1973). The 
researcher, then, can provide some clarity by interpreting the IRs involved in people’s 
lay theorization. 
 
Interpretive Repertoires of Advocacy 
In this section, I identify and discuss three IRs participants used to talk about 
advocacy: the directive repertoire, the expressive repertoire, and the representative 
repertoire. Again, these repertoires are meta-discursive in the sense of being about or 
dealing with language. I am not necessarily claiming that participants really give 
direction, are inherently self-expressive, or actually communicate sustainability solely in 
terms of facts. Instead, I am demonstrating the patterned ways in which participants 
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make claims about advocacy. Nonetheless, these repertoires can influence participants’ 
engagement in communication and whether they opt to call their communication an act 
of “advocacy.” As I will demonstrate, the three repertoires tend to favor the descriptive, 
expressive, and representative functions of communication, and disfavor the influential 
and constitutive functions of communication. 
  
The Directive Repertoire: “Telling People What to Do” 
 I am calling the first IR the directive repertoire. The directive repertoire has a lot 
to do with what participants’ advocacy was not or should not be. The cornerstone of this 
repertoire is the colloquialism “telling people what to do”—as in, “We can’t [just] tell 
people what to do.” I heard assertions like this one at many staff and volunteer meetings. 
As Searle (1975) explains, directive communication includes “attempts […] by the 
speaker to get the hearer to do something. They may be very modest ‘attempts,’ as when 
I invite you to do it or suggest that you do it, or they may be very fierce attempts as 
when I insist that you do it” (p. 355). The examples I provide below (1) link advocacy to 
directive communication; and (2) generally demonstrate skepticism, caution, or rejection 
of authority-based interaction (see Lukes, 1978). 
  Three themes characterize the directive repertoire. First, ideal sustainability 
advocacy is portrayed as a milder, less direct, softer sort of advocacy. Second, 
participants insinuate or state that advocacy might be the unjust use of communication to 
control others. Third, directive advocacy is usually compared to inefficient, combative, 
or manipulative communication and organizing.  
Characteristics of the directive repertoire. A passage from my interview with 
Karen Adams, who was an Office staff member between 2008 and the end of this study, 
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provides a good example of the directive repertoire. I told her to imagine that she was 
speaking to the current director of the OS, Paul Abbey. I then asked: “What advice 
would you give him in terms of advocacy to make the campus sustainable?” She replied: 
I told him the other day that sometimes you have to convince people that it was 
their idea in the first place. […] I was also going to say be persistent because 
sometimes you go to speak with someone and they say no. For example, we’ve 
been trying to get the budget managed through the [University’s service learning 
center] for the farmers market and it’s been months. I mean, […] the market 
ended in the first week of October and we got no and no and no both from 
Facilities Management and the [Service Center] and Human Resources and over 
and over and over again. And then Aldo just called [the director of the Service 
Center] and had this conversation. All of the sudden everything’s okay and 
they’re going to take it and they’re excited about it and I don’t know what it is but 
sometimes it’s just about being persistent in your advocacy for something because 
maybe it’s not the right time to ask but you just keep asking even if it’s annoying. 
 
It is important for me to highlight one feature of Adams’ account. She treats the turn of 
events as an “all of the sudden” change, one that resulted from “being persistent” and 
patient. Also notice how Adams characterizes the change as getting beyond a “no.” 
Overcoming resistance or reluctance—getting past “no,” in other words—requires 
“sometimes [convincing …] people it was their idea in the first place.” At first glance, 
this is the opposite of directiveness; partners of the Office attribute their motivation to 
their own inspiration rather than sustainability officers’ advocacy. 
A strategy used to arrive at such an outcome, Adams said, was “just keep asking 
even if it’s annoying.” I responded: “And it’s asking, not telling?” She said: 
It’s asking. […] I don’t think we tell anyone necessarily to do anything. 
Sometimes, we may use kind of words like “this must be done,” or “this is the 
right thing to do,” or “we really need to do this.” These are the type of things that 
we have to do to reach this goal. But we don’t have the, you know, gun to 
anyone’s heads, saying, “do it or die.” It’s not like that. We’ll point out other 
people’s guns. Like, for example, when the state came out with the LEED4 […] 
certification requirement for all new construction, no one believed anyone that it 
was actually a policy passed through and that this was what needed to be done 
from now on. It took meeting after meeting of sitting down and saying, “No 
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really, this is a gun to your head. You have to do this,” and actually explaining 
step by step what the process would be for this new requirement before anyone 
paid any attention. But we don’t put guns to people’s heads. 
 
Notice what Adams says the Office staff is doing. They are pointing out the facts of the 
matter: “No really, this is a gun to your head.” They are providing information about the 
situation, including “actually explaining [processes] step by step.” While Adams does 
not challenge the gun-to-the-head metaphor, she emphasizes one of two things: (1) the 
Office’s role as supplicant or (2) that any advocacy involving directive language should 
not be delivered as a threat.  
In fact, images of force and violence were quite often associated with lay 
theories that cast advocacy in terms of directive communication. One long-term student 
volunteer/intern told me:  
I think that they can’t, they can’t steamroll their way into people’s minds or 
hearts. And they can’t assert that their idea is the best and only idea. They have 
to allow people to um, to disagree with them or to have other ideas. And that’s 
okay, but they can’t just, “Well, we’re the Office of Sustainability and we’ve 
studied this for years and we know best. 
 
In addition to “steamrolling” and coercing, my field notes document participants’ 
comparison of “we know best” advocacy with “forcing ideas” on others, “controlling” 
them, “pinning them down,” “backing them into a corner,” and “stepping on their toes.” 
Only on rare occasions did a participant imply that directive communication, 
characterized in this way, was desirable or necessary. 
Regardless, the centerpiece of the directive repertoire is this claim: giving 
instructions/orders is an undesirable, ineffective, or immoral approach to advocacy. 
Take, for instance, a statement made by a Facilities Management staff member who 
served as Interim Director of the OS after Russell Snyder’s death. Below, he explains 
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why sustainability advocates cannot “tell people what to do” or “champion a particular 
cause.” 
If I take on one cause then all these other causes will be squashed or lost, and 
we’re trying to move a lot of things forward collectively as rapidly as possible. 
And once the Office takes a stand, it can be detrimental of all the other 
possibilities. It’s somewhat difficult for certain people to buy into that because 
there are people who want to lead and, you know, get puffed up by knowing that 
everybody’s doing it their way. And there are some people who don’t want to 
make decisions and want to be told what direction to go. Both of those types of 
people will be a little bit frustrated at times with the approach that we’ve been 
taking, but I’m [okay with that]. 
 
The interviewee suggests that directive advocacy would threaten some of the many 
causes under the umbrella of the “sustainability movement.” In a move that seems to 
contravene clichés about how to get things done quickly, he argues against giving 
directions, since that would hinder sustainability advocates’ attempts to “move things 
forward collectively as rapidly as possible.”  
This sentiment is shared by many of the participants. Usually, they point to the 
structure or culture of the university as a practical challenge to directive advocacy. For 
example, one particularly active member of the PSAB told me. “This is […] such a 
bottom-up kind of campus, rather than a top-down and all-around. It’s a distributed 
model, a disorganized distributed model of the way things work.” Given that, the OS 
should not engage in controlling behavior. The term controlling “has a negative 
connotation for me,” she said. When I asked her to explain, the PSAB member told me 
that 
[…] I have no right to control you. You’re an adult. You’re an intelligent person 
and really the only way I can be assured of controlling you is putting chains or 
shackles [on you], or putting you in a box, or stop you from doing [something], 
and that is against principles that I have. But, I can share information with you, 




To that point, I had not discussed “modeling” communication with her—or other 
interviewees, for that matter. I asked her: “Meaning [what]? By modeling do you mean 
draw up a map of [something] or do you mean, uh, modeling in the sense of leading by 
example?” Her response was direct and immediate: “Leading by example.”  
Note how the PSAB member positions “controlling” communication as 
“shackling” others. Instead, she favors “modeling” desired behavior and “sharing 
information.” Her claims about controlling, commanding, and insisting are associated 
with the directive repertoire. Participants in this study overwhelmingly wished to steer 
the Office away from advocacy as directive communication. By contrast, repertoires 
emerged around the other two frames for advocacy provided by this interviewee The first, 
related to leading by example, I call the expressive repertoire. The second, related to 
sharing information, I call the representative repertoire. I discuss these below. I want to 
note here, however, that participants’ preference for those other repertoires of advocacy 
largely stemmed from the negative connotations of “telling people what to do.”  
As I have shown above, directive advocacy may be, metaphorically speaking, 
putting a gun to someone’s head, championing one cause instead of others, and putting 
someone in a box. Interviewees also told me that directive-like communication “creates 
enemies” (in the words of one student intern) and is “inefficient” because it creates 
“blowback” (according to a consultant working with IWU on energy efficiency). A 
member of the SC told me that, based upon her previous experience in the private sector, 
directive advocacy is a “really easy [way] to make [things] fail.” She explained: 
All you have to do is say, “Yeah, okay, we’re doing it. Yeah, we’re doing it.” But, 
you know, subversion happens all over the place, so mandating something that 
people really don’t believe in and don’t want to support—what are you going to 
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get? You’re going to get a lot of people, and especially in a university setting, 
you’re going to get a lot of people who will find a way to be subversive. 
 
In part, then, participants also use the directive repertoire to claim that advocacy of this 
sort invites resistance and contestation.  
I end this subsection with a long excerpt from my interview with Robin Carson, 
the sole staff member who worked at the OS throughout the duration of my study. Carson 
explained to me why she thought the two full-time directors of the Office, Russell Snyder 
and Paul Abbey, were skilled sustainability advocates: 
Russell would come in [during meetings with other campus officials] and ask a lot 
of really good questions. He [didn’t] want to threaten anybody, and I think Aldo 
will ask a lot of questions—and in some ways I’ve watched him almost say, “I’ve 
asked too much” or “I want to hear what you have to say.” You know, almost 
back off from a level of expertise […] sort of [to say,] “This isn’t necessarily my 
decision or my place.” […] The flip side of this is to be willing to stake out some 
sort of boundary. There’s so much value in drawing people out and finding out 
their drivers and values and perhaps things they don’t normally or aren’t normally 
encouraged to share professionally or whatever, and I think that’s often been 
[Russell and Myron’s] style, both of theirs. But they also, as directors [of the OS], 
had an enormous knowledge base and wisdom; [and] that, I think, is important to 
be willing to really put forward, rather than to sort of say, “Well I don’t mean to 
…” There’s a point at which, I think, it’s worth getting beyond our “start-up 
mode” and […] claim some moral high ground, as it were. There’s a sort of a self-
effacing part [of their advocacy]—like, “Well, we’re just one of me”—that I’ve 
seen played out, especially when someone will react negatively or seem taken 
aback by [Office employees’ communication, given,] again, [our] place within 
more of a power hierarchy than a knowledge hierarchy. And I get this. I hear this, 
too, about the leadership, and our place within [the] Facilities [Management 
division of IWU], and the style of the VP’s, and that sort of thing: they can only 
handle so much, like [only] so many “curve balls” at a time. Basically, that’s not 
the way they’re accustomed to thinking or approaching things. So, [she says, 
acting as if she is one of the directors of the Office], “Well, in my weekly 
meetings [with supervisors] I can it bring up. I’ll have to sort of toss out an idea 
and then come back to it a few weeks later. […] No more than three new things a 
week!” And in the context of what we’re trying to do there is so much going on. 
It’s an interesting sort of dance, and this is why I’m very pleased that people of 
Aldo and Russell’s caliber are able to handle it, because I have no patience with 
that. And so that’s why I recognized early that I was not the right person to sort of 




Carson’s characterization gets at the heart of the directive repertoire’s ambivalence 
regarding advocacy. On the one hand, IWU sustainability advocates don’t “want to 
threaten anybody.” On the other hand, IWU sustainability advocates struggle to “stake 
out some sort of boundary” that distinguishes the acceptable from the unacceptable (i.e., 
sustainable and unsustainable). Advocates “want to hear what you have to say,” but also 
struggle to “really put forward” progressive visions of sustainability and “claim some 
moral high ground.” In our day-to-day conversations, Office staff and I regularly spoke 
of “getting beyond our ‘start-up mode,’” as Carson put it, but we also spoke warily of 
University administrators. Paul Abbey said on several occasions that his first few months 
at the Office were valuable because he could take action, make statements, and the like 
and wait to “get his hand slapped.” Carson, of course, points out how such 
straightforwardness can become something more akin to “tossing out an idea” rather 
than, say, taking a stand or advocating for a particular policy. This pattern of moderation, 
if you will, is characteristic of claims in the directive repertoire. 
Summary. Thus, the directive repertoire largely consists of claims about how 
advocacy cannot or should not be done at IWU, according to the participants. The 
directive repertoire suggests that advocacy should not involve direction giving or imply 
control (hierarchical, cultural, or otherwise) on the part of the advocates. It suggests that 
sustainability advocates should strive to be receptive to others, and it suggest that 
resistance is likely if advocates fail to listen or “start where people are at.” Statements 
approximating persuasion should be more like cheerleading, proposing, or facilitating 
than convincing, imploring, cajoling, or insisting.  
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Two other repertoires provide patterns for talking about desirable forms and 
connotations of advocacy for participants in this study. The first of these revolves around 
the notion of “leading by example;” I call it the expressive repertoire. The second one, 
which I have named the representative repertoire, revolves around claims that advocacy 
should amount to “sharing data and giving information.”  
 
The Expressive Repertoire: “Leading by Example” 
The expressive repertoire is the second advocacy-related IR employed by 
participants in this study. Personalization or individualization of persuasive 
communication is what distinguishes claims in this repertoire. More specifically, this IR 
promotes organizational advocacy as an expression of personality or individual 
character—as opposed to, say, an organizational strategy or the exercise of 
administrative authority. As I compared interview transcripts and my ethnographic field 
notes, I noticed that this repertoire is frequently associated with attributions about 
leadership and how people ought to be. For example, I often heard statements somewhat 
like, “She/he is a real leader on sustainability in her/his department.” An instance of 
advocacy described in terms of “being” documented in my field notes is this statement: 
“We have to be patient and flexible with them; changes will have to be incremental.”  
The data in this section show several patterns in lay theorization of advocacy 
from the expressive repertoire. First, this study’s participants pair claims from the 
directive repertoire with claims from the expressive repertoire in order to emphasize 
differences between the two. Second, with that contrast established, participants used the 
expressive repertoire to characterize successful or desirable advocacy in terms of 
individuals’ emotions, dispositions, motivations, or unique interpersonal communication 
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styles. Third, participants treat expressive advocacy as a more concrete, tangible, or 
action-oriented form of advocacy than others. (This pattern calls to mind the 
colloquialisms “don’t just talk, do something” and “talk is cheap.”) Fourth, participants 
imply that individuals’ personal demeanor or character affects the production of 
“sustainable” organizational communication climates. Finally, I close my discussion of 
the expressive repertoire with examples of participants’ preference for face-to-face 
communication when it comes to advocacy. 
Contrasting the expressive and directive repertoires. Participants frequently 
employ the directive repertoire when invoking the expressive repertoire. This move does 
two things. First, it emphasizes the individualization at work in the expressive repertoire. 
Second, it plays down the other-directedness of advocacy-related communication. Recall 
that the administrator who served for a time as Interim Director told me: 
It’s somewhat difficult for certain people to buy into that because there are people 
who want to lead and, you know, get puffed up by knowing that everybody’s 
doing it their way. And there are some people who don’t want to make decisions 
and want to be told what direction to go. Both of those types of people will be a 
little bit frustrated at times with the approach that we’ve been taking, but I’m 
[okay with that]. 
 
This description is in keeping with the directive repertoire. I asked him to describe the 
approach more specifically, given that it wasn’t “puffed up” leadership or telling others 
“what direction to go.” He explained:  
Raising awareness of the possibilities. Not necessarily ever saying, “Do it this 
way.” Once they start to say, “Do it this way,” I think they’ve, they will start to 
lose their effectiveness to be that catalyst for a much larger population. […] You 
know, you can in your zeal to communicate what you see as best practices can 
easily come across as an advocate of saying, “You should do it this way.” I think 
you just have to be careful on that. And I think that, as we select leaders in [the 
OS Director] position, we have to try to find people who don’t have any specific 
agendas but have a passion for seeing this make progress. And that’s, I think, one 
of the reasons we’ve been so successful: we’ve had leaders [… that have said] 
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“We don’t have any one area that we really say has to be done this direction.” 
We’re really just saying that sustainability’s a broad topic and there’s lots of 
things that must be considered, and we want lots of people engaged in finding 
those solutions and coming to those implementations themselves. (My emphasis) 
 
This interviewee’s ideal Office advocate is open-minded and passionate. Such a person’s 
broad thinking and nonpartisanship keeps them from being a zealot, apparently, and that 
person’s commitment is to an abstract conception of “progress.”  
A different interviewee, a man who oversees the OS, also voiced this perspective. 
Pay attention to the way in which the communicative actions of the Office are described 
abstractly and then compared to the individuals’ ethical/emotional experience of a 
“conscience.” Also note the distinction he draws between being “the conscience of the 
university” and “[telling people] how they should run their own business”: 
There isn’t a magic silver bullet at any of these levels, let alone all of them, that 
makes it all better by shooting it or by using it. So, because of that, what they do 
[at the OS] is somewhat nebulous, is hard to define. But, if anything, you may 
want to call it a conscience. Maybe they’re the conscience of the university and 
just kind of bring that issue to the forefront you know as you contemplate how 
you conduct your business you know and forget about this and have you thought 
about this issue or whatever. But I sense that if they were going to attempt to 
advise or get in the operational minutia, one they probably would not do it as well 
and two they’d probably piss off the people that they’re trying to tell how they 
should run their own business by you telling them how to run their own business. 
 
Advocacy, in his terms, is being and having an environmental conscience. This is 
accomplished—in part, at least—by “just kind of [bringing] that issue [i.e., sustainability] 
to the forefront.” Again, actual communication practices are left abstract and, at the same 
time, reduced or compared to individual qualities. The same interviewee did identify 
necessary qualities of sustainability advocates. When talking about labels for the various 
communicative responsibilities of the Office, he said, “Advocating is an interesting one 
because there has to be some head cheerleader out there who’s beating the drum, at least 
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at this point in time.” The cheerleader, of course, exudes pep, optimism, and group 
commitment, goading others along by being “out there […] beating the drum.” 
The broad claim that typifies the expressive repertoire might be stated this way: 
rather than giving direction, sustainability advocates should lead by example, which 
means implementing sustainable practices in their own life first, exuding desirable 
character traits, and understanding others’ limitations. It is important to emphasize the 
degree to which the expressive repertoire focuses on the character of the advocate. This is 
a kind of essentialism or reductionism, the degree of which can vary from claim to claim. 
Characteristics of the expressive repertoire. Statements characteristic of the 
expressive repertoire individualize or personify advocacy. This repertoire highlights 
advocates’ motivations, emotional virtues, and “tangible” or “concrete” actions.  
Let us turn first to the matter of motivation. Motives are usually invoked to stress 
that people serving the cause of sustainability should have a sense of purpose. Yasmine 
Meadows, a student heavily involved in the Office of Sustainability’s founding, told me 
this during an interview: 
Advocacy carries with it a sense of intention and of already having a concept of 
what it is we’re trying to achieve. You know, we are advocates for social justice. 
We are advocates for ecologically generative systems. We are advocates for 
healthier and more sustainable communities. […] We do have a goal; we do have 
a mission. We aren’t dilly dallying or wavering and saying, “Well we could go 
here and we could go there.” […] There is that intention, there’s a motive. 
 
Notice that Meadows does not describe strategies or techniques of advocacy. In fact, she 
does not mention communicative acts. She does mention some topics and objectives of 
advocacy in the form of ideographs (i.e., “social justice,” “ecologically generative 
systems,” and healthier […] communities”). What she stresses most is the expression of 
the advocate’s sense of purpose—their “intention,” “mission,” or “motive.”  
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 One way expressive advocacy is practiced at IWU is by publicly engaging in pro-
environmental activities (or publicly recounting such activities), especially if they involve 
some kind of sacrifice or extraordinary effort. People collect and give away reusable 
canvas shopping bags; they spontaneously bring food to share and announce that key 
ingredients were grown in their garden or bought from a local vendor; they playfully 
chide one another for driving alone to a venue accessible by public transit. An example of 
the importance of this comes from a discussion prior to Lillian Valmer’s leaving the 
Office in the summer of 2008. The OS staff members and I talked about what they hoped 
for in their replacement hire. My notes on the occasion do not tell me who first said this, 
but one of us explained that she/he desired “someone who takes sustainability seriously 
in their own life.” Others agreed and, when I asked what this meant, they described a host 
of specific behaviors or actions. These include recycling, commuting to work by means 
other than a personal automobile, and being involved in civic events and organizations. 
The selected candidate was to be someone who “doesn’t just put sustainability away 
when they go home” after work.  
At work, this sort of action-orientation is key. People do advocacy by taking or 
providing practical steps for others, according to participants. A student partnered with 
the OS told me that sustainability advocacy involves managing uncertainty: 
A lot of it really depends on the person that you have to talk to. I think that it’s 
very important to assess your audience and determine what is going to be the most 
successful means for accomplishing my goal. And for some who can waffle 
easily, or don’t really have any direction, or don’t care, it’s going, “Hey I’ve got 
an idea for you. Here, did it all. All the work’s done. Just do it.” And for others 
you have to like [Russell Snyder] did: you have to lead them to it so that they 
think it was their idea all along. Unfortunately there’s not one way to accomplish 
this, but I think that the Office has been successful thus far because whether or not 




The overarching label given for such action is leading by example. Leading by example is 
simultaneously an expression of personal commitment and grounded in action/behavior. 
This fusion typifies advocacy in the expressive repertoire.  
Another good example comes from my ethnographic notes and recordings in late 
January 2009. That winter, three members of the Office staff and I had a long 
conversation, part of which everyone in attendance allowed me to audio record. At one 
point, Robin Carson recalled the President’s comments during the ceremony at which he 
signed IWU onto the American University and College Presidents Climate Commitment: 
It was a really telling moment. It was very perceptive of the president, and I think 
the problem is we haven’t gone much further. But, he said he felt like the students 
were out there leading [the push for an Office of Sustainability] and running 
down, and he was running behind them, going, “Wait, wait! Wait for me; I’m 
your leader!” [Carson chuckles.] And so far, he’s been starting to integrate this 
more broadly into, when you go to any meeting he’s at in any public forum, he 
talks about sustainability […] But this internal driver […] you know, really 
directing his top-level administrators to move aggressively is the piece that we’re 
not really sure on.” (Interviewee’s emphasis) 
 
Then, speaking about IWU’s faculty and staff, Carson asked us, “What can they do?” 
Karen Adams responded: 
[…] Maybe it’s just that they’re comfortable on an individual departmental level 
or a very small office level. Maybe they’re [moving] some sort of tangible thing 
forward. Maybe they aren’t comfortable being a voice, you know, directly to the 
President. But maybe they are. But, regardless of your risk level, you can still take 
tangible actions, instead of just talking about it. There’s something for everyone 
to do. 
 
For those not “comfortable being a voice,” the alternative is taking “tangible action.” 
This is the sort of advocacy conjured up from the expressive repertoire. Carson’s 
recollection of the President’s remarks is also telling: The students were leaders inasmuch 
as they were moving along rapidly and with intention. The President did, indeed, retell 
his ironic joke—“Wait, I’m your leader!”—a number of times. The takeaway message, if 
  
234
you will, was always that the President admired the students’ entrepreneurial spirit, 
measurable achievements, and tenacity. 
 Let me provide several other examples that clearly demonstrate this joining of 
emotion/motivation and tangible action in the expressive repertoire. Notice what this 
graduate student volunteer says compels sustainability advocates, as well as the risks she 
associates with expressive advocacy: 
But [you have to] have some type of motivation internally. It was really hard for 
me to not to drive my car when it would save me, like, one hour every day 
because I was just not seeing motivation other than just leading by example, but 
I'm not leading anyone. Like nobody cares. 
 
The internal motivation of the advocate is key because, as this interviewee went on to 
explain, the advocate must demonstrate consistency in order to be a model for others. 
Being a model for others is providing a kind of “education,” she said. It also means 
demonstrating the practicality of sustainable behavior. She told me that “if people don’t 
see other people doing [some particular behavior … it won’t seem] possible to do and 
practical.” She conceded that structural changes or other incentives would be necessary to 
compel many people to change. Nevertheless, an important component of the advocacy 
she described was the resoluteness and personal dedication of the advocate. As another 
example, a member of the PSAB described advocacy as a component of the larger 
concept of leadership. When I asked the interviewee to imagine that he was giving advice 
to the OS Director about leadership through advocacy, he said: “The words I would use 
are to be bold, to be courageous, to extend the office in terms of advocacy. […] Let other 
people be the governor on the engine that says you’re revving too fast. I think it’s not a 
time for timidity. It’s absolutely not.” In this statement, the intentions and actions others’ 
mentioned are given a distinctly emotional and personified character. The emotional 
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quality of those who lead by example (and by other means) is crucial to claims in the 
expressive repertoire. 
 Thus, in the expressive repertoire, claims about advocacy associate it with 
personal dispositions and emotions, as well as individuals’ actions. In this way, advocacy 
comes to be the expression of some genuine quality of the advocate. Of course, 
participants in this study are not merely treating advocacy as some sort of simple self-
representation. Their comments about expressive advocacy’s connection to the larger 
organizational communication climate clarify why this repertoire is, in fact, relevant to 
persuasive communication. 
 Connection to communication climate. In the expressive repertoire, “good” 
advocacy is linked to its effect on communication climate. Organizational 
communication scholars have treated communication climates as “constituted by 
ensembles of expectations and beliefs about communication” (Poole & McPhee, 1983, p. 
213). Though ensembles, communication climates are assessed in order to “try to capture 
the totality of life within an organization [… which is] important because 
[…communication climates are] the conditions for communication in the daily workings 
of an organization” (Cheney, Christensen, Zorn, & Ganesh, 2011, pp. 95-96; my 
emphasis). The implicit claim suffusing the expressive repertoire is that “leading by 
example” either (1) plays to the conventions of the organization’s communication climate 
or (2) establishes communication norms that ought to apply to “ sustainable 
organizations.” 
 I interviewed one student who had partnered with the OS on several projects. She 
explained that her involvement with the Office enabled her to become a leader on 
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campus, especially among other students. Indeed, this person launched an annual waste-
reduction event, held sustainability-related administrative roles in student government, 
and more. When I asked the student how her partnership with the OS enabled her 
advocacy, she was clear:  
With students, what was really unique about the Office is that they were 
approachable. You should write that down. They weren’t some scary place. 
There’s an intimidation factor walking into a lot of places on campus because, to 
them, you’re just a student. So, the Office being so approachable and accepting 
and willing to work with you and to give you more—more worth, even though 
you’re just some undergraduate student—that was huge. 
 
A member of the PSAB also connected cited a personable and welcoming 
communication as central to the Office’s sustainability advocacy. What’s more, the 
PSAB member, like the student leader, stressed communication climate’s affect on work 
with students. This person advised OS staff members to 
create an openness and receptiveness to initiatives. And communicate to people 
that we can get things done in a hurry, because the lifetime of a student on 
campus is 4 years, 5 years, 6 years maximum for an undergraduate. On average, 
it’s 6 years, but many of the students that are involved in these kinds of initiatives 
are overachievers and will be in and out in 4 years. 
 
In the above quotation, an open and receptive communication climate is said to have 
practical value. Specifically, it’s utility helps “get things done in a hurry” and in concert 
with a transient and sometimes overachieving population. For the PSAB member quoted 
here, advocacy is one of several forms of leadership communication. 
Another member of the PSAB discussed advocacy as a component of leadership, 
too. This board member’s focus was the Office’s relationships with various operational 
units around campus, and he concentrated on challenging and questioning as acts of 
advocacy. Still, pay attention to the fact that this interviewee stresses that the OS must 
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first “find organizations who want to work with you” in order to avoid getting “a black 
eye on campus.” He stated: 
Within [the category of] “leading,” I think there’s certain things that you have to 
do. You have to advocate, you have to challenge, you have to persuade, you have 
to question. […] I would expect that part of the leadership role of the Office of 
Sustainability would be to challenge and question what we’re doing. Really their 
role is to go out and find—and I’m not saying that they ought to go to every office 
and question and challenge every office, because I think that would give them a 
black eye on campus. But I think what you do is have organizations who want to 
work with you, and then you challenge and question them on what they’re doing. 
That’s part of them asking you in: they know you’re going to challenge, and 
you’re going to question them, and you’re going to give them [feedback], because 
there’s things in our office that we don’t know that we could do that would even 
be sustainable.  And so I think we ought to be inviting them in to look at stuff and 
that’s part of, as we, as we work with the Office of Sustainability you know we’ve 
asked them, “What are some things that we can do?” And, “Are there things that 
would help us?”(My emphasis) 
 
This interviewee’s assertions call to mind Foss and Griffin’s (1995) concept of 
invitational rhetoric: “an invitation to understanding as a means to create a relationship 
rooted in equality, immanent value, and self-determination” (p. 5). The interviewee 
stresses that advocacy and challenges follow “them asking you in.” Though the 
interviewee mentions persuasion, he makes clear that the leadership/advocacy of the OS 
is mutual and cooperative, involving the kind of approachability and openness other 
interviewees referenced. For example, the same interviewee, responsible for some 
financial operations at IWU, later told me that he would be skeptical of possible but 
financially taxing sustainability initiatives, though “we could maybe agree with [the OS] 
that we’d like to do that, and they can help us push that along.” The interviewee’s 
reference to agreements, invitations, and searches for willing partners suggest advocacy 
on certain terms or in a certain climate, even as he says that “you have to advocate 
[…and] persuade.”  
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Indeed, claims from the expressive repertoire usually connote the civility and 
climate of nonpersuasion, so to speak, promoted by invitational rhetoric scholars (see 
Bone, Griffin, & Scholz, 2008). Thus, expressive advocacy may be seen as a particular 
kind of personal display or personification of organization. The expressive repertoire 
employed by participants in this study values enthusiasm, perseverance, internal 
motivation without a particular political agenda, openness and deference to others, and 
the maintenance of an accessible and low-pressure organizational climate. 
Preference for communication in person. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that 
participants in this study routinely said that they preferred communicating in person. 
(Preferred, that is, more than technologically mediated communication or communicating 
formally as the voice of “the organization” rather than as an individual. Most often, 
participants promote this mode of communication for continuing relationships beyond 
initial attempts at advocacy. Take this statement by a recently hired Office employee, for 
example: 
[…] being personable, and friendly, and good communicators is really important. 
That’s one of the most important things we can do, like if I meet with somebody 
and they want to talk to me again because, you know, I dropped the seed. I’m 
like, “Oh hey, this other school is doing this really cool lab project.” And then 
they call me the next day to get more information about it. In a perfect world, 
that’s because of the friendly dialogue. If I had said, “You guys should be doing 
this; it’s a really big bummer you guys aren’t,” they wouldn’t call me again. 
They’d be like, “That woman’s crazy.” […] I think that’s a huge part of it. […] I 
can shut down if I have a meeting with somebody and they’re either negative, or 
just not very open, or don’t smile—just, yeah, that emotional connection. And I’ll 
be like, “I don’t want really want to work with them.” So what’s the point? [If 
people think of our Office,] “Well, those people are not very nice,” no one’s 
going to be on board. So, seeing us, meeting us, liking us, and wanting to have 





Notice how much of her statement could refer to communication that is not face-to-face. 
Nevertheless, the interviewee went out of her way to clarify that “a key factor” to 
advocacy that “[drops] the seed” is communicating in person.  
A different interviewee, an IWU staff member who volunteered his time on the 
SC, made a similar claim:  
I think of the key element was the personal communication. It’s not just “create a 
pamphlet and distribute a pamphlet.” For the anti-idling campaign [i.e., a 
campaign against unnecessary running of automobile engines when parked on 
campus], it was having people there. “Here’s a pamphlet, but let me talk to you 
about what we’re doing.  What do you think? And here’s our ideas.” I think that 
personal communication is still a very key piece. […] I always like personal 
communication, face-to-face communication. […] I think what doesn’t work is 
somebody spewing out information and dictating what other people should do, or 
just spewing out information without that personal contact. I think face-to-face 
communication is essential. So, they [at the OS] need to maintain that with all the 
key players. […] One-on-one communication: you can’t beat it, you know? […] It 
needs to be personalized somehow. 
 
On this point, I simply asked him, “Because?” He responded: “Because if you don’t have 
that personal touch you’re not going to get the cooperation and you’re going to stop 
getting all the input that you were [going to otherwise]. I think, in order to get new ideas 
and new input, you need to maintain that personal relationship.”  
The preference for the human contact and mutual understanding is persistent and 
demonstrated in these examples (cf. Peters, 1999). We might treat the kind of 
communication described by these interviewees—its utility, quality, and apparent 
authenticity—as an idealization of the kind of advocacy promoted by the expressive 
repertoire. 
Summary. Repeatedly, participants in this study associate advocacy that “tells 
people what to do” with brief, unsuccessful interactions. Positively characterized 
advocacy, by contrast, is accomplished through “leadership by example,” passion or 
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courageousness, the maintenance of a harmonious and inviting communication climate, 
and communication conducted in person. These are the themes that hold together the 
expressive repertoire of advocacy evident in this case. 
 
The Representative Repertoire: “Sharing Data and Information” 
 A third IR drawn upon by this study’s participants as they made claims about 
advocacy is the representative repertoire. This repertoire, like the others, is organized 
around what language is presumed to do. The employment of this IR is associated with 
the two chief images used to characterize the Office.5 From the beginning, the OS was 
called both a pan-campus advocate for sustainability and “a clearinghouse for 
[sustainability-related] information.” The representative repertoire includes discourse 
that creatively fuses those two images of the organization. The representative repertoire 
is related to popular axioms such as “it speaks for itself,” “those are the facts,” and “just 
the facts, please.” Searle (1975) has discussed representation as a speech act that people 
“can literally characterize […] (inter alia) as true or false” (Searle, 1975, p. 355). 
Representation is the description of the world as it (supposedly) was, is, or will be. This 
ideal is the essential characteristic of the representative repertoire.  
The representative repertoire deemphasizes advocacy’s associations with 
individual beliefs, vested interests, and change-orientation. It emphasizes supposedly 
neutral, objective, or disinterested features of the situation, such as facts, data, and 
information. The central claim of this repertoire is that advocates’ primary motive 
should be understood as description of the facts of the matter. If nothing else, 
participants’ claimed that representation of truth ought to be associated with 
sustainability “advocacy” more fundamentally—or, perhaps, to a greater degree—than 
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the taking of positions. Thus, claims about advocacy that constitute this repertoire serve 
to/attempt to (1) neutralize advocacy and (2) naturalize the (un)sustainability the 
situation addressed by advocates. 
 Characteristics of the representative repertoire. All of the people I interviewed 
said that the OS should serve to provide the “best” information available, and to do so 
with as little possible “manipulation” or “shading.” Such expressions are not uncommon 
in organizations, of course. Rhetorically, those expressions align the advocate with the 
pursuit of the unadulterated truth. Concern for truthfulness was heightened for OS staff 
by the fact that they were charged with managing data that had never before been 
collected or organized. A supervisor to which the OS director reports told me that he 
persuades by “[preparing] whatever logical argument they [the target of persuasion] 
might be interested in or understand.” While it is difficult to get “dinosaur thinkers” to 
“see the light,” he also faces a significant challenge in the kind and quality of data 
available: 
I […] attempt to use data. And that’s, in my mind, always the best thing to defer 
to. The challenge that we have, at least for the types of things that I’m trying to 
forward—those arguments with respect to utilization, economies of scale, better 
logic, […] better savings, etcetera—is doing it in an environment where we have, 
not shoddy data, but data that hasn’t really, uh, been collected in ways that we 
can use in a very reliable fashion. I mean it’s broad. (Interviewee’s emphasis) 
 
How many air miles do IWU faculty, staff, and administrators travel per annum? What 
are the average levels of natural gas use per building in any given season? What are the 
likely outcomes for natural resource use and fiscal coffers if all new buildings are 
required to meet specific design standards? Because much of that data had never before 
been sought, and because the data were associated with the neologism “sustainability,” 
OS staff members regularly communicated in ways that suggested the management of 
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such data typified “advocacy.” As the supervisor quoted above told me, the OS is 
“maturing” in that “I think getting to the point where we can have better systems in 
place to measure and monitor and analyze. That helps us as we continue forward in 
advising whomever—decision makers, leadership, etc.” The following interview extracts 
further demonstrate the ways in which OS staff and partners draw upon the 
representative repertoire. 
 The chief implication of the representative repertoire is that the role of the OS is 
to provide the data against which all claims and arguments are measured. Offering an 
expert, relatively disinterested take on data is either a kind of advocacy in itself or the 
foundation that makes sustainability advocacy possible. As an example, a PSAB 
member told me that “tracking” was an important communicative function of the OS on 
campus. I asked him, “How do you see the balance between presenting information and 
doing advocacy or persuasion? What’s the relationship between those?” He replied:  
In my mind they’re tied together very closely. I think that stems from my 
disciplinary upbringing as a natural scientist. I firmly believe that, as scientists, 
we’re responsible for producing data, for running experiments that try to reduce 
ambiguities in data, etc., and that we’re responsible for putting in, as well as we 
can, all the observations that we can about a particular system. Then, the next 
stage is what you want to do with the observations and that is sometimes judged, 
is governed, by people’s views, their religion, their politics and so forth. But I 
don’t think you should confuse observations with policy actions and so forth that 
come from it. I would like to base actions on data. So presenting data in as clear 
a form as possible, in as unambiguous form. […] Let’s start with observations. 
 
The PSAB member expressed his frustration, “as a scientist,” that people are often 
misrepresenting data in a way that is unscientific for a particular purpose. So, to 
come back to your initial question, I’m a firm believer that once you get all of the 
information out in as clear a form as possible, then let people go from there.  
Now, I’m also very cognizant, in fact, that if you put all of the data on the table, 
people will make very different interpretations of it. […] The data are data. 
They’re observations. What is in conflict is actions that people might want to 




These extracts touch on a refrain I heard regularly in my time participating in and 
observing the work of the Office. People don’t “see” the harm sustained by local and 
global ecologies. Students, members of the community, and so forth were regularly 
described as in need of “education” because they “didn’t have the facts.” While the great 
majority of people were characterized as merely ignorant of the implications of the 
accumulating data on IWU and its relation to the environment, some were said to 
willfully disregard evidence of it. The political interests of those in power, especially 
representatives in state and national governments, sustain their ignorance of the “facts” 
and disregard for “the science.” During the Office’s first year, staff members and I 
frequently talked about their efforts as “laying the groundwork,” “setting the record 
straight,” and “getting the facts right” on sustainability. This sometimes involved 
explaining scientists’ overwhelming agreement that anthropogenic climate change is real 
and presents a number of urgent threats to humanity, for example. On many occasions, 
the staff and I would grouse after a long day, a meeting with a reluctant campus 
administrator, or another disappointing state legislative session, that “they don’t get it.” 
In one of these instances in November 2010, Karen Adams asked no one in particular, 
“What do they have to lose?” Why is it that so many people are unwilling to “hear the 
basic facts” about sustainability? 
 The following response nicely captures the sense that representation is the 
foundation or at the core of the Office’s advocacy. To clarify an interviewee’s statement, 
I asked him: “So, designing systems to gather and deploy data is part and parcel of the 
persuasion process for you […]?” He replied: 
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Definitely. […] I mean, that’s critical. That’s so important. Without that—if, in 
fact, we were going to attempt to forward any of these appropriate elements [or] 
strategies that support sustainable development—it all just becomes a debate on 
subjective measurements or debate on my opinion of what is going on in the 
world versus your opinion. 
 
In this statement, the OS is cast as an advocate in that it does not allow sustainability-
related communication at IWU to become merely a subjective debate. 
 A second claim characteristic of the representative repertoire defines advocacy as 
broad interpretation of data. Here, the advocate acts as an expert of sorts, but one that 
maintains some distance from specific issues. The most obvious examples include 
drawing attention to underappreciated data and identifying absences in data. For 
instance, one interviewee told me that the OS should be advocating “to some degree.” I 
asked him to explain what he meant. 
Well, we talked about [how] there are things that as the institution may be 
ignoring. […] Then, they [the OS] can be somewhat of an advocate to say, 
“We’ve got to come up with the solutions in this area. We’ve got to define that.” 
But when it comes to championing a particular cause, which can also mean being 
an advocate for a cause, I would say no. 
 
Another interviewee, a member of the PSAB, pointed out to me that, 
Actually, the climate plan [required by a compact signed by the president of IWU] 
barely requires that we do anything because we don’t have to be climate neutral 
until 2050 and anything we do today won’t actually help us achieve that in 2050. 
But the obvious next step is clear. We should be reducing our emissions as soon 
as possible. So, clearly, that requires advocating to some groups. But it’s a very 
soft form of advocacy, you see? The university’s president has signed this 
commitment. I mean, how much are you advocating there and how much are you 
just sort of sharing the information that, actually, your job description is to cut 
emissions. So, I think there’s ways in which you can do that. (My emphasis) 
 
This “soft form of advocacy” relies primarily upon the “sharing of information” about 
what is the case. As further evidence of the preference for distancing advocacy from the 
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position-taking, consider this OS employee’s reaction to my use of the word advocacy in 
a question:   
I guess I obviously have a negative connotation for that. I think we should do 
more, instead of advocating, more showing what sustainability is. So, the things 
that we do show that sustainability’s not just energy savings, but it’s local foods 
[for example]. It’s advocating for [sustainability] because it gets more people 
involved with that aspect of sustainability, but we’re not having to say, “Look at 
sustainability. It’s all these things. You should donate, and vote for us, and things 
like that.” It’s more of like, “We’re showing you what it is. If you think that’s 
cool, you should be on board.” 
 
The sort of advocacy she prefers involves just the facts, please, as the saying goes. Such 
representation constitutes advocacy due to the status of the data: People may not be 
aware of the it, it is underappreciated, or it represents an alternative picture of the 
situation facing IWU. In some cases, information about sustainability is trusted to be 
sufficiently engaging for others to “get on board.” 
 Usually, claims in the representative repertoire involve a very abstract 
conceptualization of the way in which certain data provide an alternative 
conceptualization of IWU or sustainability. I asked a member of the PSAB—who has 
also served as a faculty member and IWU administrator, and whom I quoted earlier 
about the “misuse” of science—“Is it the role of the Office to advocate for certain values 
or […] preferences?” His response to that question is provided below. I want to 
emphasize the way in which the interviewee ties “value” to the recognition and 
treatment of certain kinds of data. Earlier in our conversation, he pointed out that people 
“have values” and that “the data are data.” Below, he characterizes the OS’s advocacy as 
the “bridging” of data and values. The interviewee minimizes the place of support for 
particular positions or policies in his description of doing advocacy—for example, when 
he characterizes sustainability advocacy abstractly in the statement below as “looking 
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out for the long term.” I am not claiming that he divests advocacy of any meaning tied to 
values or influence. Rather, I wish to point out the way in which his talk strongly 
couples the idea of advocacy with two things: acts of representation and what we might 
call the virtue of representative fidelity. His reply: 
Yes. I’ve talked earlier about the importance of taking a broader view and a 
longer term view. I have this little imaginary graph that I create in some of my 
classes, I call it the space-time disconnect. On one axis, it’s just a generalized 
space axis going from local to global. And the other axis, its a time axis going 
from the immediate time through the day, the month, the year, the decade, the 
century, the millennium. And I ask people to put a dot on that graph every time 
they have a thought. So, “Where am I going to have lunch today?” That’s on the 
campus and in the next hour. So that’s a point. […] “Am I going to watch the 
[basketball] game tonight?” That’s another dot. And so forth. And it turns out that 
we fill the axis with the bottom corner of this graph, which is, in other terms, the 
here-and-now, right? Here in place, now in time. But if, in fact, you think about 
the issues that are related to sustainability—whether they’re human population, 
whether they’re water, or they’re species, the extinction of species, etcetera—they 
are in the upper-right hand corner of this graph. They’re large in space and long in 
time. So, it’s a responsibility of somebody to say, “We have to bridge this 
disconnect,” and I think the Office of Sustainability is directly charged with 
saying to many people, “We advocate a value system that is looking out for long 
term and large space.” 
 
These sorts of advocacy—which OS staff members called “soft,” “subtle,” or 
“educational” during my time doing ethnographic fieldwork—are rooted in participants’ 
meanings for and reliance on assumptions about data and information. 
 Advice giving as an ideal type of representative advocacy. When Office 
employees and partners used the representative repertoire to discuss specific arguments 
and propositions, they frequently employed the word advice. The Office “gives advice.” 
They do so after figuring out how to “get to the table.” Once at the table, Office 
representatives are there to give advice by representing or providing a “sustainability 
perspective.” Participants recounted this sequence again and again during my 
ethnographic fieldwork. In the following example, a very active volunteer and member of 
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the PSAB draws from the representative repertoire, but foregrounds persuasion to a 
greater degree than most of my other interviewees. This excerpt demonstrates the way in 
which participants’ talk about advice giving borrows from the representative repertoire 
but also allows for more directly persuasive communication. 
You know, it seems to me that […] the Office of Sustainability is specifically 
charged with something. I can [… explain] it in the way that I define the Office of 
Space Planning and Management. Our charge is to account for every space on 
campus, and then advise the administration on the best utilization of that space 
with the resources we have and the challenges we meet. My charge is very clear. 
My charge is to bring to the administration the best information I have about 
space and all its concepts. And I can create a lot of concepts around space. 
Because there’s a lot of different things that nobody else is really looking at, 
because they don’t have the breadth of what we do and [they don’t see those 
interactions] the way we see those interactions. The Office of Sustainability, to 
me, is exactly the same thing. All of the offices are exactly the same thing! And 
the Office of Sustainability has a specific charge. They are supposed to be telling 
us about sustainability, what’s possible, what we need to do, what we need to 
think about, how we might go about it, what are our opportunities, what are our 
impediments. That’s their job. And so, you persuade using whatever tools are 
necessary to persuade. You are part of the dialogue. You have a conversation.  
You have a debate. You come up with whatever facts there are, and if you get 
rejected or you only get partially accepted, then you figure out how to keep on 
moving forward. I mean, it’s the way it works. 
 
The same individual also told me that, at the time of the interview, the advocacy role of 
the Office and its partners should serve a particular position or interest. Pay attention to 
the fact that, while this interviewee speaks of “forcing” action, he grounds that action in 
“defining” the situation. Put another way, this kind of advocacy deals with the relative 
truth or falsity of different ways of conceptualizing sustainability at IWU: 
I think it’s time and that we present to the administration the clearest definition of 
what we think the challenges are. In the course of doing that, we can decide 
exactly where we stand on carbon accumulation and impact, and all that kind of 
stuff, but we need to declare that this is what we think the problem is and how 
significant we think the problem is. And we need to force the administration to 




In this statement, the interviewee draws simultaneously from the directive and 
representative repertoires. His fusion revolves around characterizing advocacy as a kind 
of expertise or provision of advice. While the OS’s advocacy aims at inducing action—
i.e., administrators publicly making decisions—that advocacy is couched in the language 
of the representative repertoire—i.e., descriptions of what the situation is and is not. 
Contrast that with another interviewee’s remarks about advice giving. This person 
employs the language of the representative repertoire, but not the directive repertoire. He 
suggested that an important role of Office employees is providing “credible evaluation.” 
In fact, he seeks to downplay connotations of advice giving as 
[reinforcing] a position that you’re taking, or want to take, [in order] to have an 
output that is different than it would have been had you just used the data in its 
raw form. So, I try to stay away from that. But, again, my desire is to have this 
consistent way of […] interpreting and analyzing. Ways that’re reasonable, 
logical, and credible. 
 
This is the tension at the heart of the representative repertoire. Participants use the 
representative repertoire to associate advocacy with reason, logic, science, and other 
culturally celebrated ideals. At the same time, they grapple with the meaning of 
communicating data and information in the interest of sustainability in a way that does 
not appear to have the qualities of directive advocacy.  
 Summary. The representative repertoire enables participants to align advocacy 
with truth telling. Importantly, the language of the representative repertoire usually 
downplays the role of the advocate, the person(s) engaged in persuasion. Data and 




The expressive repertoire, by contrast, elevates individuals’ personal connection 
to advocacy. In fact, the language of the expressive repertoire largely reduces advocacy 
to genuine self-expression. Leadership and modeling are keywords in the expressive 
repertoire, especially when associated with the phrases leading by example or modeling 
behavior. Authenticity, genuineness, openness, perseverance and action-orientation are 
this repertoire’s guiding values. These values are frequently discussed as virtues of 
particular people.  
 Finally, The directive repertoire offers patterns for describing what sustainability 
advocacy should not be at IWU. Telling and forcing are this repertoire’s keywords. 
Participants regularly contrast telling people what to do with inviting others or being 
invited into conversation, being open, and letting people think something “was their idea 
in the first place.” Key values involved in this repertoire are indirectness, patience, and 
adaptability. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Above, I explored three IRs used by staff and partners of the OS to make claims 
about advocacy. Looking across the three, we can make at least two observations. First, 
participants minimize or disparage overtly persuasive communication in their lay 
theories of advocacy. They tend to promote advocacy as expression or representation, 
and denigrate its connotations of direction and persuasion. Participants favor the term 
advocacy rather than persuasion and, similarly, they use the directive repertoire to 
theorize what advocacy should not be at IWU. By contrast, participants use the 




Second, the participants’ lay theorization of advocacy possesses what we might 
call a realist tone. Let us define realism as the depiction of things “as they are.” Thus, a 
realist style favors (the appearance that we are) presenting the world as it is. Recall how 
the interviewees repeated that giving directions or telling people what to do are 
ineffective or unethical advocacy strategies. Instead of using rhetoric to actively and 
openly persuade others, participants told me that the Office should lead by example and 
show the data. Yes, most of the interviewees told me that “knowing your audience” is 
“key” to successful sustainability advocacy. Still, participants usually talked about 
strategic adaptation to audiences in terms of what part of reality they should discuss 
with others (i.e., in a realist tone). For example, leadership by example was frequently 
talked about as an expression of some authentic self or a demonstration of intrinsic 
motivations (cf. Tracy & Trethewey, 2005). Realist style is even clearer in claims 
associated with the representative repertoire. Within that repertoire, advocacy is spoken 
of most highly when it is the simple portrayal of compelling facts. In any case, staff 
members and partners of the OS most often talk about advocacy as a compelling 
depiction or representation of the world rather than the symbolic creation or change of it. 
Importantly, this is the case despite the fact that OS staff and partners seek 
organizational and environmental change. 
As a whole, my analysis demonstrates the systematic way in which these lay 
theories of advocacy downplay/denigrate the role of influence and persuasion in 
participants’ communication with other members of IWU. When influence and 
persuasion are acknowledged, participants’ tend to insist that other members of IWU (1) 
voluntarily enter the rhetorical situation, (2) determine what sort of interorganizational 
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or interoffice relationship they want to be in, and (3) set the boundaries for persuasion 
and change.  
 These patterns limit the participants’ ability to reflect critically on 
communication’s role in advocacy. That is, the preferences and patterns exhibited by the 
three IRs I described in this chapter treat advocates as people who simply exude 
leadership or convey facts. The lay theorizing I have described says little about symbols, 
interaction, and communication that establishes ongoing and influential relationships. 
Office employees and volunteers have identified advocacy as one function and raison 
d’être of the Office of Sustainability. The patterns in theorizing advocacy that I have 
described may inhibit IWU sustainability advocates’ ability to create coherent 
communication strategies, as well as their ability to account for communication 
successes and failures to date.  
While participants in this study proudly proclaim “change” as their goal, they 
declaim broad types of communication used to realize change. I believe that lay theories 
of advocacy more embracing of the art of rhetoric might serve the participants in this 
study well. Such a shift could help this group of sustainability advocates speak in 
coherent, forthright, and compelling ways about their own role in advocacy for 





1 I want to be clear about my use of the terms persuasion and advocacy in the remainder 
of this chapter. When I discuss advocacy, I will reference its emic meanings. To put 
their struggle over the meanings of advocacy in perspective, I will sometimes talk about 
advocacy as a variety of persuasive communication. When I reference persuasion in this 
way, I am referring to the term’s etic meanings—that is, its meaning in communication 
scholarship. Yes, participants frequently used “persuasion” as a kind of dirty word. That 
is significant and will bear upon my analysis. When they talk about advocacy, this 
study’s participants are still talking about the practical art of communication to influence 
people, shape knowledge, or affect change—about rhetoric and persuasion, in the terms 
of various communication scholars. I will not use quotation marks when I am discussing 
the etic, scholarly meaning or category of persuasive communication. When I am 
referring to the emic, site-specific meanings given to “persuasion,” I will bracket the 
term with quotation marks. 
 
2
 The “triple bottom line” is a popular concept in management and business literatures 
dealing with social responsibility. A recent book intended for a broad audience and 
focused on the matter of organizational sustainability says, “The Triple Bottom Line 
exists currently as a kind of balanced scorecard that captures in numbers and words the 
degree to which any company is or is not creating value for its shareholders and for 




 The statements in quotation marks in this paragraph are not quotations. Instead, they 
are statements I’ve invented to represent similar claims often repeated in the research 
scene. They should be read as characterizations or impressions of routine talk from and 
amongst OS employees. In the rest of this chapter, statements bracketed by quotation 
marks are actual quotations of participants unless otherwise noted. 
 
4
 The Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Green Building Rating 
System is “an internationally recognized green building certification system, providing 
third-party verification that a building or community was designed and built using 
strategies aimed at improving performance across […] metrics” (U.S. Green, 2010, para. 
1). The U.S. Green Building Council, a nonprofit organization, administers the program. 
Many organizations and governments now require that their buildings be built to earn a 
particular LEED rating (e.g., a silver-, gold-, or platinum-level rating). 
 
5
 See Boulding (1956b) for a discussion of images of organization(s) as “what I believe 







In this chapter, I extend Senecah’s (2004) conception of the “trinity of voice” 
(TOV) in environmental communication in two ways. First, I consider her concept’s 
applicability in organizational settings, especially for sustainability officers working in 
situations other than those governed by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 
Second, I explain the role of communication dialectics in the TOV. Senecah says little 
about the processes that people use to realize access, standing, and influence, which are 
the elements of the TOV. To account for the dynamic, ongoing, and tension-laden nature 
of environmental voice organizing, her general theory requires elaboration. In response, I 
identify three dialectics of voice organizing (DVO), which I derived from my reflection 
on both Senecah’s TOV and my research with the Office of Sustainability (OS) at 
Intermountain West University (IWU). My effort is analogous to Hatch’s (1993) addition 
of cultural dynamics to existing models of organizational culture. Hatch’s work explained 
the relationships between elements of culture previously theorized by Schein (1985). 
Similarly, my aim in this chapter is to demonstrate the how Senecah’s conception of 
voice can be enhanced to better account for organizing processes and the cultivation of 
collective voice.1  
Senecah (2004) defines voice as the realization of persons’ access, standing, and 
influence in communication situations. I will explore her definition of voice in more 
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detail below, but I also want to extend her theory to processes of voice organizing. I am 
primarily interested in people’s struggle to create collective voice—or, to put a bit 
differently, to establish a collective’s voice. Since I focus more on the work of cobbling 
together an “organized” voice on environmental issues than the status of individuals 
according to the TOV, I should provide a definition of voice organizing that goes beyond 
the trinity of access, standing, and influence. I will borrow from Watts’ (2001) definition 
of voice, in which “its essential [characteristic is] an ethical or emotional occurrence in 
need of acknowledgement” (p. 192). Communicators “cultivate” voice, Watts says, by 
making claims upon themselves and others through unique “idioms, vocabularies, and 
sets of cultural meanings” (p.192). With those treatments of voice in mind, I propose a 
five part definition of voice organizing: (1) the continuous processes engaged by people 
(2) using discourse and texts in order to (3) constitute and maintain collective 
communication patterns (4) with ethical, emotional, or identity-related dimensions (5) 
related to access, standing, and influence in a variety of situations.2 
A recent report published by the Association for the Advancement of 
Sustainability in Higher Education (AASHE, 2008) showed the potential for an 
organizing-oriented model of voice in environmental communication situations: for 
sustainability officers at colleges and universities, “overall sustainability coordination” 
occupied the greatest percentage of work time (28.7%). My additions to Senecah’s theory 
of voice may help scholars and practitioners of organizational/environmental 
communication to interpret, create, and evaluate processes of voice organizing in a 
variety of situations. Understanding and thinking creatively about the persistent tensions 
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involved in the cultivation of some sense of collective voice may be of value to 
sustainability officers in a variety of organizational settings. 
 This chapter has four remaining major sections. First, I review the concept of 
voice in organization studies. I do this in order to demonstrate why my extension of 
Senecah’s (2004) TOV is relevant to both environmental and organizational 
communication scholars and practitioners. Second, I describe Senecah’s theory of the 
TOV in detail. I provide examples from my own study and explain why the theoretical 
perspective I developed in Chapter 4 is relevant to Senecah’s work. Third, I introduce 
three dialectical tensions into Senecah’s framework: the dialectics of facilitation, 
leadership, and motivation. I provide a great number of examples from my interviews and 
participant observation. Fourth and finally, I close the chapter with a discussion of three 
different frames for thinking and talking about collective or organized voice.  
 
The Voice Concept in Organization Studies 
 Scholars in the area of organization studies have addressed the voice concept in 
several ways. Despite some variation, the problematics of voice are a fundamental 
element of most communication-based studies of organizing: 
As organizational communication scholars, we argue that communication is not a 
neutral process of information transmission; rather, communication is constitutive 
of organizing and has political consequences that both enable and constrain the 
possibilities for collective behavior. (Mumby & Stohl, 1996, p. 58) 
 
Who “speaks” in organizational communication and whose interests are represented in 
organizations’ messages are significant problems because “what appears natural and 
normal about organizational practices is actually socially constructed and obscures other 
organizational possibilities” (Mumby & Stohl, p. 58). In communication studies, scholars 
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have developed a host of concepts to account for the fact that voice is always socially 
negotiated, contingent, and changing. Indeed, voice is a master metaphor for 
communication, itself (Putnam & Boys, 2006). Still, I am not aware of any attempt to 
model a case of voice organizing dynamics in communication studies. 
 Organizational communication scholars’ treatments of voice owe quite a lot to 
scholars in other disciplines. Weber’s foundational work in sociology stressed the 
examination of subjective experience (see, e.g., Weber, 1946). Good examples come 
from his trailblazing analyses of bureaucracy (Weber, 1968), which highlighted the 
struggle over voice in complex organizations. In fact, Clegg and Lounsbury (2009) argue 
that voice and politics are a central feature of Weber’s sociology and analyses of 
complex organizations (see also Barker, 1993). Reed (2009) explains that sociologists 
such as Selznick (1949) extended Weber’s work by, first, studying “the realm of actual 
behavior” and, second, providing “a leitmotif for subsequent studies of the dynamics of 
bureaucracy and their wider implications” for people’s subjective understanding of things 
(p. 563, my emphasis). In short, Weber helped to establish scholarly concern for the 
intimate relationship between organizing, organizational development, and voice.   
Another landmark conceptualization of voice is Hirschman’s (1970) Exit, Voice, 
and Loyalty, a book that explains stakeholder and member responses to organizational 
decline and change. Hirschman, an economist, conceived of voice as a “non-market 
force” or “political mechanism” exercised by people who have a stake in an organization 
(p. 19). He defined voice as 
any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of 
affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the management 
directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of 
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forcing a change in management, or through various types of actions and protests, 
including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion. (p. 30) 
 
If people do not respond to organizational decline through the exercise of voice, they may 
respond through exit, meaning cutting ties with the organization in question, or loyalty, 
which is a “special attachment to an organization” that moderates the likelihood that a 
person will exercise their options for exit or voice (p. 77). For Hirschman, voice is 
unique: 
It is a far more ‘messy’ concept because it can be graduated, all the way from 
faint grumbling to violent protest; it implies articulation of one’s critical opinions 
rather than a private, ‘secret’ vote in the anonymity of a supermarket; and finally, 
it is direct and straightforward rather than roundabout. Voice is political action 
par excellence. (p. 16) 
 
Thus, Hirschman placed voice squarely in the domain of symbolic activity, focusing upon 
its political nature and consequences. However, Hirschman’s work largely left 
unanswered questions about how we might interpret and assess particular manifestations 
of voice. 
Cheney’s (1995, 2002) engagement of Bernstein’s (1976, p. 490) “necessary 
elements for effective worker participation in decision making” was one important 
response. When evaluating worker voice in organizational processes, Bernstein argued, 
observers must attend to three dimensions: degree of control exercised, range of issues 
“addressable” and addressed, and the level at which control is exercised (see Bernstein, 
pp. 492-494). Working from that generalizable but flexible three-part framework, 
scholars could systematically assess and critique attempts to organize voice. 
Communication is of paramount concern, Cheney argued, because rhetoric and symbolic 
interaction are the means by which issues are made fair game or off limits, to put it in 
colloquial terms. Furthermore, rhetoric and symbolic interaction provide the resources for 
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achieving and maintaining control in organizations. Organization scholars interested in 
the concept of voice thus draw upon traditions that emphasize its subjective, symbolic, 
and political character. 
In fact, critical work on voice now predominates in the discipline of 
communication studies. One strain of critical work on organizational voice focuses upon 
various forms of silencing and suppression. Concepts frequently employed in 
communication studies of this sort include discursive closure (e.g., Deetz, 1992), 
managerialism (e.g., Zoller, 2003), concertive control (e.g., Barker, 1993; Tompkins & 
Cheney, 1985), and bounded emotionality (e.g., Martin, Knopoff, & Beckman, 1998; 
Mumby & Putnam, 1992). A second strain of the critical work on organizational voice 
deals with attempts to establish “alternative” voices and organizational forms. 
Communications scholarship has described situations, dilemmas, and opportunities facing 
those who organize in order to give voice to those who would speak differently about 
gender (e.g., Ashcraft, 2004; Ashcraft & Pacanowsky, 1996), race (e.g., Ashcraft & 
Allen, 2003), class (e.g., Cheney & Cloud, 2006), and such. What is common to both 
strains of such research on organizational voice is an abiding concern for (1) the 
maintenance of avenues for meaningful participation and (2) the negotiation of voices’ 
authenticity and efficacy in situ (Buzzanell, 1994; Clair, 1998; Mumby, & Stohl, 1996).  
 Other recent scholarship on organizational voice pays specific attention to the 
complexity of the concept. This literature stresses that voice is not the finalized work of a 
single “author.” Instead, collective voice evolves in the negotiation of competing 
demands or the navigation of relational dialectics. For instance, Ganesh, Zoller, and 
Cheney (2005) call upon organization studies scholars to look beyond “micropolitics” 
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and investigate problems of collective struggle. Dempsey (2007) offered an exemplary 
analysis of the challenges of organizing voice. Her study of an international 
nongovernmental organization developed the concept of bounded voice to explain “a 
dynamic organizational process in which opportunities for voice are strategically and 
provisionally limited to particular forums” (p. 312). Dempsey points out that “collective 
empowerment” does not necessarily translate into “increased” stakeholder voice. In fact, 
organizations may purposefully silence individual members in the pursuit of some sense 
of collective voice (see also Ashcraft, 2006; Stohl & Cheney, 2001).3 Some have pointed 
out that we can think of collective voice in terms of polyphony, the complex orchestration 
of a great variety of voices (Hazen, 1993). Thus, the “organizing” of voice involves 
creativity, negotiation, contestation, and paradox.  
 In sum, organization studies scholarship has shown “voice” to be a complex, 
multifaceted accomplishment of individuals and groups. Achieving and organizing voice 
involves (1) the assertion of identity (i.e., the distinctiveness of who or what is speaking) 
and (2) expression regarding some (potentially) consequential subject matter. As well, the 
efficaciousness of a voice is dependent upon its interrelationship with encompassing 
organizational systems. Most importantly, voice is a dynamic concept. A voice is never 
settled; it is perpetuated in day-to-day practices rife with confusion, tension, and 
contradiction.  
In the following section, I introduce a theory of voice from environmental 
communication studies. Fusing environmental and organizational scholarship may 





A Theory of Voice from Environmental Communication Studies 
Senecah (2004) proposed that voice be thought of as a trinity of access, standing, 
and influence. Thinking of voice in terms of this trinity, she argued, could provide a 
“[useful and] effective benchmark against which to plan or evaluate participatory 
processes regarding contentious environmental issues” (p. 13). Practical applications of 
the TOV ought to engender “an ongoing relationship of trust building to enhance 
community cohesiveness and capacity, [which] results in good environmental decisions” 
(Senecah, 2004, p. 23). Senecah’s essay dealt primarily with public policy and public 
debate contexts, especially those subject to the NEPA. Perhaps because her examples 
came almost exclusively from NEPA public participation processes, Senecah gave 
minimal attention to the processes and tensions involved in building collective voices in 
environmental decision making. Still, it is useful to conceive of access, standing, and 
influence as the foundations of meaningful voice on environmental issues. Before 
expanding on Senecah’s theory, I will briefly discuss each of the components of the 
trinity. 
 
The Trinity of Voice: Access, Standing, and Influence 
Citing Cronen’s (1995) approach to practical theory, Senecah conceives of the 
three elements of the TOV as “flexible, expanding abilities that cannot be reduced to 
technique” (p. 21). She is clear that access, standing, and influence are not things people 
possess, nor are they easily quantifiable statuses. Senecah’s general theory of the TOV 
guides us away from asking questions like, “Do I have access, standing, and influence?” 
and toward questions like, “How might I exercise meaningful access, standing, and 
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influence in this situation?” To curtail anyone’s ability to participate in these ways is to 
limit their voice in the process. Moreover, voice is not simply accorded to persons; they 
must experience the elements of the TOV in the situation, too. For example, it makes 
little sense for a person in power to say to another, “Participate fully in this situation, as I 
command you!” (see Stohl & Cheney, 2001). Similarly, one cannot definitively tell 
another person, “You have a voice in this process.” While organizers can do their best to 
set up situations conducive to everyone’s voice, they cannot simply declare that 
someone’s “voice” has been established. For voice to be realized, participants must feel 
as though they have the capacity to act creatively and meaningfully. With that perspective 
on voice established, let us now look more closely at each of the elements of the TOV.  
 Access. The first element addressed by Senecah (2004) is access, which 
refers to opportunity, potential, and safety. In its simplest form, it means that I 
have access to sufficient and appropriate opportunities to express my choices and 
opinions [… as well as] the opportunity to access sufficient and appropriate 
support […] so that I can understand the process in an informed, active capacity, 
not as a reactionary. (p. 23) 
 
Organizers can enhance access by providing opportunities to act and resources for 
action. As an example of statements about access, consider the following excerpt from 
my interview with a member of the President’s Sustainability Advisory Board (PSAB) at 
IWU. He told me that the OS should “meet others’ needs, [but] not without question.” 
Elaborating, he claimed that the Office had helped organize “things across campus that 
were very scattered before.” 
[…] For example, if I want to get recycling in this building, but I don’t know who 
does recycling, I could call up the Office of Sustainability and say, “We want to 
get recycling going here. Who do we talk to?” And [the OS] would then put us in 
touch with the right people and information. I could ask them questions about, 
“So should we bother with glass? What happens to the glass? Is it worth recycling 
or does it cost more energy to recycle […]?” So, they should be able to give 
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information about things like that and they should know the people on campus 
who can do that if I want to arrange pick-up of aluminum. They should be able to 
say, “Okay, call this person. They can come pick up the aluminum for you.” So, 
[the OS should be] facilitating at that level where, if someone has a sustainability 
problem that that can be solved, they would know how to solve it. 
 
The OS, according to this interviewee, provides opportunities to individuals who have 
been unable to solve “sustainability problems” up to this point. As problem solvers, the 
Office’s employees and partners provide connections, publicize information, and 
facilitates relationships. That is, the OS enhances others’ (and its own) access to 
information, people, and systems.  
Standing. Standing is the second element of the TOV. Standing “is the civic 
legitimacy, the respect, the esteem, and the consideration that all stakeholders’ 
perspectives should be given” (Senecah, 2004, p. 24). Senecah’s use of the term is 
broader than its meaning in the legal professions, where standing denotes the right of any 
party to be heard. In the context of environmental organizing, standing should include 
respect and regard for others. In its ideal form, standing means that one’s ideas and 
identity are appreciated in their own right and not subject to neglect, coercion, or 
manipulation. Take, for instance, a passage from my interview with a member of the 
PSAB and vociferous partner with the OS. He points out that sustainability-based 
arguments/perspectives might not be treated as legitimate without an actual Office of 
Sustainability at IWU: 
It’s an interesting challenge in the sense that, on one hand, I’d like to say 
particularly where [the OS] positioned in our university—as part of our Facilities 
[Management] group—they would just be given standing in any conversation 
about facilities [i.e. buildings and infrastructure]. By standing, I mean they come 
to the table with the ability to specifically say, “We’re not going to do it that way.  
We’re going to do it this way.” Or a range that allows us to make decisions about 
how we do certain parts of the business. […] Beyond that, [there is] the 
interesting conversation about how exactly we teach and talk about sustainability, 
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the philosophy of it, the whole concept. I’m starting to see interesting 
conversations about the idea [of sustainability]—that we really don’t know how to 
teach or talk about it at all. And to some degree, it’s the antithesis of the way we 
normally teach and talk. So how do we make that change and what role does the 
Office of Sustainability play in that? (Interviewee’s emphasis.) 
 
The interviewee was reacting, in part, to the fact that many at IWU still treat 
sustainability as tangential to the core missions of the university. Instead, he insisted that 
the OS should try to make sustainability-based decision making the “norm” at IWU. Or, 
as shown above, they ought to try moving sustainability discourse from “the antithesis of 
the way we normally teach and talk” to a legitimate part of the conversation about 
education and educational institutions. In effect, this is a process of developing standing 
for discourses of sustainability and people who would make claims in behalf of 
sustainability.  
Influence. The final element of the TOV, influence 
is the outgrowth of access and standing. […] It means that my ideas have been 
respectfully considered along with those of other stakeholders and my 
representative or I was a part of the process that, for example, determined 
decision criteria and measures alternatives against it. (Senecah, 2004, p. 25) 
 
 Influence is the legitimate opportunity to make a difference, according to Senecah’s 
theory, rather than the actual exercise of power. Take, for example, what a campus 
designer at IWU told me about his early encounters with the OS and Russell Snyder, who 
was the Office’s first director: 
Snyder was such an amazingly assertive person. I was really happy to work with 
him in the initial days of the sustainability program. He called me into his office 
to talk with groups of students about projects they were working on in those early 
days. That, I think, was really, really useful and helpful both to them and to me—
to be able to share experiences and talk about the projects they were working on. 
   
This campus designer went on to note that Snyder was influential in that “he [was] in a 
place where people look to him for what is the environmentally correct thing to do.” The 
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designer also stressed students’ role in the campus sustainability movement. Snyder, he 
told me, recognized and empowered students’  
desire […] to create a better world. I want to channel the optimism they have in 
the right direction and not in any way diminish […] their enthusiasm […] Let 
them go with some information that I can share with them. […] Respect their 
enthusiasm. 
 
Using the terms of Senecah’s TOV, Snyder and the OS bolstered the students’ and the 
campus designer’s influence on sustainability matters. The relationship facilitated by the 
OS was mutually beneficial. In fact, more than a year after the campus designer’s first 
encounter with undergraduates described above, I attended a meeting of the student 
government’s sustainability working group. In the basement of the student union 
building, this very same designer rolled out a map of the campus showing planned 
bicycle lanes. The designer explained the logic behind the blueprint, and students asked 
questions and pointed out how the plans matched (or didn’t match) the ways they 
typically moved through campus. After the meeting, one student commented to me that it 
was “awesome” that someone “responsible for shaping the campus’ future” was willing 
to meet with students—that they “want and get our input.” It is important that the 
basement meeting was not run or hosted by the OS, though it was inspired by both 
parties’ ongoing relationships with the Office. In short, the communication initiated by 
the Office of Sustainability enabled the campus designer and interested students to work 
in concert with one another and offered them both the opportunity for meaningful 










Senecah (2004) usefully conceptualized voice as a trinity of access, standing, and 
influence. However, Senecah’s general theory of the TOV does not speak directly to 
processes that we might call building, establishing, or organizing collective voice. This is 
particularly important for sustainability officers responsible for representing and 
empowering organizations’ stakeholders on environmental issues. Environmental 
communication scholars have, up to this point, uncritically adopted Senecah’s tripartite 
framework for voice (e.g., Martin, 2007; Singh, Koku, & Balfors, 2007; Walker, 
Senecah, & Daniels, 2006). Drawing upon data from my research, I propose that the 
elements of the TOV can be developed for collectives (and their individual members) 
through the negotiation of three dialectics. Wise engagement of these ever-present 
tensions—which, using academic terminology, we might call dialectical praxis—is the 
primary means by which individuals organize a sense of voice on complex environmental 
issues. Before I describe the DVO, I briefly explain why I think of the elements of the 
TOV as interpretive repertoires. 
 
Elements of the Trinity of Voice as Interpretive Repertoires 
It may be tempting to think of access, standing, and influence as things that 
participants in environmental communication processes have. One might also think of the 
trinity as kinds of status or privilege earned by or conferred upon participants. Senecah 
and others have resisted these definitions. Instead, Senecah (2004) characterizes the 
elements of the TOV as “the grammars (e.g., the specific tactics, behaviors) of the 
effective public participation practices of trust” (p. 32). She also says, “The practical 
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theory of the TOV could be thought of as a sixth-sense savviness and flexibility of 
knowing how and when to finesse the basic techniques that all public participation 
specialists should have in their toolboxes” (p. 23). Elsewhere, she treats the TOV as 
“benchmarks” for assessing the processes’ quality (p. 25). The components of the TOV 
have also been treated as “templates” for designing collaborative partnerships in a variety 
of contexts (Walker et al., 2006). Senecah also suggests that “the practical theory of the 
TOV could be thought of as a sixth-sense savviness and flexibility of knowing how and 
when to finesse the basic techniques that all public participation specialists should have 
in their toolboxes” (p. 23). 
 Rather than treat the TOV as a mysterious “sixth sense” or explicit “tactics” and 
“behaviors,” I will use the perspective developed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation to 
conceptualize the components of the TOV. Thus, I will henceforth call access, standing, 
and influence the repertoires of voice. The term “elements” might connote fixity and 
objective existence to some readers. By contrast, calling the three parts of the TOV 
groups of interpretive repertoires connects my arguments in this chapter with my earlier 
theorization of lay theorizing as the structuration of interpretive repertoires. I use the term 
repertoires to draw attention toward the fact that, above all else, the TOV is made up of 
interpretations and claims made (in a particular context) about one’s own, others’, or 
groups’ voices. 
In Chapter 4, I developed a unique perspective on lay theorizing and I provided a 
detailed summary in Chapter 6, so I will not repeat much of it here. I will simply say that 
participants in my study did theorize about the status of their own and others’ “voice” on 
the sustainability-related issues facing IWU. They developed repertoires for talking about 
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and strategizing for their access, standing, and influence on campus. Let me briefly 
provide examples that connect each repertoire of the TOV to the theoretical perspective I 
developed in Chapter 4 and applied first in Chapter 6. 
 
Access as an Interpretive Repertoire: “Getting to the Table”  
and “Opening Doors” 
 Early on, officers with the OS established “getting to the table” as a sort of root 
metaphor for their activity. One long-time volunteer with the Office told me that the OS 
must “come to the table” and assert a so-called sustainability perspective. Of course, he 
told me this several years after the OS had been established. Even early on, OS 
employees were preoccupied with “figuring out where everything was going on” and 
“what tables we needed to be at,” as it was put during a strategy meeting in the summer 
of 2008. During what they sometimes called their “entrepreneurial” first year, the OS’ 
staff members concentrated on meeting as many people as possible and on understanding 
the (possible) interconnections of operations on campus. Put another way, they sought 
access to as many people and administrative units as possible. Moreover, they sought out 
and gathered previously neglected data, such as the number of miles university-sponsored 
faculty and staff travelled by aircraft each year and the number of energy intensive 
research laboratories on campus.  
During the transition out of the Office’s pilot year, however, they began to 
conceptualize their role as providing others access to people and information. The 
employees’ attention turned toward “identify[ing] the key players [… and trying] to get 
them around the table.” Staff meetings in the subsequent years frequently involved 
questions about whether or not “we’re at the table” or “have gotten in the door” for 
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projects as varied as new buildings and financial planning. Later, the staff would 
celebrate enabling students and other individuals to “get a sit-down” with people in 
power, and would ask whether “the door is open” before anyone “kick[s] it down.”  
These architectural metaphors were one of several means by which participants in 
my study gauged whether or not they had meaningful access and whether they could 
realize it for others. The employees and partners of the OS developed adaptable, stylized 
patterns for interpreting and talking about whether or not people had meaningful 
information about and opportunities for involvement in sustainability-related matters at 
IWU—interpretive repertoires of accesses, in other words. 
  
Standing as an Interpretive Repertoire: “License” 
  Perhaps the best example of talk about “standing” in the case I studied is the idea 
of “license.” This statement from Lillian Valmer epitomizes the theme: 
I’m excited about the rapid progress that has been made. There is some sort of 
institutional commitment now to this group [meaning the OS]. […] I guess I just 
love feeling like we're enabling people, in their own spirit of influence, to actually 
do stuff. Sort of giving license to get things done. I remember when I was 
directing those [public forums about the possibility of a formal Office of 
Sustainability]. A guy came up afterwards, and he said, “You know, we've been 
waiting for ten years for this to happen.” 
 
Notice how she frames the OS as “enabling people, in their own spirit of influence.” As 
you will recall from Chapter 6, the Office’s employees and partners did not like the idea 
that they “told people what to do.” On the contrary, they sought out individuals who had 
a preexisting desire to take action on sustainability in their “corner” of the university. In 
staff and Steering Committee meetings, we would regularly discuss how the Office might 
“endorse,” “dialogue with,” or “partner with” others who faced obstacles in making 
change. Doing this, we asserted, enhanced the other party’s standing and the legitimacy 
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of sustainability-related claims, as the “guy [who] came up afterward” seemed to be 
saying to Lillian Valmer. 
For instance, a PSAB member told Office employees about a School of Nursing 
employee who had been spending time researching recycling opportunities at IWU and at 
an affiliated hospital. Upon hearing about this activity, her supervisor instructed her to 
“drop it” because recycling was “not part of her job.” I do not know if any meeting took 
place, but OS employees, the PSAB member, and I did talk about whether a 
representative of the Office should formally meet with the Nursing School supervisor. 
After all, the President had formally committed IWU to reducing its solid waste output. 
Furthermore, we conjectured, OS representatives could make the Nursing School 
employee’s activity look “entrepreneurial,” and they might try to “give her license” to 
continue her work by linking the activity to university-level priorities. This, we thought, 
might “give some weight” to what she had done in the eyes of her supervisor. 
Our discussion focused explicitly on how the OS might enhance the Nursing 
School employee’s standing, as well as on whether or not the OS might have standing 
with the Nursing School’s administrators. For some, the best way to enhance the standing 
of environmental voices was to embed sustainability in the language used by the 
university’s administrators. As an interviewee explained to me,  
If my boss tells me to do something and he [or she] gives me permission to do it, I 
don’t have to think about it, you know? I don’t have to worry about it. I just have 
to do it. I have to figure out a way to do it.   
 
As time passed, OS employees and partners worried less about the OS’s ability to “give 
voice” to sustainability perspectives on almost any matter at IWU. Instead, they began to 
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assume it. After a while, simply aligning oneself with the OS seemed to “give license” to 
take action on sustainability. 
 
Influence as an Interpretive Repertoire: “Leading by Example” 
 Chapter 6 dealt entirely with communication related to influence. For that reason, 
I will not dwell upon the interpretive repertoires connected with influence as a 
component of voice. In the “leading by example” repertoire, for example, influence was 
idealized as the genuine, impassioned expression of one’s enduring commitment to 
sustainability principles. As a form of “meaningful participation in processes where their 
ideas matter” (i.e., influence, as defined by Walker et al., 2006, p. 194), the implicit 
theory at IWU seemed to be that “leading by example” demonstrated one’s ardent 
positions on environmental matters without being “imposing” or “pushy,” ensuring that 
one would be “taken seriously” and thought of as a “reasonable” person (see Chapter 8). 
One lesson of Chapter 6 was that “advocacy” and other forms of influence took on 
multiple forms in the language of the OS’s employees and supporters. Sustainability 
advocates used repertoires that bear upon this idea of influence to explore whether or not 
they “had” it, were exercising it appropriately, and so forth. 
 
Summary 
 I have established that the TOV may be thought of in terms of interpretive 
repertoires of access, standing, and influence. While participants in my study did not 
frequently use these terms, they did occasionally discuss the significance of “voice.” This 
was especially true when they talked about the effort that led up to the Office’s 
establishment in 2007. For example: 
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I think a big push to develop this Office was when these forums started and, 
suddenly, people are standing up [and saying], “The University does nothing.”  
And people were just angry. Even on a small scale, [people with the] Plant 
Operations side of things were saying, “Geez, absolutely no one is aware of 
anything we’ve done. We’ve done nothing to publicize the measures that we’ve 
taken to retrofit the campus and make it more energy efficient.” So, there needs 
to be a voice behind some of these efforts. I think the University was doing them 
for the right reasons—you know, to save money for the University […] 
sustainable from, you know, a financial perspective. But I think that having a 
voice, when people do the right thing, something that kind of helps perpetuate 
recognition for doing the right thing, you feel good about it. Someone else makes 
sure you feel good about it, and that kind of helps keep it going. When people go 
above and beyond to do the right thing, there’s a source of publicity for those 
people. 
 
In this statement, the interviewee clearly links voice with “publicizing” and raising 
“awareness” of progressive change (i.e., visibility and leadership). She also implies that 
the OS now responds to and puts in contact people quietly “taking measures” and those 
who were “angry” that “the University does nothing” (i.e., it facilitates relationships). 
Moreover, later in the interview she pointed out that the Office has an expansive view of 
what it means to do sustainability “for the right reasons.” Prior to the establishment of the 
Office, the “Plant Operations side of things” did not usually communicate their work in 
terms of sustainability, and they received little acknowledgement or appreciation from 
“outsiders” as a result. So, we can infer that “being a voice” for sustainability also 
involves the negotiation of what qualifies as “doing the right thing” or “the right reason” 
for doing something (i.e., a question of motivation). The model of voice organizing that I 
develop in the next section accounts for these sorts of dynamics. 
I decided to extend Senecah’s theory after consulting participants in the study. As 
I reflected upon the participant observation and interview data I gathered, I found 
Senecah’s (2004) theory applicable to the objectives and history of the OS. Testing my 
sense that the TOV was a relevant construct, I introduced it to participants during the 
  
272
group interviews. One response was that the TOV “made sense,” though “I’m not sure 
I’ve used the term” voice to describe what the Office does. In a different group interview, 
one participant said of the TOV, “I think this is crucial.” He asked me how it is that 
individuals or groups “develop [access, standing, and voice] in the first place.” I did not 
have an answer and directed the question to the group, which engaged in discussion. 
 The model of voice organizing that I present below is a response to those group 
interview sessions. It fuses the etic terms (i.e., theoretic, deductively derived language) of 
the TOV with emic terminology (i.e., case specific, inductively derived language) used 
by participants in my study. By (1) treating access, standing, and influences as 
interpretive repertoires, and (2) focusing on the dialectical tensions experienced by the 
sustainability officers in my study, I aim to conceptualize voice in more dynamic terms. 
 
The Dialectics of Voice Organizing 
 I have established that access, standing, and influence may be thought of as 
interpretive repertoires. The goal of Senecah’s (2004) TOV is enhanced trust and 
community capacity. An important question is thus: how do sustainability experience and 
negotiate their work organizing people’s collective sense of access, standing, and 
influence? I offer the dialectics of voice organizing (DVO) as one possible answer.4 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the DVO. The model appears as a triangle with six parts. 
The repertoires of the TOV are shown as three circles, each situated at one of the points 
of the triangle. As Senecah (2004) argues, each of these three is required to support the 
others and ensure the voice of participants in environmental processes. Each of the 
triangle’s “sides” is a bidirectional arrow. Within the arrows are the dialectics of voice 








Figure 6.1. The Dialectics of Voice Organizing 
The arrows do not signify a simple causal relationship between the TOV and the 
dialectics of voice organizing. Taken as a whole, the figure depicts organizing and 
balancing the TOV as a lively process of negotiating at least three dialectical tensions. 
For example, the dialectic of facilitation is manifested in the interplay between the 
development of access and the development of standing. Participants accounted for 
communication that enhanced access, standing, and influence in their statements about 
the OS’ organizing activities. When we view their statements about communication that 
enhances access, standing, and voice in relation to one another, the three dialectics come 
into view. In this section, I account for those three—dialectics of facilitation, leadership, 
and motivation—in the case of IWU’s Office of Sustainability. 
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As relational and organizational dialectics, these ever-present tensions cannot be 
completely resolved or eliminated (Baxter & Montgomery, 1996; Papa, Singhal, & Papa, 
2006). These dialectical tensions are the necessary push-and-pull involved when people 
work to give voice an organized quality or character. Organizing involves dialectics for at 
least three reasons: (1) people bring contradictory desires to the organizing process, (2) 
organizations pursue multiple and sometimes conflicting goals, and (3) organizations are 
made “real” in part through the negotiation of what symbols mean (see Ashcraft & 
Trethewey, 2004; Eisenberg, 1984; Hawes, 1974; Putnam, 1986; Tracy, 2004; Trethewey 
& Ashcraft, 2004). 
I argue that the sustainability officers can organize and enhance voice by 
strategically engaging the three dialectics associated with Senecah’s (2004) TOV. 
Specifically, (1) negotiating the dialectic of facilitation may serve the collective’s access 
and standing; (2) working through the dialectic of leadership can bolster its access and 
influence; (3) managing the dialectic of motivation could add to its standing and 
influence. I do not offer any definitive prescription for how to do this. Instead, I 
encourage scholars and practitioners to think creatively, applying and adapting the model 
provided here to different situations. 
 
The Dialectic of Facilitation: Access ↔ Standing 
 The dialectic of facilitation involves efforts to bolster access and standing for 
IWU’s sustainability advocates. Participants in this study described facilitation as 
providing others with the resources, contacts, and information required for action/change. 
It is important to stress that, for participants in this study, “facilitating change” meant 
aiding in the accomplishment of others’ goals. Those goals might be ambiguous or open 
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for revision, but participants used the term facilitation to describe the Office’s attempts to 
empower others to discover, set, and realize new sustainability-related objectives. As one 
participant put it: 
I think facilitating is very important because that means you're just looking to see, 
if you want to do something, you have to identify the key players. You have to try 
to get them around the table. And by doing that you can actually have the energy 
come from having different views of people focusing on the same thing, versus 
controlling, which [… means being] responsible to delegate to get things done 
[and…] follow up to make sure it's accomplished. 
 
Facilitation entails connecting different groups of people and resources as well as 
enabling them work together productively on sustainability-related initiatives. This 
involves simultaneously enhancing stakeholders’ access and standing with one another.  
 Repertoires associated with access and standing. When talking about 
communication that serves access, one repertoire employed by participants revolved 
around the idea of connecting. When talking about communication in the interest of 
standing, participants developed a repertoire centered on the idea of dialoguing. These 
two poles of facilitation—each serving access and standing, respectively—are in 
productive tension with one another (i.e., they are in a dialectical relationship).  
Connecting involved the creative combination of people and elements of a 
system; participants did not use the term to connote much beyond simply “putting pieces 
together.” As the one-time Interim Director of the OS told me,  “Connect: getting these 
people talking to these [other] people so that they can—maybe, on their own, they 
wouldn’t get very far—but they start working together and can start [up] solutions that 
can actually make something happen.” He told me that the Office employees act in many 
ways like a “catalyst […] thrown into the university mix.” He pointed out that, because 
the OS employed just three people, it had to create and leverage connections to realize its 
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aspirations: “We have these three people, but it’s not [just] the three people. They pull in 
and attract through their connections a lot more that makes this catalyst work.” 
Connecting is simply putting people in touch with resources (e.g., people, data) that may 
help them realize their aspirations—enhancing access, in other words. 
Participants in this study talked about dialogue, on the other hand, as a kind of 
opening up in relationships. As in scholarly publications, sustainability advocates at IWU 
also defined dialogues as deeply personal and mutually transformative conversations. For 
instance, Lillian Valmer told me that one of the most effective ways to organize for 
sustainability is 
starting conversations, dialogues, getting people to really recognize an issue 
instead of just brushing it under the rug. We really have to bring it out into the 
forefront and really think about it. And oftentimes, once you get that dialogue 
started, people will start making good decisions of their own and really will 
change as a result of their heart changing. That's what I'm most interested in: to 
inspire people to connect with issues on a deeper level and question their own life 
and look at how they can heal their own situation. 
 
While it is related to “making connections,” participants in this study spoke of dialogue 
as a much more intense process of “opening up” and “coming together” in the interest of 
sustainability, a process by which people engage sustainability “on a deeper level” that 
deepens their commitment to one another and to the broader interests of IWU. 
These, then, are two repertoires developed by participants to talk about the OS’s 
organizational work that enhances access and standing for and amongst IWU’s 
sustainability advocates. When we consider these two repertoires in relation to one 
another, under the broader heading of facilitation, we can see how cultivating access and 
standing involves a productive engagement of dialectical tension. 
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Dialectical tension between access and standing. On the one hand, IWU’s 
sustainability officers talked about connecting and the promotion of access as an essential 
part of the process of gaining a “systems perspective” on the campus. It was, for instance, 
an article of faith that “making the campus more sustainable” required “thinking in terms 
of systems.” But, many participants told me that systems thinking is consistently thwarted 
by “bureaucracy,” “siloing,” and “not seeing the consequences” of actions. As a result, 
employees of the OS try to gather together unfamiliar people and new information to “see 
what happens”—they promote greater access through connecting, in other words. One 
member of the Steering Committee explained the OS’s connecting role through the 
example of building design. He mentioned that it is difficult to get everyone involved in 
building projects—from benefactors, to construction firms, to prospective building 
occupants—to buy into sustainable design practices. 
[For example, I want to promote] the concept of how to design a building [using] 
natural daylight instead of fluorescent light. All that kind of stuff is something 
that [… I hope] everybody would become aware of. And I don’t know, hopefully 
it will get into their heads somehow. It’s not going to get in throughout 
administrative people or me. […] I don’t know how to voice it, though. The 
criteria by which the administrative people are put into their positions don’t 
necessarily require an environmental awareness. 
 
The Office of Sustainability, he noted, could put various groups together in order to 
generate new ideas and “a very a global vision of what the campus should look like.” The 
idea is that “everybody learns” from such encounters, thus making new, sustainability-
based (i.e., systemic) perspectives possible.  
On the other hand, the new connections can lead to frustration and conflict. After 
all, few individuals are willing to “take the blame” for unsustainable organizational 
structure, as one person said during a group interview. But, more importantly, the newly 
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connected partners in sustainability organizing need to be able to speak and work clearly 
and efficiently with one another (see Thompson, 2009). In some cases, this involves 
technical problems. For instance, “outsiders” now connected to “insiders” may not 
understand the jargon used to certain professions. In other cases, ideological conflict is 
involved (see Howard & Geist, 1995). For example, different members of the PSAB 
expressed concern that other board members’ view of sustainability was “fiscally 
irresponsible” (in that it demanded sweeping and “expensive” changes) or “watered 
down” (in that it limited change to projects with very short “pay back”). On the surface, 
these two positions might seem to be in conflict. So, the unique interactions made 
possible through connecting can produce conflicts, rifts, confusion, and the like—but 
perhaps also inspiration, new perspectives, unique solutions, and greater collective 
power. 
Thus, sustainability officers encourage dialoguing and other standing-related 
communication in an effort to resolve conflicts, make groups sensible to one another, and 
ensure that everyone involved feels as though they have been given respect. Yasmine 
Meadows was heavily involved in campus gardening and the on-campus farmers market. 
She explained to me how OS facilitation was crucial to the success of student’s food-
related initiatives. The Office helped, she said, by 
facilitating, creating a forum for that dialogue to happen. As I had mentioned, the 
Office is a key connector for linking students with different entities on campus so 
that they can create partnerships and then address certain issues. For example, 
with my projects I have to have a really close relationship with Plant Operations 
in order to get the campus gardens actually running because they’re the ones who 
are in charge of the watering systems and advising us [so that…] the garden 
doesn’t become an eyesore and is well maintained. So, yes, [we need] great 
facilitators linking people together, finding those who share some of the same 
ideas or the same passions, and just making creating systems for a movement or a 




This statement nicely presents facilitation as creative activity in the space between 
connecting and dialoguing, if you will. As Meadows implies, facilitating is “creating 
systems for a movement or project to actually come to fruition” by “linking” and 
fostering “really close relationships.”  
 Summary. A member of the PSAB told me, “Connecting [and] dialoguing […] 
They’re different sides of pretty much the same coin, if you like.” Interview statements 
such as this first cued me to thinking about voice organizing as a dialectical activity. 
Facilitating is an important activity for voice organizers; it primarily serves to enhance 
participants’ access and standing. It is important to continually foster new connections 
(i.e., greater access to people and resources) and facilitate the new relationship through 
ongoing dialogue (i.e., encourage participants to maintain high regard for participants and 
stakeholders with whom they now have a more intensive relationship). Failing to 
continually renegotiate access threatens to turn dialoguing into “reinventing the wheel,” 
“covering the same ground,” “beating a dead horse,” and “preaching to the choir”—all 
colloquialisms used by participants in this study. Thus, we can think of facilitation as an 
activity that “balances” the cultivation of access and standing in the development of a 
collective voice on environmental issues. 
 
The Dialectic of Leadership: Access ↔ Influence 
 The second dialectic of voice organizing involves questions about leadership. 
Participants in this study struggled over how much and in what ways the Office of 
Sustainability should “take the lead on,” “be out in front for,” and “be the face of” 
environmental efforts on campus. At the same time, the majority of participants told me 
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that sustainability-related efforts on campus were “fragmented,” “scattered,” or 
“invisible” to one another prior to the Office’s establishment. One partner with the OS 
told me that, early on, “There started to be that discussion of [the fact that] there should 
be an office to publicize some of these things and coordinate some of these very 
fragmented efforts that are happening all over campus” (emphasis mine). This was a 
common refrain early in the life of the Office: It must publicize what others are doing on 
campus to “raise awareness” and “coordinate” just enough to get people to feel like 
“we’re working together” in the push for sustainability. The dialectic of leadership exists 
at the intersection of access and influence—which participants discussed through 
repertoires of publicizing and coordinating, respectively.  
 Repertoires associated with access and influence. Participants associated two 
specific communication-related concepts with the two poles of the dialectic of leadership: 
publicizing and coordinating. Participants used publicizing to refer to broadcasting 
others’ information as widely as possible. For example, one interviewee told me that 
publicizing is 
the communication that has to do with what’s already happening; to be that voice, 
so [IWU stakeholders] hear what is happening with the recycling program [for 
example]. What is happening with energy management? What is happening with 
water sustainability or more efficient buildings or all the different things we’ve 
been looking at? 
 
So, publicizing is “giving voice” by raising awareness of the status of things, by 
collecting and disseminating information as widely as possible. At base, it is defined by 
relatively impersonal communication to a mass or broad collection of people.5 In the 
words of another interviewee,  
I think there’s so much stuff that goes on on campus that people don’t have a clue 
what’s happening. […] What [the OS] does is give a place for people to go and 
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[…] look and see what’s going on on campus that has to do with sustainability on 
campus. I think that’s really important for people to get to know. And not only 
what is going on, but what’s the campus doing, because I don’t think anybody has 
their arms around what we’re doing for sustainability on this campus like the 
Sustainability Office does. [… The OS is] a great communicator, publicizer of 
what’s going on on campus. 
 
Publicizing then, was another way in which participants talked about the development of 
access—to information, knowledge, and schedules that people could use to act in an 
informed way. 
 While publicizing denoted for participants very little involvement or influence on 
the part of the OS, the repertoire centered on the term coordinating was associated with 
administration, primary responsibility, and giving directions. In other words, coordination 
and related concepts were one way in which participants made sense of the Office’s role 
in augmenting sustainability advocates’ influence on campus. A graduate student 
partnered with the OS told me that “coordinating any environmental activities” would be 
one of the “first” terms she would use to describe the OS’s work. Of the Office’s 
“coordinating/managing” role, she said: 
[…] being part of the planning activities of the University. I guess that the office 
needs to be part of the planning. […] Like being part of the planning process for 
the university [… involving] some type of sustainability-related issues. I mean we 
need to—not plan our activities, because it’s obvious everyone needs to do that—
but plan the University’s activities. We will be part of the planning. And again, 
coordinating and managing is part of the active management of IWU. 
 
In many staff meetings, Office staff and I would discuss how “active” or “out front” they 
should be when it came to planning and coordinating various processes. In this way, the 
OS might act as the apparent leader of and voice for a range of supporters by taking an 
active role in the coordination and management of initiatives. Still, as I discussed above 
and in Chapter 6, these same people were usually reluctant to “give directions” and “be 
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managers.” The nature and degree of the OS’s leadership on sustainability-related matters 
at IWU remains an open question to this point. 
Dialectical tension between access and influence. This dialectic involves tension 
inasmuch as the Office’s employees “can’t do everything” but must take primary 
responsibility for some activities in order to “get the ball rolling.” Consider the difference 
between the following two interview statements. Speaking about Office staff, one woman 
told me, “I see them very clearly in a leadership role” that involves both creating 
“different opportunities for people to be involved in sustainability, as well as just 
practical things […] really trying to be the hub to coordinate all the different efforts [on 
campus].” Her statement positions the Office as an active partner, as doing more than 
simply initiating and monitoring new interactions and opportunities. By contrast, a 
different interviewee told me, “I don’t like any of the words that would suggest that their 
hands are in it: coordinating, overseeing.” He acknowledged that IWU is “such a 
fragmented organization,” where  
information [and …] many other things  […] all happen so many places that until 
and unless there is a better way to collect it all for purposes of sustainability 
analysis, there may be some level of this [meaning “leadership” and 
“coordination”] that’s required of the OS, which is occurring, I think, now in a 
very difficult way. 
 
The second interviewee preferred that OS staff members (1) resist getting actively 
involved with specific initiatives and (2) favor their role in promoting access to the 
wealth of different sustainability-related initiatives already underway. The first 
interviewee disagreed, encouraging the OS’s role as a “hub for coordinating all the 
different efforts.” In the language sometimes used by participants, this struggle concerns 
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how the OS should “be leading” or “take a leadership role” on IWU’s sustainability-
related activities.  
 Summary. Sustainability officers in this case study experienced a dialectical 
tension concerning the nature and degree of their leadership. How involved should 
officers be in sorting information, structuring interaction, and designing strategy? One 
study participant told me that, “If the Office did nothing but publicize the rest of what’s 
going on at the university, it would still be incredibly useful.” However, Office staff and 
volunteers desire a more active, influential role for the organization, as well.  
In this way, the Office negotiates a leadership role that balances coordinating and 
publicizing. Publicizing enhances access by making information public and generally 
available. Coordinating, on the other hand, enhances participants’ influence in that their 
work is given shape and legitimacy when attached to the Office’s mission and oversight. 
In practice, sustainability officers can negotiate a context-appropriate leadership role 
through both publicizing and coordinating. 
  
The Dialectic of Motivation: Standing ↔ Influence 
 The third and last of the DVO involves motivation. We can define motivation in 
two ways, and I will emphasize the second definition. First, motivation can be understood 
in its conventional sense as a “mental state driving acts” (see Benoit, 1996, pp. 67-69). 
Second, we can define motivation according to the meaning of “motive” in the work of 
Kenneth Burke (1969a, 1969b) and C. Wright Mills (1940). Motives, in this second 
sense, are constellations of symbols and meaning (i.e., grammars or vocabularies) that 
people use to construct accounts of themselves and the world. Benoit (1996) calls these 
“motives as accounts,” meaning “utterances that usually occur after actions, intended to 
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explain, justify, characterize or interpret those actions” (p. 70). This second definition for 
motivation draws our attention more to communication and discourse than to individuals’ 
psychological state.  
Let us explore an example with this second definition in mind. During the course 
of my participant observation, it was not uncommon for one person to frame 
sustainability-related organizational change as “taking fiscal responsibility” and another 
to frame it as “sustainable development for future generations.” Imagine these two people 
working on the same advisory board or as part of a discussion on the reduction of energy 
use in a particular building. The two symbolic constructions—fiscal responsibility and 
future-oriented sustainability— may suggest certain ideologies, ethics, and logical 
premises that, in turn, might overlap, conflict, or remain distinct. In any case, the two 
individuals are employing different vocabularies of motive, to use Mills’ (1940) phrase. 
The two motives are consequential—that is, they affect what people do and experience—
but they are not deterministic. They are not final or closed, in other words. Our two 
imagined people might struggle to make their motive more dominant in the situation, they 
may cooperate productively from both perspectives, or they might proceed by way of a 
transcendent goal. Regardless, I am simply pointing out that the distinctness of these 
motives presents people who wish to organize voice with a problem. The dialectic of 
motivation is grounded in the problems associated with both influence and standing. 
 Repertoires associated with standing and influence. Participants in my study had 
to negotiate which motives they invoked in various situations, and they had to deal with a 
variety of motivations for people that they hoped to influence. On one side of the 
dialectic, Office employees and partners talked about collaboration, which they defined 
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in terms of cooperative projects in which different parties brought different interests, 
values, and such to bear on the work at hand. The repertoire they built around the concept 
of collaboration was associated with the cultivation of standing and defined by (1) 
people’s work together on specific projects in which (2) participants were able to 
maintain their differences. In that way, the parties involved increased their sense of 
interdependence and respect for one another’s motivation (see Daniels & Walker, 2001). 
For example, one interviewee recalled 
a time when there was sort of no the discussion between the Office of 
Sustainability [and …] people of the mindset that existed in Campus Design and 
Construction. There wasn’t a common, sort of, bringing together of design goals 
and things like that [i.e., sustainability]. Just being able to make the missions one, 
sort of. I think, prior to the Office of Sustainability, if it didn’t have a financial 
benefit, it wasn’t considered. Despite the lifecycle cost and those things, [projects 
that didn’t have obvious “financial benefit”] just weren’t looked at. I think 
they’ve been able to collaborate the efforts of what has been happening forever 
and the mission of sustainability, sort of [making] the goals [that IWU sets] more 
reflective. 
 
Focus your attention on the last few lines. The interviewee frames the Office’s 
collaboration as the harmonization of “what’s been happening forever” at Campus 
Design and Construction and “the mission of sustainability,” which was formally 
recognized by IWU’s administration only recently. The interviewee does not outright 
reject “financial benefit” thinking, nor does he advocate the unreflective pursuit of 
sustainability. The two motivations might sometimes be in tension, but the interviewee 
credits the Office of Sustainability for maintaining the standing and collaborative work of 
people with different motivations.  
On the other side of this dialectic, participants addressed enhanced influence with 
a repertoire centered on persuading. The participants’ treated persuasion as 
communication in the service of influence or communication used explicitly to create 
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change (in others’ thought, attitudes, behavior, etc.). Very often, they characterized 
persuasion as placing some motivations in a hierarchical position above the others.6 
Persuasion can enhance the influence of an “organized voice” through establishment of 
legitimated, dominant, popular, or transcendent motives. For example, I sat in on a 
meeting between OS staff and administrators responsible for purchasing at IWU. One of 
the purchasing administrators showed significant enthusiasm. He brought a number of 
catalogues featuring recycled or “eco-friendly” products, saying, “There really is a lot out 
there!” He told those of us at the meeting that he “hadn’t seriously thought about” 
sustainability until being asked to meet with the OS for the first time. “It’s really 
exciting,” he told us, to discover that a professional association he belonged to had 
recently taken up sustainability as a core concern or value. At the end of the meeting, he 
said he was enthusiastic about having a “new challenge” that would require “a lot of 
work.” In short, the purchasing official was persuaded to give (some degree of) primacy 
to sustainability as a motive in his work and relationship with the OS. Over the next year, 
Office staff members told me that they would email the purchasing administrator to ask 
what was new “on the sustainability front” or to ask for assistance on an initiative. Most 
every time, the Office employee I was talking to would remark about how pleased they 
were that he seemed “excited” or “really into it.” His newfound motivation to pursue 
sustainability enhanced the Office’s (and others’) influence when speaking up for change 
related to University purchasing policies.  
Dialectical tension between standing and influence. The tension at the heart of the 
dialectic of motivation is whether to (1) acknowledge and preserve a variety of 
motivations or (2) enhance the status of some motives over others. Participants in my 
  
287
study did not always advocate putting sustainability first. For example, one student 
partner with the OS told me that persuasion requires that you “connect with people's 
value systems. And in the message is the delivery, too.” In some cases, she explained, 
sustainability advocates are able to influence other people by promoting values other than 
sustainability. But different frames may also limit sustainability officers’ ability to 
persuade others to take on long-term problems, as one interviewee told me: 
The problem with the University is everyone sees the bottom line and upfront 
costs, and they don’t consider what it’s going to cost down the road if these things 
[e.g., inefficient resource use, environmental impact] aren’t taken into 
consideration. Even from a financial perspective, because that’s not as big of a 
concern and someone else can deal with that. “I’ll be retired by then,” or 
whatever. 
 
Accordingly, motives associated strongly with sustainability may be more or less 
effective when trying to get people to endorse organizational change. Similarly, 
motivations loosely associated with sustainability can be effective for the purposes of 
influencing others or fostering collaboration, but they might limit the scope and depth of 
that change. There is an inherent tension, then, in balancing (1) collaborative partnerships  
that play to divergent motivations and enhance partners’ sense of standing with (2) the 
desire to persuade people that some motivations are more suitable in the pursuit of 
sustainability, thus enhancing the influence of certain voices and perspectives. 
Summary. As a final example of the dialectic of motivation, consider this 
interviewee’s claims about collaborating with academic officials on building efficiency 
projects: 
That whole discussion or conversation is always a challenging one because our 
culture, meaning what you’ll find typically at universities and colleges, tends to 
be one of hoarders. A dean or somebody who is responsible for space will capture 
space, will want to control it for their uses—be it for programmatic features, for 
educational or instruction features, for research, etc.—because there is no 
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disincentive to hoard. If you have it then you have more flexibility for whatever 
your programmatic needs are. As is the case in many universities, there’s all these 
hoarders and the like who equate being able to have more space as [status] and 
power. It changes and it varies at all universities, I’m sure, but by and large it’s 
very inefficient. So, to the extent that we apply our influence and advice to those 
that have the power to drive, instruct, and direct the use of space on our campus, 
we try to do that in a proactive, supportive, business, logical [manner]. 
Administrators who do value our judgment, our credible judgment, [… we can] 
hope [that they] make the best decision for the University. 
 
This person creatively straddles the space between persuasion and collaboration—
between cultivating standing and influence, if you will. He does promote “applying our 
influence” to change academic officials’ interpretation of excess space from “power” to 
“inefficiency.” At the same time, he validates the officials’ “power to drive, instruct, and 
direct the use of space” and casts sustainability advocates as people with “advice” and 
“credible judgment.” Advice and judgment are rendered in a “proactive, supportive, 
business, logical [manner],” which are terms I regularly heard associated with 
collaboration at IWU. Thus, he reframes the dialectic by casting the OS in a dual role, as 
both persuaders applying influence and partners providing advice in collaboration with 
respected others. Managing these choices and their consequences is the heart of the 
dialectic of motivation. 
 
Summary of the Dialectics of Voice Organizing 
 My argument is that organizing voice on environmental matters is a dialectical 
process. I proposed that sustainability officers in this case engaged three persistent 
tensions in order to build or manage collective voice: the dialectics of facilitation, 
leadership, and motivation. Using participants’ language, I proposed that (1) the dialectic 
of facilitation involved the interplay of access and standing, (2) the dialectic of leadership 
involved the cultivation of both access and influence, and (3) the dialectic of motivation 
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involved balancing the development of standing and influence. I argue that enhancing the 
access, standing, and influence of collectives can be accomplished through careful, 
diligent engagement with these dialectics. Scholars of organization studies have shown 
that collective voices are never settled; they are inherently political, always negotiated, 
and influenced by context. I offer the DVO to clarify the challenges sustainability officers 
will likely confront in their work, rather than as an overly general and inflexible 
prescription for voice organizing. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 I close this chapter by considering different ways for framing the characteristics 
of voice and voice organizing addressed in this chapter. I have defined collective voice as 
(1) the continuous processes engaged by people (2) using discourse and texts in order to 
(3) constitute and maintain collective communication patterns (4) with ethical, emotional, 
or identity-related dimensions (5) related to access, standing, and influence in a variety of 
situations. In addition, I have described three dialectics that voice organizers might 
confront in their attempt to realize the TOV. It is worth reflecting on the content of this 
chapter through three different frames: (1) voice as inclusive and/or expansive, (2) voice 
as strategic and/or tactical, and (3) voice as ambiguous and/or flexible. These different 
approaches to voice hint at different ways in which sustainability officers can respond to 
the dialectics of voice organizing. 
 
Voice as Inclusive and/or Expansive 
 The first frame encourages us to think of collective voice as something 
increasingly comprehensive or all encompassing. From this perspective, we might think 
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of a voice as a common point of reference or as holistic representations and images of 
organizations—their “social presence,” to use Cheney and McMillan’s (1990, p. 100) 
term. Working from this frame, organizers might attempt to forge an environmental voice 
that is as broad as possible—a kind of “umbrella” for many different people. A voice’s 
legitimacy might then be judged according to whether it appropriately represents the 
diversity and range of the collective. The inclusive/expansive frame for voice has a 
democratic spirit.7 
 However, the inclusive/expansive frame for voice might also reflect managerialist 
desire for evermore control over organizational processes and personnel. An attempt to 
build collective voice that “covers everyone” could be thought of as a kind of 
communication “program […] enacted by managers on employees, thus always 
reaffirming the controlling, parental position and, as we would expect, extending 
managerial interests” (Deetz, 1995, p. 4, emphasis in original). People might be 
encouraged (implicitly or explicitly), even forced, to “toe the company line” or “walk the 
organization’s talk” by supervisors and peers, deepening the injustice of such a collective 
voice (see Barker, 1993). In any case, we should acknowledge the democratic ethos of 
this first frame but recognize its limitations and possible pitfalls. After all, 
“communication is not everything to the organization and voice is not everything to the 
worker” (Cheney & Cloud, 2006, p. 504). 
 
Voice as Strategic and/or Tactical 
We may also think about building a collective voice as the cultivation of “a 
strategically designed persona” (Cheney, Christensen, Conrad & Lair, 2004, p. 91). This 
second frame for voice orients us to the rhetorical and audience-centered nature of 
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meaningful participation and representation in organizational issues. Invoking “a voice” 
may be a persuasive technique more than it is an authentic representation of one’s 
identity or identification with a collective. Indeed, people invent subjectivities in rhetoric, 
beyond merely speaking through them (Charland, 1987).8 
Of course, the risk of a strategic/tactical approach to voice is that the person 
presuming to speak for or with any given “voice” may appear insincere, inauthentic, or 
manipulative. The person embodying the voice might be perceived to be “issue selling” 
(Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, & Lawrence, 2001), meaning that they talk about an issue in a 
certain way primarily to gain the attention of powerful people, or “issue crafting” 
(Sonenshein, 2006), meaning that they emphasize popular justifications for an issue or 
course of action in their communication while deemphasizing their (different) personal 
feelings and motivations. In some contexts, communication partners may think that such 
strategic communication is completely appropriate; in others, they may believe it to be an 
ethical transgression. Regardless, we can frame “voice” as a tactically designed identity 
or persuasive symbolic construction. 
 
Voice as Ambiguous and/or Flexible 
 Third and finally, we can frame voice as an ambiguous and shifting “figure” with 
an unclear relationship to the people that are its “ground.” That is, to speak of anything as 
an organized voice gives it a sense of materiality and physicality that obscures the fact 
that it is largely symbolic (Christensen, Morsing, & Cheney, 2008; Deetz, Tracy, & 
Simpson, 2000). Specific people embody a collective voice and are superseded by it. 
Thus, it can be useful to frame the concept of voice as malleable and vague.9  
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There are a number of well-known concepts and arguments in organization 
studies that adopt this third frame. Organization scholars have described organizations as 
polyphonic collectives (Hazen, 1993), flexible bodies (Christensen, Morsing, & Cheney, 
2008), as organized dissonance (Ashcraft, 2001).  Various scholars have explored the 
way in which ambiguity and “loose” relationships affect organizing processes (see, e.g., 
Eisenberg, 1984, 1990; Granovetter, 1973; Orton & Weick, 1990). An important lesson 
of this assorted body of work is that voice is mutable and indefinite, at once something 
embodied by real people and something “more” (see Watts, 2001). 
 
Summary 
  In this chapter, I have attempted to put organizational communication and 
environmental communication perspectives on voice into conversation. I have done so by 
extending Senecah’s (2004) environmental communication theory of the TOV so that it is 
responsive to perspectives on voice from organization studies. Specifically, I have argued 
that people charged with organizing collective voices on environmental issues will 
confront at least three dialectical tensions. When voice organizers navigate the dialectics 
of facilitation, leadership, and motivation, they have opportunities to moderate and 
enhance persons’ access, standing, and influence. I have pointed out, however, that we 
might frame any collective voice that results in at least three ways: as inclusive and/or 
expansive, as strategic and/or tactical, and as ambiguous and/or flexible.  
In the end, I offer readers suggestions for thinking about the difficult and 
discontinuous process that most sustainability officers (and other intraorganizational 
campaigners) will face, rather than prescriptions for action. Still, I believe that the voice 
concept and DVO are useful for scholars and practitioners. As Hirschman (1970) puts it: 
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“In a whole gamut of human institutions, from the state to the family, voice, however 





1 This chapter approaches the subject of lay theorizing in a somewhat different way than 
Chapters 6 or 8. I do explain why the elements of the trinity of voice can be treated as 
interpretive repertoires rather than abilities or benchmarks. Nevertheless, this chapter 
involves etic accounts and theoretically driven analysis to a greater extent than the other 
chapters. Here, I emphasize Craig’s (1999) description of the role of communication 
scholarship as “transforming commonplaces of practical metadiscourse [i.e., lay theories 
of communication …] into theoretical axioms or empirical hypotheses” (p. 128, 
emphasis mine). As I explain elsewhere in this chapter, the dialectics I have discussed in 
this chapter resulted from my attempt to give the range of performances and utterances 
at play in the research site some clarity and an axiomatic structure. This analysis chapter 
involved a greater degree of “transformation” than the others. 
 
2 I should note that a numbers of scholars have argued that organizations and people 
both “speak,” but differently (see e.g., Cheney, 1992; Crable, 1990). Also see Chapter 4 
for my discussion of organizations as “discursively constructed” or “symbolically 
constructed.” Finally, I should note that voice of any entity exists in the interplay of 
texts and embodied performance over time (Christensen, Morsing, & Cheney, 2008; 
Watts, 2001). Though the metaphor of voice suggests a speaking subject (Putnam & 




 It is important to note that these sources all discuss cases of social movement 
organizing. The concept of voice is relevant to scholarship dealing with rhetoric, 
especially social movement/social protest rhetoric. This chapter is meant to connect 
organizational and environmental communication scholarship, so I will opt to point 
readers to Watts’ (2001) review for rhetorical perspectives on voice, in which he notes 
that “there are more than a hundred examples of work done over the last 15 years that 
refer explicitly or implicitly to rhetoric’s capacity to give ‘voice’ to the other” (p. 193). 
 
4
 I should comment upon how the model ought to be “read.” This model is the result of 
interpretation of a case of environmental communication organizing. I constructed the 
model by, first, making sense of patterns in the way participants talked about 
communication and organizing. As I began to sort codes for their metacommunication 
and refine my interpretations, I consulted existing theory. I found that Senecah’s (2004) 
theory of the TOV offered a compelling but incomplete account of the data. I then 
engaged in an iterative process of comparing and fusing Senecah’s TOV with my 
observations about the dialectical tensions facing the employees of the IWU Office of 
Sustainability. The result are the dialectics of voice (DVO), which incorporate and 
expands upon Senecah’s conception of voice. As a model, my depiction of the DVO and 
TOV should be thought of as an ideal type rather than a representation of an actual thing 
or event. As Thagard (1984) points out, 
 
Models […] are like theories in being definitions of a kind of system, and so are 
in themselves neither true nor false. However, […] we expect models to include 
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in the definition of a kind of system features which we would not attribute to real 
systems. (p. 80)  
 
Models tidy up reality, so to speak. It is my hope that this model will clarify 
communication processes and tensions that are usually felt but mysterious for 
sustainability officers. That said, the specificity and stability suggested by the model 
should not be taken as a feature of the actual contexts and processes I studied. This 
model is an interpretation based upon my deep involvement in one case; the model will 
likely require adaptation and revision in different contexts. 
 
5
 Let me be clear: Participants in this study used connecting to describe personal, 
individualized opportunities for access and publicizing to describe mass 
communication/dissemination of information to general, heterogeneous audiences. Both 
activities can enhance stakeholders’ sense of access. 
 
6
 As I discussed in Chapter 6, this is one reason that participants in this study sometimes 




 This first frame for voice is exemplified by the metaphors of IWU’s Office of 
Sustainability as a “centralized hub” for activity and a “clearinghouse” for information. 
(These metaphors were pervasive in the data I collected and popular with participants in 
my study.) When participants characterized the OS in this way, they spoke of the 
organization as if it were a large and open space in which people buzzed about, 
fortuitously encountering one another and useful facts. The implicit message was that 
“anyone” could go to the OS in search of whatever they needed. Sustainability seemingly 
covers “everything,” so the Office would strive to be of service to “everyone” as best as 
they could. And so, one constant goal associated with the hub and clearinghouse 
metaphors was to extend the reach and enlarge the expertise of the Office.  
 
8
 For example, OS staff members would occasionally tell administrators that they were 
“speaking for” the “sustainability movement” on campus. They were appropriate 
spokespersons to give voice to this group, they said, because members of the Office “sat 
down with as many people as possible,” “have contacts across campus,” “are thinking 
about the campus as a system,” and so on. Conversely, OS staff members would 
sometimes claim that the Office was merely “one part” of the environmental voice of 
IWU initiated by, cultivated by, and responsive to students (or other stakeholder, as 
dictated by the situation). Many times, I sat in on conversations where the Office’s 
partners insisted that “it’s all about students” and that “education is our number-one 
mission” because “we are an institution of higher education, in the end.” In this way, 
who/what is the center, face, or essential character of a voice can be adapted to the 
audience and situation. 
 
9 Recall, for example, the fact that IWU’s administrators claim to “put students first” and 
highly value “student leadership.” Accordingly, sustainability advocates at the university 
would publicly credit students for their role in collaborative projects, encourage students 
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to speak at public events, and would take measures to make sure that they were 
“receptive/listening to” students. At the same time, however, the President remarked 
during several different meetings that he couldn’t lead the push for sustainability, “You 
have to ‘make’ me do it.” On some occasions, he singled out the fact that “the students” 
have to “want” IWU to prioritize sustainability. (These were meant to be invitations 
rather than threats.) Still, he was calling for a kind of “voice for sustainability” that many 
participants in this study thought had been proven by the successful campaign for a 
formal Office of Sustainability. The OS staff and I would later ask one another, “What, 
exactly, does the President want? Do we actually have some kind of ‘critical mass’ or 
‘unified voice’ on the issues championed by the OS?” My point is that the voice(s) 







 In this chapter, I address study participants’ claims about communicating ethics. 
As I discussed in Chapter 3 and elsewhere in this dissertation, sustainability is a value-
relevant concept. Sustainability discourse may, but does not necessarily, feature 
messages about moral and immoral behavior, conceptions of truth and what is good for 
society, as well as descriptions of beauty and ugliness. People can and often do address 
questions about how people might live rightly, justly, and/or virtuously in the world 
when talking about sustainability. In this way, sustainability discourse is relevant to 
ethics. 
 As I refined this study’s focus on lay theories of communication, I centered on 
the problem of communicating ethics.1 During participant observation, I became aware 
that participants struggled with the place of ethics in communication about and advocacy 
for sustainability. In order to explore this further, I asked interviewees some variation on 
the question, “To what extent, if at all, should ethics feature in messages about 
sustainability from the Office of Sustainability?” The findings in this chapter derive 
principally from responses to that interview question and my field notes.  
 The central argument of this chapter is this: Participants’ lay theories limit the 
role or diminish the significance of ethics in advocacy for sustainability. Put simply, 
participants are reluctant to express strong ethical positions on sustainability, especially 
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in explicit terms. They talk as if sustainability advocacy is (potentially) undermined or 
complicated by discussion of ethics. Thus, they argue for the minimization or 
compartmentalization of talk about ethics in sustainability-related communication. 
Ultimately, I show how participants’ hesitancy about communicating ethics may blind 
them to the ethical problems involved with the Office of Sustainability’s (OS) own 
sustainability advocacy.  
 This chapter has four remaining major sections. In the first section, I discuss the 
possible connections between sustainability and ethics, and I also explain further what I 
mean by the limitation of ethics in sustainability-related communication. In the second 
major section, I describe three interpretive repertoires (IRs) associated with participants’ 
reluctance to foreground ethics: (1) the individual repertoire, (2) the conflict repertoire, 
and (3) the context repertoire. In the third section, I describe three broader patterns in 
participants’ metacommunication that help to explain participants’ concern about 
communicating ethics: (1) belief that communication ought to unify rather than divide, 
(2) a desire to be seen as reasonable, and (3) a preference for unobtrusive control or 
influence. In the closing section, I argue that these patterns may limit IWU sustainability 
advocates’ ability to reflect critically on the ethics of their own choices regarding 
communication and persuasion.  
 
Limiting Ethics: Defining Versus Advocating for Sustainability  
Definitions of sustainability often contain explicit references to ethics. Most all 
definitions of the concept are associated with ethics, in that the reasons people give in 
support of sustainability often draw upon moral principles (e.g., fairness, kindness, 
temperance, justice, etc.). In fact, the most frequently cited definition of sustainability, 
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from the United Nations World Commission on Economic Development’s (1987) Our 
Common Future, stresses intergenerational ethics. According to the report, sustainable 
development “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (United Nations, 1987, p. 43).2 
Participants in this study echoed that and other ethical standards when defining 
sustainability explicitly during interviews. For example, one person told me, “The core 
idea is thinking of future generations. Leave the Earth in better shape than you found it, 
which you can’t do because we have to consume things to live, but you can have that as 
your goal and be sensitive.” Many interviewees characterized such goal-oriented 
behavior and sensitivity as “taking responsibility” or “being responsible.” Some 
interviewees used more emotionally evocative language when defining sustainability. 
Take, for instance, the following statement defining sustainability in terms of justice, 
emotional connection, and communication: 
In the human context, sustainability is also predicated on a fairly infinite sense of 
compassion and love. It’s very important to recognize that economies are just 
ways that people live their lives and interact with nature. So, a sustainable 
economy is one in which resources are justly distributed [and] we don't in any 
way exhaust a limited resource. We regenerate it. Members of our own species 
are fed well [and] they have the opportunity to become contributing members in 
society. We also interact appropriately with all other organisms, as well. […] 
There’s a really strong element of justice; there are elements of cooperation [and] 
of collaboration. 
 
For participants in this study, sustainability is a concept with rich, complex, and varied 
connections to ethics. Despite that, they were overwhelmingly cautious or concerned 




 I argue that participants limit or diminish ethics in their theories about advocacy 
for sustainability. They were reluctant to highlight ethics and ethicality as part of 
sustainability’s significance and range of meaning, especially when dealing with people 
who were unenthusiastic about sustainability. This pattern allowed them to define 
sustainability in ethical terms while treating ethics as a variable or dimension that can be 
set apart from sustainability as needed. Thus, participants retained a sense of 
righteousness about their advocacy while minimizing or obscuring the significance of 
ethics in their communication with others. 
 Before I move on to a detailed analysis of this case, let me provide one example 
of participants’ hesitancy regarding the communication of ethics. This exchange took 
place in an interview with a member of the Office’s Steering Committee. 
Interviewee: Maybe it’s because of my ethical viewpoint, but sustainability [or] 
being sustainable is part of being ethical. So that’s why I see it as being so high 
[meaning a significant element of or priority for the Office’s work]. 
 
Interviewer: Should ethical appeals feature prominently in the Office of 
Sustainability staff members’ interactions with others? Should it have to do with 
things being the right thing to do or the right way to live? 
 
Interviewee: See, then you get into tricky morality issues, I think. Who’s to tell 
me that my way of living is more [or less ethical]. And that’s pretty tricky because 
you don’t want anybody telling you that your morals are inconsistent with theirs 
and, therefore, wrong. I mean, these are all tricky issues. 
 
While he clearly defines sustainability in ethical terms and believes ethics should be a 
priority for the OS, the interviewee equivocates when I ask him about the communication 
of ethics. He is less certain about messages and interactions than he is with logics or 
philosophies connecting sustainability and ethics. Communication about ethics deals with 
matters of right and wrong, what is desirable or undesirable, and so on; participants 
regularly treat this as a problem that is tricky, dangerous, or that requires significant care 
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and caution. Surprisingly, since they routinely define sustainability in terms of ethics, 
participants overwhelmingly expressed reluctance or objection to the communication of 
ethics in messages about sustainability. 
 
Repertoires Limiting Ethics in Sustainability Advocacy 
Participants made sense of this incongruity with three IRs.3 The first I have named 
the individual repertoire; what epitomizes this repertoire is the notion that ethics are a 
“personal choice” and therefore off-limits to persuasion. Second is the conflict repertoire, 
which is anchored by the assumption that discussion of ethics causes unnecessary 
discord. The context repertoire is third. This IR can be summed up by the assertions that 
there is a time and place for discussion of ethics and that sustainability advocates should 
be careful not to invoke or connote ethical issues when/where they are not already 
welcome. 
 
The Individual Repertoire: “Ethics Are Personal” 
 The individual repertoire treats ethics as a so-called “personal choice.” This 
colloquialism implies that (1) persons who have considered all relevant factors and 
information (2) should be allowed to choose in an environment relatively free from 
influence. Additionally, the expression “personal choice” is often expressed in a way 
that implies persons have the right to others’ “respect” of their choice. Usually, this is a 
rhetorical device for legitimizing the choice or chooser, and it tends to shut down further 
discussion about people’s ethical decision making. 
 In some cases, the features of the individual repertoire were unmistakable in 
interviewee’s definitions of sustainability: “I guess [sustainability] would be a call to 
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personal responsibility and personal goal, a personal ethical choice.” In other cases, 
participants reinforced the notion that ethics are located primarily at the level of the 
individual with less certainty. Karen Adams talked to me about taking up “an ethic of 
responsibility” and being “an agent of change”: 
I don’t know whether or not this is a subjective or objective point. I don’t know if 
it definitely should be one way or another. I can’t say that. […] It depends upon 
your perspective. I, as an individual, believe for myself that I have an ethical 
responsibility, but I don’t think you have to have this notion of an ethical 
responsibility to change. […] What I feel individually isn’t necessarily what I 
think applies to everyone else, and I don’t think you have to have any sort of 
understanding of any ethic to be motivated, to make a difference. 
 
As she puts it, ethics are left up to individuals. Moreover, individual’s sense of ethics 
“aren’t necessarily what I think applies to everyone else.” 
 Facilitating discussions was “difficult” for one employee of the OS because 
sustainability is “really personal.” When I asked for an explanation, he responded: 
Well, [it is connected to] people’s ethics about how to live. You know: What’s the 
best way to live a life? What brings happiness? What are our needs? What is 
harm? Those kind of questions [come up] when you […] define sustainability in 
the first place. 
 
Others shared the perspective (or assumption) that conversations closely associating 
sustainability with ethics are troublesome, since ethics are particular to individuals. As 
one interviewee told me, “It gets complicated with ethics because people see it very 
differently.” In light of these perceived complications and dangers of communicating 
ethics, a different interviewee said he would “keep it really simple,” if ethics were to 
figure at all into advocacy for sustainability. He said: “I think a sort of enlightened self-
interest is part of all of this. But, where you draw the line is a bit tricky. But [I still 
define ethics as] doing something which helps somebody else, if you like, and doesn’t 
obviously reward you.” His approach to this problem is interesting. On one hand, his 
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definition of ethics involves other-directed, relatively selfless behavior. Nevertheless, he 
couches this in terms of “enlightened self-interest.” Since “where you draw the line” 
between flatly self-serving and ethical behavior is difficult to do, he advocates “keeping 
it simple”—by which he means minimizing the discussion of ethics in advocacy for 
sustainability. 
 It should be apparent from the examples above that claims made in the individual 
repertoire do not necessarily treat ethics as an exclusively personal matter. Rather, this 
IR frames sustainability-related ethics mostly in terms of individuals’ dispositions, 
actions, and beliefs. Very often, the supposed personal nature of ethics meant that 
participants avoided associating sustainability with ethics in the first place. The other 
two IRs demonstrate the limitation of ethics in sustainability advocacy even more 
clearly. 
 
The Conflict Repertoire: “Ethics Are Divisive” 
 The second repertoire treats ethics as something that invites disharmony into 
otherwise amiable, stable, or functional organizational relationships. Based upon that 
assessment, people employing the conflict repertoire usually suggest that 
communication about ethics undermines the goal of sustainable organizing. Take, for 
example, one interviewee’s recollection of the ceremony at which IWU’s President 
signed the Association of American College and University Presidents’ Climate 
Commitment: 
We went to that press conference and, you know, the ethical arguments are really 
resounding with me. But then, reading some of the letters to the editor, it just 
seems like people really take offense at that. And so, to me, maybe we do things 
in more subtle ways. Maybe we don’t throw this ethical stuff out [there] because 




This interviewee identified as an environmentalist and was appreciative of the 
President’s ethical appeals. Notice, though, how she justifies being “more subtle” by not 
highlighting “ethical stuff.” We ought to minimize appeals to ethics, she says, because 
some people do not believe the facts or data associated with climate change. At other 
points in the interview, she did promote “education” on factual elements of sustainability 
issues. Regardless, here she proposes mollifying naysayers who have factual concerns by 
playing down ethics. 
 While this may be logically inconsistent, it does demonstrate the degree to which 
some people expressed concern about ethics’ volatility and divisiveness. As I will 
demonstrate more thoroughly later on, one interviewee told me that associating 
sustainability with ethics could be “dangerous” and “inflammatory.” Given that she was 
concerned about some kind of conflagration, she wondered aloud about how the OS and 
its partners might talk about sustainability in a way that “doesn’t set people’s hair on 
fire.” Other participants told me that ethically-loaded sustainability talk can “create 
enemies” and amounts to “stepping on toes.” 
 According to the logic of this repertoire, deemphasizing explicit verbalization 
and emphasizing nonverbal social cues can help sustainability promoters avoid the 
conflict supposedly inherent in conversations about ethics. This interviewee made such a 
claim using the example of promoting alternative transportation: 
[Ethics is] part of the communication because each group of people will have 
different motivations to do something. But it can’t be the only thing, especially in 
situations where there is a conflict […] I mean there’s no way you’re going to tell 
them that cannot drive, [that] they should not drive because it’s not the right thing 
to do. And if they keep seeing everyone else they know do that [i.e., seeking 
alternatives to single-person automobile use], they would just stop because they 




If conflict is present or possible, ethics cannot “be the only thing.” She decries “telling” 
people not to drive and advocates making it more likely that they will “see everyone else 
they know” selecting alternatives to driving a personal vehicle. Her slide from telling to 
seeing is emblematic of participants’ tendency to denigrate straightforward verbal 
communication and endorse unobtrusive influence. In this instance, her preference for 
indirect, nonverbal communication stems from the theory that talk about ethics generates 
or exacerbates conflict. 
 
The Context Repertoire: “Ethics Are Appropriate for  
Specific Situations and Audiences” 
 The last repertoire treats the communication of ethics as something appropriate 
only in certain contexts. We could think about this as rhetorical sensitivity or as the 
compartmentalization of ethics (see Cheney, Lair, Ritz, & Kendall, 2010, p. 42). In any 
case, the context repertoire treats ethics as something appropriate to a limited number or 
range of situations. The consequence of such claims is that sustainability advocates 
curtail ethics, which might otherwise be relevant to a great variety of conversations and 
issues. 
 Paul Abbey told me that he often avoids speaking about the connections between 
ethics and sustainability during meetings with IWU’s managers and administrators. It is 
easy for them to feel “drowned by just the sheer weight” of the technical problems 
associated with sustainability-related change, he said. Insisting on certain definitions of 
sustainability, especially those related to the concept’s ethical dimensions, may “pop the 
balloon.” Even still, notice how Abbey wrestles with whether or not the OS is an 
organization primarily concerned ethics, in the first place: 
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We kind of have this interesting balance. We’re not an academic unit. We’re 
trying to make a difference and start to adopt strategies to test and to work out on 
the campus. We want to keep that in mind. I think it’s just an awareness that we 
don’t always step back [and do broad ethical reflection]. I think the 
administration and I think some staff get a little impatient, especially when 
faculty and students start… I’m sure you’ve been in meetings where you’ve seen 
rolled eyes. The fastest way to kill a discussion is for somebody to ask for a 
definition of sustainability before we start the discussion. 
 
Calling it an “interesting balance,” the Director is saying that (1) it is not necessarily the 
primary or proper function of the OS to initiate ethical discussions about sustainability 
and (2) that ongoing discussions about the basic dimensions or definitions of 
sustainability may undermine the ability of the Office to collaborate with IWU 
employees and administrators.  
 Usually, participants framed this as a kind of accommodation of or strategic 
response to different audiences. According to the logic of the context repertoire, 
“sustainability work […] is values-based [… and] personal,” but many people “don’t 
have the patience to get deep,” as one interviewee put it. If many people “don’t want to 
have to discuss what’s right,” another interviewee wondered, “how do we have the 
discussion when it’s appropriate?” Drawing on the work of Karl Weick (1979, 1995a), 
we can anticipate that people arrive at these questions and their answers retrospectively. 
That is, they will make sense of whether or not one context is appropriate for talk about 
sustainability’s ethical dimensions after the fact, looking backward in order to project 
forward. This is evident in the following interview excerpt from a single two-minute 
period. Notice how the President’s Sustainability Advisory Board (PSAB) member 
quoted below slides from distinctions based upon institutions and professions to 
distinctions based upon individual qualities: 
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Not everybody sees [sustainability] that as an ethical choice or a choice where 
ethics enters into the decision making process. So, certainly environmental 
justice and ethical behavior are ways that sustainability is brought to the 
forefront in churches. When you’re in a group of economists, I don’t know. 
Maybe it’s the bottom line, it’s the economic impact of the choices. I’m reading 
Carbon Detox, Marshall’s [2007] book, and in it he says, “All that matters is the 
‘carbon bottom line.’ If it doesn’t reduce carbon then don’t do it. If it increases 
carbon don’t do it.” […] It’s not because it’s ethical. It’s not because it’s going to 
improve the economy. It should improve [the] “carbon bottom line.” So does 
[an] ethical [frame] work for everybody? I suppose it doesn’t. It matters who 
you’re talking to and it matters what works for you. I’m not going to change my 
behavior if I don’t believe that it’s a problem. For me, its an ethical problem—
environmental justice and a livable future: that’s an ethical issue from my 
perspective. An ethical issue will serve as a driver for me, a reason for me to 
change my behavior, my habits. And I have to come, myself, from a position of 
integrity because I know everything about me. And if I’m not true to myself in 
this it’s hard for me to act in concurrence with anything that I don’t believe. 
 
Another interviewee also invoked both professional and personal distinctions when 
saying that ethics needed to be context appropriate. Describing the differences between 
engineers and education professionals, she claimed, “[We have] two different worlds 
here.” She said that the OS needs to be “thinking of how to get people to really endorse 
these values and create them in a way that people can own them—so they’re broad 
enough but they’re also not going to shut people down.” 
 This logical inconsistency in the context repertoire is, perhaps, one of the most 
significant reasons that it promotes the limitation of ethics: if ethics is communicated at 
all, it should be cast broadly “so that it would resonate with as many people across 
campus as possible” but in a way that individuals “own” the values associated with 
sustainability. These seeming incompatible demands provide little guidance or 
encouragement about how to articulate the intersections of ethics and sustainability. As a 
result, the participants in this study affirm the significance of ethics to one another but 
remain hesitant to feature ethics in their communication about sustainability to people 
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outside their network of advocates. Paul Abbey’s reflection on this dilemma captures the 
Office’s response nicely: 
It’s probably not our place to address [sustainability-related ethics] or at least to 
try and get other people to address it. But, I still firmly believe it has a place. I’m 
just not comfortable yet knowing where, how, when. I think we’ll sort of muddle 




 I have provided evidence of three repertoires used by participants in this study to 
limit, minimize, marginalize, or otherwise diminish ethics-related messages in 
communication about sustainability at IWU. In Chapter 4, I argued that people may 
invoke multiple IRs in a single statement. Above, I treated each of the repertoires 
separately. The following excerpt from an interview with a fundraising officer at IWU 
contains invocations of all three repertories: individual, conflict, and context. 
Interviewee: I think it’s a really tough question. I guess [sustainability advocacy] 
would be a call to personal responsibility and personal goal, a personal ethical 
choice. But, even saying that viewing the choice as being an ethical choice one 
way or another—there’s a part of that that feels kind of dangerous to me, because 
[it seems to be] “preaching” and, “Who are you to tell me what to do?” […] In my 
mind, everything about it is that it’s an ethics choice […] 
 
Interviewer: When you say it’s “dangerous,” [do] you mean both that it might be 
ineffective and that it’s… 
 
Interviewee: Worse than ineffective. I don’t think “ineffective” is nearly [as good 
a way to describe it] as dangerous as [is] “inflammatory.” […] I mean there’s 
business ethics things like, “Don’t ever embezzle and don’t abuse people and 
blah, blah, blah.”  You know what I mean?  I think there’s some straight forward 
messaging but sustainability is a really, it’s all about ethics but how do you, how 
do you, how do you get that messaging across without making it feel like you’re 
preaching to somebody who doesn’t want to be preached to? 
 
Interviewer:  Any ideas? 
 
Interviewee:  […] I think it goes back to finding something that’s emotionally 
resonant for the people you’re talking to, the audience. […] So, what do you tie to 
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the ethics message that gets, that doesn’t set people’s hair on fire? […] I’m sure 
there’s a lot of people whose hair would be on fire about a message around 
sustainability who are flying down to Chile or to Haiti to help with earthquake 
victims. It’s not to say that people who aren’t bought into sustainability as being a 
critical issue aren’t [moral or ethical]. 
 
The interviewee connects with the individual repertoire when describing sustainability in 
terms of “personal responsibility” and “personal ethical choice.” She then invokes the 
conflict repertoire in her explanation that “calls to” sustainability may be “dangerous” 
and “inflammatory.” Her propositions for avoiding such a conflagration draw upon the 
third and final repertoire, the context repertoire: base messages about sustainability on 
“something that’s emotionally resonant for […] the audience” and “that doesn’t set 
people’s hair on fire.” 
 Taken together, these repertoires demonstrate the limitation or diminution of 
ethics when communicating sustainability. Participants’ lay theories of sustainability 
advocacy rather consistently suggest that ethics ought to feature minimally if at all in 
messages about sustainability. Participants are reluctant to associate sustainability with 
ethics and ethicality when engaging in advocacy. Why? Because ethics are personal and 
unique to individuals, and those individuals have a right to be autonomous or make up 
their own mind, so to speak; because talk about ethics stirs the pot (to use a colloquial 
metaphor) and invites conflict where it might not otherwise exist; and because ethics 
some kinds and groups of people are more amenable to ethical appeals than others. 
 
Three Broader Themes in Participants’ Metacommunication 
I would like to put the three IRs described above in context. Three patterns 
regarding sustainability organizing at IWU help explain participants’ hesitancy with 
regard to ethics and sustainability: (1) unification, (2) reasonableness, and (3) 
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unobtrusive control. Following grounded theory methodology, I derived these three 
themes from field notes and interview transcripts. Taken together, these three patterns 




 Over my time as a participant observer with the Office, participants increasingly 
stressed unification or transcendent purpose in the pursuit of sustainability. There are 
two senses of unification that I would like to discuss. One has more to do with technical 
or structural communication; the other has more to do with conflict and emotionality in 
communication. 
Often, people spoke about unification in technical terms as an act of system 
integration. Sustainability, the reasoning goes, is possible only if an organization’s 
members “see the whole picture.” One interviewee from the OS Steering Committee told 
me, “The main challenge, in my mind, [is] this atmosphere is siloing.”4 Very frequently, 
OS staff and partners point to “bureaucratic silos” or people “fighting in their own little 
silo” as a principal obstacle to university-wide sustainability.  
There are two claims implicit in this kind of talk. First, unsustainable activity 
stems from people not having necessary information. That information might be “all the 
facts,” evidence of the consequences of their actions and decisions, or a sense of how 
IWU operates as a complex whole. Second, the university would be more sustainable if 
viewed or designed more as an integrated, holistic system and/or less as a highly 
diversified organization managed at midlevel. One interviewee told me that the ultimate 
objective of the OS was to enable every member of IWU to “find anything and anyone” 
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related to sustainability. At a staff retreat in the summer of 2008, Robin Carson pointed 
out that the unified systems approach to sustainability and organizations can make work 
exasperating and exhausting for sustainability officers. Sustainability can be “the theory 
of everything,” she said, given its abstractness and how applicable it is to a variety of 
situations. Despite that concern, participants in this study persistently decried “siloing” 
and “territorial thinking.” Moreover, as I showed in Chapter 6, they praised advocacy 
that amounted to “sharing data and showing information.” Usually, those data were used 
in the interest of representing IWU as a whole composed of interdependent parts—or, in 
more colloquial terms, systems thinking and seeing the big picture. So, sustainability 
advocates at IWU often spoke of unification as a kind of technical achievement. 
Participants worked to expand and intensify interactions between units within IWU. 
Furthermore, the participants wanted to make sustainability the master frame for those 
interactions and the information/knowledge they produced.  
The second implicit claim about bureaucracy and systems thinkings was 
pervasive at IWU from the spring of 2008 onward. Remember that the Office was given 
probationary status for its first year, from summer 2007 to summer 2008. Administrators 
announced that the OS was to be a “permanent feature of the university” at an Earth Day 
press conference in 2008. Up to that point, viral metaphors were common in OS 
employees’ metacommunication. In a submission to a regional conference, they leaned 
heavily on Malcolm Gladwell’s (2000) social epidemics metaphor. This view of social 
change stresses its rapid, somewhat unpredictable occurrence once some tipping point is 
reached.5 Indeed, Snyder, Carson, and Valmer talked about their introductions to other 
operational units in IWU as “going around and infecting all these little spots” in the 
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university. Ultimately, however, sustainability officers at IWU came to stress social 
unification or harmonization in the pursuit of sustainability. After spring 2008, the push 
for sustainability was usually said to either (1) require that people transcend differences 
and potential conflicts or (2) result in a more unified and uplifted IWU. At this point, 
Office staff began to worry more frequently about “stepping on other people’s toes.” For 
example, take this interview statement from a consultant working with IWU: 
One of the biggest things that we’re dealing with [… is] a bureaucratic institution 
and tailoring the message to somehow be functional within this bureaucracy and 
not step on toes. I think, when you’re dealing with IWU—you know, this long 
established institution—things have always been done like this, and you can 
somehow appeal to the institution and the way that it’s structured in a way that 
you’re not going to, um, piss anyone off. It’s the way, I think, the persuasion part 
of it comes in.  
 
Persuasion “comes in” when advocates use communication to “be functional within this 
bureaucracy,” to “not step on toes,” and to “not piss anyone off.” The stress on unity and 
harmony is clear. This is how the consultant imagined the Office’s Director advocating 
sustainability to his superiors: “‘These things are important and we need to consider 
this,’ and I guess sort of tailor it to that bureaucratic structure.” Notice the breadth and 
indeterminacy of her statement. Rather than promoting anything specific, the statement 
merely points out something’s significance for discussion. The take-away message, if 
you will, is that sustainability advocates should not aggravate others or upset the 
organization’s functioning too much, especially not by telling others what to do. “The 
bureaucracy,” as study participants’ sometimes used the term, frequently stood in for 
“just the way things are going to have to be” and what is “off limits” for change.  
I want to emphasize that this second sense of unification is often expressed in an 
emotional or moral tone. The quotation below is an excerpt from a message that Lillian 
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Valmer sent to an OS email list and an excellent example of the second meaning of 
unification for sustainability advocates IWU. Valmer had by this time left IWU and the 
Office to pursue graduate education, but she continued to receive messages relevant to 
the OS’s work on campus. In earlier messages to the list, faculty members and OS 
partners had expressed their worry that IWU’s administrators were “pretending that 
everything is hunky-dory” and “probably soft-pedaling global warming.” This is part of 
Valmer’s response: 
I would like to echo [Robin Carson’s] concerns that whatever actions taken are 
carefully crafted in partnership with the IWU community. From my experience 
[… with the effort to create the OS], what catalyzed change was the building of 
bridges and collectively crafting a productive way to move forward. Although the 
barriers to institutional change are massive and at times seemingly unmovable, 
what it comes down to is taking creative approaches to reworking the way we live 
in the world. When we are trapped by the fear of our inability to create change, 
we spread panic rather than the hopeful message of change that we desperately 
need. Considering the current financial crisis, I urge you to be sensitive to the 
intense emotional state of things and find ways to work as partners in solving this 
climate change problem. We can find strength in unity within these uncertain 
times. Furthermore, I hope that we can move beyond crediting [the university’s 
president] with all responsibility for the climate change dilemma and recognize 
that this is a societal shift we are demanding and moves far beyond the borders of 
IWU. He can be a powerful partner and ally in advancing sustainability work if 
we continue to grant him opportunities to do so. I would say that it is not so much 
of “having the power to stop him,” but having the power to help him to do his job 
well and make the IWU a leader in best practices. (My emphasis) 
 
This passage is representative of patterns that would come to predominate 
metacommunication at the OS. The OS staff had begun to speak of “partnering” more 
than “conducting pan-campus advocacy.” They had started referring to their action in 
these partnerships as “facilitating change” more than “instigating new ideas” or 
“infecting” new recruits. One interviewee even likened his ideal form of sustainability 
advocacy to the process of consensus decision making employed by Quakers. In short, 
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sustainability became a term with which OS staff could express a (desire for a) sense of 
oneness across IWU.  
What to make of all this? Kenneth Burke (1969a) says of unification: “It is a type 
of thinking capable of organizing mighty powers, as [people] materially in different 
worlds can be spiritually one” (p. 176).6 The quasi-spiritual sense of unification in 
sustainability rhetoric can be seen in Valmer’s statement in the previous paragraph. She 
speaks of “massive and at times seemingly unmovable” barriers, “reworking the way we 
live,” and not spreading “panic” because “we are trapped by the fear of our inability to 
create change.” Along the same lines, an interviewee from the Steering Committee told 
me that he is “a big proponent of not publicly criticizing others for their choices” 
because “[…] with criticism comes greater polarity.” For him and many others, unity 
was a transcendent value and goal. 
 So, a language of unification became prominent in sustainability-related 
advocacy at IWU. Participants spoke of unification as both a technical objective of 
sustainability organizing and a deeply emotional or moral sense about communication’s 
place in creating a sustainable IWU. Alliance and wholeness were stressed while the 
Office’s role as an influencer and campaigner of sorts was not. Since participants tended 
to regard ethics as personal and divisive, communication of ethics was sometimes treated 
as a threat to unity. 
 
Being “Reasonable” 
  A second thematic element of metacommunication at the OS was being 
reasonable. Organization scholars have been “concerned […] with how organizational 
control is accomplished through the self-positioning of employees within managerially 
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inspired discourses about work and organization with which they may become more or 
less identified and committed” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 620). That concern is 
warranted in the case I have examined.  
 I recall a discussion I had with Russell Snyder after Earth Day 2008. The Office 
was concluding its pilot year, and we were discussing what he anticipated for its future. 
Snyder told me, “What we need are reasonable people” in the Office’s transition to 
formal designation as a office within of IWU. Many of those involved in the start-up 
phase of the OS had been rather “strident” and “intense,” he said. A very active member 
of the PSAB and early supporter of the OS made a similar statement during our 
interview in 2010: 
Interviewee: [Paul Abbey] always seems knowledgeable and he seems reasonable 
[…] Sometimes being passionate and being reasonable can seem in conflict when 
actually you’ve got to be sort of both. If you want to persuade somebody, they 
can’t think that you’re some kind of a loony. 
 
Interviewer: What’s a loony? I mean, have you encountered somebody saying, 
“Oh, this person’s [a loony].” 
 
Interviewee: I would say [being] dismissive of other points of view. So, you 
shouldn’t be dismissive of financial concerns, for example. That’s just crazy. 
That’s being loony. And there are some people in the environmental community 
who do that. 
 
Interviewer:  Oh, saying: “At any cost!” Right?  
 
Interviewee: Yeah, and that’s actually not true. That’s grossly irresponsible. I 
would say you shouldn’t go around dissing the legislature too much, and that’s a 
very common thing. One shouldn’t go around making [anti-religious] statements, 
for example. It’s wrong, for one thing, and it’s counterproductive. […] How many 
times have two armies gone to war praying to the same god? You know, everyone 
uses the same sort of language for their own ends: […] “I think I am being 
reasonable because…” I think that happens as a normal part of language on both 
sides, both sides use it. Being “reasonable,” I guess, is a way of saying that 
you’ve got to look at the big picture. You’ve got to look at other sides of things, 




The interviewee calls two symbolic actions “loony.” One is “dissing” and otherwise 
disparaging groups with which you disagree. Another is “dismissing” other points of 
view. The distinction between dissing and dismissing is subtle but important. While 
being disparaging involves hostility toward other advocates, being dismissive involves 
not “looking at the other sides of things.” Reasonable sustainability advocates are not 
disparaging or dismissive because they look at the “big picture.” 
 This is troublesome for sustainability advocates who encounter others who are 
resistant to change, apply metrics that do not value organizational sustainability, or are 
hostile toward most things labeled “environmental.” For instance, participants regularly 
complained that program and project administrators demand short-term “payback” on 
environmental initiatives. That is, administrators often ask how quickly a sustainability-
related technology will pay for itself without asking similar questions of artifacts not 
associated with improved environmental performance. Sustainability officers at IWU 
often say that such modes for pricing do not take into account the cost of decisions 
throughout the life of the thing purchased. For example, campus construction planning 
officials were concerned about the “green premium” (i.e., additional up-front cost of 
construction) of the resource efficient buildings promoted by the Office’s draft high 
performance building standard. OS employees pointed out to me that critics didn’t value 
the fact that so-called green buildings have been shown to be healthier places to work. 
As well, the critics failed to realize that very efficient buildings are cheaper because they 
cost less to heat, cool, maintain, and such over the life of the structure.  
But how are “reasonable” sustainability advocates to respond? On the one hand, 
the participants critiqued such fiscal thinking as being unsustainable. On the other hand, 
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they would regularly tell one another that decision making based upon short-term fiscal 
considerations “is the way things work around here.” Still, they would insist, “We need a 
culture change” on matters such as this. Being reasonable frequently played out like this. 
Groups or people in power would employ unsustainable decision making premises or 
ideologies, but reasonable advocates would have to work/start with them “where they 
are.” Such strategic accommodation, participants told me, was part of culture change. 
This interviewee also refers to “seeing the big picture,” but she stresses accommodation 
more heavily than the fellow who worried that environmentalists might be seen as 
loonies: 
I think that what can get dangerous is when […people’s] message is too extreme. 
You lose too many people, especially in a university setting like this. “If we 
don’t do something right now,” you know, “our children aren’t” [going to have a 
future]. It has to be a broader message. Again, it has to have, maybe, a touch of 
financial impact. It has to have a touch of the environmental impact, but it can’t 
be this negative, dire message. I find that things are lost on a lot of people and 
they stop listening. “Oh, these crazy, radical hippies”—especially when you’re 
dealing with the business side of things. You know what I mean? I think there’s 
groups that that message is appealing to but—and I don’t think the Office does 
that—but I think they’ve maybe had to reign themselves back in at times. 
Obviously, they see this bigger picture and they all come from a certain set of 
beliefs, and you’re dealing with people who can be climate change deniers. And, 
you know, [you have] to try and somehow voice this and get people to listen to 
the message. 
 
When this interviewee stresses that sustainability advocacy has to have “a touch of 
financial impact,” she means that persuasive appeals that challenge fundamental 
economic/fiscal premises—even those deemed unsustainable—must sometimes be 
accommodated, or at least that concessions should be made in order to facilitate short 
term successes. 
Paul Abbey and I discussed this sort dissonance and disappointment. Abbey 
pointed out that partners with the Office are not always reliable or deeply committed to 
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the cause of sustainability. He then cited the work of Peter Senge and colleagues (Senge, 
Smith, Kruschwitz, Laur, & Schley, 2008) and told me: 
[Senge] just talks about—um, we just talk about—doing it humbly in the sense 
that we don't know the answers and whether or not these things will work. So, I 
think being comfortable with ambiguity is a huge requirement for the work 
because we don't see end results and we don't know if we're doing the right thing. 
We're doing our best. […] It's kind of Zen-like in that sense of just letting go and 
letting people do their best in what they can do. 
 
This “Zen-like” letting go is one feature of being a supposedly reasonable sustainability 
advocate. While this attitude may help foster dialogue and broad participation in 
sustainability initiatives at IWU (a formal goal of the Office), I believe it also presents a 
risk. Citing Jackall’s (1988) discussion of the problematic character of “being a good 
team player,” Alvesson and Willmott (2002) explain that workers can be dominated by 
“a network of meanings and guidelines for ‘getting by’ in ambiguous and politically 
charged social settings. They offer guidance on what is natural or necessary for 
corporate work to function” (p. 631). The slogan “be reasonable” serves just such a 
function for sustainability advocates at IWU. It is important that, most often, 
sustainability officers and OS volunteers tell/remind one another (or themselves) to be 
reasonable. Reasonableness seems all the more compelling because it appears to be an 
organic value of our group, as opposed to being imposed by others—such as 
administrators, antagonists, or people not associated with the university. Moreover, I can 
personally attest to the feeling of relief coupled with deciding to be reasonable (in this 
sense), especially when having a beer with other OS supporters to relax after a long day 
in which one’s persuasion seemed to fail. 
 A picture of “the reasonable person” emerged in my field notes and interviews. 
The reasonable sustainability advocate is even-tempered and respectful of others, does 
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not press for immediate action or sweeping change when doing so seems rather difficult 
or controversial, and is strategic in the “foundations” she/he decides to challenge. Put in 
terms of colloquialisms, we might say she/he plays nice, knows where the line is, and 
picks her/his battles wisely. Considered alongside the three IRs described above, this 
sense of reasonableness seems to radically limit the likelihood that ethics will be part of 
the discussion in any context. 
 
Unobtrusive Control and/or Influence 
 Sustainability advocates at IWU also overwhelmingly favor unobtrusive means 
of influence. I use the term influence here because of the disapprobation of “control” so 
overwhelming in the directive repertoire. Nevertheless, participants in this study talk 
about “change making” and “facilitating change”—as opposed to persuasion, 
management, or control—in ways consistent with scholars’ description of unobtrusive 
control in organization studies. Indeed, participants’ implicit definition of control is 
largely associated with obtrusive control—persons in positions of bureaucratic authority 
exercising power directly, etc. Participants attempt to make influence palatable by 
stripping advocacy of its association with overt communication intended to persuade. 
 In particular, participants in this study favored concertive control: 
In the concertive organization, the explicit written rules and regulations are 
largely replaced by the common understanding of values, objectives, and means 
of achievement, along with a deep appreciation for the organization’s ‘mission. 
[…] Members can be depended upon to act within a range of alternatives tied to 
implicit but highly motivating core values. (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985, p. 184) 
 
In interviews and during fieldwork, I regularly heard claims like this: “I don’t think that 
telling someone to do something is necessarily going to, long-term, change their 
behavior or habits. I think you have to, like I’ve said, convince them that it was their 
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idea in the first place.” One way to do this, according to sustainability advocates, is to 
create culture change. Culture change is presumed to take place through “norming.”  
 Let me provide you an example of how sustainability advocates at IWU connect 
advocacy to norming and culture change—and, ultimately, concertive control. In 
Chapter 6, I quoted Lillian Valmer assertion that a “good form of persuasion” is 
“constructive, positive [… and] voluntary.” She responded this way when I asked her to 
elaborate: 
Well, that’s actually an interesting question, because when you look at changing 
behavior specifically, a lot of it has to do with creating social norms. People will 
voluntarily change their habits because everyone else is doing it. Sometimes. Like 
when you [walk into] and stand in an elevator and, sort of like the Candid Camera 
show, all the people in the elevator are facing the back wall. These people would 
walk into the elevator and realize that everyone is facing the wrong way. “Why 
are they doing that?” And some of them would be like, “All right, if this is the 
way we’re doing it, I’ll stand facing the wrong way.” They just sort of voluntarily 
change what they would understand as normal and regular because everyone else 
is doing that. As social marketers, in some sense, what we’re trying to do is get 
people to reframe what they view as normal. And to sort of take some steps in a 
different direction. So are we being manipulative? Maybe. Most likely, I guess. 
But, we are we also providing other healthy alternatives […] But it does need to 
be voluntary. Even though those guys are standing in that elevator, they’re not 
telling the person to stand in the same direction. They’re just modeling behavior. 
And there are certain prompts involved and it's sort of a behavioral deal. But you 
know, I think that that’s an important distinction to make. [You might …] see 
different people like some of the ones who stepped in the elevator and they’re 
like, “You people are crazy!” And they faced the other direction and they’re like, 
“I’m not doing it,” and that’s cool. People need to have that option of saying, “I’m 
sorry, but I disagree with that. I’m not going to do it.” 
 
Valmer’s statement is an excellent illustration of the way in which sustainability 
advocates at IWU value behavior change and norming more than ostensible, discursive 
persuasion. They talk as if this is an action upon the culture promotes voluntary change 
(which is presumably better than “telling people what to do”).  
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Of course, this engenders tension about how to talk about and theorize influence 
and persuasiveness. In the example above, Valmer acknowledges the fact that 
sustainability advocates influence people with her statement about “being manipulative,” 
and the term manipulation implies unethical influence. However, she contrasts discursive 
persuasion—“telling the person to stand in the same direction”—with “sort of a 
behavioral deal” where advocates are “just modeling behavior.” The ethical tension 
inherent in persuasion is resolved by the unobstrusiveness implied by the phrase 
“creating social norms.” 
 Participants’ preference for unobtrusive influence/control stems largely from 
their reliance on the language of community-based social marketing. Several OS 
employees had attended a workshop held by Doug McKenzie-Mohr, a social 
psychologist well known for his development of community-based social marketing 
approaches to environmental problems (see, e.g., McKenzie-Mohr & Smith, 1999). 
During the Office’s pilot year, McKenzie-Mohr was invited to hold a multiday 
workshop on community-based social marketing. The event was recalled as a success 
even 2 years after it had taken place, and many volunteers (and certainly OS staff 
members) refer to “social marketing,” “CBSM,” and “what McKenzie-Mohr taught us” 
when describing the approach to sustainability advocacy at IWU. The application of 
community-based social marketing principles and methods to sustainability advocacy at 
IWU is by no means universal, consistent, or precise. However, it is an important source 
of the language of modeling, norming, and behavioral or cultural change that I critiqued 
above. Instead, I argue, the language of community-based social marketing has allowed 
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participants in this study to (1) justify concertive and other forms of unobtrusive control, 
and (2) resolve tensions they feel about communicating ethics. 
 I have two concerns. First, this pattern in participants’ metacommunication does 
not appreciate the problem of power associated with unobtrusive control/influence. It is 
akin to the “noncommunication views of organizational power” critiqued by Mumby 
(2001). In fact, many scholars have commented upon the undemocratic, managerial, or 
unreflective character—of unobtrusive approaches to organizing (see, e.g., Deetz, 2005; 
Lukes, 1974; Mumby, 1997; Tompkins & Cheney, 1985). This study’s participants’ 
metacommunication fails to take seriously the fact that organizations are “political sites 
where various organizational actors and groups struggle to ‘fix’ meaning in ways that 
will serve their particular interests” (Mumby, 2004). Calling change motivated by 
unobtrusive control/influence “voluntary” is questionable and at times surely 
disingenuous. 
My second concern is more sympathetic to the perspective of the participants, if 
you will. Sustainability advocates’ denigrate verbal and ostensible persuasive 
communication but promote establishing new social norms. This arrangement hinders 
their ability to conceptualize how such change is communicated person-to-person. Most 
of the participants in this study would concede that IWU is a roundly unsustainable 
organization and, moreover, that many people’s behaviors in the service of that system 
are unsustainable. If this is generally true, sustainability—as a label for the system and 
individual actions within it—is anything but the norm. The language participants have 
developed to talk about advocacy does not explain how a small or marginalized group of 
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people modeling sustainable behavior end up convincing others to do the same, let alone 
how that might be achieved ethically. Take this interview statement, for example: 
One of the things that we said we needed to influence was the culture of the 
campus as it relates to sustainability. Culture is very tough to measure, so it’s 
almost just the way you feel about what things are going on. I believe that there 
has been significant shift in culture, and I think it will continue to shift. I think 
part of our mission is to educate the up-and-coming culture [i.e., students] to be 
more sustainable in their jobs and careers and lives after they leave the 
university. So, the fact that we have been able to get sustainable principles 
discussed in so many different genres [i.e., venues] around campus, to have 
projects like the self-funding energy projects and the recycling program taking 
hold as quickly as they have—I think that is a success of that shifting culture and 
endorsement that these things are important. The fact that we can make decisions 
and get support from campus administration to do things because, you know, it’s 
not just financial sense, but it’s good sustainable sense… 
 
This statement uses culture as a metonym to describe a feeling about the status quo, a 
collection of principles, and even a specific generation or educational cohort. Change in 
culture is facilitated by what Cherim (2002) calls confluence of continuity, which is 
“established through the use of past labels and values and reframing these to include 
new applications required by the change” (p. 1134). Hence the interviewee’s statement, 
“it’s not just financial sense, but it’s good sustainable sense.” Still, the interviewee 
explains the place of communication in that innovation with a platitude: “we have been 
able to get sustainable principles discussed in so many different genres around campus.” 
Get it discussed, throw it out there, find people who already want to work with you, and 
model behavior. The stylized phrases used by participants hint at how change occurs but 
obscure how communication is initiated and how it ought to be carried out.  
It remains the case that sustainability advocates at IWU employ lay theories that 
discourage communication patterns where the audiences to be persuaded are obviously 
aware that the communicative relationship is primarily about influence. This is because 
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participants’ lay theories disparage persuasive messages (i.e., discursive action) but not 




When participants discussed their own communication explicitly, they regularly 
supported unification as a transcendent goal, feared being seen as unreasonable, and 
promoted using unobtrusive means of control or influence. Since they promoted 
unification but theorized ethics as personal and likely to spark conflict, they routinely 
avoided or minimized the place of ethics in communication about sustainability. Though 
ethics was an important and thoroughgoing element of many participants’ definitions of 
sustainability, they tried to appear reasonable by discussing ethics in only the most 
limited range of situations. In some cases, they were willing to avoid references to ethics 
entirely. Moreover, participants used the rather neutral, aseptic language of community-
based social marketing to describe their influence and communication strategies—
employing terms such as behavior change, norming, and showing alternatives. 
Unfortunately and surprisingly, they often said that these approaches, which minimize 
explicit communication and obvious persuasion, made any change realized more 
“voluntary” and “constructive.” By contrast, and as demonstrated earlier in this chapter 
and in Chapter 6, explicit or direct communication dealing with influence was negatively 
characterized as divisive, manipulative, or unduly directive. 
The result is that ethics are rarely discussed at length or in depth with people 
outside of a small group of strident Office supporters. Ethical reasoning about 
sustainability is far less prominent in the OS’ communication with others than is 
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economic/fiscal, scientific, technical, or pedagogical reasoning (i.e., sustainability is 
about cost saving and avoidance over the long term; sustainability is about 
understanding and complying with the laws of nature; sustainability is a technological 
and operational problem of efficiency; sustainability is an emerging domain of 
knowledge, and students should learn the most relevant facts and theories). More and 
more, the Office’s staff members and partners wonder whether communication about 
ethics ought to be a significant part of their mission. With the communication of ethics 
largely absent from discussions of sustainability, they promote theories of sustainability 
advocacy that minimize conflict and diminish the value of forthright, open, and 
transparent persuasion. As such, study participants have, in many cases, made their 
influence less-than-obvious. Still, they claim that nonobvious influence and culture 
change provides more freedom and choice to the people they are influencing.  
 
Epilogue 
I am not convinced that this is a more constructive approach to influence and 
organizational change. In many cases, it misrepresents or obscures the Office’s strategic 
use of people’s most salient values and peer groups. Furthermore, it pushes from view 
potential conflicts and limitations of partnerships. Their focus is largely communicating 
in a way that effectively generates compliance or change, but their public accounts of 
this communication often lean on moral principles of communication transparency and 
equal standing. These incongruities persist, I argue, because of participants’ hesitancy to 
discuss ethics when communicating sustainability. 
 Ethics need not be treated as something inimitably and exclusively personal, 
something set outside of the daily routines of work, or something acceptable in a limited 
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number of times and places (Cheney, et al., 2010). Surely, conversations about ethics 
can be difficult. I believe, however, that such difficulty can spark new approaches to 
shared problems, such as the problems related to organizational change for 
sustainability. Working alongside participants in the study, I also conceived of 
sustainability in deeply ethical terms. I am troubled by the degree to which that 
commitment remained tacit and the ways in which our communication strategies were 
justified. These patterns were due in part to our emergent lay theories about the 
communication of ethics. I was able to assess these thanks to the analytical distance and 
time for reflection provided by scholarly research. Most organizations’ sustainability 
officers will not be afforded that luxury. In order to make “organizational sustainability” 
a robust concept and pursuit of organizational sustainability a defensible enterprise, I 
believe that sustainability officers must create opportunities to reflect openly and 





1 By problem, I mean that “intrinsic to every practice are certain problems or dilemmas 
that affect the use of specific techniques” (Craig & Tracy, 1995, p. 253). Participants’ 
concern or hesitancy with respect to ethics affected their communication strategies. 
 
2
 I am not saying that the definition of sustainability is settled or that the UN’s definition 
is universally praised. As I explored in greater detail elsewhere in this document, 
sustainability is a multifaceted environmentalist neologism. Clair (1993) points out, 
“When new terms are introduced into a language system (e.g., sexual harassment), their 
definitions must be contested before the language-users reach consensus about their 
denotative meaning” (p. 120). My arguments about the ethical content of definitions of 
sustainability and limitation of ethics in advocacy for sustainability were inspired by 
Clair’s exploration of denotative hesitancy in a study of sexual harassment discourse. 
Yes, various definitions of sustainability are still being developed, negotiated, and 
reconciled in society. However, participants in this study overwhelmingly defined 
sustainability (at least in part) in terms of ethical or ethics-related principles. We might 
say that most of the participants are not denotatively hesitant. Still, they tend to claim 




 My arguments in the first half of this chapter correlate with similar claims made by 
Cheney, et al. (2010, see pp. 42-47). They argued that three frames can limit ethics’ 
significance in our conversations and our lives: (1) essentialization, or reducing ethics to 
one thing; (2) abstraction, or putting ethics at arms length; and (3) compartmentalization, 
or putting ethics in a box. These three frames roughly correspond to the repertoires 
described below—that is, to the individual repertoire, conflict repertoire, and context 
repertoire, respectively. These comparisons are inexact, and I focus more on interpreting 
the data than making them fit the framework of Cheney, et al. Nevertheless, I want to 




 The word “siloing” is not a typo. It is the gerund form of the word silo (i.e., silo-ing). 
Participants routinely and frequently used this term to describe organizations with high 
degrees of work differentiation and specialization, which they treated as antithetical to 
the goal of sustainability. 
 
5
 Gladwell’s (2000) explanation of “the tipping point” and social epidemics is explicitly 
based upon a viral root metaphor (see p. 281). This metaphor, of course, is rather limited 
in its ability to account for communication as symbolic activity. Gladwell is effectively 
popularizing the literature on diffusion research, especially the work of Rogers (e.g., 
Rogers, 1962) on the diffusion of innovations and Granovetter (e.g., Granovetter & 
Soong, 1983) on diffusion thresholds. 
 
6
 This is the function of rhetoric with which Burke was principally concerned: its ability 
to create separation and congregation, to spark people’s spontaneous feeling of oneness 
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with or alienation from others. In a wry moment, Burke tells us that, “surely, the first 
prize for the vagaries and vagueness of identification must go to that tiny first-person 






Introduction and Overview 
 In this dissertation, I have investigated a specific case of sustainability 
organizing. I worked with, followed, and interviewed a wide range of people 
contributing to a university’s new office of sustainability. Over the course of my 
fieldwork, I refined the study and chose to focus on questions about communication, 
itself. How did participants in the study think about, talk about, and experience the 
communication processes and problems inherent in their sustainability-related efforts? 
 Such questions led me to scholarship on lay theory, a concept with roots in 
psychology, sociology, communication studies, and other disciplines. However, I found 
that previous scholarly treatments of lay theory entailed assumptions that were not in 
keeping with my interpretive approach to research and criticism. In response, I 
developed a communication-oriented theoretical perspective on lay theory in Chapter 4. 
In Chapters 6, 7, and 8, I incorporated that perspective when analyzing participants’ lay 
theorizing of advocacy, the cultivation of voice, and communication ethics. 
 This project uniquely contributes to communication scholarship and has 
shortcomings. In the remainder of this brief concluding chapter, I discuss the lessons and 







 This dissertation extends the discipline of communication studies’ engagement in 
academic discussions of lay theory. Although I have demonstrated the utility of an 
explicitly interpretivist approach to the conceptualization and analysis of lay theories, 
the connections between lay theorizing, identity, and practice deserve to be more fully 
explored in future work. 
 
Theoretical Lessons of This Study 
 I framed this study as an interpretive inquiry into organizing for sustainability 
(Putnam, 1983). In order to conceptualize lay theories and lay theorizing from an 
interpretive perspective, I drew upon a variety of sources to forge an approach suitable 
for my research questions and methods. Prior work in psychology and sociology treated 
lay theories as cognitive structures or properties of groups. Working from a 
communication-centered perspective, I treated lay theories as types of claims that 
involve definition and conception of systems. In particular, I used Thagard’s (1984) 
definition of theory: “A theory is a definition of a kind of system, claimed to apply to 
real systems” (p. 82).  
From this starting point, I differentiated lay theories from formal, scientific, or 
professional theories according to the means by which (groups of) people create, use, 
and assess knowledge claims. Where formal theories are drawn up and adjudicated by 
relatively defined groups in relatively established institutional structures, lay theories are 
generated ad hoc and in response to practical problems. Lay theorizing, I argued, is the 
structuration of interpretive repertoires, meaning that people develop flexible sets of 
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claims that they can draw upon as needed in order to invent explanations and predictions 
for the situations that they face. 
I believe that this approach nicely fits Weick’s (2004) call to think of organizing 
as people “acting thinkingly or acting discursively, [so that scholars’] claims will have 
more resonance with the human condition to the extent that they grasp more fully the 
dynamic, transient […] character of unfolding contextualized conversation (p. 411). I 
have demonstrated the way in which lay theory may be discussed vis-à-vis lay 
theorizing. This contribution shifts the discussion of lay theory from cognitive bases to 
communicative ones. Furthermore, while prior scholarship on lay theory sought to 
structure, model, and predict lay theory, the approach developed in this dissertation 
provides a means for the interpretation of lay theory, given that lay theorizing is a 
complex, situation-contingent, and symbolic activity. The analysis chapters demonstrate 
the utility of this approach to lay theorizing in a particular case. 
I also reviewed extant scholarship on lay theory, itself, from an interpretivist’s 
standpoint. I demonstrated that important work from three very different disciplines all 
drew upon three dialectics in their explanations of lay theory: the simplicity-complexity 
dialectic, the knowledge-knowing dialectic, and the implicitness-explicitness dialectic. 
This review and synthesis may provide the groundwork for multidisciplinary 
engagements with lay theory scholarship. 
This study also provides important lessons about the conjunction of 
sustainability, communication, and organizing. As I described in Chapter 3, high-profile 
sustainability rhetoric draws upon and reinforces three themes: ecological foundations, 
crisis, and revolution. Taken together, these themes depict an unfolding drama in which 
  
332
sustainability is a necessary response to the preeminent crisis of our times. As I noted in 
my discussion of the revolution trope, the change imagined in this rhetoric is sweeping 
but tempered, fundamental but not that disruptive. This is characteristic of popular 
arguments that apply sustainability rhetoric to organizations. As a very recent example, 
take Lazlo and Zhexembayeva’s (2011) description of their approach to “embedded 
sustainability” as “a theory of strategy that enables a company to pursue profit with 
sustainability embedded at its very core” (p. 2). “The story of embedded sustainability,” 
insist the authors,  “is largely a positive and inspiring one” (p. 3). It is common for 
sustainability promoters to suggest that this sort of change is fundamental to 
organizations or should strike at their very core. In light of the findings of this 
dissertation, casting such change as sweeping or elemental is problematic. If we treat 
sustainability-related organizational change as an essential response to crisis, what is the 
consequence for communication?  
Participants in this study shied from ostensible and forthright advocacy and they 
avoided invoking ethics in discussions of sustainability because they feared taking 
authority, initiating conflict, and undermining unity—not being “positive and inspiring,” 
in Lazlo and Zhexembayeva’s (2011) terms. On the whole, participants’ lay theorizing 
of communication exhibited a broad pattern denigrating argumentation (in its formal 
sense), obvious attempts at persuasion, and direct discussion of difficult issues in 
communication. Their lay theories of communication positioned ideal advocates as 
reasonable unity-seekers, leaders by example, and facilitators of others’ ingenuity.  
They spoke of this kind of communication and advocacy as voluntary, open, and 
dialogic—riffing, in many ways, on the principles laid out in Habermas’ (1984) 
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discussions of communicative action, meaning dialogic interaction aimed at mutual 
understanding. But Habermas casts communicative action as one of several types of 
social action. Communicative action may be compared against strategic action, which 
may involve either concealed or open strategy. I claim that, (1) as actors seeking 
organizational change, (2) the participants in this study are engaged in strategic action; 
(3) they account for their strategy in the language of communicative action although (4) 
the methods of influence they promote largely consist of indirect, nonobvious, or 
concealed strategic action. As I reflect on my experiences working with the Office, I 
recall struggling to put sustainability in terms compelling to target audiences and 
seeking to introduce the concept as “part of the dialogue” rather than as a rhetorical 
proposition. This disposition had a lot to do with our emergent preference that 
sustainability promotion on campus be diffuse and organic, rather than imposed by 
means of authoritative edict (even if we did commonly say that we wanted and needed 
“top-level” endorsement). I now believe that the patterns of lay theorization of 
communication in this case risk (but do not necessarily amount to) systematically 
distorted communication, according to Habermas’ model. By this, I mean that the 
knowledge claims about communication in this case promote concealed strategic action, 
though participants frequently refer to it in metacommunicative terms associated with 
communicative action. 
This is a serious concern if (1) organizations are called upon to take 
sustainability to the heart of their identity and strategy, and (2) sustainability advocates’ 
genuine goal is social change through communicative action. After my participant 
observation and analysis, I remain convinced that the sustainability advocates at IWU 
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are committed to promoting mutual understanding, shared concern for sustainability, and 
broad participation in the university’s change. Indeed, they invited a wide variety of 
participants into processes that lead to the production of strategic plans and official 
documents in many instances. What’s more, some plans and documents authored by 
participants from across campus went through several rounds of public display, 
discussion, and revision. Still, the most prominent lay theories (as opposed to specific 
practices) at play in this case work against thinking about the Office of Sustainability’s 
efforts in terms of the instrumentalism of openly strategic action. By design and 
necessity, the OS’s communication involves instrumental and goal-oriented thinking and 
behavior. I do not believe, however, that the appropriate response is to cast concealed 
strategic action as communicative action.  
Participants in this study desire productive and robust participation in debates 
and discussions of sustainability, and yet their lay theorization of communication 
elevates modes of interaction that work against that value. Theorists, business and civic 
leaders, and others who make claims about the necessary transformation of 
organizations through sustainability must also examine their assumptions about 
communication’s role in the manifestation of sustainability within and across 
organizations. Sustainability remains a contested and shifting ideal, and thus it deserves 
critical attention in each of its manifestations. How communication is treated in the 
course of advocacy for sustainability ought to be of paramount concern to 
environmentalists and other organizational change agents. Lay theories of 
communication might not only undermine sustainability advocates’ effectiveness, they 
may raise questions of communication ethics in the pursuit of an otherwise worthy goal, 
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as well. Our theories of organizational sustainability should be responsive to this 
concern. 
 
Theoretical Limitations of This Study 
 This study is not without its limitations. There are at least three theory-related 
areas in which others and I might extend or challenge the lessons of this study. 
 First, while I have shown how we might conceptualize lay theorizing as building 
up and drawing from repertoires of knowledge claims, I did not apply the second major 
element of my literature review to the later chapters of this dissertation. In Chapter 4, I 
provided an interpretive review of scholarly perspectives on lay theory from several 
different disciplines. I argued that those perspectives each ascribed three dialectics to lay 
theories and the process of lay theorizing—the simplicity-complexity, implicitness-
explicitness, and knowledge-knowing dialectics. I suggested that this knowledge might 
contribute to the growing body of work that discusses how people communicate in order 
to “accomplish knowledge” (see Kuhn & Jackson, 2008). This review is useful, I believe, 
but I have not fully applied it within this dissertation in order to maintain the cogency of 
the analysis chapters. It is my intention to explore practical applications of this review in 
future projects. 
 Second, this dissertation project has focused primarily on discourse and less on 
extra-discursive practices. Chapter 7, in which I discussed the cultivation of voice, 
addressed practices more than any other element of this dissertation. Nonetheless, I gave 
my attention more to participants’ language and knowledge claims than to their action 
routines, bodily performances, and the like. In Fairclough’s (1992) terms, I concentrated 
on the level of discursive practice more than social practice. In Chapter 4, I established 
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that this study would address lay theory in terms of discourse, rhetoric, and other forms 
of language in use. Of course, communication is a concept that extends beyond language; 
future research could continue the line of research established in this dissertation by 
considering the consequence of practice more thoroughly. Geiger (2009) has already 
outlined the potential of such an endeavor for organization studies scholars. In 
communication studies, the concept of communities of practice (Wenger, 1998; Wenger, 
McDermott, & Snyder, 2002) may have some traction and offer a way to extend the 
perspective on lay theorizing that I developed in this project (see, e.g., Iverson & 
McPhee, 2002). 
Third and finally, I have not discussed identity in great depth in this study. The 
issue of identity certainly was relevant to participants’ experience. Take, for example, 
this interviewee’s statement: 
I need to come up with the perfect word for environmentalist. Like: I’m just a 
caring person. When someone says, “Oh she’s an environmentalist. She 
composts,” [I want to respond] “Okay or [maybe] I’m just somebody who cares 
about how clean my environment is.” You know, environmentalist now has this 
negative connotation; it’s someone who’s kind of crazy and loves trees more than 
people. […] I wouldn’t want to be described as that. 
 
She and I talked a while about her ambivalence about “being an environmentalist,” which 
presented her with personal and rhetorical conundrums. In Chapters 3 and 6, I discussed 
participants’ uncertainty about activist identity, and elsewhere I mentioned that many 
participants were uncertain as to whether the Office of Sustainability was (or ought to be) 
part of larger environmental social movements—as opposed to simply being part of a 
change process currently “trendy” at universities. Despite that, I opted not to wade much 
into issues of identity in this study. I believe it may be fruitful for others to address 
matters of identity more fully in future studies of sustainability organizing. 
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 In this dissertation I have developed and applied an approach to lay theory and 
theorizing. I explored participants’ claims about and experiences of advocacy, voice 
organizing, and ethics. In the future, scholars may productively extend or challenge this 
study by employing the framework I developed to talk about extant lay theory 
scholarship, studying extra-discursive practice, and addressing issues of identity head-on. 
 
Method 
 This was an in-depth case study of the role of communication and 
metacommunication in the development of an office of sustainability at a large 
university. My methodological choices had advantages and limitations.   
 
Methodological Lessons of This Study 
 For this study, I engaged in long-term ethnographic participant observation, 
qualitative interviewing both in group and individual formats, and some textual analysis. 
Employing these various data gathering methods provided me with a rich and varied 
cache of material to interpret and critique. It allowed me to act as a “professional 
stranger” (Agar, 1996), simultaneously sympathetic to and analytically curious about the 
people who participated in the study. This unique position enabled me to think about lay 
theory as something more than the property of individual’s minds or a single group’s 
communication patterns. Instead, my long and complex research relationship with the 
Office of Sustainability (OS) allowed me to recognize the adaptable and sometimes 
inconsistent ways in which participants’ made knowledge claims. My time in the field 
attuned me to certain patterns, keywords, and the like. Later, reviewing interview data, I 
was able to reconstruct interpretive repertoires “available to” most any of the 
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participants. Earlier treatments of lay theory (and related concepts) had treated lay 
theories as relatively consistent features of individuals and groups. That is, that work 
implied that individuals have certain lay theories or groups are distinguished by the 
theories they use. In the analysis chapters, I’ve shown a number of examples where one 
interviewee fuses or switches between different repertoires. I do not believe that I would 
have been as likely to make this observation had I relied exclusively on interviews and 
had I not worked alongside Office staff members and volunteers, sharing in their 
struggle to make sense of the changing place of the OS within IWU. 
 
Methodological Limitations of This Study 
 At least two limitations are connected to this study’s methodology. First, there is 
the matter of what we might call critical distance. In Chapters 4 and 5, I mentioned that 
critique and critical theory took a less prominent role than interpretation and 
interpretivist epistemology in this study. As I discussed in Chapter 3, sustainability is an 
idea with historical, economic, and ideological implications. For that reason, it deserves 
serious critical attention, as do the practices of people who act as its advocates. I was in 
a unique position to study a group of people working with an emerging organization. 
Moreover, offices of sustainability are a new kind of organizational unit. I prioritized 
interpretation in order to make sense of study participants’ lay theories of 
communication and organizing, but it is just as important to critique the patterns that 
emerged. My partnership with and personal affection for many of the participants may 
have limited my willingness or ability to thoroughly critique their habits of speech and 
action. I have attempted to provide a modicum of critique, which is demonstrated best in 
Chapters 6 and 8. Still, future research might more fully illuminate the various 
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dimensions of sustainability organizing by employing a stronger orientation toward 
critical inquiry.   
Second, I cannot make any strong claims about lay theorizing and causation. 
Throughout this document, I’ve used terms such as flexible, adaptable, varying, and 
changing. This is in keeping with my interpretivist approach to research, but it limits my 
ability to talk about definitive or predictable relationships between lay theorizing and 
unique characteristics of the participants. I cannot say, for example, that people 
employing the directive repertoire for advocacy are more likely to “do X.” Scholars 
more adept at gathering and analyzing quantitative data from post-positivist points of 
view might be able to challenge and extend the approach to lay theory that I have 
established and applied in this study. 
 
Practice 
Finally, this study has implications for practitioners—that is, people who do 
sustainability advocacy and organizing each day. 
 
Practical Lessons of This Study 
I have endeavored to make this study practical both in specific and more general 
ways. The dialectics of voice organizing presented in Chapter 7 are an example of a 
specific contribution to practice. Senecah (2004) intended her theory of the trinity of 
voice to be relevant to the work of environmental communication professionals; I have 
endeavored to give her work a process dimension. I believe that the tensions accounted 
for in the model will be recognizable to many people tasked with “organizing for 
sustainability.” As a model, I hope that my work will clarify the challenges for 
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practitioners and professionals working in the area of organizational sustainability. I 
believe that having a tool of sorts for perceiving these challenges can stimulate creative 
and critical reflection, and ultimately improve communication’s functionality and 
ethicality. 
More broadly, I believe that this study outlines the significance of 
communication in processes of sustainability-related organizational change. 
Communication is not simply the means by which we transmit information about the 
“facts of the matter.” Instead, it is the very stuff from which we create and negotiate 
relationships and organizational arrangements. It is the means by which we forge sense 
out of very complex and difficult change processes. For example, I have shown that 
people do not simply advocate for sustainability. Instead, they also struggle with how to 
talk and think about advocacy, itself. 
In a very recent article, Lyon and Mirivel (2011) claim that, “In fact, 
communication researchers know little about the communication concepts laypersons 
and professionals draw on, the nature of communication training in organizations, or 
whether communication research is used ethically” (p. 54). In this study, I have 
attempted to create and apply a framework for investigating practitioners’ lay theories of 
communication. In Chapter 8, for example, I specifically addressed participants’ 
approach to the communication of ethics and commented upon the consequences of their 
appropriation of community-based social marketing theories. In these ways, I hope to 
advance the scholarly conversation about metacommunication in practice. Ultimately, 
this may be translated into materials for dialogue or training on how laypersons may 
engage communication about communication.  
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Consider, for instance, that there are a number of new frameworks and systems 
to track and account for sustainability in organizations. In the domain of higher 
education, the Association for the Advancement of Sustainability in Higher Education’s 
Sustainability Tracking, Assessment and Rating System (STARS) will likely become the 
standard. STARS documents and rates colleges’ and universities’ efforts in (1) education 
and research; (2) operations; (3) planning, administration, and engagement; (4) 
innovation. While the dimension of innovation covers “creative and innovative strategies 
implemented on campuses” (Association for the Advancement, n.d., p. 13), none of the 
basic dimensions assessed deals with communication directly, let alone communication 
as symbolic interaction. This is not surprising, since STARS is described principally as a 
measurement system that identifies and accounts for specific metrics. After all, there is 
still quite a lot of uncertainty and ambiguity about what sustainability is and should 
mean for organizations, so dealing with it in the language of accountancy and auditing 
affords STARS participants some sense of clarity, objectivity, and mastery.  
Nevertheless, the analysis I provided in this study showed the way in which 
sustainability advocates at one university struggled to understand and craft knowledge of 
their communication of, about, and for sustainability. The participants demonstrated 
broad distaste for up-front advocacy and ostensible persuasion, utilized an unwieldy 
constellation of terms to talk about the development of voice for environmental issues on 
campus, and marginalized the discussion of ethics in their talk about sustainability. I 
have provided an interpretation of the problematics of communication and lay 
theorizing about communication, if you will, for one group of sustainability advocates.  
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Given my interpretation, I believe that future applied scholarship should consider 
how to more thoroughly integrate discussions and assessments of communication into 
programs promoting organizational sustainability. I do not mean that certain theories or 
strategies of communication ought to be ranked and rated. Rather, my study suggests 
that it may be valuable to fold discussions and lessons about communication as symbolic 
interaction into more formal and institutionalized planning processes and action 
strategies associated with organizational sustainability. 
 
Practical Limitations of This Study 
 It should be obvious, I think, that the practical applicability of this study is 
limited by the fact that it deals with metacommunication. Communication, symbolic 
interaction, and such are things that laypersons regularly take for granted, so the same is 
likely true for communication about communication. The discussions in this study are at 
a second step removed from many people’s everyday experience of communication, if 
you will. Teachers of all kinds will have to be careful and creative when translating this 
work to students for practical purposes; it will likely be unusually difficult to teach about 
metacommunication in ways that do not rely upon common and unproductive 
assumptions about communication. 
 
Conclusion 
 This dissertation has employed and contributed to communication theory, 
methodology, and practice in various ways. While this study has limitations, I am 
optimistic that, in our future work, other communication scholars and I can address the 
questions I have not answered and explore the issues I have not addressed.  
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Lay theory and theorizing is an area of human experience that multiple 
disciplines can explain and enliven. As such, it presents an opportunity for 
communication scholars to engage researchers in other disciplines and for us all to 
develop scholarship on genuinely interdisciplinary interests. I hope that this study will 
promote conversation between communication-oriented researchers and others 
fascinated by lay theorizing. 
Sustainability is an important concept with an uncertain future. Is it merely a fad, 
a passing social obsession? Is it simply a form of retrenchment and reproduction of the 
dominant interests of our time? Might it be part of an emergent, different way of making 
sense of human beings’ relationships with one another and our collective relationship to 
the rest of the world? Surely, the answer involves some of each of those three 
possibilities. In any case, it is important for us to understand how people put 
sustainability into practice in various contexts. This study provided an in-depth look at 
communication and sustainability in one case. I look forward to publishing from this 
study in various formats, putting my arguments and observations into conversation with 
the work of other scholars interested in the problem of sustainability. 
In the end, I hope that this study speaks to people’s desire to better understand 
themselves, to work together productively and ethically, and to live in a responsible and 
uplifting manner. Perhaps, in a small way, reflection on the persistent problems of 





DOCUMENTATION OF INFORMED CONSENT 
Consent Document: Ethnographic Observation 
 
Background 
You are being asked to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not 
you want to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done 
and what it will involve. Please take some time to read the following information 
carefully. Ask me questions if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. 
 
The purpose of this research project is to study the concept of sustainability as it relates to 
organizations and communication about change. I am doing this study as a part of my 
doctoral program in the Department of Communication at [Intermountain West 
University]. Additionally, I am conducting this study to provide information to the Office 
of Sustainability (“the Office”) and to better understand how people change organizations 
and talk about environmental issues, specifically “sustainability.” [Russell Snyder], the 
Interim Director of the Office, is designated as Internal Co-Investigator for this study. 
While he will not document his observations, he and other Office staff will work with me 
to change office policy and activity based upon research findings, and they may co-author 
publications with me based upon research findings. 
 
This research project is intended to study both organizational and environmental 
communication.  By organizational communication, I refer to patterns of interaction 
between members of an organization and between the organization and its various 
constituencies. By environmental communication, I mean messages that deal directly 
with environmental concerns and issues. In this study, I am interested in how the 
University coordinates efforts toward environmental sustainability, and, specifically, the 
role of the Office of Sustainability in that process. With respect to environmental 
communication, I am interested in how people working collaboratively define 
sustainability and identify environmental/ecological problems or issues. I hope to 
understand how the Office can play a more effective role in promoting sustainability on 
campus. On a broader level, I hope to understand how complex organizations like the 








I am conducting observations of the [IWU] Office of Sustainability and its connections to 
the campus and community. These observations will involve the work of the Office and a 
range of people, including members of other organizations. As Principal Investigator, I 
will conduct and document my observations of messages, interactions, gatherings, and 
events. You are considered a potential participant because of your connection with the 
Office. 
 
My observations will most often be recorded as handwritten notes and turned into 
detailed descriptions later. I will use these notes and descriptions to find patterns in 
communication about things such as ecological sustainability, organizational change, and 
organizational structure. Office of Sustainability staff will periodically be involved in 
reviewing research data. Meetings between Office staff and me will involve reflection on 
research data, including descriptions of my observations. These descriptions will have 
specific identifying information removed (e.g., names), but you may still be identifiable 
to Office staff who review research summaries. Based upon our meetings, Office staff 
may make changes in the Office’s work and structure. This means that observations I 
record may be involved the decisions made and actions taken by the Office. Data may 
also be used in my dissertation, which I will author alone, and in other publications, 
which may be co-authored with Office staff. 
 
Risks 
There are minimal risks to you in this study. Despite the precautions to be taken, such as 
the removal of identifying information in publications, participants may lose 
confidentiality. People reading edited data or publications may still be able to identify 
you. 
 
Additionally, [Russell Snyder] is identified as the Co-Investigator on this study. [Snyder] 
is also the Interim Director of the Office of Sustainability. He has been given the title of 
Co-Investigator because he and other Office staff will be actively involved in reviewing 
observations and other data collected for this study. Because he and other Office staff 
will be involved in the research study more than most observed participants, you may feel 
discomfort. You may also feel discomfort being observed at all. Participation in this 
study is your decision. You may contact the Principal Investigator, Co-Investigator, or 




There are no direct benefits to you for taking part in this study. However, we hope the 
information we get from this study may help develop a greater understanding of 
environmental issues and organizational change in the future. Research data will be 





In reports based upon observations and other data, steps will be taken to maintain your 
confidentiality. Handwritten notes will be stored in a locked cabinet in my workspace, 
and digital notes will be kept on a password protected computer in digital form. Your 
name will be omitted or a code name will be used in detailed notes not taken at the time 
of observation. Information that might identify you will be removed from publications 
produced using data from this study. 
 
Office staff will discuss research data with me, the Principal Investigator, on a regular 
basis. We will shape the study process together. Office staff will also often be present 
while I make observations or participate in activities. Given that, Office staff may be able 
to identify you in research data in which your name or other identifying information has 
been removed. 
 
You may choose to not participate in this study. Not completing this form signals your 
choice to not participate. You may also file a formal notice of refusal with the Principal 
Investigator, for him to keep with other study records. If you choose to not participate, I 
will not document observations of your interactions with the office. If you consent to 
participate in this study by signing this form, you may withdraw your consent at a later 
date. Please notify the Principal Investigator in person or in writing if you wish to 
withdraw consent at a later date. I will stop collecting research observations of your 
interaction with the Office of Sustainability at the time you withdraw consent, should you 
choose to do so. 
 
Person to Contact 
If you have questions, complaints, or concerns about this study, you can contact Brenden 
Kendall, Principal Investigator and a doctoral student with the University of Utah 
Department of Communication, [contact information removed]. You may contact the Co-
Investigator and Interim Director of the [IWU] Office of Sustainability, [Russell Snyder, 
contact information removed]. 
 
Institutional Review Board 
Contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) if you have questions regarding your rights 
as a research participant. Also, contact the IRB if you have questions, complaints, or 
concerns which you do not feel you can discuss with the Investigators. [Contact 
information removed.]   
 
Voluntary Participation 
Participation is voluntary. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of 
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may discontinue participation at any 
time without any penalty or loss to benefits. This will not affect your relationship with the 
Investigators. 
 
Costs and Compensation to Participants 






By signing this consent form, I confirm I have read the information in this consent form 
and have had the opportunity to ask questions. I will be given a signed copy of this 
consent form, if requested. I voluntarily agree to take part in this study. 
 
_______________________________ 
Printed Name of Participant 
 
___________________________________   ______________________ 
Signature of Participant     Date 
 
___________________________________ 
Printed Name of Researcher  
 
___________________________________   ______________________ 
Signature of Researcher     Date 
 
Consent Document: Interviews 
 
Background 
You are being asked to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether to 
participate, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
it will involve. Please take the time you need to read the following information carefully. 
If there is anything that is unclear or incomplete, please speak with the researcher, 
Brenden Kendall, in person or via email [contact information removed].  
 
The purpose of this study is to understand how people involved in environmental 
organizing think about and engage in communication. In particular, this study 
investigates how people link (or don’t) particular kinds of communication and 
organizational change. 
 
The interview data from this study complements Brenden Kendall’s past observational 
research on the Office of Sustainability at [Intermountain West University] (“the Office” 
and “the University”). This study is part of his doctoral dissertation for the University of 
Utah Department of Communication. Whether or not you were part of those recent 
observations, the study covered by this consent form is designed to ask you and others 
questions about sustainability, communication, and your experience with/in the Office. 
 
Study Procedure 
You are being asked to participate in one or both of two types of interviews: an individual 
interview and/or a group interview. Individual interviews will involve you and Brenden 
Kendall. These interviews will be conducted in a private place suggested by Kendall or a 
location you select. Group interviews, also commonly called focus groups, will involve 
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you, several other people, and the researcher. Group interviews will be conducted in 
private meeting spaces. 
 
Individual interviews are anticipated to last between 30 minutes and two hours. Focus 
groups will be scheduled for 2.5 hours, with approximately 2 hours planned for 
interaction and the remaining time devoted to preparation, breaks, and such. 
 
Questions will address several topics, including: (1) your work, student, or volunteer 
roles at [IWU]; (2) the concept of sustainability; (3) change in organizations and society; 
and (4) communication—all with reference to the [IWU’s] Office of Sustainability. In 
focus group sessions, you will be asked to interact with others based upon prompts 
related to these topics. These interviews will be “moderately structured,” meaning that 
there will be questions that are common to all of the interviews, though the actual content 
of discussion can be guided in real time by you, other participants (in the case of group 
interviews), and the researcher. With your approval, the individual interviews will be 
audio recorded; group sessions will be audio recorded with the consent of all participants. 
 
Risks 
The risks of this study are minimal. There are, however, a few you should be aware of.  
 
First, […] it is possible that others will be able to identify you or your responses, despite 
the measures taken to keep your responses confidential. You will likely know some of the 
other participants in the group sessions, and may (eventually) work with them on projects 
that are related to the Office of Sustainability’s mission but not to this study.  
 
Your name and the names of people you discuss will be in interview transcripts. 
However, only the researcher, his research advisors, and a transcriptionist will have 
access to recordings and unaltered transcripts. “Raw” interview data (e.g., recordings, 
transcripts, notes) will not be shared with Office staff/volunteers/partners and other 
[IWU] stakeholders. Also, your name will be changed in presentations and publications 
based upon the research. Still, contextual information you provide during the interview 
may be identifiable to others if that information is used in publications. Following the 
completion of the study, the researcher plans to provide presentations to Office 
stakeholders; those sessions may also be open to the public. Measures taken to accord 
you confidentiality are described in greater detail later in this document.  
 
Second, you may feel upset thinking or talking about personal experiences related to 
sustainability communication at [IWU]. This minimal risk is similar to the experience of 
discussing personal information with others. The researcher will ask you probing 
questions and will challenge assertions. As well, the researcher will ask you about 
emotions you have experienced in your work related to environmental issues. If you feel 
upset from this experience, you can tell the researcher. Contact information for the office 





We cannot promise you any direct benefit for taking part in this study. You will not be 
compensated for participation. However, the researcher hopes that the information 
gathered for this study will help develop greater understanding of sustainability advocacy 
and organizing. Lessons from this study may inform others’ work for organizational 
change. Additionally, the researcher will discuss the implications of this study with the 
employees and partners of the [IWU] Office of Sustainability in the future. Despite this, it 
is not certain that your participation in this study will benefit to you, the Office, or others. 
 
Alternative Procedures 
If you are unable or unwilling to participate in a face-to-face interview, a phone or 
computer-mediated interview can be arranged.  
  
Confidentiality 
Your data will be kept confidential. As described above, it may still be possible for others 
to identify you or your answers from individual interviews. This section describes the 
measures taken to protect your confidentiality. 
 
Your name and personal/identifying information, as well as that of other persons 
mentioned during interviews will be preserved in recordings and transcriptions (i.e., your 
data). “Raw” data will not be shared with Office staff members or affiliates. No other 
University stakeholder will be provided full or unaltered data files, except members of 
the researcher’s doctoral committee or research team. 
 
Paper copies of data and records will be stored in a secure filing cabinet in the 
researcher’s workspace. Digital copies of data will be stored on the researcher’s 
password-protected computer or in protected folders on data storage devices. The 
researcher will keep the audio recordings of all interviews for one year after the 
completion of his dissertation. At that time, he will erase/delete every audio file from all 
storage devices and services. 
 
We will do everything possible to keep information you share while participating in a 
focus group from those not associated with this project. Thus, we ask you and the other 
participants to keep the focus group discussion confidential. Still, there is a chance that a 
group member might mention your comments or name in a later conversation. 
Consequently, we cannot guarantee that no one will share what you have said after they 
leave. 
 
The transcriptionist will not be located in [this region] and will not have any direct stake 
in the work of the Office of Sustainability. The transcriptionist will sign an agreement to 
protect your privacy and keep data confidential; that form can be provided to you upon 
request. Recordings and transcripts of interviews will be transmitted via password-
protected file sharing programs on the Internet. The means of transmission will not be 
controlled or hosted by the [IWU]. Data available to the researcher and transcriptionist 




In publications based on this study, your name will be removed or changed. Contextual 
and personal information may also be altered or omitted to prevent identification. In 
publications, the researcher will provide as little personal or potentially identifying 
information as is reasonable to provide an accurate, rich account of the topics being 
studied. 
 
Person to Contact 
If you have questions, complaints, or concerns about this study, or if you think you may 
have been harmed from being in the study, you can contact Brenden Kendall at [contact 
information removed]. Kendall can be reached at this number 24 hours a day. 
 
Institutional Review Board: Contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) if you have 
questions regarding your rights as a research participant. Also, contact the IRB if you 
have questions, complaints or concerns that you do not feel you can discuss with the 
investigator. The University of Utah IRB may be reached by phone at (801) 581-3655 or 
by e-mail at irb@hsc.utah.edu.   
 
Research Participant Advocate:  You may also contact the Research Participant Advocate 
(RPA) by phone at (801) 581-3803 or by email at participant.advocate@hsc.utah.edu.  
 
Voluntary Participation 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. Refusal to participate or withdrawal 
from this research will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise 
entitled. Additionally, you may refuse to answer any question during the interview or 
terminate the interview at any time. Your decision to participate, not participate, or 
withdraw from participation will not affect your relationship with the researcher. 
 
Costs and Compensation to Participants 
Participation in this study will not cost you anything. During group interview sessions, 
light refreshments may be made available by the researcher. Beyond that, you will not be 
compensated in any way for your participation in this study. 
 
Statement of Consent 
By signing this consent form, I confirm I have read the information in this consent form 
and have had the opportunity to ask questions. I will be given a signed copy of this 
consent form, if requested. I voluntarily agree to take part in this study. 
 
___________________________________ 
Printed Name of Participant 
 
___________________________________   ______________________ 





Printed Name of Researcher 
 
___________________________________   ______________________ 




TEMPLATE RECRUITMENT STATEMENT 
I am Brenden Kendall, a doctoral candidate in the University of Utah Department of 
Communication, and I’m conducting a study of the [IWU] Office of Sustainability. To 
supplement my observational research, I am now conducting interviews with people who 
have worked/volunteered/partnered with the Office of Sustainability. I am talking with 
people in both one-on-one and group interview sessions. You are invited to participate in 
either type or both types of interviews. 
 
Whether you’ve been involved from the beginning or have been involved only recently, 
I’m interested in talking to you! Whether you think of yourself as an expert or not, I’m 
interested in talking to you! Regardless of your campus roles—student, staff, faculty, 
administrator, etc.—I’m interested in talking with you! I plan to conduct these interviews 
as soon as possible, beginning in February and continuing through April 2010. Individual 
interviews will last between 30 minutes and two hours, depending upon our conversation 
and your schedule. Group interview sessions will be scheduled soon and will last two 
hours. Interviews will be held in a private meeting space on [IWU’s] campus or at a 
location that you choose. 
 
These interviews are not hosted or sponsored by the [IWU] Office of Sustainability. I will 
not share “raw” interview data with Office staff or associates. However, I will present 
summaries of my research with Office stakeholders at the conclusion of the study. If 
desired, you will be given a written summary or be welcome at presentations at the end of 
the study. 
 
You can review the document that explains in greater detail what your participation 
would involve. I hope that you are interested in participating in this study. If so, please 
reach me at any time by email or phone. I can be reached at any time, and am able to 
schedule interviews whenever is best for you. 
 
[Contact information removed.] 
 
Thank you very much for considering participating in this important study of 
sustainability, organizing, and communication. 
 
Brenden Kendall 
Doctoral Candidate and Steffensen Cannon Research Fellow 







I’d like to begin by briefly discussing your work at the University. 
• What position or positions do you hold within the University? 
• Please describe your primary duties for me. 
• How did you get involved with the Office of Sustainability? 
• Please describe more specifically your role in or your relationship to the OS. 
 
Let’s focus on the goal of sustainability for a moment. 
• The term “sustainability” means different things to different people.  What does 
sustainability mean to you? 
• What do you see as the most promising avenues to sustainability in our 
community? 
• How does this vision of sustainability apply to your work at the University? Can 
you give me a specific example or illustration? 
 
I’d like to talk to you about change, within society but also inside organizations. 
• From your standpoint, what kinds of societal change does the pursuit of 
sustainability involve, if any?   
• What in your view are the first steps necessary for such changes to occur?  
• What obstacles do you see to such changes? 
• What does that kind of change have to do with the University as an organization? 
• What part can the OS have in bringing about these changes at the University and 
beyond? 
 
Now I’d like to talk to you specifically about communication types and patterns. 
• What types of communication are needed to facilitate change and bring about a 
greater commitment to sustainability? 
• What are the best ways in which the OS can network or create relationships 
within and beyond the University? 
• Are there specific types of messages or communication patterns that can make the 
greatest difference in this effort? Please be specific.  
• Are there specific types of messages or communication patterns that have failed 
or won’t work in this effort? 
• Are there types of communication that are special to your idea of “the sustainable 




I’d like to focus in on a particular kind of communication. 
• I’m going to give you a short list of communication-related words that I’ve heard 
people use when talking about the Office. Please, take a moment to look at the 
list. [Pause.] Now, tell me, which of these terms best describe what the Office of 
Sustainability does? You can pick up to three terms that you think most 
appropriate. Can you tell me why you think each of your choices applies? 
• How do you see the balance between offering or presenting information and 
engaging in persuasion or advocacy with respect to sustainability? 
• To what extent should the OS be engaged in persuasion or advocacy, in your 
view? Please explain. 
• Imagine that you’re giving advice to the Director of the OS. What advice would 
you give him in terms the best kinds of communication to encourage people to 
work for sustainability? 
 
As we conclude the interview, I’d like to ask you about a specific dimension of 
communication: ethics. 
• Like sustainability, ethics can mean different things to different people. How do 
you define ethics? 
• How does a commitment to sustainability relate to ethics, in your view? What 
about at the individual level? What about at the organizational level? 
• To what extent should ethics be featured in messages about sustainability, if at 
all? 
• What kinds of explicit appeals to ethics in messages do you think have the 
greatest promise for bringing about changes in attitudes and practices? 
• Are there types of communication that you believe would be unethical or ethically 
questionable if used by the OS or somebody else in pursuit of sustainability? 







Thank you for participating today. I am recording this session. If at any time you would 
like me to stop recording, please let me know. I may occasionally take notes, too. 
 
My goal today is to get you, the members of the group, to discuss several matters 
amongst yourselves. While I may jump in to ask questions or move the conversation 
along, I’d like for you to talk and respond to one another. Please talk to me or ask me 
something if you need, though. I’d like you to share your own and respond to others’ 
thoughts, stories, and suggestions. 
 
There aren’t “right” or “wrong” things to say here, and we can disagree with one another, 
though I would like to make sure that everyone is able to participate actively. I will try to 
focus the conversation. I’m going to structure the conversation around several prompts. 
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The first prompt is designed to open the conversation on the broad subject we’re here to 
talk about: communication and persuasion related to sustainability at the [IWU] Office of 
Sustainability. The middle three prompts are based on statements that I’ve found 
interesting when observing the Office. The last prompt wraps up the session, which 
should be about [___time___]. If needed, we’ll take a break half way through. 
 
Before we begin, do you have any questions? 
 
Introductions 
First, I’d like us all to introduce ourselves. Please tell us your name, your primary roles at 
the University, and how your work is related to the Office of Sustainability. I’ll begin. 
I’m Brenden Kendall, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Communication. This 
group is part of my dissertation research, which has focused on the Office of 
Sustainability for the last few years. 
 
[Others introduce themselves.] 
 
First Prompt 
I want to get us started by talking about voice. I’m handing out papers with four major 
terms on it: Voice, and then access, standing, and influence. Each term is defined. Take a 
moment to read through these. 
 
“The general trinity of voice theory holds that the key to effective process is an ongoing 
relationship of trust building to enhance community cohesiveness and capacity, and 
results in good environmental decisions.” 
 
Access refers to opportunity, potential, and safety. In its simplest form, it means that 
stakeholders have access to sufficient and appropriate opportunities to express my 
choices and opinions, as well as access to information and support. 
 
Standing refers to the legitimacy, the respect, the esteem, and the consideration that all 
stakeholders’ perspectives should be given. 
 
Influence refers to stakeholders’ ideas being respectfully considered along with those of 
other stakeholders, where representatives are part of the process that, for example, 
determines decision criteria and measures alternatives.  
 
I would like to discuss how this approach to voice, in your experience, might be related 
(or unrelated) to the work that the Office of Sustainability does on campus. 
 
Second Prompt 
I’d now like to turn to the topic of advocacy. In my field research, I’ve heard advocacy 
talked about in a variety of ways. I’m passing out papers with three statements about 
sustainability advocacy on them. I would like to hear your reflections on or responses to 
these statements, as well as your thoughts about your experiences with advocacy at the 




1. Sustainability advocacy should be an expression of our thoughts and feelings about 
sustainability-related matters, and our behavior should represent our individual 
principles. 
 
2. Sustainability advocacy should be designed to be as effective as possible, given the 
conventional rules and procedures at the University. 
 
3. Sustainability advocacy should be used to create and negotiate new ways for people 




Based specifically on our discussion today, what advice would you give to the Office of 
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